

INAUGURAL ADDRESS BY PROFESSOR HUMPHREY ASSISI ASOBIE

**THEME: RE-INVENTING THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
FROM STATE AND STATE POWER TO MAN AND SOCIAL FORCES**

INTRODUCTION

Among academic disciplines, **Political Science** is one of the most misunderstood. Yet, it is one of the oldest disciplines, and certainly, the most important. It is the ‘**architectonic**’ science: that which shapes the environment within which the other sciences are pursued. It is the systematized body of knowledge concerning how society is organized, how values are created, distributed and sustained, and, **above all, how human welfare may be enhanced and guaranteed**. Politics is primarily and ultimately about human welfare. It is about the improvement of the material conditions of life; it is also about the maintenance of the psychological and emotional stability of man; and about his spiritual growth as well. Without democracy, there can be no political stability, no national security, no religious freedom, and, often, no social and economic development; and democracy is *essentially*, though *not exclusively*, a dynamic **political process**. So politics shapes all, structures all, develops and under-develops all other aspects of national life. It even contours the basic framework for the realization of human destiny.

One reason for the misunderstanding of what the discipline is all about is the tendency to confuse politics with what ignorant politicians do. Politics is practiced mostly by those who are not exposed to, or who have no knowledge of, the science of politics. Not being trained in either the academic discipline or the practical profession, politicians do what intuitively comes to them as the practice of politics. Before serious-minded people engage in the practice of any profession, in any discipline, or field of endeavour, they usually undergo thorough training; this applies even to the playing of the game of soccer as a profession. Governance shapes the destiny of a nation; but our governors, legislators and presidents embark on governance without any training whatsoever. Yet, whatever they do, we erroneously take to be politics. From observing the fooling around of untrained and un-apprenticed politicians, some even come to the conclusion that “politics is a dirty game”. For some people who govern us, at the university, local council, state, or national level, perhaps, the only book about the science of politics that they have ever read is Niccolo Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, or its more recent parody, *The 48 Laws of Power* by Robert Greene. And the only political training they ever undergo is listening to the inanities of self-seeking sycophants and morbid psychopaths. Some of the most incomprehensible and reprehensible things those in authority do are taken either directly from the putrid pages of such misleading, misread or grossly misunderstood books, or indirectly from the misinterpretation of such books by ever rotating and revolving time servers.

One common view about Political Science is that it is, simply and starkly, the science of power. Let us illustrate the point about how misleading this can be by citing four of the “48 laws of power” enunciated by Robert Greene. *Second Law of Power*: “If you have no enemies, find a way to make them”. A person in power or position of authority is advised to hire a former enemy

and work with him for he will be “more loyal than a friend, because [the enemy] has more to prove”. *Twelfth law of power*: Do not make honesty a principle of governance; rather “use selective honesty and generosity to disarm your victim”. The ruler is advised here to use “one sincere and honest move [to] cover dozens of dishonest ones”. The logic is that once the ruler’s “selective honesty” or “timely gift” makes a dent on the armour of those he governs; he can “deceive and manipulate them at will”. *Law number fifteen*: “Crush your enemy totally”. The ruler is told that history teaches that “a feared enemy must be crushed completely” because if one enemy is left standing, he will eventually re-group, re-equip and strike back; the “enemy will recover and will seek revenge”. Therefore, in dealing with the enemy, more “is lost through stopping half way than through total annihilation”. This is reinforced by *law number forty-two*; “Strike the shepherd and the sheep will scatter”. Those in authority are told that trouble in the society “can often be traced to a single individual – the stirrer, the arrogant underling, the prisoner of goodwill”. If, therefore, “they allow such people room to operate, others will succumb to their influence”. Rulers are, consequently, strongly advised never to wait for the “troubles which [such stirrers] cause to multiply”, and not to try “to negotiate with them”, for “they are irredeemable”. In dealing with such trouble-makers, the only option open to wise rulers, it is claimed, is to “neutralize their influence by isolating or banishing them”. When the ruler strikes at the source of the trouble, “the sheep will scatter”.

We should note that the governed is seen, in the book under reference, as a “victim” or an oppressor, an enemy or a friend. There is no middle ground. A citizen is either one or the other. Note also the language of force which pervades the entire discussion about obtaining, retaining and using state power. In this line of thought, power is “seized”, not won. And power (read force or violence) is needed and used primarily for consolidating and expanding power; the end of power is power; and the means to power is also power itself. Every other thing or purpose is secondary. State power is thus all about acquiring the monopoly of the use of instruments of violence within a particular community.

After reading such a misleading book, the person in authority, who has never had the benefit of being trained in Political Science, sees his community or people as being divided sharply into friends and foes. He sets out in search of enemies; he imprisons his erstwhile friends, isolates them or sends them into political exile; he detests opposition, and regards those who criticize his policies as his sworn enemies. He makes new friends, but, with time, he also becomes suspicious of his new found friends; then begins to rely on his erstwhile enemies who now move in to confuse him the more. Before long, the academic or rural community, local government council, state or nation is engulfed in crisis. An avoidable crisis, attributable to inexperience and lack of training in the governing of men, occurs and ruins everything: the economy, social cohesion and political stability. Then people begin to wonder, what ever happened to the “good man”.

Similar, though not identical, tutorship is contained in the pages of *The Prince*. The central teaching of Machiavelli, in that book, was about how to maintain political stability in a polity. For him *stability*, not *human welfare*, is the supreme value of the state. In order to bring maximum happiness to the people, he reasoned, the ruler must use whatever means that are necessary to build or re-build a state which is orderly, unified, balanced, strong and secure. The ruler should **not** be troubled by moral scruples; to do so would be to confuse political policy with

ethics. His advice to the ruler, on the methods of winning and retaining state power, followed from this valorization of political stability, and the separation of ethics from politics. The ruler was advised to use cunning, cruelty, deception or force, **if nothing moral worked** [Paul Hartman, "*Niccolo Machiavelli: The Father of Modern Political Science*"].

Machiavelli's central point, in *The Prince*, is that all means may be resorted to in order to establish and preserve authority; in pursuit of that objective, the worst and most cruel acts of the ruler are justified or justifiable. Their justification, according to Machiavelli, stems from the wickedness and treachery of rivals or even the entire citizenry. A typical advice, by Machiavelli in *The Prince*, is embodied in the following words:

It is good to be true to your word, but you should lie

Whenever it advances your power or security;

Not only that, it is necessary.

Thus, for Machiavelli, in *The Prince*, mendacity is a legitimate instrument of power; for his faithful followers in Nigerian universities, local government councils, in the corridors of power in state and federal governments, sycophantic tell-bearing to those in authority is a legitimate means of acquiring influence and retaining the fruits of stealing, fraud and heinous crimes.

For, let us face it, it is a verifiable hypothesis that high concern for greed and gain for self tends to motivate those in authority to shun due process and resort to the crude language of force. Once those in authority begin to steal public funds, they start to feel insecure, and then develop a preference for the application of the tactics of intimidation to silence potential critics. Those who see and use sycophancy as means of gaining access to the corridors of power, do so primarily to cover up their criminal practices. As long as those in authority become psychologically dependent on their praise-singing and misleading advice, they are free from the prying eyes of those whose task it is to enforce the law against criminals. Criminals are some of the best sycophants. The tactic of fulsome adulation of authority is often so effective that before long, the immoral sycophants are able to compromise those in authority, and convert them, as well, into criminals. Once that is achieved, those in authority lose the moral force either to enforce the law on transparency and accountability or to follow due process in appointments, recruitment, admission, and procurement. What has been said in this paragraph applies to all organizations, at all levels, including universities, local government councils, the constituent states of a country, and the nation-state at large. The formula is simple: Once the chief executive who started well turns dictatorial, oppressive and vindictive, the chances are he or she has begun to dip his fingers illegally into public funds.

In *The Prince*, Machiavelli places a lot of emphasis on retaining power and on the necessity for the leader to be strong, to be seen to be strong, and to have a strong will. And he freely canvasses the utility of the use of force in governance. He likens power to a lady that has become the object of men's desire, and insists that the aspirant suitor should not flatter, beg, implore, solicit, cajole or petition her; but rather, he should physically seize her and have his way with her. That is how to succeed in winning her. By the same token, a man of unusual strong will can succeed in using force to bring order to the chaos of the university, the local community, the State or even the international system and, so, determine the flow of events. According to Niccolo, Fortune, or Success, in the admiration of such acts of boldness, easily becomes compliant and succumbs to

the strong and the bold.

These thoughts of Machiavelli have, over the years, been taken out of context, and applied to the wrong circumstances. Over the centuries, leaders have been preoccupied with the secret thoughts of not appearing weak; in periods of crisis, their major concern is to demonstrate that they are strong, bold and courageous. Most are less concerned with doing what is right in the circumstances. Fewer are bothered about following the rule of law. Many studiously avoid following due process in the management or governance of men. Also, historically, majority of leaders have been concerned more with retaining power, continuing in office, by fair or foul means, and achieving security for the regime in power, a goal which they often conflate and confuse with the stability of the state.

Many people who cite Machiavelli glibly, in support of that kind of behaviour, fail to recognize that he made a clear distinction between two types of States: a *Principality* (i. e. a failed, totalitarian State), and a *Republic* (a peaceful, stable Democratic State). He also distinguished between two types of international systems: one characterized by the prevalence of warring states and therefore burdened by pervasive international political instability; and another featuring peaceful, friendly and harmonious relations among states. *The Prince* was written for the former type of State and international system, and *The Discourses* for the latter.

In *The Discourses*, Machiavelli canvasses the virtues of liberty and the superiority of a democratic republic over a totalitarian state or a tyranny. He presents Athens, in Greece and Rome, in Italy as ideal states, because of their love of liberty, and the manner in which democratic governance furthered the cause of development. In the words of Machiavelli,

it is wonderful to think of the greatness which Athens attained within the space of a hundred years after having freed herself from the tyranny of Pisistratus, and still more wonderful is it to reflect upon the greatness which Rome achieved after she was rid of her kings. The cause of this is manifest, for it is not individual prosperity, but the general good that makes cities great; and certainly the general good is regarded no where but in republics, because whatever they do is for the common benefit, and should it happen to prove an injury to one or more individuals, those for whose benefit the thing is done are so numerous that they can always carry the measures against the few that are injured by it

By contrast, in a principality, the private interest of the Prince, which is in diametrical opposition to the interests of the generality of the people of the state, prevails. The conflict between the narrow and parochial interest of the ruler and the broad and general interest of the masses soon “leads to tyranny, the least evil of which is to check the advance of the [State] in its career of prosperity, so that it grows neither in power nor in wealth, but on the contrary rather retrogrades”. In such a state, also, there can be neither unity, nor stability, nor peace. For it will always be in the interest of the tyrant to “keep the state disunited so that each place and country shall recognize him only as master; thus he alone, and not his country, profits by his conquests”.

The point which Machiavelli is making in *The Discourses* is that there is a positive correlation between democracy and development, between political freedom/liberty and domestic, as well as international peace and stability. This is an old law of politics that has now gained wide currency, but mostly at the level of rhetoric. At the operational level, it is observed mainly in the breach.

Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* for a State that is torn by civil strife, and is surrounded by hostile, powerful neighbours, ready to invade it and subject it to imperialist control. *The Prince* was written for the ruler that is burdened with the responsibility of bringing order to a chaotic political situation, where fractious warlords have taken control of different parts of the state and in a society where the majority of the people have succumbed to debauchery and profligacy, and in which the level of morality has fallen to its lowest possible point. Besides, the treatise contained in *The Prince* is an exercise in sycophancy. It was deliberately crafted by the unemployed and banished Niccolo to curry favour from the Medici family. It was written by Machiavelli in political exile, with the partial purpose of putting the King of Florence in such a frame of mind that he would recall him from banishment, and possibly offer him a good political appointment. *The Prince* was written basically as an advice to the Medici family of the city state of Florence, in Italy, on how to rule effectively, in periods of political decay and survive in power. It was not meant to be a general treatise on good governance, but simply a set of suggestions on how a particular ruler, in a specific city, under certain peculiar circumstances, can effectively outmaneuver all hostile forces within and outside the state and remain in power.

In a sense, it is hardly surprising that *The Prince*, and not *The Discourses*, is the book that is very popular with tyrants and sycophants, especially in Nigeria. To illustrate the danger, in Nigeria of a classical distortion of Machiavelli's political thought, let us listen to Prince Tony Momoh, a product of our University, and a former Minister of Information. In a recent interview granted to *Sunday Sun*, Momoh adumbrated

You see, Obasanjo is a good student of Niccolo Machiavelli's The Prince which says the first thing you should do when someone puts you in power is to destroy the person who put you there. Not destroy him physically, but politically. Obasanjo incapacitated all the people who put him in power and even took over the party. He destroyed the PDM (People's Democratic Movement) of former Vice President Atiku Abubakar founded by late (Shehu) Musa Yar'Adua, elder brother of Umar. That was the political ladder [by which] he climbed to power. He destroyed it. He threw members of PDM out of PDP to get control of the party] Sunday Sun, July 1, 2007:10]

If the above passage reflects, indeed, Obasanjo's understanding of the political thought of Niccolo Machiavelli, in *The Prince*, he should be pitied and forgiven. After all, Obasanjo may be an experienced, practical, politician, but in the area of the science of politics, he is a stark illiterate. He actually needs to go and enroll in a good department of Political Science in a good university, to study Political Science. That was precisely what a former Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, did in 1975, after ruling Nigeria for nine years, and discovering that he knew very little about the subject matter which he had ostensibly practiced for so long. By the way, Gowon's wise act provides an eloquent anti-thesis to Julius Ihonvbere's claim that it is the professor of political science that needs to sit at the feet of the practicing politician, to be re-educated, as he ostensibly did under Obasanjo. While we understand the reason for the alleged misapplication of the thoughts of Machiavelli by Obasnajo, we can not, so readily, forgive our own alumnus, Prince Tony Momoh, for that **implied** distortion of the science of politics. We expect his appreciation of Machiavelli's thoughts in *The Prince* to be much deeper, and for the sake of less politically educated Nigerians, he should have provided that more profound understanding of Machiavelli's thoughts. For Momoh actually graduated from our Department of Mass Communication, and must have taken courses in the Department of Political Science and

the School of General Studies.

Unfortunately, even some political scientists have allowed themselves to be influenced so much by a distorted version of Machiavelli's thoughts in *The Prince*, that their own definition or conception of politics and political science does not deviate very much from the extremely partial picture presented by Niccolo in that work. It bothers me, for instance, when Political Scientists today define politics as "all that has to do with the struggle for state power, the *seizure* of state power, the use of state power and the consolidation of state power". Other popular definitions of the subject matter that interest political scientists do not deviate much from this distorted version of the Machiavellian paradigm. There is for instance, David Easton's definition that politics is about "authoritative allocation of values." A very simple interpretation of this is that politics involves the use of state power to determine who gets what, when and how in society. It is not therefore much different, too, from the definition of politics by Harold Lasswell. Lasswell defines politics as concerned essentially with "who gets what, when and how".

All of that is grossly misleading. Politics is not just about sharing or allocation; it is, in fact, much more importantly about creating a general environment that is conducive for organizing production, increasing productivity, thereby maximizing human or social welfare through an enhancement of the quantum of the social product. Politics is, fundamentally, about material and human development; and development begins with production, and not with distribution or sharing. The supreme task of the political authority is to create and sustain a legal environment characterized by liberty, tolerance, mutual respect by citizens or groups of citizens for one another, and general acceptance of the 'binding-ness' of contractual obligations. The notion of politics as dealing with how to share what Nigerians call "the national cake", through the use or abuse of state power, obviously derives partly from the misleading definition of the subject matter of my discipline, referred to above.

The preoccupation with state monopoly of the use of force, with power as the means and end of politics, and the conceptualization of politics as essentially struggle for power, are also reflected in the definition of international relations. A brief comment on the orthodox conception of international relations will make this clear.

In the conventional literature, the prevailing orthodoxy is that the field of international relations has to do with transactions and interactions among states. The sovereign entities, known as nation states, are seen as the principal actors in the international system. The field of international relations is, in fact, discussed, as basically, "**politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace**".[Morgenthau, 1978] What motivates states in their interaction with one another is said to be *raison d'etat*, that is reason of state-the survival and preservation of the territorial entity and the institutions therein.

I find the orthodox conception of international relations defective in many respects. First, this state-centric notion of international relations causes the analyst and policy maker alike to lose sight of human beings, for whom and by whom, the game of international relations is, in reality, played. State apparatuses and agencies are important instruments for the attainment of objectives in the international system. But states, as such, are not the real actors in the international system.

Second, the traditional approach to the study of international relations tends to reify the state. It attributes to states the characteristics and qualities of human beings. It endows them with the power to think, to analyze, to decide and to act. In actuality, the abstract entities known as states have no such capacity. It is men that think, analyze, decide and act on behalf of states. Yet, for centuries, the myth has been maintained that states are the real and key actors in the international system.

Third, the orthodox conception of international relations perpetuates the myth that the international system is, at bottom, a multi-state system. That it is a system that has, as its basic, irreducible units, territorial entities of striking similarity of character and behaviour; that all of them are motivated primarily by the rational pursuit of national interest. That is only an interpretation of the social reality. There is another interpretation of the same reality. I can argue, and I do contend that, in reality, the international system is much more complex than that.

Fourth, the orthodox perspective encourages the presentation of a superficial picture of the nature of the international society. It causes the analyst to focus on what meets the ordinary, casual observer's eye. It does not stimulate the exploration and exposition of the hidden forces underlying and under-girding the superficial structure and dynamics of the international society. It places much premium on inter-governmental relations, whereas international relations encompass far much more than relations among governments. Relations and interactions among multinational corporations, civil society or non-governmental organizations, and other non-official social groups are part and parcel of international relations. Indeed, relations among private businesses or owners of private enterprises, non-governmental organizations, and other non-state entities, groups and associations form the bulk of international relations. In contemporary times, transnational corporations and representatives of civil society organizations have gained preeminence in international relations.

Fifth, the orthodox or so-called realist conception of international relations, which dominated our discipline for ages, is partly responsible for the incessant conflicts that characterize the international system today. Perhaps, the most distinguishing feature of the realist paradigm is its assumption of homogeneity and rationality on the part of states. The state, or rather the government of the state, is seen as a unitary homogenous actor which behaves rationally most of the time. And to behave rationally is, above all, to have a **'preoccupying concern for power'**[Morgenthau, 1978:5-15]. According to the realist perspective, the concern for power is, for the rational statesman, the primary consideration which conditions everything else. And the main reason why the rational statesman is preoccupied with the goal of increasing state power, preserving or consolidating state power, demonstrating and using state power, is that it is the only guarantee for ensuring national security and maintaining peace and order in the international society.

Conceiving international relations in this manner implies the valorization of power, an acceptance of the view that might is right. It provides justification for the priority which statesmen place on the acquisition of arms and ammunition, on defence expenditure over spending on social services. It causes states to focus on preparing for war, instead of building the

ramparts of peace. It leads statesmen astray, making them to conceive security in terms of acquisition of more territories, if necessary, by conquest and appropriation of territories belonging to other nations. The realist perspective is a war-prone conception of international relations.

In my own view, the *raison d'être* of international relations is, and has, in fact, always been the un-ending search for higher standards of living by people inhabiting different parts of the world. Its ultimate goal is neither state **power** nor *raison d'état*: *it is not reason of state or state survival; it is human welfare*. In international relations, human beings are fundamental and elemental. Stripped to the irreducible minimum, the key actors in the international system are human beings operating as social groups. The satisfaction of basic human needs is the chief motivator of actors in international transactions. The patterns which humans form in that process constitute the structure of the international system. The laws of motion of the international system are grounded in the basic contradiction between the uneven occurrence of immobile, scarce materials of social existence, and the mobility of humanity confronting the fixity of the frontiers of the political organizations into which the world is artificially divided. The challenges that are posed by this paradox constitute the crux of the international relations *problematique*.

What I have briefly postulated in the above paragraph is another way of looking at international relations which has far-reaching implications for international development and world peace. It is a novel but controversial perspective. It is **the dynamic approach**. It is a radical departure from the prevailing orthodoxy. It is, therefore, bound to provoke scathing criticisms. I however stand by it, because it is the product of thirty-five years of research and reflection on the subject matter. A brief reflection on my researches will throw some light on the basis of the new thinking about international relations.

The basis of this new thinking may be seen from a review of some of the studies I undertook in the field of international relations over the years. The first of those studies was, of course, my doctoral dissertation which was presented to, and accepted by the University of London in August, 1977. The thesis was concerned with the constant interpenetration of domestic politics and foreign policy. Entitled “**Domestic Political Structure and Foreign Policy: the Nigerian Experience**”, it covered a period of fifteen years [1960-1975] of Nigeria’s diplomatic history. The major finding was that, throughout the period under review, Nigeria’s foreign policy was rooted in domestic concerns and pressures. It was shaped by what the political system could bear and the economy tolerate. The over-riding consideration, especially in the first ten years of independence, was the security and stability of the state and government; always coming a close second was the desire for economic development. Indeed, from 1970 onwards, it was the economy which was given pride of place in the conduct of external relations.

I found, too, that the federal cabinet, or council of ministers, played a minimal role in foreign policy formulation, often being informed rather than consulted. Policies evolved within several individual Ministries, and not just the Federal Ministry of External Affairs; they subsequently became the federal government policies once they received the approval of the relevant Minister and the Head of Government. The lack of adequate coordination between and among the different Ministries ensured that, in Nigeria, government’s programme was merely a patchwork

of the policies of different departments.

The empirical work which formed the basis of my thesis also threw up the fact that domestic politics impacted strongly on Nigeria's foreign policy. At periods of election, the various contenders to political office tried to manipulate foreign policy issues, as instruments of mass mobilization, to win popular support. After the election, the winners adopted what they perceived as the consensus of the views of the major political parties, and treated this as an approximation of the "national interest". The domestic political structure also impacted significantly on Nigeria's foreign policy. The need to balance the interests of the various parts and components of Nigeria's unstable federal structure discouraged quick and decisive reactions to external events and developments. There was always a multitude of domestic 'selfs' that needed to be satisfied; the federal government tried to meet the demands of the various interest and pressure groups.

I was groomed in a tradition of empirical research, informed by theory. I continued with this tradition after obtaining the Ph.D. degree, even when I found that in my immediate academic environment, the general preference was for extended literature review. I also resisted going with the crowd when I realized that the '*establishment*' of Nigeria's scholarship in the field of International Relations was predominantly and vehemently anti-theory. It is largely the product of that resistance that I present in this lecture.

I. STUDIES IN DECISION MAKING PROCESSES

How decisions are made by governments is central to the problem of national development. **Responsive** and **responsible** governments perceive themselves as the voice of the people, especially the voice of the voiceless majority. Therefore, they make decisions that reflect the interest of the vast majority of the people. When there is conflict between the interest of the masses/common people and the interests of the wealthy and influential few, domestic and foreign, they decide in the interest of the common people. Studies in decision making, therefore, constitute part of the exploration of why some nations develop while others remain underdeveloped. The following constitute my contribution to this branch of Social Science.

1980 (a): Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Experience.

The theme of my second major research was the constant interpenetration of bureaucratic politics and foreign policy. I had observed that the proposition was often advanced that only in the foreign policies of 'developed' (ie advanced industrialized countries) was this link important; consequently, in the analysis of the foreign policies of 'developing' countries, an entirely different emphasis was required. I further noted that, indeed, ever too often, analysts of Nigeria's foreign policy had either completely ignored or dismissed the role of the bureaucracy in policy formulation or implementation or dismissed it in a few paragraphs. No doubt, Nigeria is unique, I stated, but I argued that this point must logically be made of all states or of none. Nigeria's foreign policy, like the foreign policies of the developed countries, was shaped partly by bureaucratic politics. The nature of distribution of power and functions among those federal ministries concerned with the management of external relations, coupled with the lack of a regular coordinating policy making machinery, laid the foundation for jurisdictional disputes and rivalry among different bureaucratic units which had serious consequences for the nature of the

foreign policy output. The central point of the paper was that the government of a new or underdeveloped state was not a single- purpose organization acting with one will. Rather, it was a complex bureaucratic organization with many interests which often distorted both the policy process and the policy output. In Nigeria, between 1960 and 1975, the wide dispersion of powers for the conduct of external relations and the resultant jurisdictional disputes had serious implications for Nigeria's foreign policy. First, it led to a distortion of Nigeria's foreign policy goals, placing undue emphasis on economic growth, through the perpetuation of external orientation, coupled with the capitalist structure of the Nigerian economy. Secondly, it led to a negation of certain policy strategies which were chosen to further important foreign policy objectives. Thirdly, it resulted in incoherence of policy output. Fourthly, it constituted a hindrance to policy changes. By far, the most serious consequence of the decentralization of the power of the management of external relations was that jurisdictional disputes and divergent views were reflected in the conduct of foreign relations, thus giving the operational level of the foreign policy of the state an appearance of incoherence and confusion. [*Civilisations*, Vol.XXX-1980-No.3/4,253-273].

I identified the common motives underlying the different positions that public officials adopt in the process of foreign policy decision making in general and the struggle for funds, influence and policy functions, in particular. As I put it then, way back in 1980:

“The flame of such jurisdictional disputes was fanned by the expectation of financial and other benefits attached to having to go abroad as a government representative-especially the prospect of traveling outside Africa for bilateral negotiations or for conferences, or in the case of the FMT and FMI, the attraction of actually being posted abroad. What made this a particularly inviting prospect was the possibility of enjoying “estacode”. Sometimes, the out-of-state advances and allowances claimed and paid far exceeded the expenses actually incurred; and at times they were in excess of the estacode rates. Related to this was the consideration that control of functions entailed control over funds which, in turn conferred the power to approve requests for official services from the business community with the possibility of extra-official kick-backs”[*Civilisations* 1980' Vol.XXX, No3/3:266].

The explicit theoretical framework applied in this analysis was the bureaucratic politics model developed by Morton Halperin. Its attraction for me was the emphasis on human motives, and emotions in determining policy output. The theoretical framework underplays the notion of national interest as the determinant of international behaviour, and replaces the abstract concept of the state with that of policy or decision-makers that are positioned hierarchically within the bureaucracy. Policy is seen not as the purposive act of rational statesmen in single-minded pursuit of the national interest, but a game that bureaucrats play, for personal, professional or organizational benefits.

1980 (b) The Foreign Policy of a Developing Nation: An Analysis

In my second output, the theme was, once again, the uniqueness (or similarity) of the foreign policy of a developing nation, with a focus on Nigeria's foreign policy, vis a vis the foreign policies of highly industrialized capitalist states. I started with an acknowledgement of the prevailing orthodoxy which held that the way in which decision makers in the advanced capitalist states conceived of foreign policy contrasted with the notion of foreign policy held by decision-makers of the developing countries. For the advanced capitalist countries, foreign policy, it was claimed, is a deliberate and carefully planned event or rather, process, while for the developing countries, it is a set of *ad hoc*, uncoordinated responses to external stimuli; But, I

observed that there is no dichotomy between the two sets of countries on the conception of foreign policy; they are on the same continuum of conceptualization, with most of the developing countries at the ad hoc, rather than the planned, end of the continuum. I also interrogated certain assumptions made by analysts of the foreign policies of developing countries concerning the nature of foreign policy. I pointed out that empirical evidence does not support the following assumptions: that foreign policy is what the foreign ministry does, therefore the roles of other ministries fall outside the scope of enquiry; that the foreign policy system of a developing country is highly centralized, with the chief executive playing the role of the chief, if not the only, decision-maker; that a clear line of distinction could be drawn between domestic issues and policies and external conditions; that the stimuli from the domestic environment are generally more important than external stimuli in determining the foreign policy of an underdeveloped state. I then proceeded to identify and analyze the distinguishing characteristics of the foreign policy system of a developing nation. They are, I argued: highly decentralized foreign policy-making and implementation machinery; weakness of structural variables and the prominence of attitudinal variables; openness of the policy system, in the sense of being highly vulnerable to external influence, to the point of sometimes, falling completely under the control of external actors. I concluded that, in analyzing the foreign policy of a developing nation, the critical question to pose is not whether it is pro-East or pro-West, aligned or non-aligned. It is much more useful to investigate and discover whether policies are made to satisfy external interests or whether they are responsive to internal needs and demands of the people of a state; whether policy is coherent and consistent and yet flexible enough to respond to changing internal and external circumstances, or whether it merely consists of ad hoc, uncoordinated responses to external stimuli and the demands of powerful pressure groups. I concluded that one way of obtaining reliable answers to these questions is by a systematic and detailed analysis of the entire foreign policy system of a nation, with a view to identifying the most important variables which shape the policy process and policy outcome. It is analytically unhelpful to assume, *a priori*, I argued, that the foreign policy of a developing nation is merely the product of either a state's domestic structure or the personality characteristics of its chief executive. [Asobie, in Amucheazi, 1980:59-79]

1983, Nigeria and the European Economic Community.

Three years later, I became more empirical in my research. I examined the actual foreign policy-making process, using a specific case, Nigeria's decision, first not to accept the offer of associate membership of the European Economic Community, and then a reversal of that decision. An analysis of those two contrasting positions adopted by Nigeria within a short space of time afforded me an opportunity to identify the material factors that shape Nigeria's foreign policy. I began with the observation that, since the 1960's, attitude towards the European Economic Community had been ambivalent. Every Federal Government, civilian or military, had first opposed formal association, and then eventually concluded an association agreement, of one kind or the other with the EEC. The central argument which I developed in the paper was that while the initial rejection of formal association with the EEC was based on a careful consideration and calculation of Nigeria's national interest, the subsequent reversal of the earlier decision represented a gradual surrender to external pressure as well as the logical working out of the dynamics of Nigeria's political economy. For instance, Nigeria associated with the EEC under the first Lome Convention for political rather than economic reasons. Indeed, economically

association with the EEC was of little benefit to Nigeria. Also, from the political and diplomatic perspectives, Nigeria's association with the EEC was of doubtful value to her; it did not enhance her leadership position in Africa. Nigeria's leadership of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, was harmful to her vanguard role in creating solidarity among all Third World countries; it was also, in the long run, unhelpful in advancing the interests of West African integration.[*Africa Development/Afrique et Developpement*]

1990. Decision-making Models Re-visited.

In 1990, I rounded up my exploration of the theme of decision-making process, with theoretical modeling and taxonomy that provided the methodological foregrounding for a large and popular volume on the structure and processes of foreign policy-making and implementation in Nigeria. It was my attempt to forge a unity between crude empiricism and theoretical or methodological rigor. As the first chapter of a book edited by Olusanya, the Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, and Akindele, the Director of Research and Studies, on the *Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Implementation in Nigeria*, my contribution was meant to provide the theoretical setting for the rest of the twenty-nine chapters. I, therefore, appropriately began with an overview of the literature on Nigeria's foreign policy. I lamented that, in *qualitative* terms, the study of Nigeria's foreign policy was grossly underdeveloped, even though, in *quantitative* terms, writing on Nigeria's foreign policy had become a veritable productive industry. The study of Nigeria's foreign policy was underdeveloped in several senses. First, the 'industry' lacked forward and backward linkages: the writings were hardly based on empirical research, and the few efforts at research were not guided by conscious and explicit use of foreign policy or international relations theories, models, or paradigms. Second, I observed that the prolific factories on Nigeria's foreign policy had, by and large, failed so far to create an impetus for the advancement of propositions of sufficiently high level of generalization, internal consistency and logical rigour, to form the basis for either testing existing theories or fresh theorizing on foreign policy. Rather, the studies on Nigeria's foreign policy had been idiosyncratic in nature; each writer or researcher on foreign policy had pursued his/her own theme and gone on as if no previous work had been done on the theme. Consequently, the studies on Nigeria's foreign policy were not cumulative, with one writer or researcher building on the works of his colleagues, each drawing from and advancing existing knowledge on a given subject of inquiry. Third, as a deliberate and conscious form of activity, data-making was hardly part of the result of research efforts on Nigeria's foreign policy. The gathering of evidence was done in a half-hazard, unmethodical manner; it was not directed towards validating some testable hypothesis or even the solving of clearly posed practical and theoretical problems.

The book to which my contribution was an introduction was meant to fill the gap in the literature on the subject. To support these observations, I presented a critical summary of samples of writings on Nigeria's foreign policy, identifying their strengths and major weaknesses. I then proceeded to summarize the principal foreign policy decision-making models, classifying them according to paradigmatic taxonomies. In doing so, I postulated three sets of arguments. First, I noted that, as an explicit theoretical or methodological enterprise, the development of foreign policy decision-making models was part of the behaviouralist revolution, and that it made significant contributions to the scientific study of foreign policy. Second, I contended that, as a general approach to the study of foreign policy, however, decision-making analysis spanned

several paradigms, of which behaviouralism was only one. Indeed, within each international relations paradigm, some decision-making models might be identified, I argued. Third, I posited that, given the wide variety of types of foreign policy decision-making models, scattered around each of the three principal paradigms, the full range of the contributions of decision-making models to theorizing in international relations could only be appreciated and their full benefits tapped if certain conditions were fulfilled. The conditions were: explicit specification of the paradigmatic framework within which each decision-making model fell; applying each model to the issue area appropriate for it; highlighting both the strengths and the limitations of each model. The six decision-making theoretical models which I summarized and explained in my contribution were:

(i) Decision-Making Models of the Realist Paradigm

Type 1: The Classical or Rational Actor Model (a.k.a. Billiard Ball Model)

(ii) Decision-Making Models of the Behavioural Paradigm

Type 2: The Comprehensive-Internal/External Setting-Model (Snyder's model)

Type 3: The Bureaucratic Politics (Organizational Process) Model

Type 4: The Two-part Mediated Stimulus-Response Model

(iii) Decision-Making Models of the Marxist Political Economy Approach.

Type 5: The Instrumentalist Model

Type 6: The Structuralist Model

Having critically examined these various decision-making theoretical models, I concluded that several of them reflect images of decision-making structures and processes in the advanced industrialized economies, or developed countries, especially the advanced capitalist states. Also, most of the models could only account for superficial, short term, shifts in policy positions; they were incapable of assisting the analyst or policy maker to explain and predict radical structural changes in the condition or direction of the external behaviour of states. Incidentally, of the twenty-eight other chapters in the book, only two made any reference to decision-making theoretical models, as the basis for the empirical study of the structure and processes of Nigeria's foreign policy, which they undertook.

These empirical studies contained in the book, to which I supplied the introductory chapter, embody very useful and interesting insights into the mechanism for, and the processes by which, foreign policy decisions were made in Nigeria between 1960 and 1990; but none of the authors essayed to build a model of the policy structure and process in Nigeria and place that model in a global or comparative perspective to aid mutual learning and transfer of knowledge and experience.[Olusanya and Akindede, 1990: 562 pages, *passim*]. The question is: after analyzing those studies, does any pattern actually emerge; can a model be built out of Nigeria's thirty years experience in foreign policy decision-making?

A reading of the empirical studies shows that the variables that assume prominence or great relief as determinants of foreign policy decisions in Nigeria are disparate: the personality, perception, wishes and influence of the Prime Minister or the President of the country; the structure and orientation of the Ministry of Foreign/External Affairs; the structure and degree of professionalism of the Foreign Service, and the competence of Foreign Service personnel; the quality of expertise in the broad field of international relations commanded by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs; the nature of the relationship between the Foreign Ministry and the Diplomatic Missions abroad; the composition and orientation of the legislature; the collective influence of the foreign policy elite; the weakness of public opinion as an influence on policy; the little significance accorded to the recommendations of periodic, ad hoc people's conferences on foreign policy; the marginal impact of the findings of foreign policy research institutes; the coincidence, overlap or commonality of the economic interests of public officials and private entrepreneurs; religion and ethnicity; decentralization of the responsibility for foreign policy decision-making and implementation among several Ministries, and the consequent bureaucratic/organizational politics; the nature of the political party system and the pattern of control of the legislature by the political parties; the nature of inter-agency relationships and contacts among all the bureaucratic units involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation; the quantum, quality and variety of information, about the domestic and external environment, available to decision-makers; external influence. In stead of a theoretical model or conceptual framework, what we have is an incoherent list of factors. Significantly, however, they are all internal factors. The implication is that Nigeria's foreign policy is, after all, shaped largely by domestic variables.

In general the contributors of the empirical case studies in the volume, came to the following conclusions.(a) The values and political style of the Head of Government operating within the context of political elite interaction are the most potent variables in decision-making in the post-colonial state.(b) The Head of Government (Prime Minister) played a dominant role in foreign policy decision making because of the limitation of the power of constraint of other factors; also institutional involvement in decision making was limited.(c) Historically, the Federal Government has, sometimes, assayed to take public opinion into consideration in foreign policy decision making, and in some respects to identify itself with public demands In general, however, public opinion plays little role in shaping Nigeria's foreign policy.(d)Similarly, the views of enlightened foreign policy elite in Nigeria have not counted for much in the foreign policy making process.

2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND AND OIL: CONFLICT BETWEEN NIGERIA AND CAMEROON OVER THE BAKASI PENINSULA [2002, 2005]

The issue in Nigeria's diplomatic history that lent itself to a most poignant demonstration of what international relations is all about, and how its misunderstanding as crude contest for power can be, not only misleading, but also very costly to a nation was the conflict over the Bakasi peninsula. Following the judgment by the International Court of Justice, at The Hague, in October, 2002, concerning the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, there were calls on the Nigerian government, by some Nigerians, to go to war over the matter. I observed that the responses and reactions of many people, including those who represented Nigeria on the case, at The Hague, did not reflect a thorough understanding of the issues involved in the case. In particular, the political context of the dispute was not fully appreciated by many Nigerians. I therefore presented for publication a study made earlier and first presented in a seminar in 1998, which placed, in proper context, the boundary and territorial disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon, including the conflict over Bakasi.

I began with a dialectical analysis of the nature of the conflict. I posited that the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon was the product of a number of contradictions. First, it was the product of a clash between tradition and modernity. The ghost of the pre-colonial history of the ancient kingdom of Calabar had risen to haunt the post-colonial reality of contemporary Nigeria and Cameroon. Second, the dispute could be attributed to the tension between cartographic fact and cultural reality: the map was in conflict with the people. Third, the dispute could also be interpreted as a conflict between abstruse international law and the existential imperatives of struggling humanity. Fourth, the dispute exposed the gap between the demands of *raison d'état* and the human needs of right-bearing citizens.

I then proceeded to show that the Nigerian ruling class had, by its own actions, inactions, words, publication of official letters, production of maps, and transfer of documents produced a negative verdict against Nigeria, awarding much of the territory in dispute, especially the Bakassi peninsula, to Cameroon long before 2002 when the verdict of the ICJ was pronounced. My study revealed a number of facts about the dispute, which were previously little known. First, I demonstrated that the disputed territory of Bakassi was lost, not by Gowon's regime in 1974, as commonly but erroneously believed, but much earlier, in 1961, in the process of a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations, the results of which were freely accepted by the Nigerian Government, under Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, and legitimized by an opinion of the International Court of Justice. I provided facts and figures to show that the loss was occasioned by the political rivalry among Nigerian political parties, in the first Republic, namely, the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (previously, Nigerian Council of Nigeria and Cameroon), the Northern People's Congress, the Action Group, the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the United Middle Belts Congress. In their short-sighted preoccupation with scoring immediate, selfish, political points, and recording ephemeral political victories over their opponents, the ruling political leaders, at the federal level, at the time, worked hard to gain northern Cameroon, but were indifferent to, and therefore, lost Southern Cameroon, including Bakassi. It was a classical case of the triumph of parochialism over nationalist patriotism, and the sacrifice of broad, long term national interest on the altar of narrow, short term, party gains. I also produced evidence to show clearly that successive regimes in Nigeria knew all too well that, as far as the Bakassi peninsula was concerned, Nigeria had no case. Yet millions of dollars, pounds sterling and naira were spent in pursuing the case at the ICJ, by a team of lawyers who lost the case, cost the nation much money, but gained much for themselves. All these reinforced our earlier finding that it is not necessarily national interest and consideration of Nigerian people's welfare, but rather bureaucratic politics, driven by selfish or organizational interests, that drive Nigeria's foreign policy. The study showed, finally, that the verdict of the ICJ on the dispute was much more complex than is commonly realized. The verdict embodied not only losses, but also significant material gains for Nigeria

I used the case study to explain the true nature of international relations, in general, and international conflicts, in particular. I observed that, often, international conflicts are presented as occurring between states or, more specifically, between governments; in short they are made out as struggle for power among sovereign states. Occasionally, the bone of contention between states is said to be territory or some valued economic resource. I then argued that, on deeper reflection, however, what the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon showed was that

international conflicts are, in reality, struggles between or among social groups, or more precisely social forces, social movements, and social classes, clashing across state boundaries. The real actors in international relations are social groups which, in their struggles, mobilize and use states' apparatuses-coercive and non-coercive-to achieve their ends. The contests are, most of the time, for the control of social productive forces: objects of labour (land, mineral resources, forest resources), instruments of labour (technology, finance capital), and labour power (highly skilled or developed human resources). In brief, international conflicts occur when contending social forces, operating from distinct national societies or relatively autonomous territorial entities, struggle to establish monopolistic control over some global productive forces. Hiding behind governments, in most international conflicts, are usually some monopolistic capitalists operating trans-nationally, often with multinational tentacles. And the victims of such conflicts are usually the working peoples- workers, peasant farmers, fishermen, commercial drivers, artisans, and petty traders. Also, when violent conflicts occur between two contending ruling classes of distinct national societies or states, they are external dimensions or extensions of violent intra-state conflicts.

In general, therefore, there are three critical factors that shape the dynamics of most international conflicts. First, there is the nature of the prize that would accrue from the conflict. This refers to the relative utility and size of the productive forces or the social product that the victor might gain in the wake of the struggle. Second, there is the nature of the relationship between the social classes which are the real actors in the conflict. Once monopolistic capitalists either on one side or on both sides of the state's territorial boundaries have high stakes in the outcome of the conflict, the spiral of the escalation of international conflicts will almost be unending. Third is the state of domestic politics in the nation states, which provide the bases for the contending parties. This includes especially the nature of the regime in office. Authoritarian regimes or dictatorial governments, by their *modus operandi*, provoke the emergence of violent intra-state conflicts. And such violence easily becomes translated into coercive international diplomacy, resulting in violent international clashes.

This case highlights the clash of international relations principles and also demonstrates that adherence to certain traditional principles of international relations causes anguish among the people. There were basically two sets of principles implicated in the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. The first set consists of international legal principles that reinforce the **reason of state**. They are such traditional principles as *uti possidetis juris*, *pacta sunt servanda*, and *rebus sic stantibus*. The second set comprises human right norms. The latter set of principles pertains to the worth and dignity of the human person. It is the second set of principles that is fundamental for it is predicated on the assumption that "the foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the world" can only be laid with the recognition of the dignity,[as well as] the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family".[*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948: Preamble]

Linking these two sets of principles is the doctrine of self-determination. It is both a legal principle and a human rights doctrine.

The principle of the sanctity of boundaries inherited from the colonial powers [*uti possidetis*

juris] is a *status-quo* promoting norm. It is meant to promote stability in a changing world. Similarly, the principle which states that agreements are binding [*pacta sunt servanda*] serves the same purpose. The idea is to maintain order and secure a measure of stability in a potentially revolutionary era and environment. The last-named principle is qualified and, by that qualification, strengthened by the related principle of *rebus sic stantibus*, that is that agreements remain valid and binding unless and until the conditions under which they were made change. All three-*uti possidetis juris*, *sancta sunt servanda*, and *rebus sic stantibus*- are anti-revolutionary principles. They reflect acceptance of the orthodox paradigm of the international system as a state system, and of the state as the basic unit of analysis in international relations, because it is the key and real actor. They are based on the assumption that the “reason of state”, that is the security of the state, is the ultimate goal of international action; that the preservation of the institutional mechanisms of class domination constitutes the supreme value of contemporary international system. These traditional principles of international relations are unquestioningly subscribed to by the ruling classes not only in Nigeria and Cameroon, but also, by those of most of the nations of the world today.

The human right norms exposed and highlighted in the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula are those embodied in articles 3, 5, 9, 12 and 17 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Article 3 states that every human has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 9 complements this. It states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. And article 17.2 declares that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. These rights had been violated with impunity, by soldiers of both Cameroon and Nigeria operating in the Bakassi peninsula and its environs. Equally violated were the provisions of articles 5 and 12. Article 5 stipulates that no one shall be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. And article 12 states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his property, home or correspondence, nor attacks on his honour and reputation. [*Universal Declaration on Human Rights*, 1948]. Even though newspapers and newsmagazines in Nigeria and Cameroon contained accounts of frequent incidences of violation of these rights, yet the Governments of Nigeria and Cameroon gave very little attention to the issue of gross violation of the worth and dignity of human persons so reported. On a very rare occasion when the matter featured in the discussions between President Ahidjo of Cameroon and General Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian Head of State, not much came out of the talks. Ahijo promised to look into Nigeria’s complaints, while Gowon promised to caution the Nigerian media that carried such embarrassing reports on human rights violations. [Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992:159]

The right of self-determination is a critical democratic principle. The principle of self-determination is a legal right that is now generally recognized in international law. The constituent elements of the right of all persons to determine, democratically, their own socio-economic system as well as political system; the right of peoples, nations and nationalities (including minorities) to freely pursue, develop and preserve their culture, traditions and language; and the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination, up to, and including their right to secession, is also now guaranteed in international law. [Shivji, 1989:72, 73, 80]. The rights mentioned in this paragraph represent the internal dimension of the principle of self-determination. In the domestic political life of a people, there is no other value that is as important as liberty. Liberty is the essence of self-determination. And it is a hugely necessary

condition for development.

The external dimension of the principle of self-determination embraces the following primary components: the right of colonial peoples to independence and establishment of their own sovereign states; and the right of freedom of all peoples from alien domination, subjugation and exploitation. The principle also has certain derivative components, namely, the principles of state sovereignty, state responsibility, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state.

With regard to the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula, the primary internal dimension of the principle of self-determination was in conflict with the derivative or secondary internal dimension. As indicated earlier, in 1958 and 1961, there had been a UN-sponsored plebiscite in northern and southern Cameroon, of which the Bakassi peninsula was then a part. It was an attempt to resolve the conflict by democratic means. But the dispute could not be resolved to the satisfaction of the inhabitants of Chamber in northern Cameroon and the inhabitants of the Bakassi peninsula in southern Cameroon. However, it is noteworthy that an attempt was made by the United Nations to deal with the matter from the perspective of democracy and human rights, and not simply that of reason of state. In the post-independence era, the peoples of Cameroon and Nigeria have been consistently denied their crucial social, economic and political rights. Millions of Nigerians and Cameroonians are denied the right to determine their own socio-economic systems; the right to choose their own political systems. Even within the imposed political systems, the citizens of these two countries are also denied a related fundamental human right, which the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes as “the right to take part in the governance of one’s country directly”, and the “right of equal access to public service in his country”. These include the right of the people to freely elect those who can govern them well, and throw out those who, in the past, had governed them badly. The peoples of the two countries have often been disenfranchised through the despotic manipulation of the electoral process and the non-provision of electoral materials at designated polling stations. From this stand point, it should be stressed that Nigerians who were disenfranchised in the fraudulent elections of 2007, in Nigeria, occupy almost the same political position as some of the inhabitants of the Bakassi peninsula that, in 2002, suddenly lost their rights of citizenship, following the verdict by the International Court of Justice.

The general points which emerged from a study of the boundary and territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon may be summarized as follows. First, it became clear that there is a link between authoritarian, repressive regimes and a high proclivity to resolve international conflicts by the use of violent means. Regimes that use violence to repress political opponents and their supporters tend to reproduce themselves externally through violent diplomacy. It was under the highly repressive regimes of Babangida and Abacha in Nigeria, and Paul Biya in Cameroon that the conflict between the two countries degenerated, resulting in frequent violent confrontations. Democracy, or at any rate, relatively non-authoritarian civilian rule, is therefore a better domestic foundation for international peace than military rule.

Second, economic interests, especially stakes in some valuable natural resources, rather than concern for human lives and consideration for human welfare, underlie most international

conflicts. Even when other motives or interests are presented as issues in dispute, often, but not always, the hidden and real motivating factors are economic, in particular, contention over the control of some valuable natural resources. In the case under reference, it was the discovery of crude oil in the disputed territory in 1967 that heightened the interests of the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon in the disputed territories, especially, the Bakassi peninsula. The livelihood opportunities of the people in the area, their fishing rights and their general welfare were obviously of little or no interest to successive governments in Nigeria and Cameroon. Even the question of whether the people in the area wished to be Nigerians or Cameroonians did not bother the governments of the two countries much. This explains why the Nigerian Government readily accepted the results of the plebiscite in southern Cameroon in 1961, but, initially, rejected the verdict of the ICJ in 2002, even when Nigeria secured from that ruling a substantial portion of territory, and gained some people in the process. In the mind of the rulers in Nigeria, the loss of the Bakassi peninsula overshadowed all the gains in territory and people because it is an oil-bearing or resource-rich territory.

Third, pressure from the real victims of international conflicts, that is, those whose livelihood chances are immediately and directly threatened by the conflicts is often not critical in bringing about a resolution to the conflicts. Rather it is the influence and interests of those who are likely to benefit materially, in the long run, from a prolongation of the conflict that weigh more with national decision-makers. Examples of the latter social group in the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon were the oil-prospecting companies, operating on both sides of the divide, as well as potential suppliers of arms and ammunition, local and international. It is, therefore, obvious that conflicts that involve high stakes, represented by the presence of valuable natural resource, tend to endure. It is, therefore, important to scrutinize closely the real interests of actors that urge the parties in dispute not to accept some particular terms of settlement arrived at by judicial or non-judicial processes, and to press on, through the use of force, to obtain more advantageous outcome.

Fourth, enduring conflict resolution must be based on clear, generally accepted principles, which serve, promote and improve human welfare, not those which merely satisfy the interests of abstract entities, such as states. In this respect, the superiority of human right norms over the principles associated with *raison d'état* needs to be stressed. By the same token, democratic consultation with direct, actual or potential victims of violent conflicts, that is the majority of the citizens of a state, or the current inhabitants of a disputed territory, is more efficacious in peaceful resolution of such conflicts, than reliance on the views of the indirect beneficiaries of the continuation of the conflicts or the conflict situations.

Economic Diplomacy and National Interest (1991)

In a work published 1991, but whose production spanned several years, I pursued further my re-conceptualization of international relations, and refocusing of the study of foreign policy in a study entitled: “*Nigeria: Economic Diplomacy and National Interest-An Analysis of the Politics of Nigeria’s External Economic Relations*”. The article was published in a special edition of the *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs*, and reprinted in 2005 as part of a book, also published by the NIIA. [Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No.2, 1991; 34-98].

In those sixty-five pages, I explained the two basic concepts of “**national interest**” and “**diplomacy**”, provided a taxonomy of types of economic diplomacy, situated Nigeria’s practice and experience, over the years, in that typology, highlighted the distinguishing features of what the regime of Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1992), dubbed the “new” economic diplomacy, but which I characterized as “the **diplomacy of SAP**”, and evaluated the diplomacy of SAP by the criteria of different conceptions of national interest, while, at the same time, placing the diplomatic strategies of the period of SAP in comparative historical perspective. In the study, I made the following findings. First, the term “economic diplomacy” may be understood in three different ways: the conduct of the foreign policy of a nation in such a manner as to give topmost priority to the nation’s economic objectives; the application of economic instruments in negotiation and bargaining with other countries; a set of strategies and tactics formulated and applied for the achievement of a fundamental restructuring of the existing international economic order.

Second, there are, at least, three contending paradigms of international relations, within which the concept of national interest may be defined: the realist perspective; the behaviourist paradigm; and the Marxist political economy approach. The nature of the link between economic diplomacy and national interest depends on the paradigm that forms the basis for the evaluation.

Third, historically, there have been, in strategic terms, three major strands in Nigeria’s economic diplomacy: the diplomacy of dependent import-substitution industrialization (DISI); the diplomacy of regional economic integration (REI); and the diplomacy of the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO). There are elements of continuity and change running through the diplomatic strategies that define these three strands of economic diplomacy. A common assumption was that Nigeria was operating in an international economy dominated by global capitalism; and the common goal was rapid economic growth, following the capitalist path. Consequently, the various diplomatic strategies were meant to serve the end of dependent industrial development, either through import-substitution industrialization, or agricultural-export-led growth. Either way, the central idea was that Nigeria’s primary commodities would be exported mainly to Europe and North America; they would, there, earn the foreign exchange with which to pay for capital equipment and raw materials to support local industrialization efforts. The gap between export earnings and the cost of imports would, it was expected, be filled by foreign public loans and direct foreign investment, mainly from private sources. Such a development strategy made association, or at least, the maintenance of some kind of structural relationship with the advanced capitalist countries of Europe and North America a *desideratum*.

The diplomacy of NIEO was different in kind from the other two types of economic diplomacy. The diplomacy of new international economic order was a diplomacy of liberation from capitalist imperialism, while the diplomacy of DISI and REI was a diplomacy of economic growth within the framework and ambit of global capitalism.

Well, as I showed, in a different study [*“Indigenization, Class Formation and Class Struggle in Nigeria: An Analysis”*] Nigeria did not really have a national capitalist ruling class. The indigenous fraction of the ruling class was comprador and petty bourgeois: a band of self-serving

middlemen and pauperized middle class. Not surprisingly, Nigeria was most inconsistent and ambivalent in the practice of the diplomacy of the new international economic order. For, unlike the diplomacy of both DISI and REI, that of NIEO was directed towards altering the old international division of labour between the industrialized and the non-industrialized countries.

Fourth, the so-called 'new' economic diplomacy of the regime of Babangida, that is the diplomacy of Structural Adjustment Programme, had certain specific distinctive features. In that period, attraction of foreign capital and debt rescheduling became a pre-eminent goal of Nigeria's foreign policy. Diplomatic achievements came to be measured, according to Ike Nwachuku, Nigeria's Foreign Minister between 1988 and 1992, "more or less by the number of investors who visit[ed]" Nigeria from the different countries to which Nigeria accredited envoys. or "by the tonnage of Nigeria's produce and articles sold as a result [through the efforts of the envoys]". Another feature of the 'new' economic diplomacy was a new cost-consciousness in Nigeria's diplomacy; in foreign aid to other developing countries, for instance, emphasis shifted from financial assistance to technical assistance. A far more important feature of the new diplomacy was the use of innovative diplomatic strategies: the manipulation of domestic opposition to obtain certain outcomes in a negotiation and to narrow the options open to a negotiating opponent; trying to shape the structure of the bargaining situation by identifying and mobilizing allies in the developed countries in negotiations with them; seeking new sources of foreign capital by cultivating the sympathy and support of Africans in the Diaspora.

Fifth, fundamentally, the so-called 'new' economic diplomacy was not new; it was virtually a return to the old diplomacy of the period, 1960-1965. More important, it did not serve Nigeria's national interest, however defined. The use of foreign policy and diplomacy to attain the objectives of SAP entailed the promotion of export trade especially on non-oil commodities; the maximization of the inflow of direct foreign investment; and the enhancement of the inflow of external public loans. None of these objectives was significantly attained. In respect of export trade, the Annual Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), for the year 1989, presented a picture of poor performance of the non-oil export sector. It stated categorically that the "share of non-oil exports as a percentage of total exports declined from 8.8% during the period under review [i.e.1986-1989], as a result of the decline in cocoa beans exports". Concerning the inflow of direct foreign investment, the picture was only slightly better. According to the *Annual Report* of the CBN, "direct investment" in Nigeria declined from \$613.2 million in 1967 to \$381.8 million in 1988, but rose sharply to \$1,898.6 million in 1989 [CBN *Annual Report*, 1989:105]. However, as the report itself clearly explained, this investment was not strictly new foreign investment. In respect to the apparently phenomenal increase in 1989, for instance, the Report commented as follows:

This was accounted for mainly by the purchase of Federal Government shares in Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited by three oil companies, namely, Shell, ELF, and AGIP. Other sources of foreign investment inflow were re-invested earnings of oil companies...and proceeds from debt conversion [which] were responsible for the increase in the cumulative direct foreign investment

Admittedly, with respect to debt conversion, the 'new' economic diplomacy had something to do with it; but this could hardly be said of the other factors. Increase in public sector net claims on foreigners arising from the sale of Federal Government equities in Nigerian oil companies to

foreign oil companies could not correctly be equated with new foreign investment attracted through economic diplomacy; nor could proceeds from privatization in general.

There was evidence that there had been some positive developments in the area of long-term capital inflow to Nigeria. According to **World Bank** sources, in 1985, the net inflow of long-term loans to Nigeria was negative; it was minus \$1,100 million. But, in 1986, it was positive, amounting to \$178 million. And in 1987, the first full year of SAP, the total increased significantly to \$786 million. However, in 1988, when the new economic diplomacy was formally introduced, there was a negative inflow of minus \$107 million. The picture presented by figures from official Nigerian sources, even for 1989, did not differ significantly from the one emerging from the World Bank sources. According to the CBN *Annual Report*, long term official capital inflow to Nigeria was, overall, negative in 1987, 1988, and 1989. The situation in the area of private capital inflow was the same. The inflow was negative throughout the period: it was \$-47.7 million in 1987; \$-25.5 million in 1988; and \$-17.7 million in 1989.

Arguably, it was in the area of debt rescheduling that the 'new' economic diplomacy recorded its most significant achievements. As a **World Bank** publication, in 1989, observed, rescheduling agreements were "reached with both the Paris Club and the London Clubs". And as the CBN *Annual Report* [1989] noted, the agreement signed in 1989 made it possible for other bilateral, debt rescheduling agreements to be signed with thirteen member countries. The Paris Club agreement provided for rescheduling of some of the debts that fell due up to April, 1990, over a period of ten years, including five years grace, with final maturity in August, 1999. Those falling due after April, 1990, would be subject to further negotiation.[CBN *Annual Report*, 1989: 96] The London Club agreement of 1989 embodied options that could provide further debt relief. One of the options was the conversion of the payable debt into interest-bearing naira-denominated securities. However, the overall effect of the rescheduling agreements was not beneficial to Nigeria and Nigerians. The overall effect was to increase Nigeria's debt burden and extend the period of her oppression under the weight of debt peonage. Thus, the total stock of Nigeria's external debt increased from \$28.7 billion in 1987 to \$36.06 billion in 1989. Even more worrying, although Nigeria repaid as much as \$7.2 billion between 1987 and 1989, the total outstanding external debts in 1989 still amounted to \$28.9 billion, which was higher than the figure for 1987.

If one were to go by the realist conception of *national interest*, defined as self-preservation or national security, when interpreted in a certain manner, it could be argued that the diplomacy of SAP served the national interest. It could be contended, for instance, that maintaining a low profile in "big league" global politics, and the conscious, or deliberate cultivation of friendly and cordial relations with the advanced capitalist powers was a wise move which advanced Nigeria's national security interests. That however would be a narrow interpretation of Nigeria's national security. The most enduring security for Nigeria lies in catering for the welfare of, and providing the means of decent living for, the vast majority of Nigerian citizens. Nigeria's national security will be best guaranteed by ensuring that Nigerians are well fed, well-clothed, and well-housed. By 1989, the diplomacy of SAP had not achieved that. On the contrary, the middle- and upper-income households in Nigeria had, as a result of SAP, suffered "pronounced loss in purchasing power"[**World Bank**, *Trends...*,1989:330] And rising food prices had put " a very serious

burden on the wage population”[*Trends..*] As the Nigerian Foreign Minister, at the time, Ike Nwachuku publicly admitted, following SAP, the “vital sectors of health, education and other social infrastructures [had]suffered immeasurably”, leading to “increasing impoverishment” of Nigerian and other African peoples [*Address at the UN General Assembly*, 1989]. The result was a spate of anti-SAP riots which erupted in Nigeria in 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991. Such a situation of general impoverishment, and mass dissatisfaction with government, and more important, the feeling of relative deprivation arising from the pervasive consciousness of growing socio-economic inequality, became prescriptions for national insecurity.

I concluded the study by calling for a truly new economic diplomacy. There should be designed and methodically implemented ***diplomacy of economic liberation***. This would have two dimensions; external and internal. The external dimension would consist of strategies aimed at promoting regional economic integration and bringing about a radical re-structuring of the existing international economic order. The internal dimension would involve strategies directed at damming the sources of capital drain from Nigeria and mobilizing, totally, the human, material and physical resources of Nigeria for self-reliant development. The central strategy would be **horizontal multilateralism**.

Multinational Corporations and the Management of Public Enterprises in Nigeria (1982)

My earliest studies had led me to conclude that the international system is complex, and that states are not necessarily the key actors in the system A major actor in the system is the global operator known as *multinational corporation*. For such organizations, participation in international relations is not primarily about power; it is first and foremost concerned with profit. Profit is secured mainly through exploitation. It is, therefore, necessary to explore the structural frame of exploitation, especially between social groups located in the advanced industrialized economies and those domiciled in the underdeveloped economies. There are very few concrete studies which provide deep insight into the strategies and tactics of exploitation of the people of the underdeveloped countries by multinational corporations. I thought that such a study would be useful in exposing the real actors in international relations, the goals which they pursue, and the nature of the conflicts between or among them. It was this that led me to explore *the influences of multinational corporations on the management of public enterprises in Nigeria*.

I prefaced the study with an exposition of the nature of multinational corporations. They are, I stated, foreign, private or public companies, whose operations are distributed among two or more countries to a significant extent. An important distinguishing feature of a multinational corporation is that it has affiliates in a number of countries as well as a substantial international dispersion of its assets. An MNC generally has a string of subsidiaries, bearing different names, either in different countries, or even in the same country, such that one may be dealing with a new subsidiary of an MNC with which one had severed a strained partnership without knowing it. Also, the share of industrial and commercial activities of an MNC in different countries is large, and most MNCs would be classified as large companies by any standard.[*Africa Contemporary Record*, 1971-72: A32. Given their usually large size and world-wide operations, MNCs have capabilities which are often different from, and greater than, those of more narrowly based firms. For example, they are able to spread the overhead costs of investigation of projects

feasibility as well as research and development. At the same time, a loss that would seem colossal and disastrous to a small public enterprise in an underdeveloped state may, to them, seem marginal or inconsequential. Furthermore, MNCs tend to take longer views of investment prospects, and more important, to have access to a wide range of information about marketing opportunities. For these reasons, in the field of manufacturing for a wide market, in particular, MNCs may become powerful agents for organizing production and possibly trade in an efficient way especially from a global point of view. The rob is that the global productive efficiency of a multinational corporation may not bring benefits equally to all constituent countries.[*Nigeria Trade Journal*, vol.2/4, October/December, 1954:22.]

I then examined the forms of partnership entered into between multinational corporations and public enterprises in Nigeria, highlighting three main patterns. These are: the equity participation type; the consultancy and management agreement type; the loan-cum-management contract type. An example of the first type of partnership was the agreement between two British companies, on the one hand, and on the other, the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Government of Eastern Nigeria, and the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation, to establish a cement manufacturing company in Eastern Nigeria in the 1950s. The equity capital was distributed as follows: the Tunnel Portland Cement (5.36%); its consulting agent, P.L. Smith & Co Ltd. (5.36%); the Commonwealth Corporation (10.72%); the Federal Government of Nigeria (42.85%); the Eastern Nigerian Government (14.28%); and the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation (21.43%). That partnership resulted in the establishment of the Nigerian Cement Company in 1954. A similar type of partnership agreement was concluded between Peugeot Automobile of France (owning 40% of the share capital); the Federal Government of Nigeria (35%), and the former North Central State Government, the Industrial Development Bank, and some private Peugeot distributors (25%).

My main contribution in this study was the demonstration of the relevance of international relations to the every day life experience of Nigerians. The study of international relations is also about our most basic needs: food, clothing, shelter. It is not, mainly, about the external world out there, as is commonly, but mistakenly, assumed. The concrete exploration of the nature of international relations has to do with our daily living experiences, at home and at work. The subject matter of international relations is about work and leisure, labour and relaxation, suffering and entertainment. It is about production, distribution and exchange.

In studying the influences of multinational corporations on the management of public enterprises, I relied on a number of concrete case studies. In the process, I made a number of interesting findings on the ways in which multinational corporations manipulate the partnership agreements between them and their business partners in underdeveloped countries, such as Nigeria, to exploit the people and impoverish them.

I discovered that one of the avenues employed by multinational corporations to exploit Nigerian peoples, for instance, is the equity share capital arrangement. The equity share method happens to be a main source of finance for public enterprises entering into partnership agreement with MNCs. Some MNCs enter into partnership agreements with public enterprises promising to contribute to the financing of the company and a production project, without really meaning to

do so. They then devise devious means by which the local partner pays up both its own percentage of the share capital and that of the foreign partner. One strategy is for the foreign partner to plead unforeseen increases in the cost of equipment and other inputs, and on that basis, demand that the share capital be doubled or trebled. The unsuspecting local partner, having made a substantial initial investment, throws in more money to meet an increased liability and ensure that the initial capital outlay would not be a waste. In the end, the foreign partner actually makes no financial contribution to the venture.

In the 1970s, Nigeria had such an experience with a European MNC which entered into a partnership agreement with the Federal Government of Nigeria to prosecute a project aimed at reinforcing the ability of the country **to produce food**. The MNC, through a combination of guile and blandishments, got the Federal Government to pay the full share capital of N2 million, which had, on paper, been increased to N4 million, without apparently fulfilling its own financial obligation, involving provision of 50% of the share capital.[Eme Awa, 1979:5-9]

Another method by which MNCs siphon funds away from public enterprises is by supplying, to their local partners or the joint enterprises, obsolescent machinery which breaks down rather often. In some cases, the model of the machinery supplied may be so old that their spare parts can not be easily secured even from those countries which manufactured the machinery in the first place. This was the kind of problem faced by Aba Textile Mill (Abatex), which led to its grounding in the 1970s. The textile industry was owned by the Eastern Nigerian government (30%) and an American firm, Indian Head Incorporated, Massachusetts, (70%). Later 70% of the shares were transferred to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). After the Nigerian civil war, the Federal Government bought the shares from USAID and took full control of the company. It was only then, that it was realized that the machines recovered from the company at the end of the war were old and obsolete. Besides, the company still owed \$1 million out of the \$2 million loan secured from the US Export- Import (Exim) bank in 1964. This credit, together with its interest, was converted into a loan at 6% interest. In addition, the Exim bank extended another loan of N4.80 million at 6% interest to Aba Textiles on condition that this would be used to purchase American made machinery. Abatex accepted this condition. But then, again, the Americans sold an obsolescent model of machinery to Abatex. What was worse, the spare parts of the newly purchased machinery could not be obtained unless they were placed on special orders.

The effects on Abatex of the disruption of production and rise in production costs arising from the re-payment of the external loans, paying for the special ordered spare parts and generally maintaining the obsolescent machinery were that:

- (a) the factory's production efficiency declined from 70% in 1971 to 27% in 1975.
- (b) the volume of total trade decreased from 69% in 1971 to 29% in 1973.
- (c) the company's financial losses shot up from \$654,000 (approximately, N327,000) in 1971 to N2.8 million in 1974.
- (d) The ratio of debts to equity capital increased from 2:1 in 1971 to 5:1 in 1974. [See Eme Awa, 1979:10-16].

Moreover, the meager financial resources of the company were wasted in servicing debts: consequently, the company could not even carry out its primary function which was the

manufacture of printed cotton.

One of the main reasons why public enterprises, in partnership with multinational companies, find themselves in such a predicament is that the official representatives of the underdeveloped countries often hastily enter into management and partnership agreements without undertaking thorough and systematic pre-investment feasibility studies, taking steps to inspect the condition and cost of the machinery being imported or transferred, and working out fool-proof measures for checking other exploitative practices of MNCs.

A cogent illustration of this point may be taken from the experience of **Estavision and Sound (Nigeria) Ltd.**, which was established by the former East Central State Government. As the Government White Paper on the *Report of the Board of Inquiry into Estavision and Sound (Nigeria) Ltd.*, observed, before the company was established:

There were no feasibility studies undertaken to determine the desirability or otherwise of embarking on the venture. And there were no manifest political, economic or social considerations which gave rise to the establishment of Estavision and Sound (Nigeria) Ltd.

Rather, what seemed to have happened was that some representatives of the East Central State Government were persuaded by representatives of a foreign firm, **Salora OY** of Finland, to visit Finland, in order to tour their factories and discuss the possibility of setting up a television assembly plant in Enugu, Eastern Nigeria. In response, three representatives of the government traveled to Finland and, on their return, submitted a report. On the basis of the report, “an agreement was entered into between the East Central Government and Salora OY for the setting up an Assembly Plant to assemble black and white TV (Salora) sets”. [See Government White Paper on the Report:3]

This unequal partnership, while benefiting the foreign company, Salora OY, tremendously, constituted a source of serious exploitation and impoverishment of the people and government of East Central State. The agreement referred to above stipulated that the Finnish firm should be paid a lump sum of \$30,000 for providing the ‘know how’ even though Nigerian technicians sent to Finland to understudy the Finnish did not in fact acquire any ‘know how’; nor was any secret design passed on to the Nigerian company as a result of the agreement. Worse still, the agreement stipulated that royalties of \$40,000 should be paid by Estavision to Salora OY before October 1974, even though production was not to start then. Furthermore, from 1975 when production was expected to begin, and a production rate of 10,000 sets per year was projected, Estavision would pay the Finnish Company royalties of \$4 per unit produced and \$4 per unit sold. Then, from 1976, Estavision would pay Salora OY a minimum of \$35,000 annually as royalties whether or not there was any production. In addition, all the products would bear the **brand name of Salora**. All this meant that if Estavision, the Nigerian Company, was to start production and meet its annual targets, Salora OY would benefit handsomely from the financial charges on every set produced, whether or not they were sold. If they were sold, the financial benefits accruing to Salora OY would increase. If, on the other hand, there was no production and no sale, Salora OY would continue to receive its fixed royalties. Besides, the Finnish company would benefit from the extended market and the free advertisement of their product in Nigeria, without making any substantial contribution to the development of either Nigerian

television technology in particular or the Nigerian economy in general.

In the event, between March 1975, when production was begun and February 1976, when an inquiry was conducted into the affairs of the company, only 90 TV sets were assembled in Enugu, Nigeria. But Estavision imported 138 sets from Salora OY, Finland. To advertise both the home-assembled and the foreign made sets, Estavision (Nigeria) Ltd, spent N5, 120 of public money. But, out of the 228 sets, only 53 were sold at a total price of N18, 160: of these, only 15 sold at N6,328, belonged to the local company.

After analyzing these facts, I observed that it was difficult to understand the justification for the establishment of Estavision. At the time that it was established, unemployment was one of the greatest problems of the post-civil war East Central state. Estavision was certainly not such an establishment as could help to substantially reduce the level of joblessness in the state. Between 1975 and 1976, only 43 Nigerians were given regular employment in the company. In 1977, the company offered employment to only 55 persons. Furthermore, its product was not such as to meet the basic needs of the people; nor could the establishment of the company be justified in terms of serving the interests of even the elites who obviously preferred to buy foreign made television sets, any way. In short, as the Government White Paper on the Report of Inquiry into Estavision rightly pointed out, **“there were no manifest political, economic or social considerations which gave rise to the establishment of Estavision and Sound (Nigeria) Limited”**

Focusing on another case study, I found that there is yet another device used by MNCs to exploit those public enterprises in underdeveloped economies with which they are associated and drain them of vital funds. Multinational Corporations tend to inflate the prices of the capital goods which they supply to their partners in underdeveloped countries; they also tend to insist on crippling terms for repayments of supplier credits. Sometimes, all this is done, if not with the positive encouragement of the official representatives of the government of the African state entering into partnership, at least, with their deliberate connivance.

An illustration may be drawn from the partnership of **Coutinho Caro** of Germany and the Government of Mid-western Nigeria. **Coutinho Caro (Nigeria) Ltd**, was a subsidiary of Coutinho Caro, Hamburg. Coutinho Caro was a Nigerian company in which a relative of the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotieh-Eboh, had a share. In 1964, Coutinho Caro (Nigeria) Ltd., the subsidiary of Coutinho Caro of Hamburg, Germany, entered into partnership agreement with the Government of the Midwestern Region of Nigeria for the establishment and management of three industries. These were a textile industry, a glass factory, and a cement industry. They were to be set up at a total cost of N19.46 million. Coutinho Caro was to own 10% of the shares, provide some credit, supply the plant, machinery, other equipment and ‘know how’ and, at the same time, provide the management for the three industries.

Coutinho Caro, however, breached the agreement. With the connivance of some members of the Government of the Midwest Region and probable active encouragement of a former Federal Finance Minister, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Coutinho Caro Nigeria Limited, agreed to top 10% on the actual cost of the industries. In actual fact, however, what Coutinho Caro did was to

inflate the cost of the industries by between 30% and 40%. In addition, the Midwestern Government was obliged to make an initial down payment of N1,400,000 in 1964; then, between 1964 and 1968, the regional government made an annual installment payments, ranging from N1,234,000 to N2,132,000 to liquidate the credits provided by Coutinho Caro. The repayments were to be completed in the year that production was to start, that is, in 1967/68. [Midwest State of Nigeria, *Report of the Tribunal...*, Vol.II:23-28;52,56 and 83]

The implication of the provisions of the partnership agreement was that, should production fail to start on schedule or to start at all, Coutinho Caro would not suffer any serious loss since it shall have, by then, recovered its loans plus the interest. No wonder the company was reluctant to accept some shares in the venture. The exploitative motive of the company was also demonstrated by the following facts:

- (a) it did not accept any feasibility studies with respect to availability of raw materials, strength of potential effective demand for the products, availability of electric power and the general viability of the projects before the partnership agreement was signed;
- (b) it refused to break down the cost of machinery, and distinguish it from the cost of 'know how';
- (c) it rejected suggestions that independent experts should be appointed to evaluate the cost of the machinery it supplied;
- (d) it rejected a proposed clause in the partnership agreements requiring that the Midwest Governments would not start the repayment of loans until one month after the commencement of production;
- (e) The Nigerian subsidiary did not get its Hamburg parent company to sign the partnership agreement, thus limiting its liability to only N20,000 which was its total fully paid share capital in Nigeria.[*Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry...*1976:24]

Based on empirical study and critical analysis of the experiences of Nigeria in dealing with multinational firms, it became clear that, to put it mildly, not all of them are interested in promoting the financial health of those indigenous enterprises with which they are associated. While it is true that, generally, MNCs are profit-oriented organizations, when in partnership with public enterprises in under-developed countries, they perceive profit-maximization in terms of crudely exploiting their local partners by manipulating the partnership agreement, rather than through the conventional appropriation of surplus value. Thus while the MNCs benefit financially from the partnership agreements; the enterprises which they establish and run in the under-developed country suffer heavy financial losses.

I also studied the financial management of wholly Nigerian owned public enterprises to find out whether their performance was any better than the record of public enterprises that had MNCs as their partners. I did this to provide a **counterfactual** to the hypothesis that collaboration between MNCs and private or public partners was, on the whole, harmful to the national economy. My study focused on two companies based in Eastern Nigeria: the **Nigerian Construction and Furniture Company** (NCFC), based in Enugu; and the **Golden Guinea Breweries**, based in Umuahia.

I found that, with respect to NCFC, it operated at either marginal profit or total loss. Between

1970 and 1974, a period when private, small-scale cabinet workshops recorded an average net profit of 15%, the NCFC, a giant mechanized furniture and construction complex, had an average net profit of 2.2%. Indeed, the performance of its huge mechanized furniture factory alone was so appalling that it actually sustained losses of N17, 967 in 1970/71 and N46, 748 in 1973/74. Between 1970 and 1974, the furniture section alone recorded a total loss of N53, 985. Not surprisingly, by March 1974, the total liabilities of NCFC exceeded its current assets by as much as N966, 927. [*Report of Administrative Board of Inquiry*, 1976: 24]

The poor financial management of NCFC could be attributed to several and various factors; but most of them centered on the utter indifference shown by the managers of the company to its profitability. As a result of this attitude, theft of the company's raw materials and even finished products was common and could not be checked either by the company's managers or by the government officials, some of whom were culprits or collaborators. A former manager of the company, for instance, was known to have carted away illegally, tones of the furniture company's finished products to his private furniture selling company. When apprehended, he was merely asked to resign. Similarly, a former state engineer of the company used, free of cost to himself, materials and labour belonging to the company to build a house, thus causing NCFC to lose N40s, 000. [*Report of the Administrative Board of Inquiry...1976: 10-13*]

With respect to Golden Guinea Breweries, I found that, on the face of it, with respect to profit-making, its performance provided a reassuring contrast to that of NCFC. Indeed, Golden Guinea Breweries, owned at the time, by the Governments of Imo and Anambra states, had been described as **the first brewery in "all Africa profitably managed by an all-black personnel"**. [Anambra/Imo States of Nigeria, *Government White Paper on the Report of Administrative Board of Inquiry*,,1976:26]. The account of the company was known to have shown "a steady and increasing buoyancy from a reported loss of N12,642 in 1971 to a healthy un-audited profit of N800,000 in 1975". From its own resources, the company was able to make repayments of loans to the tune of N9 million, since it was reactivated following the end of the Nigerian civil war.

A closer look at the performance of Golden Guinea Breweries, however, showed that it had not, in fact, fared much better than the NCFC. As a White paper published by the Governments of Imo and Anambra states put it

Unorthodox, ill-advised and shady financial arrangement through wrong indents, poor and irrational [and arbitrarily awarded] contracts and orders...cost the company about N705,000 which could otherwise have been avoided through more cost-conscious management, proper financial planning and standard budgetary controls.

As a result of poor financial performance and personnel management, ineffective and chaotic distribution pattern, deliberate misuse and diversion, to unofficial sources, of the companies' products and property, as well as the uncompetitive quantity and occasional poor standard rating of the company's finished products, Golden Guinea's financial position was, in fact, far from buoyant, during the period reviewed by the Board of Inquiry [Anambra/Imo, *Government White Paper*, 1976:27] In 1975, "its current liabilities far exceeded the current assets, rendering precarious the liquidity potentials of the company". Among the causes of its poor financial state

were:

- (a) official corruption- for instance, an official of the company awarded a contract to a foreign firm for the supply of N2,160,000 worth of empty bottles at 24k per bottle instead of purchasing them locally at 7k per bottle; as a result, the company sustained a loss of N367,200. It also sustained more losses as a result of the hop and roasted malt imported from a German company, which failed to grant the breweries any rebate;
- (b) the tendency of the managing director to act without consulting either the Board of Directors or the other members of the management staff;
- (c) the lack of effective and sustained in-service training for staff, especially, all categories of the sales staff: this adversely affected morale of staff and was reflected in the ineffective distribution pattern;
- (d) the defective sales promotion tactics which became hollow in content and form.

The general conclusion from this study was that, in the short run, domestic public enterprises which enter into partnership with multinational corporations may reap some temporary benefits. But, in the long run, the losses would outweigh the gains. The short term gains include: access to high-level skilled and experienced manpower; improved staff discipline and higher level of productivity, resulting from more rational job specifications; more stratified and hierarchical organizational structure; greater correlation between financial reward and productivity. However, in the long run, the partnering public enterprise, in the under-developed country, would continue to suffer from prolonged technological dependence on its foreign partner. It would also suffer large financial losses due to inflated costs of equipment, artificially raised expatriate salaries; dumping of the products of the parent company on its local subsidiaries; over-invoicing as a means of illegally exporting capital; and other devices used to maximize the amount of capital repatriated. Also, the national economy would, in consequence, continue to be externally oriented as the multinational corporations introduce unsuitable or inappropriate, though sophisticated, technology for the local production of goods and services to suit foreign tastes. Thus, association with multinational corporations helps to intensify external orientation on the part of the elites who, as a result, soon become alienated from the broad masses, thus widening the elite-mass gap and hampering the process of mass mobilization for socio-economic development. In a general atmosphere of heightened external orientation and deepened external dependence, even public enterprises that are wholly owned, controlled and managed by indigenous personnel succumb to the temptation to depend, for their procurements, on external sources, and in the process, become infected by the imported virus of official corruption.

The solution lies in having a democratic state run by persons who are freely elected into office; that is, a government whose decisions and actions reflect the interests and desires of the vast majority of the populace. This should be coupled with proper schooling on negotiations so that those who negotiate partnership agreements are aware that entering into partnership agreements with MNCs must not be undertaken in a hurry, by estacode- seeking bureaucrats or politicians. Also, governments of under-developed countries must improve bargaining outcomes by reducing their impatience and their demand intensity, by eliminating intra-state and inter-state rivalry for the favours of multinationals; and by keeping competing MNCs in negotiation for a reasonably long period of time, playing off one company against the others. Furthermore, the governments

of under-developed countries need to take steps to secure access to modern scientific knowledge and technology through expanding and improving their tertiary education facilities, embarking on sustained efforts at methodically studying and imitating the production of modern industrial machines and equipment, and by entering into specific contractual agreements on patents, licensing and know-how with willing foreign companies.

What this study reveals about international relations is that the real actors are human groups: owners of finance capital and technology in the shape of multinational corporations; bureaucrats and politicians, acting on behalf of states; the workers in underdeveloped countries, engaged in production, distribution and exchange; and the rest of the population, as consumers of products, distributors of products, but most importantly, as victims of exploitation by the multinational corporations, working in collaboration with the ruling class of the underdeveloped countries.. International relations is about the food we eat, the house we live in, the clothes we wear. It is about the choice we make between drinking coca kola, whose taste formula is imported, and taking the orange juice/drink pressed out by members of our family from the fruits of the orange trees behind our house. It is about the choice we make between going to Mr. Biggs for launch or patronizing the restaurant run by the University of Nigeria General Enterprises Limited. At bottom, international relations is very much about lifting millions of people from poverty, about saving them from ignorance, hunger, and disease. It is fundamentally about human welfare. However, it is also basically about profit, profit-maximization, accumulation of capital, and repatriation of capital, investment of capital in production, trade and commerce. The study of international relations is concerned only secondarily, and superficially with state power; it is much less about struggle for state power. Struggle for state power is the *scaffolding* rather than the *foundation* of international relations. The problem is that, hitherto, struggle for power among states had been treated and taught, not just as the basis, but indeed, the essence of international politics. Perhaps, this misrepresentation flows directly from the misreading of Machiavelli's political thought.

The Meaning and Scope of International Relations.

To fully appreciate the denotation and connotation of the subject matter, which is my second love, we need to go back to the roots. In its classical usage, the word **international** means **inter-state**. Apparently, the term, *jus gentium*, a Latin phrase, meaning the law of nations, was first used by the English philosopher, **Jeremy Bentham**, in the later part of the 18th century, although a Latin equivalent of inter-state, *inter-gentes*, is said to have been used much earlier by **Richard Zouche**, a professor of civil law in Oxford University and one of the classical writers on international law. Zouche used the term a century earlier.[Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., **Politics and the International System**, pp.1-6]

Both Bentham and Zouche used the term to describe the branches of the law of nations or "*jus gentium*", which referred to the legal principles applied by Roman officials in cases involving non-Romans. Using the term, "international law" as a translation of "*jus gentium*", was, however, a mistake, because the body of rules referred to as "*jus gentium*" by the Romans was controlled by Rome itself, and governed relations between the Romans and the tribes of Italy,

and later, the various parts of the Roman empire. It could not therefore be called “*international law*”. It was, more appropriately, intra-empire law. Later, as the concept of sovereignty developed, it became clear that the phrase, “*jus gentium*”, could not adequately express the developing law between or among sovereign states. Nevertheless, the English equivalent of Bentham’s concept, “*international law*” continued to be used to describe legal relations, and later, all relations, between sovereign states.

The dictionary meaning of inter- state is “pertaining to relations between the constituent states of a country”. But, it has also been defined as “pertaining to relations, especially, political and commercial relations between states”. Thus, the concept is somewhat ambiguous, for it could apply to both intra-state (that is domestic) relations and relations that take place across the frontiers of nation states. The word “international” is more precise; it means “involving different countries”[BBC English Dictionary,p.609] Many writers in the field of international relations have therefore derived their understanding of the meaning and nature of international relations from this ordinary interpretation of the concept. Such writers include Quincy Wright and Hans Morgenthau. For Quincy Wright, the phrase, international relations means simply, relations between “territorially organized nation- states”. For Hans J. Morgenthau, the term, international relations should be understood as “politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace”.

There are, however, other writers who have a more complex view of international relations. We may cite just three such authors, for illustration. Frederick S. Northedge, for instance, conceives of international relations as “all relations across national frontiers, between governments and peoples, and including non-governmental organizations, as well as the formally controlled authorities of the state”. Similarly, Karl J. Holsti defines international relations as “all forms of interaction between members of separate societies, whether government-sponsored or not”. In the same vein, L. Oppenheim, a British authority in international law, defines international relations as relations between “people...settled in a country under its own sovereign government”

From our own study and reflection, we contend that the term, “International Relations”, refers to processes of social interaction that take place across the boundaries of self-contained and self-governing territorial units. The units across whose boundaries social groups interact may be city-states, empires, colonies or other semi-autonomous dependencies or independent territorial entities. The contents of the intercourse may be cultural, economic or military. The transactions are international so long as they are carried out across the boundaries of self-contained and self-governing territorial units, of whatever name.

There are certain distinguishing characteristics of transactions that fall under the purview of international relations. First, interactions and transactions that qualify as the subject matter of international relations have to do with those social processes which take place across the boundaries of self-contained and self-governing territorial units. Interactions among social groups qualify as international relations only when they involve elements, human and non-human that are foreign to the territorial unit, even though they may be resident in, or temporarily present within the unit.

Second, **international relations are essentially interactions among human beings**; indeed, **they are primarily transactions among social groups, organized and active as social forces**. People involved in international relations are generally organized in groups. Often, they belong to more than one or more inter-locking groups. People interact with one another, across territorial boundaries, as owners of industry, banks, insurance companies, other financial institutions. They operate across territorial boundaries as industrialists, entrepreneurs, or as importers, exporters, shippers, owners of airlines, or as artisans, farmers, shopkeepers, petty traders, petty contractors, or as workers, peasants, the unemployed. Peoples and groups relate with one another, across the boundaries of states or such other autonomous, self-contained territorial units, as producers and consumers, or as suppliers and buyers of commodities. They interact as manufacturers or factory hands, as transporters or distributors or middlemen, as technicians, managers, middlemen, etc. In short, they interact as members of different social classes, or the same social class, but from different territorial entities.

Persons involved in international relations are also, sometimes, conscious of belonging to religious organizations or sects or to secular ideological groups. People also interact in the international society as members of specific ethnic groups, nationalities, nations, and races. However, generally, these levels of consciousness are not the primary levels among persons and groups. The occupational level of consciousness, that is the consciousness of belonging to social groups organized on the basis of livelihood opportunities, followed by the primordial level consciousness, is for most people, the decisive form of consciousness in terms of determining behaviour in the international system. It is often more significant than the consciousness of belonging to different territorial units.

In international relations, people are, all the time, in search of higher profits on investments, higher interests on loans, higher rents on their land or estates, higher wages for their labour, higher prices for the commodities they export and lower prices for those they import. Also, people are perennially interested, strongly, in getting more buyers for their products or more efficient suppliers of the equipment, raw materials or social product which they need, more investors in their pet ventures, more reliable partners for their joint businesses. The interactions among these actors are described as international in the sense that they act as members of different, territorially distinct societies. It is not the states that interact; it is human beings that relate with one another; it is social groups that do business with one another across the frontiers of states and other self- contained autonomous units.

The central and crucial point is that it is people, not abstract entities that interact with one another in the international society. This **human element** needs to be emphasized in order to underscore the social nature of international relations. And generally, it is only on rare occasions that the interest of the whole nation is in the minds of people as they interact with one another. Even among official representatives of nation-states, that is not a regular or invariable occurrence. From time to time, persons involved directly in the process of international interactions adopt measures that further the welfare of the majority of the people of a nation, and also speak and act in defence of the general welfare. But this is hardly the usual practice. Also people hardly act regularly and often in the interest of ethnic groups or nationalities.

This last point may be illustrated by drawing from the experience of some Nigerians in the North-east of the country, but who suddenly became Cameroonians, following the verdict of the International Court of Justice. A report in *The Guardian* newspaper, published in Nigeria, presented the matter graphically. According to a reporter of the paper, Kamal Tayo Oropo,

Even as Nigerians in the Bakassi peninsula are still grappling with the ruling of the International Court of Justice, ceding their communities to the Republic of Cameroon, their counterparts in the North East appear to have taken the ruling in philosophical good faith. Some of the people of this zone who spoke to The Guardian were not particularly bothered by the change of nationality. As far as they were concerned, the major issue is the local economy which is largely predicated on the flow of the Lake Chad. "To me, the important thing is to continue my farming without having to encounter problems in doing so. I am a farmer and I need constant supply of water. It does not matter to me where the water comes from or where I am, so long as I can do my thing. Even if I have to relocate somewhere else again, I would not mind as long as I continue my farming, said a villager, Halidu Guram, in Darak community.

Since, in international relations, consciousness of belonging to certain socio-economic groups is pervasive, this should be taken into serious consideration in defining the subject matter. For, in the international society, it is the interest of the various socio-economic groups that are most frequently and permanently protected, promoted and defended. Hence, it can be argued that international relations is essentially, but not exclusively, relations among social classes, operating from, or belonging to separate and distinct territorial entities.

Third, social groups that are the real actors in the international system employ some tools to achieve their goals. As the primary actors in the international system, social classes, social forces and social movements employ certain instruments and mechanisms in their interaction with one another. For example, they employ the coercive apparatuses of the state- the armed forces, the police, the secret intelligence service- to back them up as they interact with social groups operating from other territories. They also wish to be served, and sometimes assisted and supported by the state bureaucracy, the diplomatic service, as well as the executive, the legislative and judicial arms of government. Because these arms of the state control, and press to their service, the ideological arms of the state- the media, the schools, and other educational institutions- their role in the international system assumes much feasibility and great prominence.

The other arms of the state which are also used as mechanisms for international interaction among social groups are political parties, the mass media, as well as even faith-based organizations and academic institutions. These ideological arms of the state are used mainly to spread globally the value and belief systems that legitimize or rationalize the international activities of the dominant social forces within different territorial entities, and put an acceptable face to the real and concrete material interests which they pursue in the international society.

International institutions and organizations also serve, in a sense, as the instruments by which social groups pursue their international objectives. At the same time, some international organizations are theatres of struggle for the realization of divergent social group interests.

Others are forums for the resolution of the secondary contradictions arising among dominant social classes from distinct territorial entities; a few constitute channels for the reconciliation of primary contradictions between dominant and dominated classes, based in and operating from, separate and autonomous national societies.

Fourth, social groups involved in international relations employ several techniques to advance their interests. They use force. This may take the form of total war or limited and targeted armed attack. It may also take the form of revolutionary warfare in the shape of either guerrilla war or downright terrorism, carried out by either the coercive arms of the state or non-state social movements. Social groups, as international actors, use economic techniques, too. These are varied as well. They include trade protection and trade boycott, advancing of loans and withholding of loans or credits; increasing the level of investment or divestment; granting of subsidy and denial or canvassing the denial of subsidy, especially to farmers.

Social forces and social movements that operate at the level of the international system employ socio-cultural techniques as well. Such methods embrace the propagation of certain philosophical, moral, or religious ideals and values; the promotion of certain kinds of arts and culture, such as specific kinds of music, styles of dressing and forms of expression. Also propagated internationally are certain views about life and about the world in which we live. In this manner, the ways of life and specific outlook on life associated with groups of people from a particular part of the world are presented as preferable to others and as global ideals and norms which every one else must accept and adopt. These techniques therefore serve as instruments of domination by one group of people operating from certain parts of the world over all others.

In sum, then, international relations are processes of interaction among social groups that are either based in, or which originate and operate from, separate relatively autonomous territorial entities. The social interactions described as international are so, in the sense that they take place across nation-state boundaries or athwart the territorial frontiers of other independent or semi-independent entities. The real actors which participate in international relations are social groups. They comprise social forces and social movements, including social classes, ethnic nationalities, and religious or faith-based organizations. And the contents of their interactions cover the political, the socio-cultural and the economic.

This definition clearly raises a very important question. When official spokesmen of the state decide, speak, and act, do they do so for the state or for certain social groups within the state? When George W. Bush, or Tony Blair or Gordon Brown, or Thabo Mbeki, Robert Mugabe, Ibrahim Babangida, Umaru Yar'Adua or Johnson-Sirleaf speaks or acts, is the action in the interest of, and on behalf of the dominant class within his or her state, or in the interest of, and on behalf of all the people of the state?

The answer differs depending on whether the analyst is operating from the traditional perspective or from our own new perspective, which I describe as the *dynamic perspective*.

Our studies have shown very clearly, that from the Nigerian experience, international relations are conducted primarily and fundamentally in the interest of the dominant class within the state.

Our work on “*Economic Diplomacy and National Interest*” already reviewed above, shows that what Ike Nwachukwu and Ibrahim Babangida dubbed “economic diplomacy” was really a diplomacy in support of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Its major achievement was the re-scheduling of the external debt imposed on Nigeria by the profligacy, debauchery, robbery, and mismanagement of the economy, by the Nigerian ruling class. We found that that dubious achievement was recorded at great cost to the interests and welfare of majority of Nigerians who had to endure great deprivations while members of the ruling class stashed away, in foreign lands and foreign banks, billions of dollars of Nigerian people’s wealth. We also demonstrated, with our study on the “*Influences of Multinational Corporations on the Management of Public Enterprises in Nigeria*” that the systematic impoverishment of Nigeria and pauperization of the Nigerian people was, and remains, a joint venture between members of the Nigerian ruling class, and members of the ruling class in several other states of the world, operating under the rubric of multinational corporations. We demonstrated how members of the ruling class in Nigeria are inducted into the culture of corruption by the multinational corporations which enter into partnership agreements with public enterprises in Nigeria, ostensibly for the development of the Nigerian economy.

The story of multinationals as critical actors in the international system is the same in many other countries of the world. Let us take the United States of America as an example. Here, too, I will draw from my own research. In October, 2002, six months before the American and allied forces invaded Iraq, I made a public presentation of a study, which the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) had commissioned me to undertake. The topic was “*International Relations, Foreign Policy and Prospects and Problems of Globalization*”. I argued, in the paper, that the foreign policy of the United States of America, as pursued by George W. Bush, was conducted essentially for the benefit of the ruling class in America; and that globalization was the **current** American ideology for the promotion of the interest of American capital, in particular, and global capital, in general. In a few paragraphs below, I hereby proceed to present, in more details, my position on this matter in 2002.

There is a deep contradiction between the foreign policy of the United States of America, as articulated by George W. Bush, at the rhetorical level, and that country’s foreign policy, as implemented at the operational level. In fact, like most capitalist countries, the United States of America has two foreign policies: the people’s foreign policy, spoken of, but hardly implemented; and the foreign policy of the corporate world, or the dominant class, seldom articulated but actually implemented.

To illustrate, the United States of America is, at the rhetorical level, a foremost advocate of global free trade. But, it has taken more significant measures than any other country to scuttle the movement towards free trade. Similarly, the US government is, in theory, a champion of free, unhindered and unassisted free flow of global capital. But, in practice, it is currently doing everything possible to assist American capital to penetrate those areas of the world, including Iraq, where, hitherto, it has not been able to penetrate unassisted.

The government of the United States of America preaches free trade abroad, but practices protectionism at home. Mr. George W. Bush, the American President, projects himself to the

world as an apostle of free trade. He pushed for the launch of a new global trade negotiation round, which began in Doha, Qatar, in 2001. He supported the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), introduced by his predecessor, Bill Clinton, in the year 2000. Nonetheless, the Bush administration has introduced a number of protective measures that frustrate free trade. In March, 2002, it imposed tariffs of up to 30% on 12 million tons of imported steel. It initiated and pushed through a farm bill which grants US\$190 billion of production subsidies to American agro-business organizations, that is the rich farmers. There are also export subsidies for American farmers, as well as 62% tariffs on imported farm goods. In America, too, tariffs are slammed on textile and clothing imports, tariffs of 17% and above. In addition, there are global quota rules which American importers must adhere to. The American government also imposes tariffs on imported soft timber and, generally, protects the country's dying textile industry from external competition.[*The Economist*, March 30, 2002:37-38; July 13, 2002:24-26; July 31, 2002:24; August 3, 2002:12].

Europe behaves in a similar manner. Their textile industries are heavily protected from international competition. And the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) embodies production subsidies for farmers as well as price support and tax breaks for them. All these put together amounted to 104 billion Euros (about US\$100 billion), in aid, to European farmers in 2001. Indeed, it has been estimated that farmers in countries that make up the European Union get about 35% of their income from subsidies. [*The Economist*, March 30, 2002:37; July 13, 2002:25]

Just as American and European governments protect the interests of big business-agricultural and industrial- at home, they do the same for them abroad. The government of the United States of America, for instance, usually takes steps, including the use of force, to ensure the security of oil supplies, trade routes and markets. This was indeed one of the main motivations of George Bush in attacking Iraq, to bring about a change of regime. The whole talk about ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction, which Bush claimed either existed or were being developed in Iraq, was a ruse. A more important consideration is to have pro-American regimes control all the major oil-producing states in the Middle East, but especially, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). These countries also harbour American armed forces and contain American military bases. Tremendous advantages will accrue to corporate America, in general, and the oil companies, in particular, if pro-American regimes can also be installed in Iraq and Iran.

To start with, the American oil companies would gain access to all the oil fields in the region. This will place under American control the entire Gulf oil, including that from Iran and Iraq. The Gulf is of great economic importance to corporate America because it controls 40% of global trade in the commodity (i.e oil) and makes up two-thirds of the world's known deposits. With this, America will then be in a position to indirectly manipulate the world oil market and either call the bluff of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or even destroy its capacity to determine world prices of oil.

Control of Iraq and Iran would also enable America to secure more comprehensively the entire Arab Gulf, which is a lucrative market for Western exporters of food, consumer goods, weapons

and technologies. As a market, the Arab Gulf is very important because its merchandise imports add up to nearly the same as those of Russia and India combined. Arab Gulf's ports and airports also play strategic role in giving America access to Central and South-East Asia. Indeed, the American government found its bases and other facilities in the Arab Gulf indispensable in its fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Besides, the Arabs of the Gulf region play a crucial part in American and European capital markets: they hold an estimated US\$1.3 trillion in overseas investments, "including perhaps \$400 billion worth of American shares".

Furthermore, the American government wishes to guarantee, for itself, and for Europe, as well as Egypt, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, India, Bangladesh and the Philippines – mostly its allies – the job security of eleven million expatriate workers which the Arab Gulf states and companies employ and who send home US\$25 billion in remittances every year.[*The Economist*, March 23, 2002: "A Survey of the Gulf":1-28]

What available empirical evidence reveals, therefore, is that globalization is the ideology of capitalist states of Europe and America which they employ as a fig leaf to mask the interests of the ruling class in each of their countries. For these capitalist states, especially the United States of America, under George W. Bush, national interest is often conflated and confused with corporate interest. In 2002, I contended that "the impending great power war on Iraq is a war in defence of capitalist globalization". Today, I stand by that argument.

Those that control state power in the United States of America utilize it to promote and defend the corporate world, partly because several of the American political leaders, themselves, are also part of the profit-seeking business world. In the *Stupid White Men*, Michael Moore provides background information on some of the closest associates of the American President, George W. Bush. According to Moore, Dick Cheney, the U. S. Vice-President, was chief executive officer of Halliburton Industries, an oil services company. Halliburton, he asserts, had "dealings" with regimes in Burma and Iraq, and two subsidiaries of Halliburton were, by 2001, doing business with Iraq. Paul O'Neil, appointed U. S. Secretary of the Treasurer by George W. Bush immediately he became President, had served as president and chief executive officer of Alcoa, before joining the Bush administration. Alcoa is said to be the world's largest manufacturer of aluminum. The man appointed Secretary of Commerce by Bush when he assumed office, Don Evans, was chairman and chief executive officer of Tom Brown, Inc., US\$1.2 billion oil and gas company. The former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Don Rumsfeld, who also served under George W. Bush was chief executive officer of G.D.Searle pharmaceutical company and General Instrument. Before joining the administration of Bush, he had served on the board of Kellogg, Sears, Allstate, and the Tribune Company. The former U.S. National Security Adviser and current U.S. Secretary of State under Bush, Condoleezza Rice, had served on the board of directors of Chevron, and had a 130,000 ton oil tanker named after her. "She was also a director at Charles Schwab and Transamerica, and [had] served as an adviser to J.P. Morgan".[Moore, 2001:17-25]

Considering this interesting composition of the American government under Bush, between 2001 and 2004, it is easy to understand why the American state had to be dragged into war in Iraq, and is kept there still. The fact is that the interests of the American political leadership coincide with

the interest of global capital, in general, and the American corporate world in particular. As *The Economist* [London, July 13, 2002:24] observed,

...too often, this [Bush] administration's policy seems to be expressly tailored for (and heavily influenced by) business lobbies...too many of the corporate types in the Bush team equate good economic policy with what is good for business This is hardly surprising: Mr. Bush's presidential campaign was largely financed from Corporate wallets and his cabinet is stuffed with corporate chief executives.

Under Bush, the business world in the United States found allies in the defence industry which was itching to try out new weapons and innovative ways of waging wars. By 2002, modern technology, in the form of e-mail and the internet had begun to play a big part in the planning of armed attacks. The Islamic revolutionary movement, al-Qaeda, was said to have used the new technology in the 9/11 attack on the U.S.A. On the part of the U.S. government, some new military equipment had been tried out in Afghanistan in 2001. It involved the use of “unmanned aircraft and precision-guided munitions (PGMS)”. These included “low-tech bombs with satellite navigation system bolted on to guide them to their targets”. It was expected that the impending war in Iraq, then, was likely to be dominated not only by UAVs (unmanned air vehicles), but also by high altitude long endurance (HALE) aircraft, with satellite antenna, which operates autonomously. It would also involve using information technology to link American and allied forces so that they could fight jointly. The American government and defence industry lobbies could hardly wait to try out the new ideas, and then later market them in other countries. The apparent mutuality of interest in war as a commercial enterprise, cemented the convergence of interests between the corporate world and the state of America and eventuated in the invasion of Iraq.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: MY MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

What I consider as my most critical contribution to the study of international relations is my attempt to *humanize* the contents of the discipline. When I look at the world, I do not see, as the dominant scenery, boundaries and military tanks, armoured vehicles, presidents, defence ministers and armies. Rather what I see very clearly are human beings. I am acutely conscious of toiling, suffering, but gregarious and happy humanity existing, moving and relaxing in their simple ways. I perceive also relatively idle, cliquish, but opulent and anxiety-ridden parasites operating in their devious ways. It is this constructivist prism that informs my reinterpretation of the nature of international relations, and my re-conceptualization of the configuration of forces in the international system. Mine is, I dare say, a fresh, bold and humanistic perspective on the discipline of international relations. It represents an abandonment of the elite stand point, and an embrace of a mass line, in looking at the world. The proponent of the elitist viewpoint studies the powerful, and therefore researches on how power is seized and consolidated; the protagonist of the mass line empathizes with the victims of power and studies how they can be liberated from exploitation and oppression- above all, how they can be freed from the tyranny of poverty.

My first published, purely conceptual work, reflecting this humanistic perspective, appeared in the *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* in 1993. Titled “**Conceptualizing the Configuration of Forces in the Emerging International System: Contending Perspectives**”,

it addressed the problem of the relationship between Africa's hapless predicament and the structure of the international system. In the paper, I critically examined the orthodox perspectives on the structure of the contemporary international system and identified their deficiencies. I highlighted, in particular, those perspectives that focus on the state as the only basic unit of analysis. I then proposed, as a means of overcoming their deficiencies, a re-conceptualization of the international system in terms of social forces, social movements and correlation of forces. These concepts, I posited, would provide a useful analytical framework for a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the structure of the international system than the traditional notions of states, alliances of states and balance of power. Based on the proposed new conceptual framework, I then argued that the predicament of contemporary Africa is best conceived, **not in terms of marginalization, but in terms of the lack of democracy.** Africa's social, economic and political problems have to be placed in the wider context of the international correlation of social forces and social movements if they are to receive meaningful attention and enduring solutions. The main reason is that the task of solving those problems actually belongs to the people, organized as social forces and social movements. It does not belong to the state, which is dominated by the elite, and which also constitutes a critical part of the problem.

My second contribution is in the area of international relations methodology. There are three dimensions of my output in this area. First, is the consistent application of theories to the analysis of international relations: a determination to promote the scientific study of international relations. This earned some of my works the sobriquet, "technical international relations" among students and colleagues. The consequence of this "technicalization" of international relations, as it was described by some, was not always pleasant. At first, some lazy students, especially some senior staff of the University who had registered for the course, "Principles of International Relations", changed to another elective course as soon as I took over the course from my former teacher, late Dr. Ray Ofoegbu. But to the credit of the successive leadership of the Department of Political Science, from 1977 to 2007, I remained the lecturer for the course, even after its title changed to "Introduction to International Relations". My first published work in this area, titled, "Decision-Making Models Revisited" has already been reviewed in this lecture. It is the first chapter of a book on decision-making process edited by Professors Olusanya and Akinele, former Directors-General of the NIIA. My second published is the first chapter, also, of a new [forth-coming] book on Nigeria's foreign policy, edited by Professor Bola Akinterinwa. It is entitled, "*Nigeria's National Interest in a Globalizing World: A Theoretical Perspective*".

The second dimension of my contribution in the area of methodology is the clarification of concepts. The concepts that captured my attention and the efforts to clarify which have been published are: "National Interest", "Non-alignment", and "Globalization".

The third dimension of my contribution to the promotion of methodological consciousness in international relations is my insistence on systematic presentation of data and information as evidence on the basis of which conclusions may be reached. I believe in, and lay much emphasis, in both research and teaching, on the accumulation and orderly presentation of facts and figures in support of arguments. Sometimes, my works make tedious reading because of this concern for what I regard as "concrete evidence. An example is my article published in CODESRIA's *Afrique et Développement/Africa Development*, Vol XIII, No.2, of 1988. It is a 48-page, facts

and figure-studded analysis of Nigeria's indigenization programme, and its impact on class formation and class struggles in Nigeria.

The third major contribution which I have made in the study of international relations is the shift of emphasis in foreign policy analysis from the traditional focus on objectives and principles to an accent on diplomatic strategies and techniques of bargaining. This change was accompanied by another innovation; it was the re-focusing of foreign policy analysis from the secondary (political and security matters) and tertiary (diplomatic ceremonials and protocol as well as values) to the tertiary(material conditions of life) level of foreign policy. My first published contribution in this area was entitled, "Foreign Policy and Economic Development". : The second was on the diplomacy of Nigeria's external economic relations: economic diplomacy and national interest.

The fourth major contribution which I have made to the study of international relations is providing a fresh perspective on **linkage politics**: the nexus between domestic politics and international politics; the exposition of the impact of domestic politics, especially bureaucratic politics, on Nigeria's foreign policy. A good example is the study of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi peninsula. Another is the study of the way in which the wide dispersal of responsibility for the conduct of external relations resulted in bureaucratic politics (the struggle for functions and funds) and incoherence in foreign policy output (published in **Civilizations** in 1980)

The fifth major contribution which I have made to the study of international relations is the construction of a framework of analysis of an international organization that enabled me to identify trends in the development of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and on the basis of my analysis of such trends predict fairly accurately its future development and status. That work was published under the title, "The OAU in the Year 2000: Some Informed Projections". Published in a special edition of the *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, in 1988 to mark the silver jubilee celebration of the OAU, the article carried the prediction that the OAU would be relegated to functional irrelevance, "as the twenty-first century matures", if it did not become proactive in tacking the problem of neo-colonialism, which I projected to be the historical African task in the new century. The emphasis being placed today on the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), rather the African Union (AU), is a validation of that projection.

Earlier, I had published two other works on international organizations. One was on "*Nigeria and the Non-aligned Movement*"[1986], in a book produced to mark 25 years of Nigeria's foreign policy and diplomacy. The other was on "*The EEC and South Africa*", in the book titled, **Southern Africa in the 1980s**, a product of an international conference. These publications exposed me to the international academic community. Consequently, in 1989, I was invited by a consortium of four international academic associations to be part of a team to produce a research-based special publication, a book on "**The United Nations System: The Policies of Member States**", to mark the golden jubilee of the United Nations system. Published by the United Nations University, the book had my contribution on "*Nigeria and the United Nations*" as its chapter eight. The concluding part of that chapter is symptomatic of, and consistent, with the humanist perspective which I espouse:

For a more effective world organization, peoples, not states,

should be the main target of the reform. Maximization of welfare, not the balancing of power, should be a guiding principle. Allies of the future United Nations should be sought among those who favour people's welfare over governmental security, among those who value human rights and development over and above the acquisition of war materials or profits derived from the sale of arms and ammunition.

[Asobie, in Alger, Lyons and Trent, 1995:364]

My participation in the research that led to the production of that book opened my eyes on the nexus between scholarship and policy; between research and activism; and between theory and ideology. I realized, from that experience, that globalization is not simply the unguided but inexorable march of market forces, but also, even more importantly, the deliberately orchestrated programme of global corporations and their political associates located strategically in the White House in Washington and Number 10 Downing Street in London. For, in that cold winter month of January, 1990, at Ottawa, Canada, the scholars drawn from across all the continents, and participating in the international conference to present our research findings on the UN system, discussed, not just the policies of member states, but also the possibility and feasibility of “global governance”.

That experience brought home to me the significance of my discipline in the twenty-first century; the century of global governance. Our individual lives are, every day, shaped by world events and developments that are apparently outside our control. A decision by OPEC in Vienna can determine whether or not we can afford to continue to finance our children's education. The future of OPEC itself may be determined by an action of the US Congress in Washington, aimed at illegalizing the existence of any cartel of petroleum producing and exporting countries. Our political leaders probably do not realize that, in the context of global governance, our President, whoever he may be, is virtually reduced to no more than the status of a provincial governor, of one of the about 200 constituent states, reporting simultaneously to both the G8 and Washington..

The *raison d'être* of the science of politics is the discovery and articulation of laws for the organization of society in a manner that maximizes the enhancement of human welfare. The sub-field of international relations approaches the same *problematique* from a global, systemic stand point. Still, the focus is on humanity. Humanism is the unspoken ideology of the expert in Political Science; it is, or should be, also, the guiding philosophy of the professional politician. Achieving “the good life” was, after all, the ultimate goal of politics in ancient Greek city states. The welfare of all, the good of the community, was also the guiding philosophy of pre-colonial Igbo village republics. Therefore, those who seek power in order to use it for the service of self, the despoliation of the common wealth, the suppression, oppression, starvation, and impoverishment of the vast majority of the citizens are stark illiterates in the science of politics. So are those who seek power for its own sake if any such there be. Power is for the common good. Politics is fundamentally concerned with the maximization of the welfare of the people. This is true of both domestic politics and international relations. This is the mass line. This I believe. The elite perspective is, of course, different. Happily, I am not a member of the “elite club”

REFERENCES

H. Assisi Asobie, "Nigeria: Economic Diplomacy and National Interest: An Analysis of the Politics of Nigeria's External Relations", *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.17, No. 2, 1991:34-98.

H. Assisi Asobie, "The Conflict Between Nigeria and Cameroon over Land and Sea Borders: The Political Context and Contending Principles", *University of Nigeria Journal of Political Economy*, Vol.1No.1,2005:74-104

H. A. Asobie, "The Foreign Policy of a Developing Nation: An Analysis", in EC Amucheazi, ed., *Readings in Social Sciences; Issues in National Development*.(Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980:59-79]

H. Assisi Asobie, "Decision-Making Models Re-visited: An analysis of the Application of Theories and Models of Foreign Policy Decision-Making to the Study of Nigeria's Foreign Policy", in G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele, ed. *The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria, 1960-1990*". Lagos :Nigerian Institute of International Affairs; Ibadan: Vantage Publishers International, 1990:3-52]

H. Assisi Asobie, "The Influences of Multinational Corporations on the Management of Public Enterprises in Nigeria", *Afrique et Developpement/Africa Development*, Vol.VIII. No.1, 1983:5-30

Assisi Asobie, "Indigenization, Class Formation and Class Struggles in Nigeria", *Afrique et Developpement/Africa Development*. Vol,Xiii, No.2,1998:29-76.

H. Assisi Asobie, "The EEC and Southern Africa", in Timothy Shaw and Jide Aluko, ed, *South Africa in the 1980s*. [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985:171-195]

H. A. Asobie, "Nigeria and the United Nations" in Gene M.Lyons, Chadwick F. Alger and John E. Trent, ed. *The United Nations System; The Policies of Member States*. [Tokyo, Paris and New York: United Nations University Press, 1995:329-366]

H. Assisi Asobie, "The OAU in the Year 2000: Some Informed Projections", *Nigerian Journal of International Affaris*, Vol.14,No.1,1988.

H. Assisi Asobie, *Conceptualizing the Configuring of Forces in the Emerging International System: Contending Perspectives.*, *Nigerian Journal of International Affaris*, Vol.19, N0.1,1993:1-227

H. Assisi Asobie, "Nigeria and the Non.Aligned Movement", in G.O.Olusanya and R. A. Akindele, ed., *Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years*, [Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986:141-175]

H. Assisi Asobie, Domestic Political Structure and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Experience, 1960:1975.[Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Economics, University of London, 1977]

Assisi Asobie, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights : A Case Study Approach [Academic Staff Union of Universities, 2004]

Michael Moore, Stupid White Men, [New York:Harper Collins Books, 2001]

H. Assisi Asobie, “International Relations, Foreign Policy and the Prospects and Problems of Globalization “ [Paper presented at the ASUU State of the Nation Conference, Abuja:14-17,2002]

Humphrey Assisi Asobie, Globalization: A View from the South., Annals of the Social Science Academy of Nigeria, No.13, January 200116-56