UNITED NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF SANCTIONS: THE SYRIAN DEBACLE

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A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, IN THE PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

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This project report, titled The United Nations and the Politics of Sanction the Syrian Debacle has been approved by the Department of Politics Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

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This study is dedicated to Almighty God, Nelson Mandela and the people of Syria who lost their lives as a result of seeking for their freedom from the hands of al-Assad’s despotic regime. It is also to empathize with the less privileged and the oppressed in this world of oppression.
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ABSTRACT

Conflict is never a sign of development but a darkness and economic doom to any given state or society, hence it should be treated with high handedness. United Nations and the Politics of Sanctions the Syrian Debacle is a topical issue in all Cable Networks, both the electronic and the paper media looking for adequate attention and a possible answer due to the battle and face off between Russia and US, permanent members of the Security Council. It also shows the bearing of this study, it highlighted. The introduction, statement of the problem, objective of the study, significance of the study, literature review, theoretical framework, method of data collection, conclusion and recommendations the focus of this study is to access the UN Security Council resolutions in achieving a peaceful regime in Syria in spite of the confusions within the UN Security Council, the broad objective is to ascertain the role of the UN Security Council in the management of the Syrian crisis. Qualitative method was used to gather data, the findings were characterized by the division of the UN Security Council in spite of their enviable roles in maintenance of global peace and security. The recommendation, the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council should be eliminated and simple majority system should be used under the supervision of great powers such as US, with the cooperation of the permanent members of the Security Council with this peace is achievable. This abstract X-rays the mechanism of the Security Council and the possible methods adopted to reach the possible solution to the Syrian crisis. Whether Assad or the Syrian National Council will be considered to carry out the democratic processes after the peace settlement.
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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

President Bashar al-Assad’s father who came from a poor Alawite family, seized power in the 1970 coup. Hafez al-Assad ruled Syria with a firm hand and was accused of numerous human rights abuses over the years, after the death of his father. Basher al-Assad presented himself in the Baath party and was elected unopposed as a reformer when he succeeded his father in 2000. But critics have called any changes largely superficial, and Assad crackdown on protesters in March 2011 sparked the current civil war. (www.cbc.ca/news/interactives/syria-dashboard/who/slides.html). Conflict and conflict management have been recognized globally as a social problem yearning for immediate attention. (Dougherty et al 1981:329) describe conflict as

a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, religious, socio-economic, political or otherwise) are in conscious opposition to one or more identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.

(Nicholson 1972) “A conflict occurs when there is interaction between at least two individuals or groups whose ultimate objective differ.” Conflict, which is as old as man, instead of diminishing with the rate of global development, is growing with speed. One wonders what has perpetuated this social cankerworm around the globe. That the emergence of conflicts has been traced to the following factors, the passion for power, wealth, fame, quest for minority rights, injustice, heterogeneous composition of the states, quest for ethnic identity, national interest and a purposeful partitioning of states into fragments by colonial masters. (Mac-Ogonor 2000:143-154) One of the basic interests of states is the pursuit of security objectives. This involves security against internal revolt and external aggression. However, the international
system is very much concerned with the problem of external aggression or conflict between states. However, it does not neglect internal conflicts due to its possible impact on the international system.

The pursuit of security makes it imperative that nation-states acquire power to deal with threats to its territorial integrity. As a result, there exists in the international system an inherent competition for power. This competition in a system that lacks the necessary instruments for the maintenance of law and order creates room for anarchy. It becomes important therefore to devise means to manage these conflicts arising from the competition for power by the actors in the international system. Such instruments for conflict management safeguard the nation-states from both external aggression and internal conflicts that could threaten the security of the international system.

It was this reason that the international organizations are formed. Such international organizations include the defunct League of Nations, United Nations, the Arab League of Nations, Africa Union and others. A common objective of these organizations is the maintenance of peace and security. However the United Nations is a global organization that has universal membership is committed to the maintenance of global peace and security, while the others pursue regional security matters. The United Nations, coined by United State President Franklin D. Roosevelt was first used in the declaration by United Nations of 1st January 1942, during the Second World War, when representatives of 26 nations pledged their governments to continue fighting together against the Axis power. (Plesch, 2011:89-90)

The forerunner of the United Nations was the League of Nations, an organization conceived in similar circumstances during the First World War and established in under the
Treaty of Versailles to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security. The League of Nations ceased its activities after failing to prevent the Second World War, hence was replaced by the United Nations. (MacKenzie, 2010:53) In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on international organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United State at Dumbaton Oaks. The Charter was signed on 26th June, 1945 by representatives of 50 countries. (Plesch, 2011:90-91)

The United Nations officially came into existence on 24th October, 1945 when the charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and the majority of other signatories, hence United Nations day is celebrated on 24th October each year, and also the Charter vii of the United Nations contains provisions for conflict management, the provisions stipulated the means and method of management of conflict and its resolution. The interest of the permanent members of the UN Security Council has made the peace process controversial in Syria since “the occupy Syria”. US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, in Qatar on January 12th, 2011, during her last stop in a Middle East diplomatic shuttle commenting on the challenges facing the region as she saw them. Her statement was sandwiched between four nationwide protest which began in Tunisia on December 18th 2010, spread to Algeria on January 3rd 2011 and snowballed into Egypt on January 25th, 2011 and to Yemen two days later. Although less covered there were also protest in Libya, Jordan (The Guardian, Sunday, February 6, 2011: 61) and on March 15th, 2011 the Syrian protest began. Clinton’s statement turned out to be a diplomatic summation of years of accumulated citizen’s frustration in Arab countries from the Morocco desert to the Persian Gulf. These are countries in which Arab leader’s grafted
democracy onto traditional Islamic religious establishments in response to the global spread of state secularization.

The shallowness of their democracies, however, is revealed in various democratic deficits, including inadequate democratic institutions and violations of rule of law and human rights, the sit tight posture of their leaders, the suppression of opposition and the persistence of Arab monarchical and Islamic traditions, some of which compromise the freedoms and choices necessary for democracy to thrive. The consequences for their citizens include exclusion from the management of their own affairs and the failure of political leaders to deliver political goods to their citizens as the nation’s wealth is concentrated in their own hands. The series of protest witnessed recently in these countries mark the culmination of resistance by citizens who refuse to take it any more

The top ten reasons for the uprising in Syria include political repression, discredited ideology, uneven economy, drought, population growth, new media, corruption, state violence, minority rule, and the Tunisia uprising and a wave of anti-government uprising across the Middle East, watching the fall of Tunisia and Egyptian regimes in early 2011 broadcast live on the satellite channel Al Jazeera, made millions in Syria aware that change was possible for the first time in decades. The crisis started with absolutely peaceful demonstrations.(Primoz, 2013)

Arab and Western diplomats and the UN Security Council draft resolution that calls for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to step down, while representatives from Russia and China slammed it as meddlesome. According to Vitaly Churkin, Russia Ambassador to the United Nations, the Council cannot impose the parameters for an internal political settlement “We are convinced that at a time of intense internal political crisis, the role of the international community should not be
one of exacerbating conflict nor meddling by use of economic sanctions or military force. Russia, China say dialogue should occur inside Syria. The focus of this study is to access the UN Security Council resolutions in achieving a peaceful regime in Syria in spite of the confusions within the UN Security Council.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The state of Syria got her independence 17th April; 1946, the early year of independence were marked by political instability. In 1948; the Syrian army were sent to Palestine to fight along with other Arab armies against the new created state of Israel; the Arabs lost the war and Israel occupied 78 percent of the historical Palestine. In July 1949 Syria was the last Arab country to sign an armistice agreement with Israel.

In 1949; Syria national government was overthrown by a military coup d’état led by Hussnial al-Zaim. Later that year Zaim was overthrown by his colleague Sami al-Hinnawi, a few months later; Hinnawi was overthrown by Adib al-Sheeshkli. The latter continued to rule the country until 1954, when growing public opposition forced him to resign and leave the country. The national government was restored; but again to face instability this time coming from abroad. In the mid 1950; Syria’s relation with the west witnessed some tension with the improving Syria-Soviet relations. The Syrian crisis has been stage managed by the division of the Security Council and thousands of lives have been lost and the inability of the United Nations Security Council to address the Syrian revolution that started 2011. (Jonathan, Syrian Embassy Washington January 2005) The research questions therefore arise.

1. Is the doctrine of collective security of the UN implicated in the Syrian crisis?

2. Does the UN sanction depend on the interests of the Permanent members of Security Council?
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The broad objective of this study is to ascertain the role of the UN Security Council in the management of the Syrian crisis. However the specific objectives of the study are to;

1. Ascertain whether the doctrine of collective security of the UN is implicated in the Syrian crisis
2. Determine if the UN sanctions depend on the interests of the Permanent members of the Security Council.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study has both theoretical and practical significance.

Theoretically this study will advance the knowledge of scholars and students in the doctrine of collective security, especially as it affect the Syrian crisis, and also the use of the UN sanctions by the Security Council in conflict resolution and the protection of the interest of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This study will also serve as a data base to researchers in the area of international conflict resolutions and the place of the UN Security Council in it.

Practically, this study will provide stakeholders in with the UN Security Council the framework for deeper appreciation of the nature of the Syrian conflicts and the possible ways of resolving it without escalating it, through a proper application of the doctrine of collective security and the use of sanctions.

This study will equally provide stakeholders involving the warring parties in Syria, through its recommendations that the sanctions being threatened by the UN Security Council is not really for the interest of the Syrian people, rather, it is to promote the interest of the
permanent members of the Security Council. Therefore it is left to them, the Syrian people, to resolve the crisis amicably and give peace a chance to reign.

1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The United Nations since its establishment in 1945, the Security Council through her department of peacekeeping operation has touched the length and breath of the globe trying to maintain one peace or the other for the benefit of mankind. For the purpose of the study we are going to limit our study strictly to the country’s profile.

In order to have proper focus and understanding we shall critically examine the causes of the conflict in Syria, the study will also expose the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council that has heightened the debacle in Syria. The limitation of this study, due to the distance and inadequate finance I was unable to travel to Syria to carry out this study and the time frame in the course of this study were my major setback.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

Is the doctrine of collective security of the UN implicated in the Syrian crisis?

The world has been over saturated with this discuss of maintaining world peace through the conscious eradication of intra and interstate conflicts. The formation of the 1920s International Organizations, the various regional organizations and the contemporary United Nations are geared toward the solidification of the noble peace course in the world today. Civil wars within states have erupted far more frequently than have wars between states. It is these armed struggles that most often capture news headlines worldwide. Hence the United Nations
Security Council has the responsibility of maintaining global peace and security. World War I pointed out a fundamental flaw in the balance of power system. When the system failed, the result was dangerous and catastrophic.

The incredible levels of destruction in the war led most nation-states to reject a balance of power system as the basis for international security in the Post-World War I. Instead, the victorious states sought to institutionalize a system of collective security via the League of Nations in which aggression by one state would bring response from all states; collective security would thus be achieved. The achievement of this “collective security” would be based on the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. Any state contemplating aggression would face the sure prospect of struggle not simply with the prospective victim, but with all other members of the system, who would make any necessary sacrifice to save the state attacked.

In a hypothetical world of collective security, the assumption is that the members of the system will have such an overwhelming preponderance of power that will be so unreservedly committed to the principles they have endorsed that aggression will become quite irrational; presumably, it will not occur or if it should occur, it will be defeated. The League of Nations and the United Nations are two Post-World War (first and second World Wars) agencies under which the collective security system has been used as machinery for joint action for the prevention or counter of any attack against an established international order. (Plesch, 2011:89-90)

(Dyke, 1957) sees collective security as a system in which a number of states are bound to engage in collective efforts on behalf of each other’s individual security. To (Chaturvedi, 2006), collective security is “an arrangement arrived at by some nations to protect their vital interests, safety or integrity, against a probable threat or menace over a particular period, by
means of combining their powers. In his conceptual clarification, (Eke, 2007) sees the concept of collective security as “an idealist one which hinges on the prevention of hostilities by the formation of an overwhelming military force by member states to deter aggression or, by implication, to launch a reprisal attack capable of defeating the recalcitrant member.” According to him, collective security connotes the institutionalization of a global police force against abuse of order and breaches, which can lead to insecurity. It is an arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any state within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force, by employing a system of collective security, the United Nations hopes to dissuade any member state from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace, thereby avoiding conflict.

From the above definitions by these eminent scholars, collective security can then be seen as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign states, whose members pledge themselves to defend each other against attack. The concept is best seen as “security for individual nation by collective means, that is, by membership in an international organization made up of all or most of the states of the world pledged to defend each other from attack. The idea of collective security was extensively discussed during the World War I, and it took shape in the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, and again in the Charter of the United Nations after World War II.

According to (Palmer and Perkings 2007), a collective security system, to be effective, must be strong enough to cope with aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it must be invoked if and as aggression occurs. The principle of collective security involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and when necessary and even to go to war. Collective security will never work unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to threaten
with sanctions and to fight, if necessary, an aggressor. It must be open to those states which are willing to accept its obligations in good faith.

(Rourke and Boyer 1998) assert that collective security is based on four principles: first, all countries forswear the use of force except in self-defence; second, all agree that peace is indivisible, an attack on one is an attack on all; third, all pledge to unite to halt aggression and restore the peace; fourth, all agree to supply whatever material or personnel resources that are necessary to form a collective security force associated with the United Nations or some IGO to defeat aggressors and restore the peace. The principle of collective security is found in Article 48 and 49 of the Charter of the United Nations which states that, “the action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine; such decisions shall be carried out by the members of the United Nations directly or through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. The idea behind the collective security system is that members of the organization advancing the collective security system (this time, the United Nations) are bound to spring to each other’s defense in case of attack. The basic principle is that an attack on one is an attack on all. Any state contemplating aggression would face the sure prospect of struggle not simply with the prospective victim, but with all other members of the system, who would make any necessary sacrifice to save the state attacked. In a hypothetical world of collective security, the assumption is that the members of the system will have such an overwhelming preponderance of power and will be so unreservedly committed to the principles they have endorsed that aggression will become quite irrational; presumably, it will thus not occur, or if it should occur, it will be defeated. (Dyke, 1957)
Karen Mingst averred that collective security is borne out of some salient assumptions. These assumptions are that: wars are prevented by restraint of military action; aggressors must be stopped; the aggressor is easily identified; the aggressor is always wrong; aggressors know that the international community will act against them (Mingst, 1999). As asserted by (Dyke 1957), they wanted states to abandon narrow conceptions of self interest as a guide to policy and to regard themselves as units in a world society having an interest in preserving law and order everywhere.” These ideas expressed by these scholars could not work out as a result of numerous problems associated with the concept of collective security. There are other scholars who feel that the concept of collective security is misguided. They see it as conceptually muddled and naively unrealistic. Although they are pledged to defend each other, many countries will refuse to do so, if such an act is not in their own best interests or thought to be too risky or expensive. In addition, they argue that collective security arrangements will turn small struggles into large ones, and prevent the use of alternative (non-violent) problem solving, relying instead on the much more costly approach of military confrontation. In addition, there is always a danger that alliances formed by the purpose of collective security can also serve as a basis for an aggressive coalition. Other problems associated with the collective security system are discussed as follows:

1. States do not regard themselves as members of one society having a common vital interest in protecting and preserving each other’s rights. Does it really matter to Japan if Paraguay and Bolivia destroy themselves in a war? Of what interest is it to Nigeria if Egypt should attack Tunisia and such attack is repelled or defeated? There is no doubt that states have demonstrated a willingness to ally themselves with certain other selected states and thus to pledge to defend certain selected frontiers in addition to their own, but the principle of “one for all and all for one” does not commend itself.
2. Another challenge to collective security is that its risks are great. Governments of nation-states can enforce law against individuals with little risk or fear. Internationally, however, the situation is quite different. Disparities of power are much greater. “Theoretically, it might be easy for a world society to defeat aggression by a smaller power like Nigeria, but what if one of the great powers turns aggressor”? It is one thing for a government to enforce a law against a hapless individual and another thing for the United Nations to try to enforce the law against a state which may be almost as strong as the rest of the world combined. The development of nuclear weapons makes the problem all the greater. An aggressor with such weapons could virtually wipe from the face of the earth a number of the members of the collective security system. Faced with such a possibility, a member whose own most vital interest was directly threatened might choose proud defiance rather than surrender. But a member whose own vital interests were not directly threatened would be unlikely to be so bold. Nor do states want to commit themselves in advance to undertake such risks, regardless of the identity of the aggressor and of his victim.

3. (Jones 1985) and (Rostow 1968) cited in (Eke 2007) are in agreement that the principles of the United Nations veto is “a great inhibition to the smooth and effective functioning of the Security Council collective security system”. In his observation, Rostow argued that “part of the problem is that the responsibility of world peace was resting on the shoulders of nations with preponderant military and political power.” By this, he meant those nations that could become arrogant to ignore local wars, revolutions, or conquests on the assumption that they do not disturb the general equilibrium of power or endanger the sense of security of the system as a whole. The veto principle of the Security Council of the United Nations was originally meant to ensure commitment of the five permanent members to the
United Nations. It was also meant that no superpower is against any UN action, which can lead to outbreak of hostilities (Butler, 1999). The superpowers were expected to exercise collective responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security. But what we see today has been unilateral actions by some permanent members of the Security Council with veto powers, especially the United States and Great Britain against countries they perceive as threats to international peace and security. A good example is the invasion of Iraq by the United States and Britain, “this wave of American-styled security by domination in place of collective security creates both anxiety and curiosity over the weakness of the United Nations Collective Security as “sine qua non” for world peace and security.

4. The activities of powerful regional organizations have posed a serious problem to United Nations Collective Security System. “Experience has shown that members of such organizations demonstrate divided loyalty often times with more concern to the regional organization than the UN,” (Eke, 2007) Members of regional security have often abandoned the UN Collective Security System in preference to regional security system. Bulter observed that during the invasion of Iraq by the United States “the Security Council – the hub of collective security regime was bypassed, defied and abused”. (Butler, 1999). Palmer and Perkins agree that the United States and western powers, in their attitudes of placing more emphasis on national and regional defense than on collective security as the obligation to the Charter of the United Nations are fundamental problems of unanimity of the Council and by extension, the cause of failure of security regime. (Palmer and Perkins, 2007) In many instances of states and regional conflicts, members of regional security abandon the UN. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had helped to bury the optimism, which greeted the UN Collective Security System in the 78-day bombing of Yugoslavia, and of course Iraq, after the
fall of Soviet empire. In these two crises situation, the Security Council which is the hub of collective security regime was bypassed. The double allegiance of members of the United Nations, especially by the veto-wielding ones, concretely depicts moral failure.

**Does the UN sanction depend on the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council?**

The Syrian crisis started on the 15th of March 2011, as a result of poor political reform and inability to deliver political goods. (CNN) After 21 months of bloodshed and a failure by the international community to do anything to stop it, the UN-Arab League point man on the Syrian crisis expressed confidence that political resolution is possible. Lakhdar Brahimi’s optimism followed talks in Geneva with Russia Deputy Foreign Mikhail Bogdanov and US Deputy Secretary of state Williams Burns, which he called “constructive and held in a spirit of cooperation”. Getting Russia on board any international plan is seen as key because it has been an ally of Syria’s government and blocked tough measures against president Bashar al-Assad in the UN Security Council. The bleak assessment by top U.N. humanitarian officials motivated the Security Council, which has been deadlocked over how to deal with the crisis since it began, to reach agreement on a non-binding statement demanding an end to the escalating violence and condemning human rights abuses by all sides. (www.un.org/news/focus/syria)

A quarter of Syria’s 22 million people are displaced within the country and 1.3 million have fled to other states in the Middle East and North Africa, U.N. aid chief Valerie Amos and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres told the U.N. Security Council.
It was a rare public briefing of the Security Council on the conflict in Syria, which was called for by Australia, and Amos pleaded for the 15 council members to "take the action necessary to end this brutal conflict". "The situation in Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe with ordinary people paying the price for the failure to end the conflict," according to Amos. "I do not have an answer for those Syrians I have spoken to who asked me why the world has abandoned them."

The Security Council has been deadlocked on how to end the conflict. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's close ally Russia, with the aid of China, has used its veto power to block any condemnations or attempts to sanction Assad's government. The United Nations says the war in Syria, which began as peaceful protests that turned violent when Assad tried to crush the revolt, has claimed more than 70,000 lives. "Children are among the ones who suffer most," according to Amos. "Children have been murdered, tortured and subjected to sexual violence". Many do not have enough food to eat. Millions have been traumatized by the horrors. This brutal conflict is not only shattering Syria's present, it is destroying its future. U.N. envoy on sexual violence in conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, and U.N. envoy on children and armed conflict, Leila Zerrougui, also briefed the council on the Syrian conflict.

Syria's U.N. Ambassador Bashar Ja'afari blamed terrorism and sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and others for the plight of its people and accused neighboring countries of preventing refugees from returning to Syria. "Syrian people will not forgive facilitating the movement of thousands of European and Western terrorists and jihadists, sponsored by well-known intelligence agencies, to the Turkish, Lebanese and Jordanian borders with Syria". "They are accommodated in training camps to then enter my country and spread destruction and sabotage, and shed innocent blood," Ja'afari told the Security Council in comments that echoed what Assad said in a television interview.
The UK, US, and France rounded on Russia and China following the veto of a UN draft resolution on fresh Syrian sanctions lambasting the move as “inexcusable” and accusing Moscow of buying time for Bashar al-Assad to smash the opposition. Both Russia and China have consistently resisted the Security Council’s attempt to introduce sanctions on Damascus, meaning their veto was no surprise, but the strength of the response from those in favour gave some indication of the frustrations behind the scenes Britain’s foreign secretary, William Hague condemned the two vetoing the resolution as “inexcusable and indefensible” adding that Russia and China had “turned their back on the people of Syria in their darkest hour”. It was the third time Russia and China have used their vetoes over Syria. The resolution would have allowed sanctions to be imposed on Assad regime under chapter vii of the UN charter.

The UK ambassador, sir Mark Lyall Grant was the first to respond to the vote at the UN in New York, telling council members that UK “is appalled by the decision of Russia and China to veto the draft resolution”. Russia and China are failing in their responsibilities as permanent Security Council members, Lyall Grant said, adding that the proposed resolution is supported by almost every group internationally. He added that the other UN Security Council nations had offered “flexibility on Russia and China concerns,” yet the countries argued that charter vii resolution is somehow designed to seek conflict through the back door.

“This argument is irrational” he added. The French ambassador, Gerard Araud, was even more critical, declaring that “history will prove (Russia and China) wrong, and it will judge them.” It is now clear that Russia merely wants to win time for the Syrian regime to smash the opposition he said. Russia’s ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, fought back against criticism, saying countries had “attempted to fan the flames of conflict with the UN Security Council”. The draft which was just voted on was biased the threats of sanctions were leveled exclusively at the
government of Syria. This counter to the spirit of the Geneva document and does not reflect the realities in the country today China also believed the resolution to be seriously problematic, with uneven content that is intended to put pressure on only one party. The country’s ambassador Li Baodong said countries had made “unfounded accusations against China” adding that the resolution would not only further aggravate the turmoil, but also result spill over to other countries in the region. (www.guardian.co.uk>News>WorldNews>United Nations)

However Susan Rice, the US ambassador said that the suggestion that the resolution would give green light for foreign forces to enter Syria was paranoid if not disingenuous, it would in no way authorize or even pave way for foreign military intervention, we have missed yet another critical opportunity to work together. We and the people of Syria cannot afford to miss any more she added. One can only hope that one day, before too many thousands more die, that Russia and China will stop protecting Assad and allow this council to play its proper role at the centre of the international response to the crisis in Syria.

The Security Council is the most powerful organ in the United Nations saddle with the responsibility of maintenance of world peace and security, in contrast to the League of Nations, the UN recognized Great Power prerogative in the Security Council. It was made up initially of 11 states, and then after 1965, of 15 states, it include five permanent members, namely the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union (later Russia) and China, as well as 10 elected non permanent members. Unlike the League, the decisions of the Security Council are binding, and must only be passed by a majority of nine out of the 15 members therefore have veto power over all Security Council decisions. There have been widespread calls for the reform of the Security Council, but this is very difficult. The five permanent members of the Security Council were seen as the major powers when the UN was founded, and they were granted a veto
on the view that if big powers were not given a privileged position, the UN would not work. This view stems from Realist theory. Indeed, this tension between the recognition of power politics through the Security Council veto, and the universal ideas underlying the UN, is a defining feature of the organization. When the Security Council considers a threat to international peace, it first explores ways to settle the dispute peacefully under the term of charter vi of the UN charter. It may suggest principles for a settlement or may suggest mediation. In the event of fighting the Security Council tries to secure a cease fire. It may send a peacekeeping mission to help the parties maintain the truce and force opposing forces apart. The council can also take measures to enforce its decision under chapter vii of the charter. It can, for instance impose economic sanctions or order an arms embargo. On rare occasions, the Security Council has authorized member state to use “all necessary means, including collective military action, to see that its decisions are carried out. The Syrian crisis is an arms struggle between President Assad and the opposition groups; the duty of the UN Security Council is to maintain global peace and security because of the division of the UN Security Council and the inability to bring about absolute resolution. According to Jonathan Karl ABC News; President Obama has directed his National Security team to significantly ramp up US support of the opposition forces battling Syrian president Assad. White House is actively considering supplying the Rebels with arms. This is a move Obama has resisted for fears that the weapons could fall into the wrong hands. Analyst with Max-Security Solution; a security consulting firm based in Israel; said in the New York Times that Russia arms sales to Syrian are worth 4 billion dollars and Russia investment in Syria worth 20 billion dollars. The big question is this. The UN Security Council ought to prevent the crisis or to ship arms to Syrian people to kill themselves? Ideally in any crisis zone the first step is to stop the shipment of arms to those areas.
Responsibility to Protect, for this to take place the power approach which is expressed in the policy of prestige, according to the adherents of power school of thought, because of the unsettled nature of the international system; nations are continuously in the quest to acquire in other to actualise their foreign policy objectives which are embedded in the advancement of national interests. Hans Morgenthau who is leading progenitor of the realist school and subscriber of power politics view power “as man’s control over the minds and actions of other (Morgenthua, 1967:25-26).(Stoessinger 1979:12) postulates that power “is the most crucial of all the concept in the study of international relations”. Both Stoessinger and Morgenthau tend to subscribe to the idea that the relevance of states such as the US, capability in the global affairs depend on its power to effect changes in political behavior of both its allies and adversaries. Essentially, this is manifested in the military capability of the US in terms of military technological superiority. In fact, the US is probably the only nation in the world today that is capable of mobilizing its forces within 24 hours in any part of the globe. The US capability in the global affairs which has continually been expressed in its power of influence in peace keeping operations and rescue operations during natural disaster attest to this. It is against this backdrop that one can then appreciate the nature and character of the post 9/11/2001 US unilateral foreign policy (cited in Okolie, 2009:210-211) based on this facts US should intervene in the Syrian crisis despite the veto of Russia and China. The power approach has been somehow neglected in the literature, the major task of this study is therefore, to adopt appropriate technique, generate and analyse relevant data and fill this gap in literature
1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to (Onuoha 2008:32) “theories are lenses through which we see the world. It is a deliberate systematic body of knowledge that helps the scholar to speculate, but also interpret, describe, explain, and predict global politics.” The theories of international relations provide us with a choice of conceptual framework, that is a device or scheme for adopting or applying the assumption, postulations and principles of a theory in the description and analysis of a research problem (Obasi, 1999:43). In this study we shall adopt the Marxian political economy approach as our theoretical framework in buttressing the views and literature regarding the relationship between President Assad, the Syrian National Council and the International Community. Also how the Syrian protest led to the civil war or the ongoing revolution.

The proponents of the Marxian theory include, (Paul, Baran 1987), (Ake, 1981), (Robert, Gilpin 1987), (Lenin, 1975), and other known contributors to the theory. As lucidly presented by (Aja, 1998), (Marx, 1977), (Ake, 1981), political economy approach attempts to show how the interplay of politics and economics affects reforms in societies and the global economic structure with which state and other economic entities contact and interact in world economic system.

Marxian political economy is a theory based on dialectical materialism or economic determinism in which the system of economic production determines the institutional and ideological structure of society (Wetter, 1963). Central to the political economy of imperialism and war is the assumption that all international issues are reducible to issues of economic gains rather than political power. It considers that all histories and history of class struggle between the ruling class and the opposition group, from which comes a new economic, political, and social system (Marx, 1977). Marx analysis contains a thesis, ruling class and an antithesis, opposing
groups which clash and produce a synthesis, a new economic, political, and social system (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1977)

Labour is the essence of material existence, hence, economic activity is man primary concern. In line with (Aja1998), the thrust of this perspective is on how the understanding of a society’s politics and culture depend primarily on the understanding of its economic structure as defined by the relations between employers of labour and the working class in the process of production. To Marx every political system corresponds and reflects its kind of economic structure. Marx places emphasis and premium on the production base, e.i the substructure, one easily understand the nature of internal relations, how a society organizes, manages, and reproduces itself the causes of tension, conflicts, or contradictions in any given society and the bearing or direction of social change.

This theory enables us to appreciate the dimensions and dynamics of the prevailing political crisis in Syria, political repression and uneven economy. President Bashar al-Assad assumed power in 2000 after the death of his father Hafez al-Assad who had ruled Syria since 1970. Privatization policy favoured families with personal links to Assad, leaving provincial Syria, and the essence of Russia protecting Assad is because of economic gains Russia is protecting her investment in Syria, and President Assad is the only man Russia trust to protect such economic gains. Hence according to Marx the class struggle, ultimately produce revolution as exemplified in Syria. Syria is al-Assad and al-Assad is Syria.
1.8 HYPOTHESES

This study is guided by the following hypotheses:

- The doctrine of collective security of the UN is implicated in the Syrian crisis.
- The UN sanctions depends on the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council.

1.9 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

Qualitative method was used, secondary sources of data were utilized in generating data for this study. Consequently data was collected from published works such as books, journals, articles, conference papers, Newspapers, UN publications, magazines, periodicals and internet materials. According to (Obasi, 1999:172) “secondary sources rely on information pieced from document. These documents may be published and unpublished materials on the activities of public and private organization which constitute important source of data for qualitative political analysis.” This type of data could be obtained easily even without the concept of the original owner of the generator of such documents. The advantages of secondary sources “are that is economical, the cooperation of the individual about whom information is being sought is not required, thus, creating an analytical basis for establishing trend of events” (Obasi, 1999:172)

DATA ANALYSIS

This study adopts qualitative description analysis which is an aspect of content analysis. According to (Asika 2006:118) “qualitative descriptive analysis essentially has to do with summarizing the data generated in the research.” Being a non-experimental research, the use of qualitative descriptive analysis will be employed to analyse the data generated from our sources
on the efforts or actions the UN Security Council in their application of the doctrine of collective security and sanctions towards the resolution of the Syrian crisis.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

A research design, is a plan which guides a researcher and prevents him or her from veering off course in the process of collecting, analyzing, presenting and interpreting data. It is a logical model of proof that allows the research to draw inferences concerning causal (relations among the variables under investigation, both the independent and dependent variables exist and are observed at the same time because, the effect of the former on the later took place before the study and this represent by XO where X stands for experimental variable and O representing observation. This study utilizes the ex-post-facto research design. Ex-post-facto research design refers to those studies which investigate possible cause and effect relationship by observing an existing condition and searching back in time for plausible causative factors. (Asika, 1999) observes that in ex-post-facto, the events that are observed have indeed taken place already. In other words, data are collected after the event or phenomenon under investigation has taken place. The ex-post-facto design will enable us to understand the doctrine of collective security and sanctions of the UN Security Council and their applications, especially in the Syrian situation and the effect this has on the Syrian crisis, as some of the actions have already taken place.
### LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK (LDF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESEARCH QUESTION</th>
<th>HYPOTHESES</th>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>SOURCES OF DATA</th>
<th>METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION</th>
<th>METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the doctrine of the UN collective security implicated in the Syrian crisis?</td>
<td>The doctrine of UN collective security</td>
<td>The veto of Russian and China</td>
<td>Textbooks, journals, UN publication, conference papers, newspapers, internet materials</td>
<td>Qualitative method: gathering of data from secondary sources</td>
<td>Qualitative descriptive or content analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Syrian crisis</td>
<td>Basher al-Assad government and the opposition groups killing themselves for regime change</td>
<td>Textbooks, journals, UN publication, conference papers, newspapers, internet materials</td>
<td>Qualitative method: gathering of data from secondary sources</td>
<td>Qualitative descriptive or content analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the sanction depend on interest of the permanent members of the Security Council?</td>
<td>The UN sanction depends on the interest of the permanent members of the Security Council.</td>
<td>US, Britain and other European/Arab League countries give economic sanctions to Bashar al-Assad’s government and travel ban.</td>
<td>Textbooks, journals, UN publication, conference papers, newspapers, internet materials</td>
<td>Qualitative method: gathering of data from secondary sources</td>
<td>Qualitative descriptive or content analysis</td>
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<td>The interest of the permanent members of the Security Council</td>
<td>The politics of US and Russia on the Syrian crisis is based on economic gains and geopolitics</td>
<td>Textbooks, journals, UN publication, conference papers, newspapers, internet materials</td>
<td>Qualitative method: gathering of data from secondary sources</td>
<td>Qualitative descriptive or content analysis</td>
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CHAPTER TWO

2.1 HISTORY OF THE SYRIAN STATE

Formal Name: Syrian Arab Republic (Al Jumhuriyah al Arabiyah as Suriyah). Short Form: Syria. Term for Citizen(s): Syrian(s). Capital: Damascus (population estimated at 5 million in 2004). Other Major Cities: Aleppo (4.5 million), Homs (1.8 million), Hamah (1.6 million), Al Hasakah (1.3 million), Idlib (1.2 million), and Latakia (1 million). (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

A Brief Period of Independence: The period between the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and the granting of France’s mandate over Syria by the League of Nations in 1922 was marked by a complicated sequence of events during which Syrians achieved a brief period of independence (1919–20). However, three forces were at work against Arab nationalism: Britain’s interest in keeping eastern Mesopotamia under its control in order to counter Russian influence and to protect British oil interests; the Jewish interest in Palestine; and France’s determination to remain a power in the Middle East. Ultimately, Syria and Lebanon were placed under French influence, and Transjordan and Iraq, under British mandate. The termination of Syria’s brief experience with independence left a lasting bitterness against the West and a deep-seated determination to reunite Arabs in one state. This quest was the primary basis for modern Arab nationalism. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

The period of French Mandate brought nearly every feature of Syrian life under French control. This oppressive atmosphere mobilized educated wealthy Muslims against the French. Among their grievances were the suppression of newspapers, political activity, and civil rights; the division of Greater Syria into multiple political units; and French reluctance to frame a constitution for Syria that would provide for eventual sovereignty, which the League of Nations
had mandated. Only in the wake of a widespread revolt instigated by the Druze minority in 1925 did the French military government begin to move toward Syrian autonomy. Despite French opposition, the Soviet Union and the United States granted Syria and Lebanon recognition as sovereign states in 1944, with British recognition following a year later. These Allied nations pressured France to leave Syria, but it was not until a United Nations resolution in February 1946 ordering France to evacuate that Syrians finally attained sovereignty. By April 15, 1946, all French troops had left Syrian soil.

**Independence:** Syria endured decades of strife and turmoil as competing factions fought over control of the country’s government following independence in 1946. This era was one of coups, countercoups, and intermittent civilian rule during which the army maintained a watchful presence in the background. From February 1958 to September 1961, Syria was joined with Egypt in the United Arab Republic (UAR). But growing Syrian dissatisfaction with Egyptian domination resulted in another military coup in Damascus, and Syria seceded from the UAR. Another period of instability ensued, with frequent changes of government. The Arab Socialist Resurrection (Baath) Party (hereafter, Baath Party), with a secular, socialist, Arab nationalist orientation, took decisive control in a March 1963 coup, often referred to as the Baath Revolution. The Baath Party had been active throughout the Middle East since the late 1940s, and a Baath coup had taken place in Iraq one month prior to the Baath take-over in Syria. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

Factionalism continued within the Baathist regime until the assumption of power by then-Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Hafiz al Assad following a bloodless military coup in
November 1970. Internal conflict between the Baath Party’s more moderate military wing and more extremist civilian wing had been exacerbated by external events, including Israel’s defeat of the Syrians and Egyptians in the June 1967 war, as a result of which Syria lost territory in the Golan Heights, as well as Syria’s disastrous intervention on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Jordan in September 1970 (events later dubbed Black September). Assad, approved as president by popular referendum in March 1971, quickly moved to establish an authoritarian regime with power concentrated in his own hands. His thirty-year presidency was characterized by a cult of personality, developed in order to maintain control over a potentially restive population and to provide cohesion and stability to government. The dominance of the Baath Party; the socialist structure of the government and economy; the military underpinning of the regime; the primacy of members of the Alawi sect, to which Asad belonged, in influential military and security positions; and the state of emergency imposed as a result of ongoing conflict with Israel further ensured the regime’s stability. Nevertheless, this approach to government came at a cost. Dissent was harshly eliminated, the most extreme example being the brutal suppression in February 1982 of the Muslim Brotherhood, which objected to the state’s secularism and the influence of the “heretical” Alawis. Moreover, the country’s economy suffered, and progress was hindered by an overstaffed and inefficient public sector run overwhelmingly according to Baath Party dictates. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

Hafiz al Assad died in 2000 and was promptly succeeded by his son, Bashar al Assad, after the constitution was amended to reduce the mandatory minimum age of the president from 40 to 34. Bashar was then nominated by the Baath Party and elected president in a popular referendum in which he ran unopposed. From the start, the younger Assad appeared to make
economic and political reform a focus and a priority of his presidency. He has faced resistance from the old guard, however. After a brief period of relaxation and openness known as the Damascus Spring (July 2000–February 2001), dissent is once again not tolerated in Syria, and it appears that any reforms will be slow in coming. Nevertheless, Assad reportedly is slowly dismantling the old regime by enforcing mandatory retirement and replacing certain high-level administrators with appointments from outside the Baath Party.

GEOGRAPHY

Syria is located in southwestern Asia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, with Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east Jordan to the south, and Israel and Lebanon to the west.

Syria is about the size of North Dakota, with a total land area of 185,180 square kilometers (184,050 square1,130 square kilometers of water), including 1,295 square kilometers of Israeli-occupied territory. Syria’s land boundaries total 2,253 kilometers with the bordering nations of Iraq (605 kilometers), Israel (76 kilometers), Jordan (375 kilometers), Lebanon (375 kilometers), and Turkey (822 kilometers). Territory disputed by Syria includes 1,295 square kilometers of the Golan Heights occupied by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. A portion of the Golan Heights also is claimed by Lebanon. In addition, the Syrian government has never recognized the legality of Turkey’s possession of Hatay Province, which was the Syrian province of Iskenderun until France ceded it to Turkey in 1939. Diversion of water from the Euphrates River for dams is a continuing source of conflict between Syria and both Turkey and Iraq. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

Syria’s population was estimated at 18.2 million in July 2003 and was growing at an estimated rate of 2.4 percent in 2004. The annual growth rate from 1990–2002 was 2.6 percent.
About 52 percent of the population was urban as of 2002, with a growth rate of 3.1 percent. Syria is one of the most densely populated countries in the Middle East (57 people per square kilometer in 1986 and about 363 per square kilometer in 2004), but there are significant regional variations. The population is concentrated along the coast in the west, in the south around Damascus, and in the Euphrates River Valley in the northeast. More than 400,000 Palestinian refugees are believed to reside in Syria. In addition, Syria has some 170,000 internally displaced people, mostly from the Golan Heights. An estimated 40,000 people remain in the Golan Heights, including about 20,000 Arabs and 20,000 Israeli settlers. In early 2005, news reports indicated that Syria had been “overwhelmed” by the influx of more than 700,000 Iraqis since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003

**ECONOMY**

Syria had a relatively well-developed agricultural and industrial base at independence in 1946, but following independence the economy underwent widespread structural change. When the Baath Party became the major political force in the 1960s, Syria’s economic orientation and development strategy were transformed. Government-sponsored land reform and the nationalization of major industries and foreign investments confirmed the socialist direction of the country’s economic policy. With the high oil prices of the 1970s, Syria experienced a shift away from the traditional agrarian base to an economy dominated by the services, industrial, and commercial sectors, but a series of crises in the 1980s caused the economic climate to shift again, this time from prosperity to austerity. The government instituted limited reforms to respond to the burgeoning crisis, but the pressing economic problems required a radically restructured economic policy in order to improve performance. The principal challenge of reform is to
modernize and transform an inefficient centralized economy. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

Unlike many of its Arab neighbors, Syria has a diversified economy that is not overly dependent on oil. However, economic development has been hampered by a number of internal and external factors and has not kept pace with population growth. Historical problems affecting economic growth in Syria include a preoccupation with the Israeli threat and an obsession with internal order; massive defense and security spending has taken precedence over economic reform. Additionally, the overstaffed and inefficient public sector of the predominantly statist economic system has drained the economy by soaking up government expenditures and foreign exchange. Modest reforms are beginning to have a positive impact, and some sectors that were exclusively state-operated have opened to private-sector participation and foreign investment. New investment laws have encouraged private-sector growth by gradually expanding the list of goods that the private sector may produce or import and have permitted private competition with the government in some areas, such as textile and pharmaceutical manufacturing. However, the government continues to control strategic industries, such as oil production and refining, telecommunications, air transport, power generation and distribution, and water distribution, as well as the price of key agricultural goods. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005). Moreover, resistance from senior regime members, entrenched interests, and a bureaucracy staffed with unskilled workers has hampered the reform effort. Assad remains committed to reform, but the effort is not comprehensive or integrated.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS:

Ostensibly a republic, in reality Syria is an authoritarian, military-dominated regime opposition where the president is not tolerated, and, with the succession of the previous president’s son, concern about hereditary rule is plausible. Whereas the citizens may vote for the president and members of parliament, they cannot change the government; the president, for example, is not actually elected but, rather, confirmed by unopposed popular referenda. Parliament may assess and sometimes modify laws proposed by the executive branch, but it may not initiate laws. The president and his senior aides make most decisions in the political, economic, and security sectors, with a very limited degree of public accountability. The regime does not tolerate political opposition and justifies itself by maintaining a state of emergency that has been in effect since 1963 as a result of the state of war that continues to exist with Israel.

With the constitution ceding primacy to the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Baath) Party, all three branches of government are dominated by its views. The party is both socialist (advocating state ownership of the means of industrial production and redistribution of agricultural land) and revolutionary (espousing the goal of carrying the socialist revolution to every part of the Arab world). However, since August 1990 the regime has de-emphasized the socialist aspect in favor of pursuing pan-Arab unity. The regime’s survival hinges on its strong desire for stability and its success in giving groups such as religious minorities and peasant farmers a stake in society. Perhaps more important, the expansion of government bureaucracy has created a large class of citizens loyal to the regime. The army and internal security apparatus, the units most responsible
for enforcing the regime’s stability, are loyal, effective, and dominated by the Alawi sect, to which the Assad family belongs. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

Following the death of Hafiz al Assad in 2000, his son Bashar was nominated and confirmed as president. Bashar al Assad is a reform-minded president, and although his reforms have been met with resistance from the old guard, the country appears to have the potential for some modification of its system of government. There reportedly have been calls to make the Baath Party less influential in government and speculation that the president might push to remove the article of the constitution granting the party primacy. Syria’s Permanent Constitution of March 13, 1973, provides for a republican form of government described as “a democratic, popular, socialist, and sovereign state.” The constitution stipulates that the president must be a Muslim, and the main source of legislation must be Islamic doctrine and jurisprudence, although Islam is not specifically designated as the state religion. The Baath Party is named “the vanguard party in the society and the state.” Governmental powers are divided among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but the already formidable role of the presidency is strengthened by the constitution. Economic principles set forth a planned socialist economy. The constitution also reaffirms the ideological promise that Syria is only part of the one and indivisible “Arab nation” that is struggling for complete Arab unity.

Branches of Government, In the executive branch, the president is approved by unopposed popular referendum for a renewable seven-year term. According to the constitution, the candidate must be a Syrian Arab Muslim, proposed by the Baath Party, and nominated by the legislature. The constitution was amended in June 2000 to reduce the mandatory minimum age of the president from 40 to 34 in order to make Hafiz al Asad’s son, Bashar, eligible for nomination. The president can be removed from power only in the case of committing high
treason. He is both head of state and chief executive officer of the government as well as commander in chief of the armed forces. He appoints his vice presidents (two), appoints and dismisses the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and other members of the Council of Ministers (the cabinet), as well as military officers. The Council of Ministers serves collectively as the executive and administrative arm of the president and the state. The president holds the right to dissolve the legislature. Other presidential prerogatives include the right to declare war and a state of emergency, issue laws to be ratified by the People’s Council, declare amnesty, and approve five-year economic plans.

The legislative branch consists of a 250-seat unicameral People’s Council. Members are elected by direct popular vote on the basis of single-member electoral districts for four-year terms. Half of the seats in the People’s Council are reserved for the Baath Party. The Council sits in three regular sessions annually but may be called into special session. In theory, the functions of the council include the nomination of a presidential candidate, enactment of laws, discussion of government policy, approval of general budget and development plans, and ratification of treaties. In practice, however, the legislature has no independent authority, because the executive branch effectively controls the legislative process. The assembly may criticize government policies and modify draft laws, but it cannot initiate legislation.

The judicial branch includes courts at three levels: courts of first instance (magistrate courts, summary courts, and peace courts), courts of appeal (one per province), and the Court of Cassation in Damascus, which serves as the highest court of appeal with the authority to resolve both jurisdictional and judicial issues. The Supreme Constitutional Court adjudicates electoral disputes and rules on the constitutionality of laws and decrees. The High Judicial Council,
headed by the president and composed of senior civil judges, appoints, transfers, and dismisses judges. Specialized courts exist outside of the basic three-tiered structure. State security courts, topped by the Supreme State Security Court, hear cases related to national security. In these courts, judgments are not subject to appeal, the president must approve the verdict, and the court is not bound by the same procedures as the courts of regular jurisdiction.

Operating under a state of emergency, these special courts do not observe constitutional provisions that safeguard defendants’ rights. Military courts can try both military personnel and civilians. Here are reports that the government operates military field courts outside established courtrooms, observing fewer of the formal procedures. Economic security courts, which formerly handled economic crimes, were abolished in 2004. Personal status courts deal with matters such as marriage and divorce and are divided along religious lines. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

Administrative divisions Syria has 14 provinces (muhafazat; pl., muhafazah): Halab, Dimashq, Dar’a, Rif Dimashq, Dayr az Zawr, Hamah, Al Hasakah, Hims, Idlib, Al Ladhiqiyah, Al Qunaytirah (includes the Golan Heights), Ar Raqqah, As Suwayda, and Tartus. Syrian maps also include the Turkish province of Hatay (Iskenderun). Damascus (Dimashq), Syria’s capital, was designated as a province in 1987.

Provincial and Local Government In practice, government remains highly centralized in Damascus, and provincial governments have little autonomy. Governors, nominated by the minister of interior, approved by the cabinet, and appointed by the central government, head provinces. A provincial council assists each governor. Three-quarters of council members are popularly elected for a term of four years; the minister of interior and the governor appoint the
remaining members. Each council has an executive arm consisting of six to 10 officers appointed by the central government from among the council’s elected members, each of whom is charged with specific functions. Each province is divided into districts, which, in turn, are divided into sub-districts. Officials appointed by the governor administer districts and sub-districts. These officials serve as intermediaries between central government authority and traditional local leaders, such as village chiefs, clan elders, and councils of elders. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)

Syria’s legal system is a mix of Ottoman- and French-based civil law, as well as Islamic law. The constitution requires that Islamic jurisprudence be a main source of legislation. Personal status issues, such as marriage, divorce, paternity, child custody, and inheritance, are governed primarily by customary, Islamic, and other religious laws relating to specific religious communities, with some more recent personal code modifications regarding the status of women, for example. Trials are public (except for juveniles and sex offenses), but Syria does not have trial by jury in regular courts; judges render verdicts. Defendants are entitled to legal representation and to the presumption of innocence, and they are allowed to present evidence and to confront their accusers. Verdicts can be appealed to provincial appeals courts and ultimately to the Court of Cassation.

Electoral system Syria has universal suffrage at age 18. Direct popular elections are held for president, the National Assembly, and provincial assemblies. In practice, however, the selection of the president is not open to popular choice. Presidential candidates nominated by the Baath Party run unopposed in popular referenda rather than in open elections. The most recent presidential election took place in 2000; the next is due in 2007. The most recent legislative elections occurred in March 2003 and will next take place in 2007.
Politics/Political Parties, Syria is essentially a one-party state, dominated by the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Baath) Party (hereafter, Baath Party). The umbrella National Progressive Front (NPF) encompasses the Baath Party and eight (increased from the original six) allied parties, giving the appearance of a multi-party system. But the NPF has little power independent of the Baath Party. A limited number of independent non-NPF candidates may run for seats in parliament, but the current allotment is set at 83, or 33 percent of seats, based on the 2003 elections, thus ensuring an NPF, and consequently a Baath, majority. In practice, non-Baath parties and independents have little real influence.

Baath Party institutions are parallel to and integrated with Syria’s governmental structure. Baath Party members in key positions control the executive and legislative branches of the Syrian government. The Baath party is dominated by the military, which consumes a large share of economic resources. Every four years, the party branches elect representatives to the Party Congress, which then elects the members of the party institutions; the Central Committee has 90 members, and the Regional Command has 21 members. The Regional Command is the highest body of the party and of the state in Syria. The presidential candidate must gain the approval of the Regional Command before being nominated to run for office. The party is headed by a secretary general, a position held by both Hafiz al Asad and his son and successor, Bashar. The National Command is the pan-Arab institution above the Regional Command. The Syrian faction (versus the Iraqi faction) controls most of the Baath Parties of the Arab world. (Library of Congress-Federal Research Division 2005)
2.2 THE ORIGIN OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS

This is a concise overview of the ongoing crisis in Syria from its origins as a series of protests against the Assad regime in concordance with the start of the Arab Spring in Tunisia to the present battle in Aleppo. On January 28, 2011 in the north-east Syrian city of Al-Hasakah a man named Hasan Ali Akleh soaked himself with gasoline and set himself alight in a manner reminiscent to how Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi did. Bouazizi's self-imolation is seen by many in retrospect as the spark that ignited the Arab Spring. Similarly Akleh's action was seen as "a protest against the Syrian government," and in a similar way sparked the ongoing Syrian struggle.

A "Day of Rage" was called in early February from social media websites, Syrians were to accordingly take to the streets and hold demonstrations. Security was increased across the country. However plans to arrange this "Day of Rage" ended in failure. Al Jazeera in a report back then described the country as a kingdom of silence, stating that the strict security measures taken in Syria along with the popularity of President Assad was the reason. The same article quoted Assad as stating that his country was "immune" from the kind of democratic insurrections that toppled the dictators of Tunisia and Egypt respectively. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east 14035274)

However, by February 17, 2011 a demonstration in protest of a police beating of a local shop keeper saw to protesters chanting "the Syrian people will not be humiliated." The demonstration resulted in government officials and the country's interior minister dispersing the protesters with the aid of secret police and promising an investigation into that alleged incident of police brutality.
On March 6 young boys were arrested in the city of Daraa for writing the slogan "the people want to overthrow the regime," on walls across the city. The following day 13 political prisoners went on a hunger strike protesting "political detentions and oppression," in their country demanding the implementation of civil and political rights. Three days later dozens of Syrian Kurds started their own hunger strike in solidarity with these other strikers. These events led to the "Day of Dignity" where protesters in Damascus demanded the release of political prisoners. Some 35 were arrested. These protests took place alongside similar such demonstrations in cities such as al-Hassake, Daraa, Deir al-Zor and Hama. Over the next few days the security forces broke up a silent gathering in Marjeh square in Damascus, this protest saw to 150 people holding up pictures of their family and friends who were imprisoned by the regime. Security forces in the Omari mosque in Daraa. They went on to open fire on the hundreds of youths who marched in solidarity with the six killed. By the end of the month Assad in a speech blamed foreign conspirators for the unrest in the country. A week later Mr. Assad issued a decree that granted nationality to thousands of Kurds. Again on April 16 he went on television promising to implement further reforms in an attempt to alleviate the disgruntled populace. He would go on to implement decrees to end nearly half a century of emergency law. April 22 saw to the bloodiest day in the uprising at that point in time, with a reported 100 people killed by security forces in Daraa. On April 25 Syrian troops laid siege to Daraa. A siege that went on to last 11 days. On April 28 footage was released online of 13-year-old Hamza al-Khateeb. Opposition groups alleged he was tortured and killed in custody by the Syrian regime. (Paul, 2012, a recap of the Syrian crisis to date)

He subsequently became a symbol for the protesters struggle against the regime and also was symbolic to many of the cruelty of the Syrian state forces. Over the next fortnight the U.S.
imposed sanctions on Syria's intelligence agencies and two relatives of Assad whilst the E.U. put the names of 13 Syrian officials, including Assad's notorious younger brother Maher on its sanctions list. Maher al-Assad. The notorious younger brother of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. On June 6 the country's state television claimed that 120 soldiers were killed by "armed gangs." However residents of the northwestern town of Jisr al-Shughour -- where the soldiers were killed -- stated that the soldiers were murdered by security forces for refusing to fire on the protesters. On June 12 the armed forces take control of Jisr al-Shughour as thousands of its residents fled into neighbouring Turkey. The next week saw to more than 12,000 people fleeing over the Turkish border.(Paul, 2012, a recap of the Syrian crisis to date)

Assad later claimed in his third speech -- when he once again promised reform -- that he will pursue a national dialogue that will pave the way to a new constitution, however he refused to do so amidst the "chaos" in the country. By the end of June some 500,000 people began a protest in the central city of Hama. By the end of next July security forces killed 140 people, 100 of them in Hama when the army stormed the city in order to crush the dissenting protesters there. The UN went on to condemn this crackdown. The Arab League the week after condemned the actions of the Syrian government, Saudi Arabia at the same time recalled its ambassador from Damascus. The EU and US on August 18 called for Assad to step down. Assad went on to warn against foreign military intervention in his country stating that "any action against Syria will have greater consequences," for those who carry out such an intervention.(Paul, 2012, a recap of the Syrian crisis)
The mainstream narrative of the United Nations has long been that its creation in 1945 was an almost revolutionary act that constituted a seminal answer to the atrocities of World War II and the Holocaust and must be seen as an unprecedented universal (even though U.S.-led) attempt to achieve world peace and guarantee human rights (see Amrith and Sluga 2008). In this context, the positive accounts on the UN’s history in recent years seem to be due to the “New World Order” proclaimed by former U.S. President George H.W. Bush and the intellectual reaction to George W. Bush’s unilateralism in order to show that the UN does matter (Mazower, 2009: 5). Apparently, however, not only historians, also international relations (IR) scholars failed to appropriately address the complex nature of the ideas and ideologies constituting the basis of the UN (Mazower, 2009: 9).

The British historians Mark Mazower and Dan Plesch have initiated interesting debates about the origins and thus, implicitly, the very nature of the United Nations organization. Here, two main questions shall guide us: To what extent do we have to contest the narrative that the creation of the United Nations in 1945 constituted a radical shift in world history? And secondly, did the UN rather perpetuate colonial ideas or was it, in contrast, designed to end colonialism?

While Plesch argues that 1942 was the birth date of the United Nations, Mazower observes some continuity since the early twentieth century and the League of Nations. Both authors approach the subject quite differently: Dan Plesch provides an archive-based narrative of a UN already established during the war, and Mazower illustrates the ideological origins of the organization with the intellectual setting of its leading figures. Mazower looks at specific persons
he considers as key figures: The South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, the English internationalist Sir Alfred Zimmern, the Jewish emigrants Joseph Schechtman and Raphael Lemkin, and last but not least the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In contrast to Mazower, who in comparison rather tends to neglect the most obvious documents and meetings, Plesch focuses very much on the Atlantic Charter (1941), the talks at Dumbarton Oaks (1944), as well as the conferences in Yalta and San Francisco (1945) that led finally to the establishment of the United Nations organization.

According to Plesch, the “wartime UN” has largely been forgotten, because “it needed a new start in 1945, a UN born out of the ‘ashes of war’” (Plesch, 2011: 8). The political climate in the United States changed in the late 1940s, when it had become inopportune to argue that the U.S., the British, and the Soviets had been planning the UN together (Plesch, 2011: 9). Nonetheless, it was on 28 December 1941 when Roosevelt came up with the idea to use “United Nations” instead of Associated Powers to depict the alliance fighting Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and Japan (Plesch, 2011: 32). Already in early 1942, Roosevelt and Churchill made military and political plans. While the former were naturally held as secrets, the political arrangements “had a vital public dimension in rallying domestic and international support for the war effort” (Plesch 2011: 31). The assessment of a contemporary advocate of the UN supports Plesch’s thesis: “The Declaration of the United Nations [of 1942, K.D.] . . . brought the United Nations into being” (Straight 1943: 62). After Roosevelt had led political “celebrations” internationally, “The ideas of the United Nations became embedded in wartime civilian culture, especially in the USA” (Plesch, 2011: 31). The outlook of the wartime “United Nations” was debated mostly between the U.S., the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Once, it was accepted, military communiqués and official statements in the U.S. and Great Britain frequently referred to the United Nations
Plesch stresses the discussions between Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill with regard to a new post-war world order, based on the British–U.S. American Atlantic Charter of 1941. The idea emerged that these three great powers should, together with China, manage world affairs as the “four policemen” (Plesch, 2011: 82). Plesch further regards the focus of wartime United Nations initiatives (food, relief, health care etc.) on the social, economic, and humanitarian dimensions as proof for the United Nations’ encompassing approach to global security and global governance within World War II (Plesch, 2011: 87/88).

With regard to Plesch’s argument that the creation of the UN can be dated back to 1942, we must ask: Is it appropriate to consider this “wartime UN” as much more than a public relations invention to guarantee public support? Some argue that it was rather the success of the propaganda strategy to label the Allies, led by the U.S., Britain, and the USSR, as “United Nations” to support their cause morally (Mawdsley, 2012). This was deemed necessary by Roosevelt to convince the isolationists and the public in the U.S., particularly with regard to the Lend-Lease agreement, with which the U.S. supported the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and other Allies with material. The important question seems to be the level of institutionalization and perspective beyond the war-related public relations and public diplomacy dimension of the “United Nations” notion. And there were institutions: The better known was certainly the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA, founded in 1943 by forty-four nations), but also the London-based UN War Crimes Commission (also created in 1943 by seventeen countries) is worth mentioning. The author emphasizes that “as part of the cooperative process under the United Nations framework, the UN War Crimes Commission and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, both internationally staffed and funded, were up and running in 1943. They began to turn the political rhetoric of the United Nations about the
postwar world into something tangible that the public could relate to” (Plesch, 2011: 99). So we could argue that besides the wartime rhetoric tool, the United Nations also seemed to have been embedded in an institutional framework. This is an important aspect, although I tend to interpret these institutions as.

Michael Straight, a US citizen who served in the Air Force during World War II, then became editor of The New Republican, but was also a KGB informant, expressed Plesch’s main arguments already in 1943: the UN was founded in 1942 and it should support decolonisation and human rights. Maybe a Mazower-style analysis of persons like Straight may have enriched Plesch’s book further. temporary, as these central wartime agencies, once the UN was created in 1945, ceased to exist in their own right.

Another aspect that can be mentioned against the wartime UN is actually presented by the author himself. Plesch admits that the idea of a general United Nations organization for the coordination of military and economic matters encountered resistance from the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR until shortly before the end of the war: Until late in the war, the idea of making a general organization of the United Nations to coordinate military and economic affairs was resisted by the Big Three. Roosevelt regarded it as creating an unnecessary target for his opponents at home and did not publicly endorse the idea until after D-Day had succeeded. Churchill was more concerned with US-UK bilateral agreements, and sought to elevate Australia and Canada as auxiliaries of the Empire and arrange regional rather than global structures. Stalin, having given strong support to the League of Nations, was now more concerned to secure a territorial buffer zone against further attacks from Germany” (Plesch, 2011: 166).
So, again, was the tale of the “United Nations” before 1945 rather a propaganda success story than the birth of the United Nations Organization? Plesch certainly has a point, although to date back the UN as we know it to 1942 would be a bit too adventurous. The planning of the United Nations Organization certainly can be traced back to 1942, but then also the ideas of the League of Nations must be considered as ideological background for the UN—and this is what Mark Mazower does.

In his introduction, Mazower sharply analyzes the deficiencies and blind spots of existing accounts on the UN’s origins as mixed motivations that had rather been neglected and international cooperation as such taken for granted as something basically positive: Their guiding assumption seems to be that the emergence of some kind of global community is not only desirable but inevitable, whether through the acts of states, or non-state actors, or perhaps through the work of international organizations themselves, staffed by impartial and high-minded civil servants (Mazower, 2009: 5) (see Iriye, 2002).

Mazower’s main argument is that in contrast to repeated laudations of the UN as the only authentic world organization with idealistic goals (and, on the other hand, categorical repudiations and assessments of the overall failure of the United Nations), the UN’s origins trace back to old-fashioned national and great power interests and imperial motives, but then developed in a different direction as its mostly Western creators had anticipated. Mazower manages magnificently to exemplify his narrative of the UN as a creature of U.S. global power ambitions and particularly British colonial interests. He does so by examining the convictions and motives that drove Jan Smuts and internationalist Sir Alfred Zimmern (both had already played a significant role in designing the League of Nations) in the UN’s establishment,
supplemented by the impact Mazower attributes to the Indian independence hero and first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru with regard to the unexpected non-Western orientation.

Mazower challenges two important interpretations of the UN’s history: He concludes that the UN was not so different from the League of Nations and that it was not, as often assumed, a mostly U.S. American enterprise only (see, for example, Schlesinger 2003). Both theses are supported by a closer look at the relationship between empires with the British empire in particular and connected ideas of global order, and the respective intellectual origin of the League of Nations and the UN (Mazower, 2009: 14). Also, Plesch discusses briefly Churchill’s “flirt” with the idea of an Anglo-Saxon world empire (Plesch, 2011: 165). In contrast to other authors who certainly acknowledge some heritage of the League in the UN (see, for instance, Kennedy 2006, or MacKenzie, 2010: 53), Mazower goes further and identifies a clear continuity between the two institutions.

Mazower’s first two chapters deal with Jan Smuts and Alfred Zimmern, with which the author illustrates the ideological roots of colonialism and the racist belief in the superiority of the white man as essential aspects of the internationalism that inspired the League’s foundation. It seems contradictory that Smuts, who spoke on behalf of equal rights in the UN context, increasingly followed a more racist line in his South African Apartheid regime. But from a contemporary reading of internationalism, it was not such a paradox, argues Mazower. Smuts and Zimmern envisioned the British Commonwealth and then the League as a variation of it as the institution with which the (white) civilization should be spread throughout the world.

Plesch takes a very different stand on the question whether the UN was a new form of empire. While World War II historians have long paid little attention to colonial repression, it is obvious
that European colonialism based on the conviction of European supremacy, which also found expression in the subjugation of African–Americans in the United States. Therefore, in Plesch’s opinion, Roosevelt’s resolve to apply the Atlantic Charter principles worldwide including the right to self-determination was volatile in colonial nations and in the U.S. itself. Roosevelt’s anti-colonial policy did not outlast him and it is not properly acknowledged. The main achievements were the promotion of an Asian nation, China, to great power status and the inclusion of India as a separate country in the Declaration of January 1942 and in the wartime UN conferences (Plesch, 2011: 88).

In Plesch’s view, the missing set-up of a schedule for the end of British and French colonies was the main lost opportunity, although Roosevelt tried to push it (Plesch, 2011: 89/90). Roosevelt came up with a plan that envisioned several regional commissions with representatives of the colonizers and the colonized to deal with the independence process but it did not convince Churchill. Plesch concludes that “the post-war world would well have been more peaceful and prosperous had this declaration been pursued as Roosevelt intended” and judges Roosevelt’s declaration as a vision of the “end of empire,” which would have included fixed dates (Plesch, 2011: 90/91). At the same time, it meant a radical shift that China was elevated as one of the four big powers: “Back at the time of the creation of the League of Nations, the white nations had refused to include language on racial equality, humiliating delegates from Japan and elsewhere” (Plesch, 2011: 89).

Plesch thus regards China’s elevation and the plan for a scheduled end of colonies as the reinforcement of “the anti-imperial origins of the UN” and explicitly distances this narrative from Mark Mazower’s interpretation of the UN’s ideological basis. However, as Plesch continues, after his death, Roosevelt’s anti-colonial ideas and economic policies to endorse the
“developing world” soon became obsolete when President Truman took office (Plesch, 2011: 91). Plesch thus strengthens the argument that the United Nations was designed to become a major anti-colonial force—unlike Mark Mazower. Mazower’s book questions the all too uncritical Western belief in the UN as a truly universal and global caretaker that despite a Western dominance at its origins pursued international goals for the best of all. Mazower presents how this belief was anchored in a perpetuated civilizing mission of the colonial powers and now also the United States. It was then Jawaharlal Nehru and increasing anti-colonialism that challenged the UN’s colonial heritage to the surprise of the Western powers. Nehru turned the UN into an anti-colonial forum that nevertheless then converted into a defender of national sovereignty again. Here one of the decisive differences between the league and the UN comes into play: The UN gave the “great powers” much more say, even a de-facto veto right, so all rhetoric praise of human rights protection, for instance, seemed in reality nothing more than lip service as these big countries did not imagine to be subject to any meddling in their domestic affairs. This sacrosanct principle of sovereignty then became important again and was revived with the entry of all the newly independent countries that turned the UN at least the General Assembly into a Third World forum rather than a great power concert.

While the “Eleanor-Roosevelt narrative” that human rights at the UN were mainly a consequence of the war cruelties and the Holocaust in particular, has already been appropriately demystified (see, for instance, Normand/Zaidi, 2008), both authors shed some new light on the issue. Mazower looks at two Jewish emigrants, Raphael Lemkin and Joseph Schechtman, and thereby shows the transition from the league’s minority rights system to the rather loosely defined right of self-determination of peoples in the UN. While Mazower convincingly illustrates the role of these activists in the making of universal rights, Plesch demonstrates that the United
Nations could possibly be seen as more important than even the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials on the way to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. He describes the UNWCC as the “main legal response to Nazi crimes during the war” that laid the groundwork for the Nuremberg trials. It further implicitly seems to prove that the Allies were aware of the Holocaust (The Jewish Chronicle 2011). UNWCC, with a secretariat in London, was promoted mostly by smaller countries that had been invaded by Germany, as well as by civil society and some “principled” officials from the U.S. and British governments but less so by the great powers (Plesch, 2011: 101, 102, 116). Here, Mazower is more skeptical about the “troubled history” of UNWCC as it seemed unlikely that the great powers would promote an international criminal law (Mazower, 2009: 127).

In conclusion, while Plesch argues that the UN was planned already in 1942, Mazower would identify its ideological roots in the League of Nations and the British desire to perpetuate empire. Thus, Mazower argues that the UN’s creation stood for a continuation of colonialism by other means that ended surprisingly with the action taken by Nehru and his allies later on. In contrast, Plesch interprets the UN as designed to terminate colonialism and eventually only Roosevelt’s death prevented it to set exact dates to “end empire.
CHAPTER THREE

3.1 UN Doctrine of Collective Security and the Syrian Crisis

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the principal organs of the United Nations. According to article 24 of the UN Charter, the foundational treaty of the United Nations, the UN Member States have conferred the primary responsibility of maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council and have agreed that this body, in order to carry on this duty, acts on their behalf. The Member States have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council through article 25 of the Charter. While other organs of the United Nations can only make recommendations to governments, the UNSC is the only organ capable of issuing resolutions that are legally binding on all Member States. (Source: The UN Security Council Website, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/index.html, viewed 23 August 2011).

In order to fulfill its responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and when faced with a conflict, the first action of the Council is to recommend to the parties that they reach agreement through peaceful means. It may appoint special representatives, may ask the Secretary-General to appoint special representatives, and may set some principles for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. When a dispute leads to fighting, the UNSC will try to bring it to an end as soon as possible. It can do so by issuing ceasefire directives, sending UN peacekeeping forces or eventually deciding on enforcement actions such as economic sanctions or collective military action.

The Council’s other responsibilities include recommending the admission of new members and the appointment of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA). Together with the UNGA, it is responsible for electing the judges of
International Court of Justice. Established in 1946, the UNSC currently has fifteen members. The Peoples’ Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are the five permanent members of this body and the holders of veto power. Except for the Peoples’ Republic of China (which replaced the Republic of China in 1971) and the Russian Federation (which replaced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991), the current Permanent Five (P5) are the main victors of World War II. The other ten members of the Security Council are non-permanent.

They are elected by the General Assembly through majority vote to take on a two-year term. On the first of January each year, five new non-permanent members start their term. To ensure better regional representation, non-permanent members are elected from different regional groups. The African Group has three representatives, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), and the Asian Group each has two representatives and the Eastern European Group has one representative. Also one member of the Council should be an Arab country which can be chosen from the Asian or African groups.

According to the Charter, non-permanent members are not eligible for immediate re-election once they finish their two-year term. Current non-permanent members of the Security Council are Bosnia and Herzegovina (from East Europe, due to finish in 2011), Portugal and Germany (from WEOG, due to finish in 2012), Brazil (from Latin America, due to finish in 2011), Colombia (from Latin America, due to finish in 2012), India (from Asia, due to finish in 2012), Lebanon (from Asia, the Arab state, due to finish in 2011), South Africa (from Africa, due to finish in 2012), Gabon and Nigeria (from Africa, due to finish in 2011).
It is noteworthy to mention that the first ever president of the UNSC in January 1946 was Australia. (The UN Security Council Website, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/index.html, viewed 23 August 2011). Procedural matters are the matters related to the procedures and are of less importance than substantive matters. UNGA Resolution 267 provides a list of procedural matters. However it emphasises that this list is not fixed and other matters can be considered procedural if the members of the Council conclude so, some argue that it has rendered the nature of procedural matters ambiguous and disputable. The presidency of the Security Council is held in turn by the members of the Council in the English alphabetic orders of their names. Each president holds the office for one month. India is the president in August 2011 and Lebanon will take this responsibility in September.

The role of the president is setting the agenda, chairing the meetings and overseeing any crisis. The president is authorised to publish presidential statement, although it is subject to the consensus of all members. In the voting system, the Charter distinguishes between the procedural and non-procedural (substantive) matters. According to article 27 of the Charter, decisions on procedural matters will be made by an affirmative vote of at least nine out of fifteen current members. On the other hand, decisions on substantive matters are made by affirmative votes of nine members, “including the concurring votes of the permanent members”; this is the clause that gives the Permanent Five their veto power. In order for a resolution to fail (without failure because of the exercise of veto by one or more of the permanent members), seven countries have to vote against the resolution, abstain or be absent from the Council at the time of voting. (The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945), United Nations Website, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml, viewed 23 August 2011).
(Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011 cited in United Nations Website). Since its establishment in 1946, the Security Council has been faced with considerable criticism and since that time there have been many calls for the reform of the Council. A large part of the criticism is due to the structure of the Council that many believe is undemocratic especially because it gives considerable power and privileges to certain countries of the world.

The main example is the veto power of the Permanent Five. As Robert Hill, former Australian ambassador to the United Nations, summaries, “the Security Council is a club and P5 is a club within a club”. As mentioned earlier, Article 27 of the UN Charter allows the permanent members of the Security Council to quash any non-procedural draft resolution with their negative votes, irrespective of its level of international support and popularity. This power is referred to as the “veto power” of the Permanent Five although the word “veto” is never mentioned in the Charter. The initial reason for the inclusion of this power in the Charter was to prevent the UN to take direct actions against any of its principal founding members.

This section illustrates how the use of veto power has become distant from that initial reason and how this power has turned into a tool for protecting national interests of permanent members or their strategic allies. This power has been responsible for the silence of the Security Council on some major international conflicts including the 2003 Iraq War, the 2008 conflict in Georgia, the 2009 massacre of Sri Lankan Tamils and the recent Syrian conflict. Although the issue of Israel-Palestine conflict is on the agenda of the Security Council, this body has not been successful in condemning the violence and settlement activities through issuing resolutions .(http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/NumberofSecurity_Council_Resolutions.pdf viewed 24 August 2011)
The Syrian uprising that began in March 2011 has morphed into a violent civil war with strong sectarian overtones. And the intrastate armed conflict, resulting by late November 2012 in an estimated 60,000 deaths, it has divided the international community. While the United States, the European Union, Turkey, and the Gulf countries particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia have openly sided with the armed opposition to President Bashar al-Assad, Russia and China have opposed any pressure on Damascus. Iran has materially supported the Assad regime. India and Brazil, both seeking United Nations (UN) Security Council membership, are engaged in a tough balancing act. The Syrian crisis is testing the strength of the United Nations and, in particular, the credibility and effectiveness of its Security Council. (Dmitri, 2013)

3.2 RUSSIA AND CHINA VETO IS IMPLICATED

Much has hinged on the Russian government’s attitudes and policies toward the recent developments in Syria. Two decades after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to be a major international player as a permanent member of the Security Council. Moscow espouses a distinct worldview that increasingly diverges from that of the West, and it is not shy about offering alternative solutions to a range of international issues. This is particularly important because it has the power to block U.S. policies at the Security Council, rendering them illegal in terms of international law should Washington proceed without the Security Council’s consent. But given Moscow’s international weight, U.S.-Russian collaboration on Syria could pave the way toward an end to the conflict (Dmitri, 2013, The Mythical Alliance Russia’s Syria policy).

Russia’s position is also important in light of China, a rising global power that is still generally reluctant to oppose the West alone on issues that do not affect its own immediate interests. However, Beijing has occasionally joined Moscow in opposing selected issues,
allowing the Russians to take the lead (and the heat), thus creating a pattern of Sino-Russian
opposition to the United States and Europe. Moscow often has international support for its high-
profile efforts to stand up to Washington. Less often overtly than otherwise, support for Russia’s
stances is found among a number of governments and non-state actors that are opposed to U.S.
policies or are simply wedded to the traditional values of international relations, such as state
sovereignty and nonintervention, which Russia defends against the current Western practice of
humanitarian intervention.

The Syrian crisis is testing the strength of the United Nations and, in particular, the
credibility and effectiveness of its Security Council. The Mythical Alliance Russia’s Syria
Policy Such opposition risks permanently dividing the UN Security Council on the issues of
sovereignty and human rights. Since most armed conflicts in the world now tend to be within
states, rather than between states which was the case in the mid-twentieth century when the UN
Charter was written this disagreement can paralyze the principal organ of the world body
responsible for international peace and security. Still, with global Western domination on the
wane, and many things in flux, Russia is putting itself forward as a counterweight to the West
that can influence the shape of the emerging international order. In reality, the wrangling over
Syria represents a contest of different views of the global order, of the issues of sovereignty and
human rights, of the use of force, and of the responsibility to use force rather than allow a
conflict to “burn itself out.” This contest is fundamentally different from the U.S.-Soviet Cold
War rivalry in the Middle East, which was essentially about ideology and regional dominance.
The situation is also different from the past because in Syria there is now an international crisis
atop an acute domestic conflict, which itself is part of a region wide process dubbed the Arab
Spring. (Dmitri, 2013, The Mythical Alliance Russia’s Syria policy)
Syria exemplifies in many ways a quintessential early twenty-first-century confrontation, and the contestation that pits Russia against the West and the Arab world at the Security Council represents the difficulties of dealing with such conflicts at the global level. The United States and its allies can no longer solve those issues alone. Successful conflict management and resolution require global and regional cooperation even when values are divergent. Effective cooperation, in turn, demands at a minimum that the parties clearly understand their motives and aims especially Russia’s. Understanding Russia’s approach to Syria begins in Libya. The Origins of Russia’s Approach: The Libya Prelude the Syrian crisis came on the heels of the outbreak of the crisis in Libya, but the situations evolved quite differently from one another. In Libya, the uprising against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi, which began in February 2011, received decisive support from the international community. In March 2011, as Qaddafi’s forces were preparing to put down the resistance in Benghazi,

The UN Security Council passed resolutions 1971 and 1973, condemning the Libyan leader’s actions and imposing a no-fly zone over the country in order to protect civilians from massacre at the hands of the regime’s forces. The international effort in Libya led to the downfall of Qaddafi’s regime by October 2011. Syria exemplifies in many ways a quintessential early-twenty-first-century confrontation, and the contestation that pits Russia against the West and the Arab world at the Security Council represents the difficulties of dealing with such conflicts at the global level. What lies behind Russia's determination to stand by its old ally? By the end of the 20th century, Russia's global ambitions had been dealt a severe blow in the wake of the collapse of the USSR and the country's domestic crisis. (Alex, 2011)
But by the mid-2000s, Russia's internal political and economic situation had stabilized and its geopolitical ambitions were renewed. While Moscow’s principal interests lie in the West, it also increasingly looks toward Asia (China, India, Japan, Korea) and the Middle East. In recent years, Russia has marketed its Middle East policies as "a return" to the region, invoking images of the Soviet epoch, when Cold War exigencies largely defined its regional policies. Nowadays, the Kremlin perceives the Middle East as an arena where it can employ a variety of tools to influence regional developments, particularly those that affect the interests of outside powers. In addition, Russia's Middle East policies are also designed to counterbalance NATO's policy in Europe towards Russia. Hence, Moscow has newly deepened its political and military ties with traditional allies, especially Syria; engages in a lively dialogue with Israel; treats Turkey as a key regional partner; maintains a thriving, albeit complicated relationship with Iran; and promotes trade with energy-rich Gulf Arab countries, Algeria and Libya. In a radical departure from the Soviet days, Russia keeps the lines of communication open with all important actors in the region. (Alex, 2011)

The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with newly independent but still occupied Syria in 1944. By the early 1950s, Syria, being pro-socialist in its development, gradually became one of the USSR's most important partners in the Middle East. Their strategic relations became all the more significant when Egypt reoriented itself toward the US after the October 1973 war and signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Needing to maintain a presence in the region and avoid a further erosion of its position, Moscow supported Damascus in its struggle with Israel and helped enhance Syrian influence in Lebanon. Beginning with Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in the mid-1980s, and continuing with the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia's interests and influence in Middle Eastern affairs declined.
3.3 THE INTEREST OF RUSSIA IN SYRIA

For Syria, this was a cause of great concern, as its most powerful supporter had turned inward. Nevertheless, Damascus was resilient it developed independent foreign policies that enabled it to maintain its core positions while avoiding international isolation. However, the continuing state of belligerence with Israel and the constant pressure that the US and other western states exerted on Damascus left Syria in need of renewed Russian support. As for Moscow, its Middle East policy is based on the centrality of Syria's position in the region and the impossibility of achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace without Damascus. Hence, Russia has sought to influence regional processes through its partnership with Syria, interaction with Syria's strategic regional ally Iran, and contacts with Syria's main clients, Hamas and Hezbollah. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov expressed this thinking clearly, emphasizing that the Middle East is “crucially important” for Russian “geopolitical and economic interests” and that cooperation with Syria brings “tangible economic and political dividends.” (Alex, 2011)

Since 2005, Russian-Syrian cooperation has reached a new high. That year, Bashar Asad visited Moscow; 73 percent of Syria's 13.5 billion dollar debt to Russia was forgiven and a declaration articulating the countries' shared positions on urgent regional problems was signed. Asad's two subsequent visits and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's reciprocal visit in May 2010 have furthered the countries' strategic partnership in key spheres. The wave of Arab Spring protests reached Syrian shores in March, sparking demonstrations and riots that ended with brutal clashes between protestors and the security forces, and generating steadily escalating US and European pressure on the Asad regime to change course. Russia, China, India, Brazil and South Africa have opposed a proposed US- and EU-led Libya-style UN resolution condemning the Syrian regime for the bloodshed and adopting sanctions against it, arguing that it would
neither solve Syria's domestic problems nor promote a peaceful resolution to the situation. To be sure, Western economic sanctions can have little impact on the Syrian regime, as Asad has spent the last decade strengthening his economic ties with the East, namely Russia, China, India, as well as Turkey and South American states. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/18/syria-assad-must-resign-obama.)

Russia has important economic interests in Syria. In particular, Syria purchases 10 percents of Russia's total arms exports, making it the third largest buyer of Russian arms, after India and Venezuela. Ninety percent of Syria's armament is Russian made, and several recent contracts have been signed that will provide Syria with modern combat aircraft, anti-aircraft missiles, tanks, etc. Furthermore, several Russian oil and gas companies have large contracts with the Syrian government, including deals to build the Syrian portion of a pan-Arab gas pipeline and a petroleum processing factory near Palmyra. Several Russian companies are also involved in the development of Syrian oil and gas reserves. Moreover, Russia sees Syria as a military ally.

The Russian navy is expanding beyond its coastal zone, and considering the possibility of using the Syrian facility at Tartus as its base of operations in the Mediterranean. While Moscow denies having any real interest in Tartus, Syrian officials say they are willing to negotiate the matter. The establishment of a strong Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would certainly have geopolitical ramifications. Among Moscow's once-strong group of Middle Eastern allies, Syria is the only state that remains close to Russia. Russia is therefore deeply interested in how the current uprisings in Syria unfold. Further, an alliance with Syria is perceived by Russia as a way to counterbalance American influence in the region, as well as an
answer to NATO's eastward expansion and missile defense deployment close to its borders. Central to Russia's calculations is Iran. (Alex, 2011)

The Western powers' efforts to weaken Tehran and pry Syria away from its 32-year alliance with it are deemed by Moscow as a threat to its own geopolitical interests in the Greater Middle East. The Damascus Tehran axis is viewed as an important factor in counterbalancing the US and its regional allies. If the Syrian regime collapses and, in the worst scenario, the country shatters into several entities, Russia will lose its last close ally in the region, leaving it significantly weaker in the international geopolitical competition with the US and Europe. In June 2011, Russia’s Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Alexander Pankin, articulated Moscow’s official position on the Syrian crisis: “the current situation in Syria, despite an increase in tension and confrontation, does not present a threat to international peace and security. A real threat to regional security, in our view, could arise from outside interference in Syria’s domestic situation, including attempts to push readymade solutions or taking of sides.” However, on August 3, as the situation on the ground grew dire, the UN Security Council adopted a "Presidential Statement" on Syria, expressing its concern at the deteriorating situation and regret at the death of people during the demonstrations. The next day, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that “the situation in the country must be resolved by the Syrians themselves, without outside interference through an inclusive dialogue, which is the only way to solve the crisis.”

On August 18, the US and Europe dramatically increased the pressure on Bashar al-Asad, with Barack Obama articulating a demand by world leaders for Assad to surrender power. In response, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that “President Bashar al-Assad has to be given more time to carry out the declared major program of political and economic reforms. We
believe that a clear and unambiguous signal has been sent to the Syrians about the need to end all violence. This signal is also for the opposition, which should enter into dialogue with the authorities and dissociate itself from extremists. Based on these considerations we do not share the US and EU point of view concerning President Bashar al-Assad and will continue to pursue our consistent and principled line on Syria.”

Given these considerations, Russia is likely to continue to oppose Western attempts to increase international pressure on Syria. The success of NATO’s violent intervention in Libya is not a scenario which Russia wants to see repeated. Clash of interests made Russia and China to veto the decisions of the United Nations Security Council three times.

Most important international factor that influences the Syrian crisis is the politics of the United States and Russia. In the eyes of the majority of the American observers, the primary factor for the continuing bloodshed in Syria is the diplomatic and military support rendered to Assad’s regime by Russia. Let’s take a closer look at the main arguments of the powerful group of observers and experts who tend to blame exclusively Moscow for the endless bloodbath in Syria. Some of those arguments are absolutely correct. It is true that one of the main reasons for the Russian attitude is the traditional close relationship between Moscow and Damascus that has lasted for decades. It is also true that the loss of this connection will deprive Russia of its only remaining ally in the area. In case of a regime change, Russia is about to lose Tartus, which is the only base of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean. Undoubtedly, given that in the eyes of President Putin the United States is the main geopolitical enemy of his country, he is determined not to allow an American victory in the Syrian confrontation (George, 2011).

All this is true, and it fits the “blame Russia for Syria’s calamity” school of interpretation. At the same time, however, there are some additional elements of the picture that as a rule are
absent from Western analyses but which happen to be absolutely correct. The most important among them is Moscow’s stake in the future of bilateral relations with Syria and the Russian interest in finding a solution to the crisis that will preserve the secular system of government. This dimension of the Russian approach to the Syrian crisis has never been properly understood by Secretary of state Hillary Clinton. As far as the State Department bureaucracy is concerned, they also don’t understand, or rather pretend not to understand, that a victory of the opposition will be nothing short of the establishment of an Islamic dictatorship over Syria. At the same time, regardless of the hostile attitude of President Putin, portraying the United States as enemy number one, he realizes to an extent the nature of the Islamic danger hanging over Russia. That is why at least part of the Russian policy regarding Iran is based on the fear of the Shia-related Iranian influence (www.guardian.co.uk>News>worldnews>middle east live)

Any confrontation with Teheran will increase the magnitude of the Islamic threat to Moscow. The main threat for Russia is the Saudi-originated Wahhabist branch of extreme Islam. Wahhabism is the ideological fuel to the fundamentalist guerrilla warfare in the area of the Northern Caucasus. The most disturbing recent development was the attempt on the lives of two leading Muslim clerics who were attacked in the center of Kazan (the capital of Tatarstan, the largest Muslim-populated province of the Russian Federation, located 400 kilometers east of Moscow). One of them died, and the other was wounded. The reason for the attack was their hostility towards Wahhabism. In short, Moscow doesn’t want to see the Assad regime replaced by a fanatical Islamic state ruled by Wahhabists. There are two possible exits from the seemingly endless conflict that ravages Syria. One of them is highly desirable but also highly unlikely. It would require an American-Russian understanding based on the agreement of both countries not
to accept the establishment of an Islamic-dominated dictatorship over Syria after the end of the Assad regime.

The second option would express itself in the breakup of Syria by the emergence of a mini-Alawite state along the coastline, where most of the Alawites live. Such a state will be protected by the Syrian army in its present composition. There are talks also between some Kurdish activists and their compatriots from Northern Iraq for the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region on Syrian soil. Under such a scenario, most of Syria, including the capital of Damascus, will be a part of an Islamic, theocratic state. There is much more contradiction than unity within the ranks of the Syrian opposition. Heavy-duty mutual accusations are flying back and forth among the representatives of the different organizations and leaders. The ideological pendulum of the enemies of the Assad regime varies from the hardcore jihadists all the way to the relatively limited group that includes pro-Western democrats (George, 2011).

Every outside attempt to help the unification of the anti-Assad opposition has failed. As a matter of fact, the most recent event along those lines that took place in Cairo in early July, instead of bringing about much-sought-after togetherness and solidarity, made things worse. The Kurdish delegation, for instance, virtually stormed out of the last session of the conference because of the unwillingness of the potential Arab allies to recognize their national identity. There is more to this picture, though. The most numerous and the best-organized component of the opposition is represented by the notorious Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the many tragic features of the civil war that devastates Syria expresses itself in the fact that the Brotherhood is not fighting for democracy. The goal of the Brothers is to replace the authoritarian and secular dictatorship of Bashir Assad with an Islamic tyranny based on the ideology of the Sunni-based extreme variety of Islam (George, 2011).
In the aftermath of the repressions that followed the crackdown of the Hama-based Islamic insurrection of 1982, many participants have left the country. The majority of them settled in Germany and Spain, where they were immediately granted the status of political refugees. With the growth of Jihadism that followed 9/11 and the outbreak of the Iraqi war, the Syrian Islamists were amongst the most active fighters for global jihad. They fought in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya in short, everywhere. Evidently oblivious to the hospitality of the people of Spain, their Syrian guests established a connection of their own to the infamous Madrid bombing of 2004. A Syrian jihadist by the name of Abu Musab al Suri played a key role in the popularization of the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world. It was al Suri who published on Pakistani soil a book entitled The Islamic Jihadi Revolution in Syria, which established him as one of the main theoreticians of jihad (www.guardian.co.uk>News>world news>middle east live). As it has been pointed out, the most tragic aspect of the American-Russian confrontation over Syria is the fact that it is the clash between Washington and Moscow that feeds the continuation of the Syrian civil war and, consequently, the huge loss of innocent life. Unless the policymakers of both countries accept the reality that it is Islamic fundamentalism which represents the biggest threat hanging over them, the Syrian tragedy will continue under different shapes and forms that finally will impact the ability of the country to survive.

Most countries condemn the violent crackdown on the opposition and protesters by the Syrian government. They have also decried the degeneration of this crisis into a full blown civil war and the gross violation of human rights in Syria. The Arab league has called for the UN Security Council to send a peace keeping mission to Syria and has called on Arab nations to severe diplomatic relations with the al-Assad regime. The United States has ruled out military
action in Syria. This means that for now an international intervention like we saw in Libya seems improbable, though CNN reports that the US has been gathering intelligence on Syrian military sites and activities and is monitoring and intercepting communication of key Syrian officials. The end of the al-Assad regime is inevitable. There is only so long the al-Assad regime can sustain this carnage and tragic destruction. (Dooter, 2012)

The crucial question is, how long can this brutal regime hold back the opposition, the Arab League and the condemnation of the international community? Al-Assad has the benefit of retrospect in considering which path to follow in ending the current crisis. He can choose to follow his father’s footsteps and attempt to crush the uprising hoping it will go away while offering small concessions like a referendum on the Constitution. For this path to be successful however, he would have to take his country back to the 80’s where this method of oppression was not unusual. This path seems unlikely to succeed with the prevailing realities on the ground. He could also follow the favourable path of Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh who handed over power to a transitional government and negotiated a favourable immunity deal. This path seems plausible and might satisfy both the opposition and the international community. Another option for al-Assad will be the path of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak who handed over power relatively late to his former military colleagues. (Dooter, 2012)

This path like the previous one seems also plausible. Finally, Muammar Gaddafi’s path is also available to al-Assad. Gaddafi appeared to be delusional to his last breadth and didn’t handover power till he lost his life trying to hold on to power. Sadly, in an interview with Russian Today TV on the 8th of November, 2012, Bashar al-Assad indicated that he would stay and die in Syria. This seems to be the Gaddafi option and path. In analysing the end game, it is hoped that with the end of the US elections, the Obama administration might be more amenable
to a more concerted and proactive policy to end this carnage and quagmire. This is because President Obama would no longer be bound by political posturing and exigencies that limited his ability to take a more proactive position on the crisis. Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom seemed to be thinking and strategising along the same line. Speaking to the media during a visit to Jordan, Mr. Cameron said the Syrian crisis would top the list of issues he intended to discuss with the re-elected President Obama. Since the international community is so far not interested in intervening to end this catastrophe, we might be wondering, how long can Al-Assad hold on? But the real question though is, how long can the will of the opposition hold? If the precedent of the Arab Spring is anything to go by, the answer to that question would be, “a very long time.” Only one person can cut that time short - Bashar al-Assad!

It is the duty of the Security Council to apply the doctrine of collective security in resolving or managing the Syrian crisis, but the veto power welded to the permanent members of the Security Council is always used to protect the interests of the permanent big five, thereby making it difficult for the smooth running of the Security Council or making it ineffective when the need arises. The veto of Russia and China had debunked the principle of collective security hence the doctrine of collective security is implicated in the Syrian crisis.
CHAPTER FOUR

The UN sanctions and the interest of Permanent Security Council members

4.1 THE POLITICS OF SANCTIONS AND THE ASSAD’S REGIME

The conflict in Syria poses increasingly complex and difficult policy questions for Congress and the Obama Administration. The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion against the Assad regime is in its third year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. Al Qaeda affiliates and other violent extremists, including foreign fighters, have assertively demonstrated their presence in Syria.

On the other hand, after suffering a series of setbacks, Syrian government forces, aided by Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia, have reclaimed some territory in the areas around Damascus and the city of Homs. The Syrian government continues to launch indiscriminate attacks on rebel-held areas and has stated its willingness to use its unconventional weapons in the event of foreign military intervention. As of early June 2013, United Nations officials have cited estimates that as many as 4.25 million Syrians have been displaced inside the country. As of mid-June 2013, there are more than 1.6 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. Recent developments in the conflict, including the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that Syrian government forces have used sarin nerve gas in limited attacks, have led the Obama Administration to offer more civilian and military support to the opposition. On June 13, a White House statement relayed the U.S. intelligence community’s judgment that “the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year.”
The statement further said that: “the President has augmented the provision of non-lethal assistance to the civilian opposition, and also authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC) the Assad regime should know that its actions have led us to increase the scope and scale of assistance that we provide to the opposition, including direct support to the SMC. These efforts will increase going forward.” Unnamed officials cited in subsequent press reports have indicated that such assistance may be provided under intelligence authorities by the Central Intelligence Agency and include small arms, ammunition and the possible provision of anti-tank weapons and training.

Other reports further suggest that related plans call for rebels to be armed in Jordan and for a limited no-fly zone to be enforced from Jordan to create a safe zone where training can occur there and in southern Syria. As of June 14, no official comments or public documents have confirmed those reports. An ongoing U.S. and allied military exercise in Jordan has brought Patriot missile batteries, F-16 fighters, F-18 fighters, and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit to Jordan that could be used to protect Jordanian airspace and territory from attack. Some Members of Congress have 1 Section 1295 of H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, required the Administration to provide a report within 90 days of enactment on Russian military assistance to Syria. (CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, coordinated by Jim Nichol). Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use, June 13, 2013. Mark Mazzetti, Michael R. Gordon and Mark Landler, “U.S. Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian Rebels,” (New York Times, June 13, 2013.) Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Stepping Up 'Military Support' to Syrian Rebels,” (Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2013.) Hendrick Simoes, “US participating in international Eager Lion exercise in Jordan,” Stars
been calling for increased support to the opposition, including the provision of arms to vetted units, while others have opposed and warned of the unpredictable consequences of deeper U.S. involvement. Proposed legislation before the 113th Congress alternately seeks to authorize or restrict U.S. actions in Syria.

The Administration’s decision to offer increased support to the opposition and the regime’s Hezbollah-backed counteroffensive come in the midst of a diplomatic initiative aimed at bringing Syrian combatants to the negotiating table. In May 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry renewed joint U.S.-Russian efforts to broker a political settlement, returning to a Russian-backed proposal known as the Geneva Final Communiqué, an agreement reached by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in June 2012. The Geneva Communiqué broadly outlined a path toward a transitional government with executive authority formed by mutual consent in negotiations between the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition. This agreement did not specifically prohibit any member of the Assad regime, including President Assad himself, from serving in such a transitional government despite U.S. and other repeated calls for his resignation.

The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Syrian Coalition or SC) has said that it welcomed “all international efforts calling for a political solution, which will achieve the aspirations of the Syrian people for a democratic state that begins with the removal of the Assad regime.” However, members of the SC and many armed groups in Syria continue to demand that President Assad and other senior figures have no role in any transition. SC officials and armed Syrian opposition groups also have pushed for assurances of foreign
military support before negotiations would begin and have amplified those demands in response to the regime’s counteroffensives. According to one SC official, “We’re not going to sit at the table while Assad continues to kill, supported by Russia and Hezbollah What we are asking for is arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA) or SMC before the talks. SMC commander General Salim Idriss reportedly submitted a detailed request for ammunition, anti-tank weaponry, and anti-aircraft weaponry to oppose regime counter attacks in recent days.

With the Assad regime still entrenched in a number of strongholds and able to use limited but indiscriminate air, artillery, and missile power against rebel-held areas, the death toll, which may now exceed 90,000, continues to climb. Recent sectarian atrocities and Hezbollah’s intervention on the side of the Assad regime are amplifying the risks of broader civil and regional conflict. If continued, these trends could produce greater regional intervention or result in greater displacement of Syrian civilians as communities seek to relocate and consolidate for protection.

As of June 2013, the armed conflict in Syria shows no signs of abating. In fact, recent gains by government forces appear to have bolstered the regime’s confidence. Although many observers, including U.S. intelligence officials, predicted that government forces would continue to lose ground, a change in regime tactics coupled with an infusion of foreign assistance appears for the time being to have stemmed rebel advances. Some observers have speculated openly about the potential for the opposition’s defeat if their recent reversals continue. The Assad regime benefits

(Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response Congressional Research) from
advantages in air power, armored equipment, and artillery. It displayed more sophisticated
military tactics and incorporated Hezbollah fighters in its recent campaign to reclaim the
strategically important town of Qusayr (alt.sp. Qusair) located six miles from the Lebanese-
Syrian border. Qusayr is at a crossroads linking Damascus to the Alawite-controlled
Mediterranean coast. Regime control of Qusayr may allow government forces to launch a new
offensive against the city of Homs, which is still partially controlled by rebel forces. Opposition
control of Qusayr had been crucial for receiving shipments of weapons from Lebanon.
Government forces and Hezbollah launched their offensive to retake Qusayr on May 19, as
various unsubstantiated claims estimate that the number of Hezbollah fighters now in Syria
number anywhere between 2,000-5,000 gunmen. Elsewhere, the regime continues to use
irregular Alawite militias to support military operations, some of which have committed
atrocities against mainly Sunni civilians. Opposition forces still control substantial areas of
northwestern, eastern, and southern Syria.

The broad grouping of forces opposing Assad’s regime includes a multitude of local
militias; army defectors; and volunteers fighting in brigades that are organized under the banner
of the Free Syrian Army and various armed Islamist coalitions. Some of these groups include
foreign fighters. Islamist militia groups; Free Syrian Army brigades; and local fighters in
different cities, continue to operate relatively independently. Several leading opposition groups
hold divergent and potentially contradictory goals for the country’s political future. Groups with
divergent priorities now control different areas. Islamist fighters, including the Al Qaeda-
affiliated Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front), captured the city of Ar Raqqah (Raqqa) in March
2013. Kurdish forces control areas of northeastern Syria, and some Kurds have clashed with Arab Islamists. As death tolls have spiraled, both sides have adopted brutal tactics.

In many areas, the regime has resorted to the use of air power, Scud missile strikes, and indiscriminate shelling of entire population centers, as part of a strategy to leave rebels with damaged physical infrastructure and a resentful population. A June 2013 report by a United Nations Human Rights Council Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria found that government forces and regime-affiliated militia have committed “War crimes and gross violations of international human rights law - including summary execution, arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful attack, attacking protected objects, and pillaging and destruction of property.” The report also documents human rights violations by the opposition, though it notes that “the violations and abuses committed by anti-Government armed groups did not, however, reach the intensity and scale of those committed by Government forces and affiliated militia.”

These crimes have intensified as Syria’s civil war has taken on an increasingly sectarian dimension. In many areas, Alawite-led security forces and allied militia such as Jaysh al Shaabi (Popular Army) are engaged in combat with predominantly Sunni rebel militias. Some of these Sunni militias are becoming more radicalized and aligned with extremist groups such as Ahrar al Sham (the Free Ones of the Levant) or the Nusra Front. The Obama Administration has designated as terrorist groups both the Popular Army and the Nusra Front pursuant to terrorism and Syria-related sanctions legislation and executive orders. In early April, the Al Qaeda affiliated Islamic State of Iraq announced its merger with the Nusra Front, but a Nusra leader reportedly rejected the claim and pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri in turn (U.N. Document A/HRC/23/58, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, June 4, 2013.)
Instructed the groups to refrain from rivalry and continues to encourage foreign fighters to travel to Syria and calls on Muslims to offer material support to armed jihadist groups in Syria. Over time, Syria’s conflict has become more complex. Sporadic clashes have broken out within the ranks of the armed opposition and allegedly within the tight-knit Alawite community.

Violence also has spilled over to varying degrees into neighboring states, such as Israel, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Many observers are concerned that the country is descending into anarchy. If current trends hold, fighting may gradually turn from a two-sided war into a contest involving multiple combatants from armed ethnic/sectarian communities, rebel militias, and remnants of the old regime. External intervention, including Hezbollah and Iranian support for Assad and increased U.S. support for select opposition forces, may invite a cycle of counterintervention from other parties. In sum, the short-to-medium-term security outlook for Syria and its neighbors is not positive.

The United States and other third parties face difficult choices with limited potential to shape the overall outcome. Possible Questions for Congressional Oversight on Recent Events

With White House statements and press reports suggesting that U.S. involvement is set to increase in the Syrian conflict, Members of Congress may wish to explore a range of strategic, political, military, and fiscal issues as they conduct oversight and authorize and appropriate funds that support U.S. policy. Possible questions include: What specific types of increased support will be provided, with which resources, and under which authorities? Who is receiving U.S. assistance, who may receive it in the future, and what mechanisms are in place to ensure that U.S. assistance is put to its intended use and does not benefit the Assad regime or extremist
groups? Should Congress seek to shape the provision of such assistance now or in the future by enacting specific authorizing or appropriating language? Why or why not?

What further contributions, if any, should the United States make to international humanitarian relief efforts in response to the United Nations appeal for billions of dollars more in funding for 2013 alone? Should the United States seek to expand the recognition it receives among Syrians for its support? What might the costs of further humanitarian assistance be under various scenarios and what funding is currently available to respond? What are the estimated costs of the current deployment of U.S. anti-ballistic missile batteries and other forces to the region? Over what periods of time might current operations continue? What would more robust operations cost and what funds and other resources are available? How might the Asad regime and its allies respond politically and militarily to increased U.S. support for the Syrian opposition? What degree of support and protection is the United States prepared to provide to regional allies who may become involved in facilitating the delivery of increased U.S. support, including military material and training, to the Syrian opposition? If the Syrian military were to attack regional U.S. allies, how should the United States respond? (Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response Congressional Research)

Two months into anti-government protests in Syria last year, as the military crackdown grew more vicious, the European Union and US introduced sanctions against President Bashar al-Assad, his security chiefs and members of his family. The sanctions were designed to freeze property and bank accounts, make it harder to access money and move assets around, and, ultimately, bring about an end to the violence. Eighteen months on, though, the fighting is worse and Brussels and Washington are struggling to make these sanctions bite. There is no official
tally of the amount of Assad riches frozen by the U.S., EU and Arab League under targeted sanctions on individuals and companies.

But based on the amounts known to have been blocked by Britain and non-EU Switzerland, it is likely to be several hundred million dollars. Switzerland has blocked about 100 million francs ($106 million) in assets linked to Assad, his associates and Syrian companies, in line with EU sanctions. Britain has frozen Syrian assets worth about 100 million pounds ($160 million), a source familiar with the situation said in July. But Western diplomats and experts in asset tracing say the search has unearthed only glimpses of a suspected international financial network supporting Syria's ruler and his inner circle. Western governments appear to be more focused on applying a set of broad based sanctions, such as those blocking Syria's central bank from US markets and imposing curbs on trade and services including a European Union ban on Syrian oil imports. In part, this may be because the size of Assad's personal wealth - the assets he could realistically offload to generate funds - is probably no more than $1 billion, according to private sector experts in corporate investigations. This is much less than the multi-billion dollar hoard that his opponents alleged he owned when the conflict began in March 2011.

Iain Willis, Director of Research at UK-based business intelligence company Alaco Ltd, said that early in the uprising "enormous figures" of more than $120 billion were being floated as estimates of Assad's wealth, based on the fact that the Assads in effect controlled most of the levers of the economy. "In reality, while they certainly had fingers in an awful lot of industries, it's nowhere near that, in terms of what's realisable, liquid, practical and moveable. I would say one percent of that is likely to be a realistic figure,"he said. Efforts to freeze whatever money he does have access to have been hindered by lawsuits lodged by some of those who appear on sanctions lists, Russian and Chinese opposition, lack of intelligence resources, and perhaps even
a policy to calibrate the amount of pressure on Assad to give him a path to exile. "There's been a sense that at the end of the day it's not a lot of money, that it doesn't have a significant impact on the decision-making calculus of the leadership," said Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank in Washington, thought he said he did not know this was fact. "The other operating theory is that, and this is potentially pretty cynical if your goal is to get rid of Assad and there is an opportunity to get him to agree to step down, potentially you don't want to go after his assets because you want to be able to give him an escape route where he can end up in exile and enjoy the fruits of his despotic regime. 'Let's not squeeze him entirely'."

Another explanation may be psychological tactics, said Charles Crawford, a former British ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia/Montenegro and Poland who helped implement sanctions intended to topple late Serb strongman Slobodan Milosevic. He said sanctions officials might want to list some regime hardliners but not others to stir up paranoia. But a simple lack of manpower may also have hurt. A Western envoy in the UAE, where Assad and the family of Rami Makhlof, Assad's cousin and main financial ally, are believed to have assets, said the probe into their private wealth was valuable but "we just don't have the resources. There is so much happening in the region right now that there are many other issues that take priority." Nick Bortman, Gulf-based head of London corporate investigation firm GPW's Middle East practice, said Bashar's wealth had been meticulously invested overseas, over many years, and behind multiple layers of proxies and offshore companies and in countries where disclosure laws were weak or not enforced. "Such groundwork dulls the blade of broad sanctions regimes," he said. "Freezing wealth requires identifying wealth, and that ultimately comes down to accessing advisors and consiglieri figures, something beyond the typical remit of financial and
commercial watchdogs and other would-be enforcers." Information from Gulf states has been meagre, some Western officials say. A senior Western diplomat said:

"We have been discussing with Russia and the Gulf countries in terms of our concerns they may be using their banking systems. It's not clear the extent that the regime money may have gone there." There has been some progress. Take Makhlouf, accused by European Union foreign ministers in May 2011 of bankrolling Assad. The tycoon has been under US sanctions since 2008 for what Washington calls public corruption. Brussels brought in its own sanctions last year. In July this year, evidence released by the US Senate's permanent sub-committee on investigations into anti-money laundering weaknesses at HSBC showed that Makhlouf and his father Mohammed were beneficiaries of a trust established in the Cayman Islands by the British bank.

On August 16, the EU listed a Luxembourg company, Drex Technologies Holding, saying Makhlouf was the beneficial owner. It said Makhlouf used the firm to facilitate and manage his international financial holdings, including a majority share in mobile phone operator Syriatel, which the EU has previously listed on the grounds that it provides financial support to the Syrian regime. Drex Technologies could not be reached for comment. Paolo Poveda, a client relations analyst at Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca, described as a registered agent of Drex in the EU listing, said they had resigned that position in June 2012. On Aug 30, the Swiss sanctions department listed the Luxembourg company. Makhlouf could not be reached for comment and questions sent through Syriatel were not answered. Makhlouf is believed to live in Syria still. Swiss prosecutors last year froze roughly 3 million euros held in a Geneva bank by Makhlouf, on grounds of suspected money-laundering. The money was unfrozen when Makhlouf appealed, saying it predated sanctions imposed by the Swiss last May. Mahlouf's lawsuit was one of 35
legal challenges against the Syria sanctions at the European Court of Justice, according to one EU official. The majority of those are still pending. Several European officials said the bar for evidence of wrongdoing was being set much higher than in the early months of the uprising. In another case, a Syrian businessman, Emad Ghreiwati, was taken off the sanctions list this year after he challenged his listing in a lawsuit at the European Court of Justice. The court ruled there was no need to make a formal finding in the case, as he had been taken off the list, for undisclosed reasons, after his lawsuit was launched, an official said. Asked about the pace of the EU's efforts to target Assad's circle, a senior EU official said it was up to member states to propose "ideas for potential candidates" and legal challenges to the measures had resulted in a more cautious approach.

"Sometimes when mistakes are being made, evidence that is put on the table is not strong and solid enough, then there is always a possibility for legal recourse. And we are having a few of them in front of European courts and we have to be careful, to have solid ground," he said. Perhaps the most interesting case study is Romania. Romania's former communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and Assad's father Hafez al-Assad had along and warm friendship. Romania-based Syrian dissident Mohamad Rifai alleges close ties continue between the two countries, specifically the Syrian ambassador to Romania Walid Othman, who is Rami Makhlouf's father-in-law. Rifai, a dentist who left Syria in the early 1980s to study in then-communist Romania, wants the EU and the United States to investigate companies linked to Othman as possible havens and conduits for funds belonging to Assad and his extended family, including Makhlouf. Former Syrian Oil Minister Abdo Husameddin said Othman was "one of the people making (money transfer) dealings on behalf of the Assad family." But Othman's opponents have produced no evidence of any wrongdoing. A Romanian investigative journalism website called
Rise Project published documents in May 2012 that show the extent of Syrian commercial activity in Romania, including companies owned by Othman's sons, but no evidence of any connection to Assad himself, or to his assets.

An EU diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity said Othman's name and that of his sons and his daughter, Razan, were on a list of potential sanctions targets presented by Syrian opposition activists to the EU in mid-September. But Razan's was the only name that drew interest. On Oct. 15 the EU added her and 27 other names to a list of individuals targeted by EU asset freezes and travel bans, bringing the total number of people facing such sanctions to 181. Razan Othman is married to Makhlouf. The EU said she was "associated with the Syrian regime and benefiting from it". A Western official, speaking on condition of anonymity when asked about Othman, said only that Romania was one of several countries being studied as a potential location of activity by Assad's private financial network. (Micah Zenko, Damascus, November 3, 2012)

Subsequent Executive Orders under Presidents Bush and Obama have also targeted Syrian individuals and entities. Notable measures in response to the 2011-2012 crisis include Executive Orders 13572 and 13573, which froze the U.S property of several high-ranking Syrian and Iranian officials, including President Assad. More broadly, Executive Order 13582 froze all U.S. assets of the Syrian government, prohibited U.S. persons from doing business with the Assad regime, and banned U.S. imports of Syrian petroleum products. Additionally, Washington officially closed its embassy in Damascus and withdrew Ambassador Robert Ford on February 6, 2012, amid an escalating assault by Syrian security forces on the city of Homs. The U.S. government ordered the expulsion of Syria's charge d'affaires from Washington in May 2012,
following the killing of more than 100 civilians, mostly women and children, by regime forces in the Houla region. (Jonathan Masters 2013, Syria’s Crisis and the Global Response)

The European Union has passed more than a dozen rounds of sanctions on the Assad regime since the March 2011 uprising. This list from Reuters AlertNet provides more comprehensive details of the EU measures. Significant sanctions include: Asset freezes and travel bans imposed on top members of the Syrian military and government, including Assad and his family.

Express Asset freezes and travel bans imposed on top members of the Syrian military and government, including Assad and his family.

Bans on the import of Syrian oil and thort of equipment for the petro industry.

Sanction on the Syrian central bank.

Bans on the import of Syrian oil and the export of equipment for the petro industry.

The EU eased restrictions on Syrian oil in April 2013, allowing the import of crude from opposition forces to bolster their finances. Western bans on the import of Syrian oil, the mainstay of its economy, have exacted a heavy toll, according to reports.

Sanctions and the pullout of foreign energy companies have decreased oil-sector production by nearly half, according to the Damascus-based Syria Center for Policy Research. By the end of 2012, the total economic cost of the protracted crisis was pegged at $48.4 billion, more than 80 percent of GDP. The Syrian economy has averted collapse by relying on the aid of friendly nations, including Russia, Iraq, and Iran, according to Samer Abboud at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The sanctions that have hit Syria the hardest, he says, "are
Their sanctions mainly target sources of government revenue by prohibiting transactions with individuals, companies, and state-owned institutions tied to the regime." Both Russia and China have significant economic and military relations with Syria. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the countries have vetoed three Western-backed resolutions aimed at isolating the Assad regime--the most recent in July 2012. Analysts say the diplomatic opposition stems from fears of another Western-backed military intervention similar to those in Libya and the Ivory Coast. In early July 2012, Russia endorsed a called for a transitional government in Damascus, but Moscow was keen to have the proposal omit any explicit demands for Assad to leave power. Russia has since reemphasized that it will not back a UN proposal that would include sanctions as a solution to the Syrian political crisis. After a Moscow meeting in early May 2013, top U.S. and Russian officials called for an international peace conference in the near future aimed at persuading regime and opposition officials to accept the Geneva plan for a negotiated end to the war. The United Nations Security Council has adopted sanctions against two Iranian firms on charges of supplying arms to the Syrian government, but stopped short of naming countries fuelling unrest in Syria by arming militants in the Arab country. The Iranian companies hit by UN sanctions on Thursday are Yas Air and SAD Import Export Company, AFP reported. The sanctions freeze the assets of the firms and ban dealings with them. US Ambassador to UN Susan Rice claimed that the two Iranian firms were “responsible for shipping ammunition, assault rifles, machine guns, mortar shells and other arms from Iran to Syria.” The Security Council is dominated by countries that have been actively supporting the militants in Syria.
The United States, Britain and France have also recognized a Syrian opposition coalition as the representative of the Syrian people. The UN human rights investigators have acknowledged that “foreign fighters” are filtering into Syria to join the militants fighting against the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. From the facts given it is evidence to say that as a result of the division of the permanent members of the Security Council, the sanctions given to the Assad’s regime is based on the interests of the permanent members of Security Council in the United Nations.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is hard to imagine what it felt like to be Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria, watching the footage of Gaddafi being dragged dastardly through the streets of Sirte in Libya before being killed. The wave of protests and demonstrations that gripped Arab nations popularly called the ‘Arab Spring’ has led to the end of many long-serving regimes like the ones in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. The protest in Syria began in January, 2011 and is currently the focus of international attention. This protest has degenerated into unspeakable carnage and destruction that by November, 2012 over 40,000 people have died and a lot of cities and towns left in ruins. A bookmaker’s bet following the precedent that has emerged over the past several months will be that the regime of al-Assad will eventually collapse. This is a sensible assumption, but it is also safe to argue that Syria stands unique in circumstances and the end of the al-Assad regime might be entirely up to al-Assad

Most countries condemn the violent crackdown on the opposition and protesters by the Syrian government. They have also decried the degeneration of this crisis into a full blown civil war and the gross violation of human rights in Syria. The Arab league has called for the UN Security Council to send a peace keeping mission to Syria and has called on Arab nations to severe diplomatic relations with the al-Assad regime. The United States has ruled out military action in Syria. This means that for now an international intervention like we saw in Libya seems improbable, though CNN reports that the US has been gathering intelligence on Syrian military sites and activities and is monitoring and intercepting communication of key Syrian officials.
The end of the al-Assad regime is inevitable. There is only so long the al-Assad regime can sustain this carnage and tragic destruction. The crucial question is, how long can this brutal regime hold back the opposition, the Arab League and the condemnation of the international community? Al-Assad has the benefit of retrospect in considering which path to follow in ending the current crisis. He can choose to follow his father’s footsteps and attempt to crush the uprising hoping it will go away while offering small concessions like a referendum on the Constitution. For this path to be successful however, he would have to take his country back to the 80’s where this method of oppression was not unusual. This path seems unlikely to succeed with the prevailing realities on the ground. He could also follow the favourable path of Yemeni’s Ali Abdullah Saleh who handed over power to a transitional government and negotiated a favourable immunity deal. This path seems plausible and might satisfy both the opposition and the international community. Another option for al-Assad will be the path of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak who handed over power relatively late to his former military colleagues. This path like the previous one seems also plausible. Finally, Muammar Gaddafi’s path is also available to al-Assad. Gaddafi appeared to be delusional to his last breadth and didn’t handover power till he lost his life trying to hold on to power. Sadly, in an interview with Russian Today TV on the 8th of November, 2012, Bashar al-Assad indicated that he would stay and die in Syria. This seems to be the Gaddafi option and path.

In analysing the end game, it is hoped that with the end of the US elections, the Obama administration might be more amenable to a more concerted and proactive policy to end this carnage and quagmire. This is because President Obama would no longer be bound by political posturing and exigencies that limited his ability to take a more proactive position on the crisis. Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom seemed to be thinking and strategising
along the same line. Speaking to the media during a visit to Jordan, Mr. Cameron said the Syrian crisis would top the list of issues he intended to discuss with the re-elected President Obama.

Since the international community is so far not interested in intervening to end this catastrophe, we might be wondering, how long can Al-Assad hold on? But the real question though is, how long can the will of the opposition hold? If the precedent of the Arab Spring is anything to go by, the answer to that question would be, “a very long time.” Only

The UN Security Council has the responsibility of maintaining global peace and security it has recorded some landmark achievement since its inception after the Second World War because of the characters of the big five, the world has experienced relative peace. Hence the world is watching the big five as they respond to the Syrian crisis. Steps are taken in order to address the ongoing civil war in Syria but the three veto of Russia and China has debunked the process of the collective security mechanism, in spite of that, Kofi Annan six points agenda were also neglected, while the killing goes on.

In international relations power is the object of the study and the interest of one state supersede all other interests, and clash of interests always leads to conflicts. UN Security Council should consider the responsibility to protect and shade their interests for the sake of humanity, if the Syria crisis moves on the crisis will spread to neighbouring states and the Syrian state may be a breeding ground, for terrorist to operate hence the region will be a threat to global peace and security.

Revolution occurs as a result of inadequate political goods, abuse of human rights, sit tight posture of leaders and non involvement of citizens in management of their own affairs. For effective leadership role in the United Nations Security Council the veto power used by the five
permanent members should be removed from the UN Charter and give chance to simple majority voting.

Dialogue, negotiation and arbitration should be used between warring parties before resorting to war and the UN Security Council should monitor these activities with urgency using powerful states like US to moderate the conflicting parties at the watch of other Security Council members because power is a major element in international relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this study, we want to make the following recommendations that will help to reposition the UN Security Council in the 21st century as well as giving adequate attention to crisis regions in the world

1 The veto of the five permanent members should be removed in the charter and simple majority voting system should be adopted, because the veto is used by the permanent members to frustrate the mechanism of the collective security of the Security Council of the United Nations.

2 Government should respect the rights of their citizens, governance is a collective responsibility not a family affairs hence leaders should respect the rights of their citizens because political sovereignty is in the hands of the people.

3 Dialogue, negotiation and arbitration should be used between government and citizens before resorting to war. The people of Syria should settle the dispute themselves because outsiders will only key in their interest first before the interest of the Syrians.

4 Powerful states, like the US should be in the fore front to manage conflicts in developing states because power is the key element in international politics.
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