THE STRUGGLE FOR A PERMANENT SEAT AT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
CONTESTANTS IN 2012

BY

ANEKE, CORNELIUS COLLINS
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SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR IGWE, OBASI

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BY

Prof. Obasi, Igwe
Project Supervisor

Prof. Obasi, Igwe
Head of Department

External Examiner
DEDICATION

To God Almighty for HIS grace and protection and to my loving wife – Mercy; and to Michael and Michelle, you were the inspiration.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UN – United Nations.


SA – South Africa.

BRICS – Top Strong Emerging Economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

NAM – Non-Aligned Movement.

P-5 – Five Permanent Members of the Security Council (US, Russia, China, Britain and France)

WWI – World War I.

WWII - World War II.

G4 – The four countries of Germany, Japan, Brazil and India that are jointly seeking permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

UFC – Uniting for Consensus formerly the coffee club used in designating those countries that vehemently oppose the idea of granting either permanent seat or veto to member countries of the G4.
ABSTRACT

This work set out to investigate the struggle for Permanent Seats At The Security Council: A Critical Assessment of the Contestants in 2012. While observing that there exists a fundamental need to reform and enlarge both the membership and voting pattern in the Security Council in order to reflect geopolitical realities of the 21st Century by making both the organisation and the Security Council in particular to appear democratic while at the same time enhancing its efficiency and legitimacy around the world. It is noted that while all member states of the organisation accept this need and exigency, they however, differed on the modalities, nature and extent of the reform. Moreover, each of the major contestants though enjoys the support of one or the other of the members of the P5, but they at the same time faces opposition from major powers in their respective regions; thereby making the struggle a serious and arduous task. We however, in this study vehemently believe that the structure and composition of the United Nations Security Council must definitely be reformed and reorganized to reflect the wide and varied membership of the organisation. The theory of national interest was used as our framework for analysing the quest and struggles for permanent seat in the Security Council. Data for the study was gathered through observation of the secondary sources like books, journals, Internet, official documents et cetera. Our method of data analysis which involved giving a qualitative description to quantitative information brings simplicity and coherence to our work. Our recommendations were also anchored on the findings of our research work which was clearly articulated in our conclusion.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The membership and structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have been among the most controversial and intractable issues considered by UN member-states since the establishment of the organization in the mid-1940s (Article 23 of the United Nations Charters). Tillema (1989) opined that the importance of the UNSC, particularly the council’s permanent seats, stems largely from the status and prestige associated with its decision-making authority on questions of global peace and security. In fact, permanent membership is equated with “great power” status in the international political system.

As a consequence, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of emerging global and regional powers throughout the world – including Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt have sought permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council during the past few decades. However, Malik notes that, despite a tremendous amount of discussion and debate, there has been little consensus on the matter of United Nations Security Council restructuring, including to what extent the council ought to be enlarged, how many new permanent and non-permanent members ought to be added, whether the new members ought to be extended the veto privilege and which specific countries ought to be added as permanent members (Malik, 2005: 19).

Although much has been written about United Nations Security Council restructuring during the past decade from an institutional perspective, (Russett et al., 1996; Daws, 1997; Schlichtmann, 1999; Afoaku and Ukaga, 2001; Berween, 2002; Weiss, 2003; Thakur, 2004; Blum, 2005; Malik, 2005; Price, 2005; Soussan, 2005), there has been relatively little focus on the politics of seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council from the perspective of an existing or emerging global or regional power.
Although the United Nations Security Council has been restructured only once in more than sixty years, there have been several attempts over the years to achieve this goal. As a result of several new UN member-states due to decolonization in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Spain and several Latin American countries proposed amendments to the UN Charter in 1956 to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council from six to eight (Bourantonis, 2005). He also notes that after several years of debate and disagreement, including the Soviet Union’s insistence on linking the issue of United Nations Security Council restructuring to the issue of mainland China’s membership in the UN, there was a “breakthrough” on the issue in the early 1960s. In December 1963, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) formally approved amendments increasing non-permanent seats from six to ten, and the amendments were ratified by the required number of member-states in 1965 (Afoaku and Ukaga, 2001; Weiss, 2003; Blum, 2005).

As a result of continued decolonization, overall membership in the UN continued to grow significantly from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s. At the same time, developing countries were increasingly dissatisfied with the abuse of the veto power by the permanent members and the lack of “equitable representation” for Asian and African countries on the various councils of the UN. Bourantonis (2005) noted that consequent upon this scenario, India and several developing countries proposed amendments to the UN Charter in 1979 to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 11 to 14. “In 1980, several African, Asian, and Latin American countries proposed increasing the number of non-permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council from 10 to 16” (Blum, 2005: 637). But as noted by Archibugi (1993) unlike the previous effort to restructure the United Nations Security Council in the early 1960s, these subsequent efforts were unsuccessful largely because of heightened tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during this period.
With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, there was renewed interest in restructuring the United Nations Security Council to reflect the changes in the international political system (Russett, et al., 1996; Drifte, 2000; Miyashita, 2002). In December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approved a resolution sponsored by India calling upon the United Nations Secretary-General to invite member-states to submit proposals for United Nations Security Council reform, resulting in proposals from some 80 countries (Drifte, 2000). A year later, the United Nations General Assembly established an “Open-Ended Working Group” to consider the proposals for United Nations Security Council reform (Daws, 1997; Price, 2005; Schlichtmann, 1999; Bourantonis, 2005). Several options for United Nations Security Council restructuring were among the proposals submitted to the working group, including a proposal by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) calling for an increase in permanent seats from five to nine and non-permanent seats from ten to seventeen (Berween, 2002).

In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly approved the Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, which stated the United Nations Security Council should be “expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character, and improve its working efficiency and transparency” (Schlichtmann, 1999:510). Two years later, UN Ambassador Ismael Razali of Malaysia proposed adding five permanent seats (without veto power) and four non-permanent seats to the United Nations Security Council. The Razali Plan, which permitted the United Nations General Assembly to choose the countries to be given permanent seats, was ultimately blocked by members of the NAM, as well as countries such as Italy, Egypt, Mexico, and Pakistan (Bourantonis, 2005).

After a decade of intense debate on UN reform, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan established a 16-member high-level panel in 2003 to evaluate
and recommend specific options. In 2004, the panel proposed two different options for United Nations Security Council restructuring: (1) six new permanent seats without veto power and three additional non-permanent seats; and (2) eight four-year renewable seats and one additional non-permanent seat (Blum, 2005; Price, 2005). After debating these and other options for United Nations Security Council reform during much of 2005, the United Nations General Assembly was unable to come to a consensus on how to restructure the council. Such that Brazil’s UN Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg expressed frustration with the outcome of the debate by stating that a “few countries, seeking to avoid any decision on this matter, take refuge on claims for consensus and on allegations on the disruptive nature of the issue” and that the actions of these countries “only contribute to the perpetuation of current inequalities in the structure of the organization, and to the frustration of the aspirations of all members, for a more balanced distribution of power in the work of the Security Council.”

On this background therefore, this study seeks to investigate the prospect of the contestant for the United Nations Security Council’s permanent seat; with focus on Nigeria and other contestants such as Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa etc.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

There has been general agreement over time that the Security Council is an unrepresentative relic and that its composition is a throwback to the immediate Post-World War II global order. Several recommendations for expanding the Council have been proposed since the end of the Cold War. For instance, the Commission on Global Governance recommended establishing a new class of five…

standing members, the intent of which would be to reduce the status of permanent membership; increasing the number of “non-permanent” members from ten to thirteen; and eliminating the veto, except for very exceptional and overriding circumstances related to the national interests of the major powers (Knight, 2005:106).
According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, our minds find it taxing to hold two mutually inconsistent beliefs for a protracted period (Evanston and Row, 1957). The mind seeks to reconcile them over time, if necessary by substantially modifying one of them or by denying its validity altogether in order to relieve the dissonance. Politics, of course, holds innumerable examples of the phenomenon.

At the United Nations, there may be no starker case than that of the protracted and polarizing matter of Security Council reform. On one hand, judging by public statements, it is generally accepted that the Security Council is long overdue for a major overhaul. The calls for its radical reform have come with such frequency and from so many quarters, as to qualify as common wisdom.

In this connection Japan and Germany, the second- and third-biggest contributors to the UN budget, have been campaigning for permanent seat status on the Council. India, the world’s second most populous country, and Brazil, Latin America’s biggest country, also have designs on achieving permanent status on the Council. These four states have banded together to press their case before the UN membership, and they are joined in spirit by the Africans, who want two seats for their continent (perhaps Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa).

None of these proposals for UN Security Council expansion is likely to go far. However, China mistrusts Japan. Italy opposes a permanent seat for Germany and has instead proposed a single permanent seat for the European Union. This latter recommendation is opposed by Britain and France who would have to give up their permanent seats under that scenario. Under the current charter, regional bodies are not UN members and would therefore be ineligible for seats on the Council. Mexico and Argentina oppose Brazil’s quest for a permanent seat on the Council, and Pakistan opposes India’s bid.

The implications of the preceding analysis is that the United Nations Security Council, which is seen as the key organ of the United Nations charged with the responsibility
of ensuring international peace and security are both technically and procedurally dominated by the winners of Second World War who shaped the Charter of the United Nations in their national interests, dividing the veto-power pertinent to the permanent seats amongst themselves; thereby giving the council the character of inequity, undemocratic, unrepresentative of the races of world, unaccountable et cetera to the larger world community that make up the organization.

It is in order to address this anomaly that scholars such as Chopra, (2001), Beigbeder, (1994), Rourke (2002), Canton, (1986), Barry (2003), Kegley (1985), Roskin (1993), Roberts (2000), Goodrich (1999), Sheever (1999), Roskin (1993), Huggins (1988), Sigler (2002), (Maya, 2005), Brocker (2000), Hopkinson (1998), Galtung (2000), Cede (1999), Bourantonis, (2005), Afoaku and Ukaga (2001), Weiss (2003), Blum (2005), (Archibugi, 1993) and Heinrich (2012) have argued and continue to argue that there is the dire need for the reorganization and reformation of the UN Security Council both in terms of composition and voting pattern to reflect the multilateral character of the organization.

However, while these group of scholars and existing literature on the issue of United Nations Security Council reform largely succeeded in providing the descriptive analysis of the need to reform the United Nations Security Council and the on-going bid by some perceived “developing nations” in all the geo-political regions of the universe for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council is very informative; it contains neither a thorough discussion of the potential strategies for obtaining a permanent seat nor a theoretical framework that might be used to further analyze the bids for these group of countries seeking permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.

Moreover, they fail to provide us with the yardstick with which we can use in ascertaining the method and criteria that can qualify a country to be (s)elected for such
position of permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. On the account of this, the study therefore elicits the following research questions:

1. Is the need to reform the United Nations Security Council implicated in the geopolitical realities of the 21st Century membership of the organisation?

2. Is the quest to reform and enlarge the structure and voting pattern in the United Nations Security Council aimed at making it more democratic, efficient and legitimate?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

The broad objective of this study is to interrogate the issues involved in the quest and struggle for Permanent Seat at the United Nation’s Security Council: A Critical Assessment of the Contestants in 2012”. However, the study will address the following specific objectives:

1. To determine if the need to reform the United Nations Security Council is implicated in the geopolitical realities of the 21st Century membership of the organisation.

2. To ascertain whether the quest to reform and enlarge the structure and voting pattern in the United Nations Security Council is to make it more democratic, efficient and legitimate.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The study has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, the study will provide a comprehensive insight into the looming and cyclical issue of United Nations reforms, especially in to the United Nations Security Council reform by giving a detailed account of both the remote and immediate factors that necessitate the call for the reformation of the structure of the council and its voting pattern; it will also account for the reasons why the current veto wielding members (the so-called big five) have been giving the move a sort
of lip service and lackadaisical attitude, rather than giving the issue the seriousness and attention that it deserved. It will also provide the reading public with a clear cut meaning and nature of the functions of the United Nations Security Council, its structure and the provision of the United Nations Charter as it regards the membership and power of the Security Council. It shall equally add to the extant body of literature that borders on United Nations Reform and the Quest for permanent seat in the world especially as it concerns Africa, which Nigeria is part and is vehemently positioning itself as the beautiful bride to be crowned with one out of the two proposed slots (seats) that is to be allocated to Africa.

Practically, it shall be of immense benefit to diplomats, public policy formulators, politicians and high level representative at the international level especially policy makers that are saddled with the task of devising appropriate institutional mechanisms for the smooth and foreign policy thrust that will enable their home government to adequately lobby and canvass for the its allocation or (s)election. For the United Nations Security Council, It will also provide the basis to scholars for further research into the United Nations Reform and the expansion of the composition of the security for both the permanent and non-permanent categories.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

This review focused primarily on those documents and commentators that comments and contributes to the on-going debate on the reformation, reorganisation and expansion of the United Nations Organisation especially as it relates to the call to reform United Nations Security Council both in composition, representation and in voting pattern because the use of Veto by a select few is causing disquiet among the rest of the world.
The Politics of Veto in United Nations Security Council (Uses and Abuses of Veto Power)

One of the most distinctive features of the UNSC is that it is the only U.N organ in which there is a formal rule of unanimity or ‘right of veto’. The UNSC is part parliament and part secret diplomatic conclave. As Beigbeder (1994:18) asserts, “the Charter declares that decisions of the Council shall be by the affirmative vote of nine members and that, except for procedural matters, the votes shall include the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The only exception to this Charter rule is that in decisions relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Thus, if nine or more of the 15 members vote in favor of a proposal but one of the five permanent members votes ‘no’, the proposal will be nullified. The UNSC can veto virtually any decision including the proposals by the UNGA as a whole. A closer analysis however, reveals that there is no reference in the U.N Charter to the ‘right of veto’. What is called the ‘right of veto’ is intrinsically linked to permanent membership. Article 27 (3) of the U.N Charter merely calls for the ‘concurring votes’ of the permanent members when the UNSC takes substantive decision.

The model on which the U.N was built has been proved to be too ambitious. The U.N Charter had been drafted on the assumption that the victors of the WWII would continue to co-operate as they did during the hostilities. Paradoxically, from the beginning, the U.N had been unable to function as designed. The working of the UNSC, a body designed to ensure the strong beat of the heart of the U.N Charter and its collective security provisions has over the years attracted widespread criticism. Instead of fostering co-operation, it became apparent in the early days of the U.N that the Post-War differences that had developed between the U.S and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) significantly limited the ability of the UNSC to take action. As Chopra (2001:42) argues, “The superpowers were inevitably
on opposite sides of most issues and the U.S controlled the votes in the council”. The USSR’s interests being frequently threatened, and because of its conspicuous minority position in the UNSC, it was left with the veto as its sole weapon within the U.N machinery to thwart any action it considered injurious to its interests.

Since the U.N originated from a coalition of victorious wartime allies, “the organization faced for roughly several decades questioning on how those ‘converted’ to the antifascist side of peace might be admitted to the club” (Beigbeder 1984:45). Over the years, vetoes have been cast to block the admission of member states as well as nominations for the U.N Secretary General. As argued by Rourke (2002:34), “Despite all 14 other UNSC members having supported Boutros Boutros Ghali, the U.S veto ended his tenure as the U.N Secretary General”. As the Cold-War evolved, within an economically and ideologically diametrically opposed world, the U.S and the USSR approached this issue of new U.N membership, not from the viewpoint of who sided with whom during the WWII, but rather who sided with whom in the Cold-War.

Thus, the U.S ensured that USSR allies applying for membership were denied the required UNSC majority. On the USSR side, in a bid to keep out Western-sponsored applicants, it used its veto recurrently (Canton 1986). In the early days of the U.N as Barry (2003:38) argues, “The USSR Commissioner and later Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov said ‘no’ so many times that he was known as ‘Mr Veto’. ’” Vyacheslav Molotov regularly rejected bids for new membership because of the U.S refusal to admit the Soviet republics. This state of affairs led in 1955 to a compromise deal which resulted in the admission of sixteen members of the U.N. As Kegley (1985:128) asserts, “This compromise between the superpowers allowed the great powers to support a politically balanced package of applicants, including pro-Easterners, pro-Westerners, and neutrals”. The compromise deal
opened the floodgates and by 1980, the U.N had more than 150 members, roughly three times the original number.

It is apparent that the U.S and USSR would probably not have accepted the creation of the U.N without the veto power. This is because some exceptional privileges denied to Great Powers in the days of the League of Nations or in other security associations, the veto represents that right which was prerequisite of all sovereign states in the pre-UN world not to be overruled by other members. As Roskin argues:

> Stalin at Yalta in 1945 insisted on the veto provision, Churchill and Roosevelt went along. Stalin felt [correctly] that the USSR would be so outnumbered by non-Communist countries that it would suffer permanent condemnation. On the same basis, Stalin got the bizarre provision giving three UNGA votes to the USSR, whose constituent republics of Ukraine and Beloroussia were counted as U.N members. (Roskin, 1993:362)

One may observe that since the UNSC was originally intended to deal with most critical issues of national interests, and because these Great Powers hold the preponderance of means for the enforcement, such an arrangement may be considered a necessary departure from the complete abandonment of unanimity. Though it is impossible to escape the fact that the primary purpose of the veto is not to foster co-operation but to prevent action, the use of veto is often in contradiction to the literal terms of the U.N Charter and has been manipulated for national interests. The veto strangles the UNSC and prevents a broad consensus from guiding its work across a wide range of issues surrounding global politics. This device however, in international politics helps Great Powers to make sure that their vital interests are not surrendered.

According to Roberts (2000:41), “there was discontent when the U.S and Britain systematically blocked council action to impose economic sanctions on South Africa during hay days of apartheid regime and/or policy in the country in the 1980s”. Goodrich (1999:60)
notes that, “there was dissatisfaction when France and Britain blocked action on Suez in 1956; when the U.S refused action on Vietnam in the 1960s, 70s and when the USSR prevented action on Afghanistan in the 1980s”. Today, the opposition is conspicuous because the UNSC, rather than failing to act, is now acting in ways that often seem motivated by geopolitical interests of permanent members. Currently, there has been sign that Russia and China are willing to veto any resolution punishing Iran because of its drive to control the nuclear fuel-cycle.

Expressing the role of veto in the U.N system, Sheever (1999:59) notes that, “no important action can be undertaken by the U.N with any reasonable prospect of success in the face of U.S opposition. Conversely, if the U.S gives full support to a proposal, its chances of being adopted must be considered very high, unless of course the veto operates”.

Similarly Roskin observes:

In speeches and corridor conversations, diplomats often point out that four out of the five permanent members are ‘European’ (a concept that includes the U.S). He adds that ‘Four out of five are ‘industrialized' countries. The four-fifths of humankind that live in the poor countries of the global South, they say, have only one voice, namely, China (Roskin, 1993:63).

The Chinese role in representing Third World Countries founds expression in President Robert G. Mugabe's speech, during his state visit to China where he implored to the Chinese leaders that Britain wanted to use the U.N Special Envoy for Zimbabwe, Anna Tibajuka's report to put Harare on the UNSC agenda, but expressed hope that China a staunch ally since the days of the liberation struggle would use its veto to thwart such action. In Beijing, the Zimbabwean President said, China, as a member of the United Nations Security Council, we appeal to you to act in defense of innocent people and nations in the Third World. My country at the moment is being brought into an arena of international publicity unnecessarily (Southern Times, 2005).
In the same vein Huggins (1988:41) commented that, “it became the practice to use the veto more broadly both to stop the possibility of any sanction directed against permanent members, even to stop a mere critical resolution directed against an ally”. It is for this reason that Sigler (2002:67) posits that “the U.S use of veto has traditionally been tied to Israel with the U.S vetoing anything critical of the Israeli’s at the Security Council”. In September 2003, the U.S vetoed a resolution drafted by Syria that denounced Israel's threat to remove the then Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat. Washington said the resolution was ‘flawed' because it did not include a robust condemnation of acts of terrorism by Palestinian militant groups (Maya, 2005). “In 2002 the U.S again blocked another draft resolution criticizing the killing by Israeli forces and the destruction of the World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse in the West Bank” (Sigler, 2002:67).

These above illustrations depict how relations among veto-wielding permanent members’ interests impinge as well as determine the shape, nature and character of global events within a particular epoch. The veto power was deliberately inserted in the U.N Charter by the Great Powers and universally accepted by others as an automatic switch off, to prevent the UNSC from becoming involved in a great power showdown. Considering the end of the Cold-War, the less used veto now serves as a mechanism:

To prevent an ad hoc UNSC majority from ganging up on one of its permanent members, such as China for its human rights record. In addition, it forces the majority to consider minority positions in its resolutions, such as softening the sanctions against Libya for its failure to turn over those wanted for the airline bombings (Brocker, 2000:42).

In the Libyan case, it is when the sanctions were softened; China (and other members) abstained, allowing the resolution to pass.

On Reform, Composition and Voting Power in the Security Council

The U.N reform, in the sense of changing the organization so that its capacities to fulfill the goals of its Charter are strengthened, has been a continuing matter of concern and
the object of serious research. According to Trevor (2000:81), “The U.N’s failure to fully understand and doctrinally adjust to the new circumstances surrounding global politics brought the world body to the point of outright strategic failure”. As Hopkinson (1998:50) has put it: “The world balance of power has changed dramatically in the years since the United Nations was established but the composition of the Security Council has not”. Hence the need for reform has persistently been suggested.

Over the years, a variety of proposals to amend the structure of the UNSC, to align it with the current geopolitical realities have been proffered. However, the veto power aspect has become a stumbling block, as the five permanent members have been ever ready to quash any attempt that may lead to the amendment of Article 108 of the U.N Charter. It was on the basis of this that Rourke declared that:

The continuing importance of the veto in practice, its value as a symbol of big power status, and the difficulty of amending the Charter mean that the veto authority is likely to continue without major revision despite arguments that its existence is in the hands of an unrepresentative few countries and is undermining the legitimacy of the UNSC (Rourke, 1995:363).

Advocating the overhaul of the U.N, Galtung observes that:

Abolishing the Security Council, revising the contribution structure, significantly reducing the level of the United Nations salaries, the dewaldheimization of the United Nations system, greatly reducing the power and authority of the executive heads, and moving the United Nations headquarters out of New York will make this international body more efficient and reliable (Galtung, 2000:98).

The special status enjoyed by the five Permanent members of the Security Council has become a simmering issue in the U.N. As Rourke (2002:169) argues, “The most common argument against the arrangement is that the existing membership has never been fully realistic and is becoming less so as time goes by”. Many global and regional powers that do not have the veto power have been pressing for changes in the UNSC structure. In the same
vein, less powerful countries have jumped on the bandwagon. This can be illustrated by the Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga who once called on the UNSC “to become more representative and more responsible to the general membership of the United Nations” (Rourke, 2002:169). The Sri Lankan President’s sentiments were echoed by Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa who emphasised that “the Security Council can no longer be retained like the sanctuary of the hollies with only the original members acting as high priests, deciding on issues for the rest of the world who cannot be admitted” (Rourke, 2002:169).

In his report in 2005, titled “In Larger Freedom: Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that, no overhaul of the U.N would be complete without reform of the Security Council. Dissatisfaction with the UNSC has spawned many plans to revise it. However, any change in the membership of the UNSC requires an amendment to Article 108 of the U.N Charter which needs the consent of all the permanent veto-wielding members. As such, it is highly unlikely that any formal changes concerning membership of the permanent members or their veto power will materialize.

As Cede (1999:35) argues, “five seats are attributed to the Afro-Asian group, two for the Latino-American, two for the Western European and others and one for the Eastern European group”. The term is for two years, with half of the number elected by the UNGA (Art. 23) each year. As Article 23(2) stipulates “a retiring member shall not be immediately re-elected”. The principal officer of the UNSC is the President who, rather than being elected, is appointed monthly, in rotation, according to alphabetical order. This rule gives each UNSC member (permanent and non-permanent) a chance to hold the Presidency.

Bourantonis (2005) asserted that as a result of the entrance of several new member-states into the United Nations Organisation due to decolonization in the late 1940s and early
1950s, Spain and several Latin American countries proposed amendments to the UN Charter in 1956 to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the UNSC from six to eight. Bourantonis equally argues that after several years of debate and disagreement, including the Soviet Union’s insistence on linking the issue of UNSC restructuring to the issue of mainland China’s membership of the UN, there was a “breakthrough” on the issue in the early 1960s. In December 1963, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) formally approved amendments increasing non-permanent seats from six to ten, and the amendments were ratified by the required number of member-states in 1965 (Afoaku and Ukaga, 2001; Weiss, 2003; Blum, 2005).

As a result of continued decolonization, overall membership in the UN continued to grow significantly from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s. At the same time, developing countries were increasingly dissatisfied with the abuse of the veto power by the permanent members and the lack of “equitable representation” for Asian and African countries on the various councils of the UN. Consequently, India and several developing countries proposed amendments to the UN Charter in 1979 to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the UNSC from 11 to 14 (Bourantonis, 2005: 31). In 1980, several African, Asian, and Latin American countries proposed increasing the number of non-permanent seats on the UNSC from 10 to 16 (Blum, 2005). Unlike the previous effort to restructure the UNSC in the early 1960s, these subsequent efforts were unsuccessful largely because of heightened tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during this period (Archibugi, 1993).

According to Schlichtmann (1999: 510) the UNGA approved in 1995 the Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, which stated that the UNSC should be “expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character, and improve its working efficiency and transparency”.

Heinrich (2012:1) showing the insignificant character of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, posed the question; “there are 10 non-permanent members on the UN Security Council - name three”. He went on to assert that beyond a handful of policy wonks, no one pays much attention to non-permanent members, which is indicative of how little prestige such a seat bestows. Although non-permanent members vote, they exercise no veto and so lack any pretence to a powerful say on the council, much less a decisive role of the kind enjoyed by their permanent, veto-wielding counterparts.

Continuing he opined that indeed, the powerlessness of the council's non-permanent membership betrays its real purpose. Elected in regional blocs (by a process that makes selecting a World Cup host look transparent), it exists to provide the UN Security Council with a democratic veneer, to legitimise the non-democratic decision-making of the permanent five. So which countries make up the numbers? Most non-permanent members sit within three informal categories. The first are the "great-power wannabes", countries such as India and Germany. Next are the "minnows" - Togo and Azerbaijan, for example - so lacking in diplomatic weight that a UN seat is one of the only ways they manifest international presence. The third category comprises countries with geopolitical situations so benign they can afford a UN seat as a diplomatic comfort zone.

According to the http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,5999729,00.html, the G4, (an alliance of some developed countries made up of Germany, Japan, Brazil and India) been pushing for an overhaul of the UN system as part of the G-4 alliance. A move which has seen them campaigning to join this elite group (United States, Britain, France, Russia and China hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council and the power to veto all resolutions) as part of a more comprehensive project to revamp the Council for most of the past decade. The G-4 group has been calling for the addition of six permanent seats to the Council without the power of veto, and a further four non-permanent seats.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the unipolar stand of the United States have also added to the urgent need for a radical reformation of the entire UNSC structure and operations. Akpotor and Agbebaku (2010) observed that at the end of World War II, the United Nations was born with the Big Five negotiating them into the Security Council which is the most powerful organ of the U.N.O. But since 1955 there had been clamour for changes and reforms of the UN especially the Security Council which is regarded by many as a prestigious exclusive club. The calls for reforms increased with the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s. This made the United States too powerful and many times going against the decisions of the Security Council especially in the area of collective security as in Iraq.

Tanin (n.d) commenting on the issue of Reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) argued that the reform encompasses five key issues: categories of membership, the question of the veto held by the five permanent members, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council and its working methods, and the Security Council-General Assembly relationship. Member States, regional groups and other Member State interest groupings developed different positions and proposals on how to move forward on this contested issue.

**On the United Nations Reform and the Position of Africa in the Security Council**

On his part Kasese-Bota Zambia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, argued that the African proposal for permanent seat in the UN Security Council sought to redress the historical injustice to the continent through the Security Council composition and processes. Thus:

> It is the position of the African Group that there should be expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories with the new permanent members exercising all privileges and obligations that go with permanency tenure. (Kasese-Bota, 2012:5).
He also added: “However, Africa exercises flexibility on issues of maintaining or abolishing the veto for all permanent members of the Security Council.” (Kasese-Bota, 2012:8).

In the same vein, Charles Ntwaagae, (2012) Permanent Representative of the Republic of Botswana to the United Nations, maintained that Africa remained committed to reforming the Security Council to make it more representative, more accountable, more democratic and inclusive in its composition and methods of work. He however, said that the identification of the candidate countries to occupy the Permanent Seats should be left to the wisdom of African leaders to decide on.

Responding to the double standard nature of the UN membership Security Council, Ambassador Wilfred Emvula, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the United Nations, said his country was strongly opposed to any second-class permanent membership status for African countries or any other member state:

> The fact that the agenda of the Security Council has dealt more with issues concerning Africa than any other region is a compelling case for the continent to play an active part in deciding upon matters affecting its wellbeing (Emvula, 2012:3).

Moreover, Coordinator of the C-10 Group negotiating on behalf of the African Group, Ambassador Shekou Touray, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations, said that support for the African Common position continued to receive support in the continent’s quest to claim permanent membership in the Security Council and address the historical under-representation.

Arguing further he observed that:

> The UN Security Council was the principal decision-making organ in matters relating to international peace and security. Currently the UN Security Council is composed of five permanent members — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America — and 10 non-permanent members of which only South Africa
and Togo are from Africa, the continent with the largest number of members of the UN (Touray, 2012:6).

Commenting on the issue of reforming the UN Security Council Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan (2012) called for a reform of the United Nations (UN) and support for Nigeria's quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. President Jonathan made the call when he received the visiting UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, at the State House. President Jonathan decried the situation whereby no African nation is represented in the permanent category of the UN Security Council said the reforms were necessary to bring the world in line with the global current realities.

**World Opinion Leaders and the United Nations Reform and Expansion**

According to the [http://www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org) (2011) the existing five permanent members, each holding the right of veto on Security Council reform, announced their positions reluctantly. The United States supported the permanent membership of Japan and India and a small number of additional non-permanent members. The United Kingdom and France essentially supported the G4 position, with the expansion of permanent and non-permanent members and the accession of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan to permanent member status, as well as an increase the presence by African countries on the Council. China supported the stronger representation of developing countries, voicing support for the Republic of India. Russia, India's long time friend and ally has also endorsed the fast growing power's candidature to assume a seat of a permanent member on the Security Council.

On his part the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon (n.d) opined that the UN Security Council reform, being debated since two decades is too long overdue and the necessary expansion must be made considering how much the world has changed.

In a joint declaration by the United Kingdom and France on reform to the United Nations Security Council through their permanent representatives, held that:
Reform of the UNSC, both its enlargement and the improvement of its working methods, must therefore succeed. We reaffirm the support of our two countries for the candidacies of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan for permanent membership, as well as for permanent representation for Africa on the Council. We regret that negotiations towards this goal remain in deadlock and are therefore ready to consider an intermediate solution. This could include a new category of seats, with a longer term than those of the current elected members and those terms would be renewable; at the end of an initial phase, it could be decided to turn these new types of seats into permanent ones. We will work with all our partners to define the parameters of such a reform. UNSC reform requires a political commitment from the member states at the highest level. We will work in this direction in the coming months with a view to achieving effective reform.

India’s permanent representative to the UN commenting on the need for a reform of the Organisations, said that:

Activities of the Security Council have greatly expanded in the past few years. The success of Security Council's actions depends upon political support of the international community. Any package for restructuring of the Security Council should, therefore, be broad-based. In particular, adequate presence of developing countries is needed in the Security Council. Nations of the world must feel that their stakes in global peace and prosperity are factored into the UN's decision making. Any expansion of permanent members' category must be based on an agreed criteria, rather than be a pre-determined selection. There must be an inclusive approach based on transparent consultations. India supports expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members' category. The latter is the only avenue for the vast majority of Member States to serve on the Security Council. Reform and expansion must be an integral part of a common package.

Moreover, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh during the General Debate of the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly observed:

It is common knowledge that the United Nations is often unable to exert an effective influence on global economic and political issues of critical importance. This is due to what may be called as "democracy deficit", which prevents effective multilateralism, a multilateralism that is based on
a democratically-evolved global consensus. Therefore, reform and restructuring of the United Nations system can alone provide a crucial link in an expanding chain of efforts to refashion international structures, imbuing them with a greater degree of participatory decision-making, so as to make them more representative of contemporary realities. The expansion of the Security Council, in the category of both permanent and non-permanent members, and the inclusion of countries like India as permanent members, would be a first step in the process of making the United Nations a truly representative body (Manmohan Singh, 2004:13).

During the General Debate of the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly President, Medvedev of Russia commenting on the pungency of reforming the structure the UN held that:

The UN must rationally adapt itself to new world realities. It should also strengthen its influence and preserve its multinational nature and integrity of the UN Charter provisions. The reform of the UN Security Council is an essential component of its revitalization. The time has come to speed up the search for a compromise formula of its expansion and increased efficiency of its work (Medvedev, 2009:9).

Emphasizing the need to reform and enlarge the membership of the United Nations Security Council in order for it to reflect in multilateral character and its creed on equity, justice, fair play and democratisation, the Portuguese Prime Minister, José Sócrates said that:

The 15-member Security Council must be enlarged so that it is more representative, transparent and efficient. In our view it is illogical that countries like Brazil or India that have today an irreplaceable economic and political role are still not permanent members of the Security Council. Africa also deserves consideration to take due account of the remarkable political and economic progresses that we have witnessed in that vast continent (José Sócrates, 2010:7)

According to Nkoana-Mashabane (2011) The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) urgently requires reform to rectify inequitable power relations. We reiterate that the
reform of the UNSC is urgent and would go a long way in rectifying inequitable power relations within the Security Council.

In the words of Da Silva (2008) the United Nations has spent 15 years discussing the reform of its Security Council. Today’s structure has been frozen for six decades and does not relate to the challenges of today’s world. Its distorted form of representation stands between us and the multilateral world to which we aspire. Therefore I am much encouraged by the General Assembly’s decision to launch negotiations in the near future on the reform of the Security Council.

It is clear from the foregoing that whether it is increments in the number of the permanent members, who at the same time possesses the power of veto or on the hand increasing or doubling the number of the non-permanent members of the security council, the non-veto wielding category, or both at the same time, that there is the critically need to reform and expand the membership of the United Nations Security Council.

The gap which this research work seeks to fill is the analysis of the factors that can enhance the contestant’s chance at clinching permanent seat at the security council considering the fact that each of them have one or more challengers both from their various regions and even within the extant five permanent members of the security council that actually did not wish it to secure the seat at all cost due to historical exigencies.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

It has been observed that every serious academic research requires a systematic frame of thought. This view finds orchestration in the belief that any scientific investigation (especially within the Social Sciences), which lacks “a definite theoretical underpinning is blind and incomplete. Theoretical framework of analysis in other words serves as the element that organises fact and gives direction to any scientific study.
A theoretical framework is a way of describing, analyzing, interpreting and predicting phenomena. It involves linking the problem under investigation to the assumption, postulation and principles of a theory (Obasi 1999:43). The importance of a theoretical direction for a work of this nature cannot therefore be underestimated or overemphasized.

The nature of the present task appear to dictate the employment of the services of the propositions emanating from the national interest theory as our theoretical framework of analysis, which appears a useful tool in analyzing the quest for and struggle by nations to secure a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council that stands as the single most powerful body in the entire universe; not to mention the pride, respect and prestige to go with such a position among the comity of nation for any country that manages to clinch such a coveted and exalted position.

The theory of National Interest focuses both on the foreign policy and motive of nations in their interaction and transaction at the international level, while dealing with other actors in the system. Thus, it resonate the idea that in politics that there is no permanent friend or enemy rather the only constant variable is the permanence of interest.

National interest according to Morgenthau (1952) is the “political traditions, and the total culture context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy”. It is further defined as the state of affairs valued solely for its benefits to the nation (Osgood, 1953). It is because of the prime position which the concept of occupies in a nations foreign policy that made Morgenthau (1952) to state that “as long as the world is politically organized into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word in politics”.

The concept of national interest indeed occupies a prime position in nation’s foreign policy. National interest and foreign policy are at the root of the study of international relations. It is believed that countries engage in international politics in order to protect or
further their national interest. The total of the actions, means and processes through which the national interest of a state are pursued constitutes that states foreign policy (Obikeze and Obi, 2003).

According to Padelford, et al (1976) national interest are centered on core values of the society, which include the welfare of the nation, the security of its political beliefs, national way of life, territorial integrity and self preservation” they insist that “these goals must be sought by specific policies and programs that seek to create and preserve a favourable environment.

Mahan, A.T. (in Beard, 1934) sees national interest as self interest. He asserts that self interest is not only legitimate, but a fundamental cause for national policy; it is vain to expect governments to act continuously on any other grounds than national interest. They have no right to do so being agents not principals.

In his own work, Morgenthau (1952) sees national interest as aimed “at promoting national image, prestige and respect both at home and abroad”. According to him, national interest is determined by political traditions and the total culture context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy. He insists that the main requirement of a nation state is to promote its physical, political and cultural identity against encroachment by other nation states. He also believes that the objectives of foreign policy must be defined and situated in terms of national interest, for the simple reason that national interest is the perennial standard by which political actions must be judged.

In his masterpiece, “Politics Among Nations” Morgenthau (1973) asserted most emphatically that “no nation can have true guide to what it must do and what it needs to do in foreign policy without accepting national interest as a guide”.
In his contribution to the clarification of the exact meaning of national interest, Akinboye (1999) while citing Ogwu (1986) posits that the main policy instrument in the conduct of foreign policy is invariably the promotion and pursuit of national interest. Thus, national interest refers to totality or aggregate of interests of individuals and groups within a given nation state. Viewed from its classical perspectives, national interest encompasses the various strategies employed in the international interactions of states in order to ensure the preservation of the stated goal of society.

He further delineated the two primary purposes which national interests serve. These are: as an analytical tool and as an instrument of political action. As an analytical tool, it served as conceptual guide by providing the objectives often considered by a state while weighing an intended foreign policy option. As an instrument of political action, it serves to justify or repudiate state’s foreign policy option and action in the international system.

Kaplan (1967) defined national interest as the interest which a national actor has in implementing the needs of the national system of action. Jones (1970) holds that national interest is a term used in political debate within a country to signal the case that the item of policy suggested will bring benefits not merely to the proponents but also to its opponents.

Frankel (1972) postulates that national interest is a key-concept in foreign policy formulation. In his view, it amounts to the sum total of all the national values, national in both meanings of the word, both pertaining to the nation and the state. Moreover, it has equally been perceived as the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts. This presupposes that every nation has a set of objectives or goals which gives life and meaning to the behaviour of such nation in international relations.
While some of the objectives or goals are central to the survival of the nation, others are not so central to it even though they are integrated within the larger interest of the international community. Strictly speaking, every nation strives to protect, promote and defend the objectives at all cost even to the point of going to war if it is felt that the totality of these objectives or goals is what constitutes national interest (Akinboye and Ottoh, 2005:117).

Over the years, national interest have been conceptualized in various ways to the extent that virtually all that a nation does in the international arena are now seen as constituting or in pursuit of its national interest. However, Chandra (1982) has identified what constitutes the core of national interest, which is the same for all nations. The first is the desire and continuous search for national security, political independence and territorial integrity. The second is the promotion of economic interest, which includes the preservation or acquisition of favourable conditions and terms of trade. The third is the maintenance of international peace, the promotion of international law, or the establishment of global organisation. The third item in the list usually applies to the great powers, for according to Deutsch (1986) the larger and more powerful a nation is, the more it’s leaders, elites and population increase their level of aspiration in international affairs.

Thus Obi (2006) argued that national interest is eternal and is therefore not dependent or consistent with particular government. What particular governments do is to identify and pursue the national interest through the instrument of foreign policy.

In applying the theory to the work we note that the concept of 'the national interest' is an ever present feature of contemporary diplomatic discourse and has been widely analysed by historians and political scientists alike.
The concept of National Interest in International relations and politics implies that states rarely act in the interest of the collective security or whatever purpose the collectivity or union is formed for. Rather what state do is that in order to enhance and achieve their individualistic and private goal they usually subsume their national interest in the under the common interest of the collectivity such that in pursuing and implementing the collective goals, they will be serving and servicing their interest and positioning it for actualization.

The United Nations Security Council being the most powerful body in the world is an embodiment of prestige, honour and respect. In fact, the realities of the contemporary world has actually shown that the organ can effectively and efficiently be deployed as instrument of offence and defence in the hand of its veto wielding permanent members both in promoting, projecting and protecting its (the states) core values as well as those of its allies. Moreover, a veto wielding member of the Security Council can conveniently use it to block any form of sanctions against an ally, while using same to punish an enemy both real and perceived ones by invoking the so-called pocket veto. It is therefore, for this reason that each region and states now seeks to secure at least one for itself, such that when matters concerning it arises in the body that it can through “inside trading” either deflect or promote such a course.

It is therefore, from this perspective of the expected largesse that come not just the membership of the security council but the veto wielding permanent member that the quest by the contestants for the United Nations Security Council permanent seat can be articulated, explained and understood.
1.7 HYPOTHESES

This study will be guided by the following hypotheses:

1. The need to reform the United Nations Security Council is implicated in the geopolitical realities of the 21st Century membership of the organisation.

2. The struggle to reform and enlarge the structure and voting pattern in the Security Council is to make it more democratic, efficient and legitimate.

1.8 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

To generate data needed in this study to test and validate our hypotheses, we relied on the qualitative method. The qualitative method is used to obtain in-depth information and concept clarifications so as to facilitate instrument designs. To this end, it is well suited for contextual analysis (Biereenu-Nnabgwu, 2006:372). Qualitative method is particularly useful when the task is to extract, illuminate and interpret valuable information, as to draw inference from the available evidence, in order to reach a conclusion.

The advantages of qualitative method lies in the fact that it is, “able to gain access to organizational structure, bureaucratic processes… it can more readily lead to the discovery of the unexpected phenomenon”, (Obikeze in Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006:372). Besides, in respect of sources of data, we depended heavily on secondary sources of data. This was essentially because of the nature of this study, on one hand and the types of data required to test and validate our hypotheses, on the other.

Secondary sources of data refers to a set of data, gathered or authored by another person, usually data from the available data archives, either in the form of documents or survey results and code books, (Ikeagwu, 1998:211; Asika, 2006:27). The advantages of
secondary sources of data have been articulated in Selltiz et al (1977:317), to include that of economy.

Again is the fact that information of this sort is collected periodically, thereby making the establishment of trends over time possible. More important is the obvious fact that the gathering of data from secondary sources does not require the cooperation of the individual(s), about whom information is being sought. Thus we made use of such sources as textbooks, journals, newspapers, magazines, conference papers, charter of the United Nations, Resolutions of the Organs of the United Nations, institutional and official document in addition to government publications.

The afore-mentioned institutional and official documents were complemented by other sources of secondary data, such as materials from the internet which had bearing on the subject matter.

The adoption of the qualitative method in this study was complemented by the experience the researchers had amassed over the years as keen observers on topical national and international issues especially, the workings of the international system.

1.9 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

In justifying our analysis, we will relied on the qualitative descriptive method of data analysis which to Asika (1991:118) “summarizes the information generated in the research verbally so as to further discover relationships among variables”. The adoption of the foregoing analytical method becomes necessary since the study will rely principally on secondary sources of data. Therefore instead of doing a presentation of all available data on table as the quantitative method may imply, the qualitative descriptive method tries to be concise by summarizing data into writing form. Thus, since most of the data acquired for this
work were mostly in written form, the qualitative descriptive method of data analysis was then used as a method to analyze the available data for the study.

1.10 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

**Security Council**: This refers to the “defacto-military” arm of the United Nations organization that oversees the maintenance of international peace and security. This organ is made-up of two categories of members; permanent and non-permanent.

**Permanent Seat**: This defines a situation in which the tenure of a member of the United Nations Security Council is no longer based on election; rather is fixed so long as the organization exists. One basic feature of permanent member/seat is the idea of veto.

**Veto Power**: This is the special right that is being exercised by the permanent members of UNSC in rejecting any decision that is not to their interest. It is also used in preventing the UN from taking any action against such a member or its allies.

**Contestants**: This refers to the process of vying for permanent position and seat in the UNSC among the non-permanent members of the council.

**Reform**: Within the context of the UNSC, this concept is usually used synonymously with enlargement. It refers the process of restructuring and reorganising the composition of membership of the council, by increasing both the number of permanent and non-permanent seats to reflect the geo-political realities of the 21st century; while at the same time making the organ to appear democratic and legitimate.
CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND TO THE PERMANENT SEAT QUESTION

Several authors and historians of international politics argue that it is nearly impossible to have a full understanding of the intentions of the founders of the United Nations collective security system (security council) without looking at its predecessor, the League of Nations (Frank, 2007:2). This is certainly true but it is worth looking even further into the past. It is necessary to understand how the interstate relationships (of the international collective system) were before the existence of both the League of Nations and the United Nations as presently constituted. This type of academic adventure usually generate such mind bugling germane questions like; Why has the world community, mainly the West, decided to create a collective security system? And why was this system replaced by a new one after World War II (WWII)? In the shape, form and nomenclature of the United Nations, which will serve as necessary catalyst in understanding the raison d’être for the permanent seat quest(ion) among the members states of the supranational body (United Nations).

2.1 THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIP SYSTEM BEFORE 1914

The rise of intergovernmental organisations started to grow in the 19th century. Prior to that period such organisations did not exist. The reason for this is not farfetched because intergovernmental organisations (supranational institutions/organisations) can only exist if there is a stable system of sovereign states. This system was introduced into the European system in 1648 by the Peace of Westphalia. This generates the following question? Why did governments not form such an organisation after the Peace of Westphalia? In an attempt to answer this question, Archer (2001:4) cites, four criteria’s needed for the existence of an intergovernmental organisation:

1. The existence of a number of states functioning as independent political units;
2. A substantial measure of contact between these subdivisions;

3. An awareness of problems that arise from states’ co-existence;

4. And their recognition of ‘the need for creation of institutional devices and systematic methods for regulating their relations with each other:

Only the first criteria existed manifestly before the 19th century. Diplomatic contact between states was scarce. But political, economic and social developments during the 19th century formed the basis for the creation of an intergovernmental organisation.

**Political Developments**

1. **Vienna meeting**

   Russia, Prussia and Britain, also referred as the Great Powers, combined their powers in 1814 to defeat Napoleon. At the Vienna meeting in 1814, the Great Powers came together to prepare a peace treaty and to prevent Napoleon’s attempt to conquer Europe. These States also codified and standardised the rules of diplomatic practise and discussed other problems in the international system such as slavery. The major goal of the cooperation was to prevent any future threat to the system. A new phenomenon about the Vienna Congress is that states representatives agreed to meet in times of peace to prevent war (Archer, 2001:6-7).

   This was new because as a rule congresses and conferences tended to be called on three sorts of occasion:

   - at the end of a war to draw up a peace treaty;
   - to meet some sudden emergency;
   - or perhaps to deal with some question which had been germinating over a period and was now regarded by one or other of the Powers as ripe for treatment” (Northedge, 1998:7).

   After the Vienna meeting the Great Powers met several times to discuss matters “such as the Greek independence and the revolution in the Italian peninsula” (Archer, 2001:7). This
congress system, between 1814 and 1822, became known as the Concert of Europe. These powerful states came together, at a state government level, to discuss matters of common interest. This was a ground-breaking improvement on interstate relationships. However the Concert of Europe had deficits. The Great powers met to discuss ongoing problems rather than trying to prevent future conflicts.

“The right to attend a congress or conference was almost always limited to the European great powers” (Northedge, 1988:7) and many decisions concerning war and peace were made without consultation with other governments (Archer, 2001:7).

2. Internationalisation of the European System

Other factor which pushed states to take a more organised approach to problems of international relationships was the internationalization of the European system. Archer (2001:8) observed that many major events in the world served as harbinger to the internationalisation of the European state system:

1. The international recognition of the United States by the Treaty of Paris in 1783
2. The recognition of new Latin American states by Britain
3. The admission of the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe system by the Treaty of Paris
4. Japan’s admission to the system in 1853
5. The imposition of diplomatic relations in the mid-nineteenth century by Britain on China

For the maintenance of the state system general rules; the European and non-European states signed in 1856 the Declaration of Paris which established the principle of free navigation for traders on all international rivers and also dealt with the question of warfare, the abolition of privateering, rules for neutral flags in times of war and blockades. “Signatories of the Treaty were the Great Powers including Turkey and Sardinia; in 1856
fourteen other states signed the Declaration, Japan signed in 1886, Spain in 1908 and Mexico in 1909” (Archer, 2001:9).

3. **The Hague Conferences**

In 1898, an international conference was called by the Czar Nicholas II to discuss disarmament. This congress, Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907, were remarkable for the period prior to 1914. These conferences had on contrary to other conferences prior to 1914 the sense that community affairs were being regulated, namely international arms limitation and peaceful settlement of international disputes. Although the conferences failed to limit arms, the Hague conferences “did refine the laws of war, including the rights of neutrals. It also established an international panel of arbiters available to hear cases put before it by the disputing nations” (“Russian History Encyclopaedia”, “Hague peace conferences”, para 2). Representatives of forty-four states attended the second Hague world conference in 18 October, 1907. The first was attended by 26 states including the United States and Mexico. A third Hague world conference was intended to hold in 1914 but the War intervened.

**Economic developments**

Due to the improvement of industry, European States were forced to cooperate in the socio-economic areas of life. E.g. “the introduction of the submarine telegraphs cable which joined England and France required cooperation of both the states” (Archer, 2001:11). Faster travel and communication conditions, such as the emergence of the steamship and the telegraph made communication between nation states easier and faster. National governments had to come together to regulate aspects of the public life associated with travel, communications, and commerce. E.g. article 15 of the Treaty of Paris (1856) established a European Danube Commission to supervise the free navigation of the Danube River. In 1821 an international commission for the Elbe was established, and in 1831 one for the Rhine. These were aspects that did know no frontiers and required cooperation between the states.
As governments involvement in the social and economic sphere of its citizens’ live grew, so did the requirement to ensure that these activities were not improperly confused by the existence of national borders (Archer, 2001:12). The International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875), the International Union Publication of Customs affairs and Metric Union helped ease international trade, whilst the International health offices established in Havana and Vienna in 1881 and in Paris in 1901 demonstrated increased government concern on matters of public health and recognition that disease knew no frontiers (Archer, 2001:13).

**The League of Nations**

After World War I (WWI), which had caused tremendous deaths, human suffering, and destroyed economies, the international community in particular the West, entered a new era of interstate relationships. The new method of diplomacy included more and better cooperation as well as organisation and communication between leading powers. “For the first time in the history of humankind there existed an international organisation which was committed to ways of solving problems through peaceful means and thus avoiding the recourse to war”(Kennedy, 2006:9).

To guarantee that WWI would never recur, the International community, in particular the United States and Great Britain decided to create an International organisation which would be responsible for the maintenance of peace and stability in the world. At the Paris Peace Conference in January of 1919 a Commission to draft the League of Nations Covenant was set up “on the insistence of Woodrow Wilson, the then President of the United States of America” (Henig, 1973:2). In the drafting Commission of the League’s Covenant participated by the five Great powers: The United States of America represented by its then President, Woodrow Wilson (Chairman) and Colonel House, Great Britain represented by Lord Cecil a former under-secretary for Foreign affairs and Hurst, France represented by Bourgeois and
Larnaude, a distinguished International lawyer, Italy represented by its Prime Minister Orlando and Vittorio Scialoga, an international lawyer, Japan represented by Baron Makino, the Japanese Foreign minister, and Viscount Chinda the Japanese ambassador to London (Northedge, 988:39). Representatives of minor states like Serbia, Portugal, China, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece Poland and Rumania were also allowed to participate in the drafting Commission (Henig, 1973: 3). However despite their participation the League’s Covenant became an Anglo-Saxon affair.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was approved by conference of the Allied and Associated Powers in Paris on 28 April, 1919. The League came into existence on 10 January, 1920 with the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles. Surprisingly the United States of America did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles and thus did not become a member of the League of the Nations. Yoder observes that:

The United States Senate refused to ratify Wilson’s beautiful dream, The Treaty of Versailles, simply because the majority of the Senate, in particular the Republicans, did not want the US in a permanent foreign alliance. The US traditionally favoured unilateralism or isolationism foreign politics, a foreign politics policy which is characterised by its individualism. The US preferred not to get involved in international alliances and/or in other regional affairs. The Senate believed that being a member of the League of Nations would get the US too involved in European affairs which would be a threat to the US sovereignty (Yoder, 1996:9).

The most important organs of the League of Nations were the Council, the Assembly, and the Secretariat. The headquarters of the League was in Geneva, Switzerland. The League’s Council, the main decision-making organ, consisted of four permanent members; Japan, Great Britain, France and Italy, the great powers of that time, and four non-permanent members; the first were Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain. In 1926 the number of seats
increased to fourteen (Ginneken, 2006:9). Germany became a permanent member in 1926, two seats were semi-permanent and given to Poland and Spain and there were seven non-permanent members.

Remarkable about the League’s Council is that its initial composition kept changing during its existence. In the 1930s Germany, Italy, and Japan withdrew from the League. All decisions taken by the council had to be unanimous “unless the Covenant specified that some lesser quorum was sufficient for particular issues” (Gareis & Varwick, 2005: 78). All council members actually implicitly had the right to veto. The reason the decision-making process was organised in such a way is because member states did not want any form of regulation that created a threat to their sovereignty. Sovereign equality was a fundamental principle. “Since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, states as political units do not recognise any higher governing authority” (Mingst & Karns, 2006:25).

In its first decade of existence the League was a successful organ. It was the centre of action for cleaning up the mess left by World War I (Yoder, 1996:13). The League did not act like a policeman or judge by imposing a solution rather, it acted as a forum, an investigative body and as conciliator or arbiter, allowing passions to cool and recommending solutions (Yoder, 1996:14).

In its second decade of existence it became very clear that the League was a weak organisation and that it did not have the power to prevent armed conflicts, especially when one of the Great Powers was the aggressor. It did not stop the Japanese occupation of the Chinese Manchurian in 1931. The “Japan’s military strength was so dominant in Eastern Asia, that none of the League’s members seriously considered military or even economic confrontation with Japan” (Yoder,1996:18). The League also failed to counter Italy’s invasion of a weak and relatively defenceless Ethiopia in 1934. The League failed to stop the
aggressive imperial behaviour of Germany, Japan, and Italy (Axis powers), which destroyed the League and led the World to yet another War in the form of World War II.

The League was a failure due to several reasons. One of them was the absence of the United States of America in the League. The absence of the world’s greatest economic and military power at that time weakened the League’s “muscles” and legitimacy. The League, like the United Nations, did not have its own military force and depended on the Great Powers for enforcement of its resolutions.

The League also had problems of representation because many countries did not join the League and because other nations were members for only a short period. The fact that Japan, Italy, and Germany withdrew from the League further weakened its muscles. France and Great Britain at one point remained the only Great Powers in the League. Guaranteeing world peace and security was a too weighty task for these two nations alone. The decision-making process of the League required a unanimous vote of all members of the Council. In order to adopt a resolution this made the Council ineffective and slow in coming to its decisions. To tackle this problem the League opted to submit recommendations instead of resolutions, because this did not require unanimous votes. However this was not a solution. Recommendations were not binding, so member states were reluctant to follow them.

THE UNITED NATIONS

After the League’s failure to prevent a Second World War, the US, Britain, the then Soviet Union and China met in Washington in 1944 and agreed on a blueprint for a proposed world organisation (Mingst & Karns, 2006:25). The blueprint formed the basis of talks in 1945 between representatives from 50 allied countries at San Francisco. Under the terms of the resulting charter, the United Nations came into being on 24th October, 1945. The intentions of the founding fathers are reflected in the preamble of the Charter.
The principal organs of the UN are; the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.

There were several similarities between the two organisations - League of Nations and United Nations; however the differences were apparent as well. “Firstly the concept of collective security of the League of Nations failed to operate correctly because the Articles of the Covenant failed to establish an obligation on each member state to participate in the repression of an act of aggression” (Bertrand, 1997: 8). The provisions of Article 43 of the UN Charter established an obligation on each member state to participate in the repression of an act of aggression. Secondly the League of Nations lacked muscles due to the fact that the world’s major powers did not join the League and some of them, such as the then Soviet Union and Japan, joined it temporarily. In the United Nations the major powers were the founding members. The League’s Council, which had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, the equivalent of the UN Security Council, made its decisions only by unanimous vote. This decision-making process was also used in the Assembly, the equivalent of the UN’s General Assembly. Implicitly, each member state of the League had veto-power; effectively meaning that a single negative vote annulled any resolution. The founders of the United Nations decided to use a different decision process than the League of Nations. Decisions in the UN organs, such as in the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies, are made by majority voting “(though, on occasion, committees dealing with a particularly controversial issue have been known to proceed by consensus). The rule of unanimity applies only to five major powers—France, China, the UK, the US, and the Russian Federation — and only when they are acting in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council. The Security Council also proceeds by majority vote, but on substantive (though not on procedural) matters, it must include the concurring votes of all
2.2 THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

2.2.1 Formation and Composition of the UN Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers, outlined in the United Nations Charter, include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action. Its powers are exercised through United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Council, which exists in continuous session, has travelled widely, holding meetings in many cities, such as Paris and Addis Ababa, as well as at its current permanent home at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, USA.

When drafting the UN Charter, the intention was for the Allied states, which were the world’s greatest powers at that time, to exercise global leadership with the view to managing or governing the international system (Bourantonis, 2005:4). The Security Council, where these powerful nations are concentrated, “had to play a central role as the leading world forum for managing threats to international order”, like in the League of Nations (Bourantonis, 2005:5).

This intention is reflected in the powerful and strong position of the Security Council within the UN. The Charter recognises the position of the Security Council, article 24, says that the Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security and has the authority to act on behalf of all members of the UN. Its decisions are binding on all member states of the UN.
The provisions for carrying out this role are spelled out in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. The size of the Security Council is intentionally kept small in order to be efficient. Generally speaking, the bigger an organ is, in terms of participants, the less quickly it is to come up with decisions.

This basic structure of the Security Council is set out in Chapter V of the United Nations Charter. Security Council members must always be present at United Nations headquarters in New York so that the Security Council can meet at any time. This requirement of the United Nations Charter was adopted to address a weakness of the League of Nations since that organization was often unable to respond quickly to a crisis. The Security Council originally consisted of eleven member states but expanded to fifteen in 1965. Like the League’s Council, the United Nations Security Council is divided into two categories; permanent and non-permanent members. The five permanent members (P-5) are the United States, Russia, Britain, France and the People's Republic of China. This category reflects the economic and military power of 1945, at that time these nations were the victorious powers of WWII. Putting these leading powers at the front line of the international security organisation would give the organisation “teeth” and ensure the UN’s capability to respond quickly and effectively against aggressive nations; this was the logic of the designation of the P-5 (Mingst & Karns, 2006). The P-5 has the right to veto any decision of the Security Council.

The six non-permanent members were to be elected by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly for a two-year term. In contrary to the permanent members, the Charter, article 23 of the UN Charter, sets two basic criteria to be applied in the election of non-permanent members namely contribution of the members of the UN to maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the organisation and equitable geographical distribution. The Security Council reaches a decision “on procedural matters
when nine members are in agreement, on all other matters an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the P-5; provided that in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting” (Article 23 of the UN Charter).

Apart from its primary function, the Security Council has the responsibility to carry out, jointly with the General Assembly, numerous other important functions related to the internal operation of the UN. The other functions are the elections of the secretary-general and justices to the International Court of Justice, the admission of new members, the suspension of the exercise of rights and privileges of membership and the expulsion of member states from the UN. The reason why the UN founders created such a powerful organ within the UN is to give the international security organisation ‘teeth’. Members of the P-5 were regarded as powerful and feared by other nations. For this reason their common decisions would be taken seriously. Any nation would think twice before acting against the will of these five power states. The permanent members of the Security Council have the power to impose its decisions (assuming that they all agree to take action). The League of Nations had shown that an international security organisations lacking teeth and only “passing recommendations and issuing condemnations of aggressors, are doomed to lose their credibility and legitimacy” (Bourantonis, 2005:5).

There have been two seat changes in the United Nations Security Council since its establishment, although not reflected in Article 23 of the United Nations Charter as it has not been accordingly amended:

1. China's seat was originally filled by the Republic of China, but due to the stalemate of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, there have been two states claiming to represent China since then, and both officially claim each other's territory. In 1971, the People's Republic of China was awarded China's seat in the United Nations by UN General
Assembly Resolution 2758, and the Republic of China (based in Taiwan) soon lost membership in all UN organizations.

2. Russia, being the legal successor state to the Soviet Union after the latter's collapse in 1991, acquired the originally-Soviet seat, including the Soviet Union's former representation in the Security Council.

The five permanent members of the Security Council are also the only countries recognized as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, membership of the UN Security Council is not dependent on nuclear weapons status.

2.2.2 Functions of the United Nations Security Council

Under Chapter Six of the United Nations Charter, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, the Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. The Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment if it determines that the situation might endanger international peace and security. These recommendations are not binding on United Nations members.

Under Chapter Seven, the Council has broader power to decide what measures are to be taken in situations involving threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. In such situations, the Council is not limited to recommendations but may take action, including the use of armed forces to maintain or restore international peace and security. This was the legal basis for United Nations armed action in Korea in 1950 during the Korean War and the use of coalition forces in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 and Libya in 2011. Decisions taken under Chapter Seven, such as economic sanctions, are binding on United Nations member states.
The United Nation's role in international collective security is defined by the United Nations Charter, which gives the Security Council the power to:

i. Investigate any situation threatening international peace;

ii. Recommend procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute;

iii. Call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to serve diplomatic relations;

iv. Enforce its decisions militarily, or by any means necessary;

v. Avoid conflict and maintain focus on cooperation.

vi. They also recommend the new Secretary-General to the General Assembly (Charter of the United Nations: Chapter V: The Security Council).

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognizes that the Security Council has authority to refer cases to the Court, where the Court could not otherwise exercise jurisdiction (Article 13 of the Rome Statute). The Council exercised this power for the first time in March 2005, when it referred to the Court “the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 2002”; since Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Court could not otherwise have exercised jurisdiction. The Security Council made its second such referral in February 2011 when it asked the ICC to investigate the Libyan government's violent response to the 2011 uprising.

2.3 PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEIR PRIVILEGES

Permanent members of the Security Council have a superior position compared to other members of the United Nations. Besides the fact that these nations always sit around the Security Council’s table, each member of the P-5 has significant power to influence the
decisions of the UN Security Council. By using or threatening to use their veto right permanent members can determine outcomes of the Security Council. E.g. The UK and Russia strenuously opposed the inclusion of Northern Ireland and Chechnya as “armed conflicts,” especially because the conflicts would be subject to monitoring under the terms of the resolution. London and Moscow signalled their hidden vetoes by “refusing to support” the text. The UN Secretariat was then forced to make “official corrections” to the original report so that it referred to the sensitive cases not as “armed conflicts”, but as "situations of concern.”(Celine Nahory, 2004, The hidden veto para. 7). Apart from this and written privilege, the veto right, the P-5 also has unwritten privileges (Bourantonis, 2005: 7) The P-5 succeeded to also have permanent seats in other UN organs such as in the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice. It has also resulted in the frequent appointment of nationals of the permanent five to key positions in the UN Secretariat. Being a permanent member of the Security Council is very attractive. It guarantees permanent seats and influence in various organs of the UN. Members of the P-5 permanently occupy key positions in the various important organs of the UN. This disequilibrium is undesirable because it gives the P-5 the power to control and govern the UN. Furthermore, the UN is an international organisation, the participation and governance of its organs should for that reason reflect its international character and not the P-5’s special position.

2.4 NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Within the United Nations Security Council, ten other members apart from the permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms starting on 1 January, with five replaced each year. The members are chosen by regional groups and confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly. To be approved, a candidate must receive at least 2/3 of all votes cast for that seat. This can result in deadlock if there are two roughly evenly matched candidates for instance in 1979, a standoff between Cuba and
Colombia only ended after three months and 154 rounds of voting, when both withdrew in favor of Mexico as a compromise candidate.

The African bloc is represented by three members; the Latin America and the Caribbean, Asian, and Western European and Others blocs by two members each; and the Eastern European bloc by one member. Also, one of the members is an "Arab country," alternately from the Asian or African bloc (Malone, 2003). Currently, elections for term beginning in even-numbered years select two African members, and one each within Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Additionally, the Arab state is represented in this group (Libya within Africa in 2008, Lebanon within Asia in 2010). Term beginning in odd-numbered years consists of two Western European and other members, and one within each of Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa.

The current elected members, within the regions they were elected to represent and their Permanent Representatives, are shown in the table below:

**Table 1: Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council for 2011 - 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 January 2011 – 31 December 2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regional bloc(s)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Western Europe and Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Western Europe and Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: http://www.wikipedia.org

**Table 2: Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council for 2012 - 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 January 2012 – 31 December 2013</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regional bloc(s)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Africa and Arab Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
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Source: http://www.wikipedia.org
It is however, a cardinal principle and convention that a state which is a member of the United Nations, but not of the Security Council, may participate in Security Council discussions in matters by which the Council agrees that the country's interests are particularly affected. In recent years, the Council has interpreted this loosely, allowing many countries to take part in its discussions. Non-members are routinely invited to take part when they are parties to disputes being considered.

**VETO POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL**

Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, Security Council decisions on all substantive matters require the affirmative votes of nine members. A negative vote, or *veto*, also known as the rule of "great power unanimity", by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal, even if it has received the required number of affirmative votes of nine (9). Abstention is not regarded as a veto despite the wording of the Charter. Since the Security Council's inception, China (ROC/PRC) has used its veto 6 times; France 18 times; Russia/USSR 123 times; the United Kingdom 32 times; and the United States 82 times. The majority of Russian/Soviet vetoes were in the first ten years of the Council's existence. Since 1984, China and France have vetoed three resolutions each; Russia/USSR four; the United Kingdom ten; and the United States 43 (forty three).

Procedural matters are not subject to a veto, so the veto cannot be used to avoid discussion of an issue. The same holds for certain decisions that directly regard permanent members.
Fig.1: Number of Resolutions Vetoed by each of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council between 1946 and 2007


The structure of the Security Council can vary depending on international voluntarism and on special circumstances. It is composed of two Standing Committees at present that are composed of all Members of the Security Council and they are:

- the Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedures which studies and advises on rules of procedures and technical matter; and

- the Committee on Admission of New Members.

Ad Hoc Committees and working groups can also be established as needed to facilitate the work of the Security Council. Finally, Peacekeeping Operations and the International Court of Justice are under the authority and command of the Security Council.

The Security Council is organized to be able to function on a continuous, 24-hour per day, 7-days a week basis if necessary and to be convened at a moment’s notice. At least one representative of each of the Members serving on the Security Council is required to be present at all times at the United Nations Headquarters Building in New York to allow for this kind of situation.
2.5 EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

How effective is the UN Security Council? This subheading will evaluate the effectiveness of the Security Council. It will evaluate if the members of the Security Council, in particular the P-5, dealt effectively with disputes that came before the Security Council. Its efficiency will also be evaluated. Do the Security Council’s permanent member states respond quickly and with clear useful mandates to disputes that came before the Security Council? The success of the Security Council operations depends on various elements, such as the willingness of the parties in dispute to respect the Council’s resolutions. But it also depends on whether the P-5 are in agreement to resolve the dispute, and on the quality of the mandates of the Security Council. Why is it relevant/important to measure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in relationship with the expansion of its permanent seats? The answer is that it is needed to find out in what way the present distribution of the UN Security Council permanent seats contributes to its effectiveness.

During its first forty years, during the Cold War, the Security Council was not a systematic effective organ in responding to disputes brought before it. It failed to act quickly and effectively due to lack of agreement between its permanent members. The East and the West often stood against each other. During the Cold War several disputes brought before the Security Council involved disputes of former European colonies. The P-5 wanted to increase or establish their influences in these “fresh” nations, instead of acting on the basis of collective interests of the United Nations. The members of the P-5 often acted on the basis of their own national interests. In some cases, like in the Korean War, members of the P-5 even supported the aggressors and sometimes they were the aggressor themselves. “The Soviets violated the UN Charter numerous times including materiel support for North Korean aggression, Egypt’s wars against Israel, and the invasion of East European nations. Great Britain and France joined Israel in the aggression against Egypt in the Suez War; the United
States violated the Charter by supporting covert attacks against Cuba and Nicaragua” (Yoder, 1996:96). Its latest violation of the Charter is the invasion of Iraq in 2003 without UN’s permission (Frank, 2007:16).

2.6 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REFORMS

Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations has been in a constant state of transition as various international stakeholders seek ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nation system. Recent controversies, such as corruption of the Iraq Oil-For-Food Program, allegations of sexual abuse by United Nation peacekeepers, and instances of waste, fraud and abuse by United Nation staff, have focused renewed attention on the need for change and improvement of the United Nations. Many in the international community, including the United States, have increased pressure on United Nations member states to implement substantive reforms. The 110th Congress will most likely continue to focus on U.N. reform as it considers appropriate levels of U.S. funding to the United Nations and monitors the progress and implementation of ongoing and previously-approved reform measures.


Since the World Summit, United Nations member states have worked toward implementing these reforms with varied degrees of success. Some reforms, such as the
creation of the Human Rights Council and the Peace building Commission, have already occurred or are ongoing. Other reforms, such as United Nations Security Council enlargement, have stalled or not been addressed. United Nations member states disagree on whether some proposed reforms are necessary, as well as how to most effectively implement previously agreed reforms. Developed countries support delegating more power to the Secretary-General to implement management reforms, for example, whereas developing countries fear that giving the Secretary-General more authority may undermine the power of the United Nations General Assembly and therefore the influence of individual countries (Blanchfield, 2008:2).

2.7 CRITICISMS AGAINST THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

It has been argued that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, who are all nuclear powers, have created an exclusive nuclear club that predominately addresses the strategic interests and political motives of the permanent members; for example, protecting the oil-rich Kuwaitis in 1991 but poorly protecting resource-poor Rwandans in 1994 (Rajan, 2006:n.p).

Another criticism of the Security Council involves the veto power of the five permanent nations. The veto power was adopted at the insistence of the Soviet Union after World War II. According to the by-rules of the United Nations, a “no” vote by any one permanent Security Council member is enough to strike down any given proposal. The “no” vote is the same as a veto. As would be expected, permanent members often use this veto power to strike down measures that run contrary to their individual national interests. For example, the People's Republic of China, which, in 1971, replaced the Republic of China as a permanent Security Council member, has vetoed sparingly, but always and only on issues
relating to Chinese national interests. In another example, in the first ten years of the UN’s existence, Russia was responsible for 79 vetoes more than half of all the vetoes cast during that period and cast them to dispute the U.S.’s refusal to admit all of the Soviet Republics as member states of the United Nations. In another example of the use of the veto power to advance national interests, between 1982 and today, the U.S. vetoed 32 Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, a U.S. ally in the Middle East (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006). Due to the immense power of the veto, permanent members often now meet privately and then present their resolutions to the full council, which critics characterise as a fait accompli (Childers, 1994).

The Security Council’s effectiveness and relevance is questioned because in most high-profile cases, there are essentially no consequences for violating a Security Council resolution. During the Darfur crisis, Janjaweed militias, allowed by elements of the Sudanese government, committed violence against an indigenous population, killing thousands of civilians. In the Srebrenica massacre, Serbian troops committed genocide against Bosniaks, although Srebrenica had been declared a United Nations “safe area” and was even “protected” by 400 armed Dutch peacekeepers (Deni, 2007). The UN Charter gives all three powers of the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches to the Security Council (Creery, 2004).

Another criticism is that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are five of the top ten largest arms exporting countries in the world (Anup, n.d). The amount of time devoted to the Israeli-Arab conflict in the UNSC has been described as excessive by some pro-Israel political organizations such as the UN Watch (http://www.unwatch.org/unandisrael) and the Anti-Defamation League and academics such as Alan Dershowitz, Martin Kramer, and Mitchell Bard. This “excessiveness” is partially due to the existence of the Security Council Resolution 1322 (2000) that serves the legal basis for
a monthly discussion on this protracted conflict. Paragraph 7 stated that “invite the Secretary-General to continue to follow the situation and to keep the Security Council informed.” In accordance with its general practices, it is considered that this issue has to be dealt on a regular basis (i.e. every month). The resolution was adopted with 14 affirmative votes and one abstention.

2.8 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER PROVISIONS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT

Article 23 (1) of the UN Charter specifies the composition of the Security Council (Charter of the United Nations). In addition to the permanent members, “the General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council”. For the election, “due regard shall be specially paid, in the first instance to the contributions of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the Organization and also to equitable geographic distribution”. Article 23 (2) further specifies that “non-permanent members […] shall be elected for a term of two years” and that “a retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.” These are the most basic and most important provisions in the UN Charter about non-permanent membership.

Election to the Security Council is furthermore defined as an “important question” under Article 18 (2) which requires a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. In addition, article 18 (2) also defines the required majority by reference to members “present and voting”. If all members are present and voting, the required majority in the 2008 Security Council elections will be 128 UN Member States. However, Article 19 could preclude a UN Member State from voting in the General Assembly, “if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it to the preceding two full years.” This has
been very common in recent years although the General Assembly may also permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond its control.

However, there have been major exceptions to these Charter provisions in course of the history of the Security Council (Security Council Report, 2006). Most importantly, the composition of 15 United Nation Member States was not originally prescribed in the UN Charter. When the United Nations was founded in 1945, it provided only for eleven members of the Security Council comprising of five permanent and six non-permanent members. Then, Article 23 (2) included a provision that in the first election of non-permanent members, three members should be chosen for a period of one year so that in the future three new members could be elected annually. This was decided by drawing lots for the one-and two-year terms.

The interpretation of how the principle of equitable geographical distribution should be transferred into seats was based upon an informal understanding among the P-5, known as the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” or “London Agreement”. In the first election of non-permanent members to the Security Council on 12 January 1946, the agreed pattern of geographical distribution was that two seats should be allocated to Latin American states, one to the Middle East, one to Eastern Europe, one to Western Europe and one to the Commonwealth.

Quite soon, the exact nature of this agreement became subject to controversy. The United States believed that the 1946 formula only applied to the first election, while the Soviet Union maintained that an agreement of a more general nature had been reached on the future meaning of geographic distribution. Another conflict herd was the Eastern European seat which the Soviet Union had understood as strictly to apply to a state belonging to the Soviet bloc (Blum, 2005:636). The United States, however, interpreted Eastern Europe as a geographical and not political entity so that members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) like Greece and Turkey were also included. As a fall-out from this disagreement between the Cold War powers over regional rotation, the Charter’s provision of two-year terms was no longer observed (Security Council Report, 2006).

From the late 1950s, the terms were continuously split. The first example was the election in 1955 when the Philippines and Poland contested for a seat. After four inconclusive ballots, Poland withdrew in favour of Yugoslavia. However, the stalemate could not be resolved. After two months and over thirty rounds of voting, an informal agreement emerged that the Philippines would withdraw, but that Yugoslavia would resign after only one year, at which point the Philippines would run as the only candidate for that seat. This became a very common procedure over the next few years.

Another reason for discontent with the composition of the Security Council was the increasing aspirations of newly independent countries (Blum, 2005:636). Decolonisation accelerated with the accession to independence and admission to the United Nations of scores of new states from Africa and Asia so that, by the early 1960s, the original membership of the United Nations had almost tripled. There was growing acceptance that the Security Council was no longer representative of the United Nations organisation. Therefore, the European groups and the Commonwealth group started to include African and Asian countries from 1956 onward (Berg-Andersson, n.d). For example, in 1961, Liberia took the place of a Western European country and from 1964-1965, the Ivory Coast substituted a member of the Commonwealth.

decided that the now ten non permanent members should be elected according to the following pattern: Five non-permanent members should come from African and Asian states, one from Eastern European states, two from Latin American states and two from Western European and other States. This amendment was implemented on 1st January 1965 and has remained in practice until today.

With two types of membership, permanent and elected, the Security Council is composed of just fifteen countries, a fraction of the nearly 200 United Nation member nations. There are five permanent members, each of which wields veto power over resolutions: France, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The other ten Security Council members, picked using guidelines to ensure geographic diversity, are elected to two-year terms - with a class of five new countries joining each year. Although non-permanent members covet these seats for their strategic position, these elected members are clearly second-rate members on the Security Council, as all resolutions passed can be vetoed by any one member of the five permanent members.
CHAPTER THREE

STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES IN THE ENLARGEMENT ADVOCACY

Commenting on the need and urgency of the reform and enlargement of the United Nations Security council, Banki Moon, the United Nations Secretary General asserted that:

Considering the dramatic significant changes in the international political scenes, member states have agreed that there is need for the reform of the Security Council in a democratic and transparent and more representative way, for that there is no disagreement. Member state have now in the last three years accepted accelerating the negotiations on how to find the common elements in making some good modalities where member states could agree. They have begun to discuss and negotiate on the basis of the text and I sincerely hope that they will find a good solution on this matter. As the secretary general I have always been trying to facilitate such ongoing negotiations and processes. Please note that this is to be determined and decided by member states (Moon, 2011:2)

3.1 THE G4 POSITION AND THE REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The G4 is an alliance among Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan for the purpose of supporting each other’s bids for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Unlike the G8, where the common denominator is the economy and long-term political motives, the G4’s primary aim is the permanent member seats on the Security Council. However, the G4’s bids are often opposed by certain countries, particularly their economic competitors or political rivals (Globalpolicy.org., 2006:6).

The United Nations currently has five permanent members with veto powers in the Security Council namely; the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The G4 nations are regularly elected to two-year terms on the Security Council as non-permanent members by their respective regional
groups: in the 24-year period from 1987 to 2010, Japan was elected for five terms, Brazil for five terms, Germany for four terms and India for two terms. Cumulatively, the G4 has spent 64 years on the Security Council since the UN's inception, with each country serving at least a decade. By comparison, the three permanent members of the Security Council who have maintained their seats since the United Nation's founding (France, the U.K., and the U.S.) have each accrued 66 years of membership. The People's Republic of China has held its permanent seat for 40 years, since it replaced the Republic of China in 1971, and the Soviet Union held a permanent seat for 45 years before being replaced by Russia.

According to IMF report, by 2015 the nine economies with the highest GDP in the world will be those of the five current permanent members of the Security Council and the G4. Currently, India ranks ninth behind Italy and Russia ranks tenth. Taking into account the calculation of GDP by Purchasing Power Parity, this scenario has already been achieved.

The G4 (Group of Four) retain their goal of permanent United Nations Security Council membership for all four nations (plus two African nations). In January 2006, Japan announced it would not support putting the G4 resolution back on the table, not to interfere with any effort by the African Union to unite behind a single plan. And meanwhile, Japan's continuing relations with the G4 were not mutually exclusive (International Review, 2006 and Global Policy Forum, News24.com, 7th January, 2006). G4 issued joint statement in February 12, 2011, in which their foreign ministers agreed to seek concrete outcome in the current session of the UN General Assembly (The Indian News, 12th February 2011).

3.2 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND JAPANS QUEST FOR PERMANENT SEAT UNDER THE AEGIES OF THE G4

Japan is an island nation in East Asia. Located in the Pacific Ocean, it lies to the east of the Sea of Japan, China, North Korea, South Korea and Russia, stretching from the Sea of Okhotsk in the north to the East China Sea and Taiwan in the south. The characters that make
up Japan's name mean "sun-origin", which is why Japan is sometimes referred to as the "Land of the Rising Sun".

Japan is an archipelago of 6,852 islands. The four largest islands are Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū and Shikoku, together comprising about ninety-seven percent of Japan's land area. Japan has the world's tenth-largest population, with over 127 million people. Honshū's Greater Tokyo Area, which includes the de facto capital city of Tokyo and several surrounding prefectures, is the largest metropolitan area in the world, with over 30 million residents.

Archaeological research indicates that people lived in Japan as early as the Upper Paleolithic period. The first written mention of Japan is in Chinese history texts from the 1st century AD. Influence from other nations followed by long periods of isolation has characterized Japan's history. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War and World War I allowed Japan to expand its empire during a period of increasing militarism. The Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937 expanded into part of World War II in 1941, which came to an end in 1945 following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since adopting its revised constitution in 1947, Japan has maintained a unitary constitutional monarchy with an emperor and an elected legislature called the Diet.

A major economic power, Japan has the world's third-largest economy by nominal GDP and fourth-largest economy by purchasing power parity (World Factbook, 2011). It is also the world's fourth-largest exporter and fourth-largest importer. Although Japan has officially renounced its right to declare war, it maintains a modern military force used for self-defense and peacekeeping roles. According to both UN and WHO estimates, Japan has the longest life expectancy of any country in the world. According to the United Nations, Japan also has

**Table 3: Socio-Economic and Political Data of Japan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (and largest city)</th>
<th>Tokyo (<em>de facto</em>)35°41′N 139°46′E / 35.683°N 139.767°E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official language(s)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognised regional languages</td>
<td>Aynu itak, Ryukyuan languages, Eastern Japanese, Western Japanese, and several other Japanese dialects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National language</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>98.5% Japanese, 0.5% Korean, 0.4% Chinese, 0.6% other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonym</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Unitary parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emperor</td>
<td>Akihito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Yoshihiko Noda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper house</td>
<td>House of Councillors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower house</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Foundation Day</td>
<td>11 February 660 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji Constitution</td>
<td>29 November 1890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current constitution</td>
<td>3 May 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of San Francisco</td>
<td>28 April 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>377,944 km² (62nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water (%)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 estimate</td>
<td>127,799,000 (10th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 census</td>
<td>128,056,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>337.1/km² (36th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (PPP)</td>
<td>2011 estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$4.440 trillion (4th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>$34,739 (25th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (nominal)</td>
<td>2011 estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$5.869 trillion (3rd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>$45,920 (18th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>37.6 (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI (2011)</td>
<td>0.901 (veryhigh) (12th)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan gives a remarkable amount of money to the United Nations. In fact, the only country that gives more is the United States of America. Undoubtedly strong economically and (since World War II) arguably a peaceful nation, Japan would extend the Asian presence and has the support of many nations in Southeast Asia, including the very populous Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have all benefited from Japanese largesse. One of the objections levied against Japan is its alleged attempts to "rewrite" the human travesties in its history, a vehement cultural sticking point for China and South Korea. The UK, France, and the US all back Japan, as does Russia to a more lukewarm extent.

In his address to the General Assembly, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi rolled out his country's credentials, pointing to its reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as its leading role in talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Countries with the will and resources to play a major role in international peace and security must always take part in the Council's decision-making process, he said. Koizumi also claimed a unique voice for Japan as the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack.

3.3 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND INDIA’S QUEST FOR PERMANENT SEAT

India is a country in South Asia. It is the seventh-largest country by area, the second-most populous country with over 1.2 billion people, and the most populous democracy in the world. Bounded by the Indian Ocean on the south, the Arabian Sea on the south-west, and the Bay of Bengal on the south-east, it shares land borders with Pakistan to the west; China, Nepal, and Bhutan to the north-east; and Burma and Bangladesh to the east (National Informatics Centre, 2005.). The island countries of Sri Lanka and the Maldives are to the south; in addition, India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands share a maritime border with Thailand and Indonesia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India).
Home to the ancient Indus Valley Civilisation and a region of historic trade routes and vast empires, the Indian subcontinent was identified with its commercial and cultural wealth for much of its long history. Four of the world's major religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism—originated here, whereas Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam arrived in the 1st millennium CE and also helped shape the region's diverse culture. Gradually annexed by and brought under the administration of the British East India Company from the early 18th century and administered directly by the United Kingdom from the mid-19th century, India became an independent nation in 1947 after a struggle for independence that was marked by non-violent resistance led by Mahatma Gandhi (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=India&oldid=501276897).

The Indian economy is the world's eleventh-largest by nominal GDP and third-largest by purchasing power parity (PPP). Following market-based economic reforms in 1991, India became one of the fastest-growing major economies; it is considered a newly industrialised country. However, it continues to face the challenges of poverty, illiteracy, corruption, and inadequate public healthcare. A nuclear weapons state and a regional power, it has the third-largest standing army in the world and ranks ninth in military expenditure among nations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India).

India is a federal constitutional republic governed under a parliamentary system consisting of 28 states and 7 union territories. India is a pluralistic, multilingual, and multi-ethnic society. It is also home to a diversity of wildlife in a variety of protected habitats (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=India&oldid=501276897).
Table 4: Socio-Economic and Political Data of India

| Capital          | New Delhi  
|                 | 28°36.8′N 77°12.5′E / 28.6133°N 77.2083°E |
| Largest city     | Mumbai   |
| Official language(s) | Hindi, English |
| Recognised regional languages | Eighth Schedule |
| National language(s) | None |
| Demonym         | Indian   |
| Government       | Federal parliamentary constitutional republic |
| President        | Pratibha Patil |
| Vice President   | Mohammad Hamid Ansari |
| Prime Minister   | Manmohan Singh (INC) |
| Speaker of the House | Meira Kumar (INC) |
| Chief Justice    | S. H. Kapadia |
| Legislature      | Parliament of India |
| Upper house      | Rajya Sabha |
| Lower house      | Lok Sabha |
| Independence     | from the United Kingdom |
| Dominion         | 15 August 1947 |
| Republic         | 26 January 1950 |
| Area             | Total 3,287,263 km² (7th)  
|                 | 1,269,219 sq mi |
| Water (%)        | 9.56    |
| Population       | 2011 census 1,210,193,422 (2nd)  
| Density          | 369.3/km² (31st)  
|                 | 956.5/sq mi |
| GDP (PPP)        | 2011 estimate  
| Total            | $4,457 trillion (3rd) |
| Per capita       | $3,693 (129th) |
| GDP (nominal)    | 2011 estimate  
| Total            | $1,676 trillion (11th) |
| Per capita       | $1,388 (140th) |
| HDI (2011)       | 0.547 (medium) (134th) |
| Currency         | Indian rupee (INR) |

Foreign Relations and Military

Since its independence in 1947, India has maintained cordial relations with most nations. In the 1950s, it strongly supported de-colonisation in Africa and Asia and played a lead role in the Non-Aligned Movement (Rothermund, 2000). In the late 1980s, the Indian military twice intervened abroad at the invitation of neighbouring countries: a peace-keeping operation in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990; and an armed intervention to prevent a coup d'état attempt in Maldives. India has tense relations with neighbouring Pakistan; the two nations have gone to war four times: in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. After waging the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1965 war with Pakistan, India pursued close military and economic ties with the Soviet Union; by the late 1960s, the Soviet Union was its largest arms supplier (Sharma, 1999).

Aside from ongoing strategic relations with Russia, India has wide-ranging defence relations with Israel and France. In recent years, it has played key roles in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the World Trade Organisation. The nation has provided 100,000 military and police personnel to serve in 35 UN peacekeeping operations across four continents. It participates in the East Asia Summit, the G8+5, and other multilateral forums (Alford, 2008). India has close economic ties with South America, Asia, and Africa; it pursues a "Look East" policy that seeks to strengthen partnerships with the ASEAN nations, Japan, and South Korea that revolve around many issues, but especially those involving economic investment and regional security (Ghosh, 2009 and Sisodia & Naidu, 2005).

Since the end of the Cold War, India has increased its economic, strategic, and military cooperation with the United States and the European Union (Europa, 2008). In 2008, a civilian nuclear agreement was signed between India and the United States. Although India possessed nuclear weapons at the time and was not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it received waivers from the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, ending earlier restrictions on India's nuclear technology and commerce. As a consequence, India became the sixth de facto nuclear weapons state (The Times of India, 2008). India subsequently signed cooperation agreements involving civilian nuclear energy with Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2009; Rediff, 2008; Reuters, 2010 and Curry, 2010).

The India’s armed forces; with 1.6 million active troops, compose the world's third-largest military (Ripsman & Paul, 2010). It comprises the Indian Army, the Indian Navy, and the Indian Air Force; auxiliary organisations include the Strategic Forces Command and three paramilitary groups: the Assam Rifles, the Special Frontier Force, and the Indian Coast Guard. The official Indian defence budget for 2011 was US$36.03 billion, or 1.83% of GDP (Behera, 2011). For the fiscal year spanning 2012–2013, US$40.44 billion was budgeted (Behera 2012). According to a 2008 SIPRI report, India's annual military expenditure in terms of purchasing power stood at US$72.7 billion (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008). In 2011, the annual defence budget increased by 11.6%, although this does not include funds that reach the military through other branches of government (Miglani, 2011 and Shukla 2011). As of 2012, India is the world's largest arms importer; between 2007 and 2011, it accounted for 10% of funds spent on international arms purchases (Stockholm International Peace Research Initiative, 2012). Much of the military expenditure was focused on defence against Pakistan and countering growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean (Miglani, 2011).

**Economy of India**

Indian agriculture dates from the period 7,000–6,000 BCE, employs most of the national workforce, and is second in farm output worldwide (Olson, 2009).

According to the International Monetary Fund, as of 2011, the Indian economy is nominally worth US$1.676 trillion; it is the eleventh-largest economy by market exchange
rates, and is, at US$4.457 trillion, the third-largest by purchasing power parity, or PPP. With its average annual GDP growth rate of 5.8% over the past two decades, and reaching 6.1% during 2011–12 (International Monetary Fund, 2011), India is one of the world's fastest-growing economies (Nayak, et al, 2010). However, the country ranks 140th in the world in nominal GDP per capita and 129th in GDP per capita at PPP.

The 487.6-million worker Indian labour force is the world's second-largest. The service sector makes up 55.6% of GDP, the industrial sector 26.3% and the agricultural sector 18.1%. Major agricultural products include rice, wheat, oilseed, cotton, jute, tea, sugarcane, and potatoes. Major industries include textiles, telecommunications, chemicals, food processing, steel, transport equipment, cement, mining, petroleum, machinery, and software. In 2006, the share of external trade in India's GDP stood at 24%, up from 6% in 1985 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007). In 2008, India's share of world trade was 1.68% (The Times of India, 2009); In 2011, India was the world's tenth-largest importer and the nineteenth-largest exporter (World Trade Organisation, 2010). The country’s major exports include petroleum products, textile goods, jewelry, software, engineering goods, chemicals, and leather manufactures. Its major imports include crude oil, machinery, gems, fertiliser, and chemicals. Between 2001 and 2011, the contribution of petrochemical and engineering goods to total exports grew from 14% to 42% (Economist, 2011).

Averaging an economic growth rate of 7.5% during the last few years (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007), India has more than doubled its hourly wage rates during the last decade (Bonner 2010). Some 431 million Indians have left poverty since 1985; India's middle classes are projected to number around 580 million by 2030 (Farrell & Beinhocker, 2007). Though ranking 51st in global competitiveness, India ranks 17th in financial market sophistication, 24th in the banking sector, 44th in business
sophistication, and 39th in innovation, ahead of several advanced economies (Schwab, 2010). With 7 of the world's top 15 information technology outsourcing companies based in India, the country is viewed as the second-most favourable outsourcing destination after the United States (Sheth 2009). India's consumer market, currently the world's eleventh-largest is expected to become fifth-largest by 2030. Its telecommunication industry, the world's fastest-growing, added 227 million subscribers during the period 2010–11 (Telecom Regulatory Authority, 2011). Its automotive industry, the world's second fastest growing increased domestic sales by 26% during 2009–10 (Business Line, 2010), and exports 36% during 2008–2009. Power capacity is 250 gigawatts, of which 8% is renewable. At the end of 2011, Indian IT Industry employed 2.8 million professionals, generated revenues close to US$100 billion equaling 7.5% of Indian GDP and contributed 26% of India's merchandise exports.

Driven by growth, India's nominal GDP per capita has steadily increased from US$329 in 1991, when economic liberalisation began, to US$1,265 in 2010, and is estimated to increase to US$2,110 by 2016; however, it has always remained lower than those of other Asian developing countries such as Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand and is expected to remain so in the near future (International Monetary Fund, 2011).

According to a 2011 PricewaterhouseCoopers report, India's GDP at purchasing power parity could overtake that of the United States by 2045. During the next four decades, Indian GDP is expected to grow at an annualised average of 8%, making it potentially the world's fastest-growing major economy until 2050 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The report highlights key growth factors: a young and rapidly growing working-age population; growth in the manufacturing sector due to rising education and engineering skill levels; and sustained growth of the consumer market driven by a rapidly growing middle class. The World Bank cautions that, for India to achieve its economic potential, it must continue to focus on public sector reform, transport infrastructure, agricultural and rural development,
removal of labour regulations, education, energy security, and public health and nutrition (World Bank, 2010). As per a report by Datamonitor, India is expected to occupy sixth place in top 10 wealthy markets list by the end of 2012.

In its quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC, the first argument for India is that it's huge. About one out of every six person in the world lives in India, making it the second most populous nation in on earth, with over a billion citizens. The second argument for India is that it maintains a military which must be respected: India openly possesses nuclear weapons, placing it in the select company of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Pakistan, and probably Israel. The economic boom in India is also formidable, as the country's infrastructure exploded in the early 1990s. Many argue that the "world's largest democracy" is also deserving due to its contributions of troops to peacekeeping missions. Russia, France, and the UK support India's bid. China does so with modifications, and the United States is tepid in its support, at best.

3.4 GERMANY’S AND THE QUEST FOR PERMANENT SEAT AT THE UNSC

Germany is a federal parliamentary republic in west-central Europe. The country consists of 16 states, and its capital and largest city is Berlin. Germany covers an area of 357,021 km² and has a largely temperate seasonal climate. With 81.8 million inhabitants, it is the most populous member state in the European Union (Mangold, 1995). It is one of the major political powers of the European continent and a technological leader in many fields.

A region named Germania, inhabited by several Germanic peoples, was documented before AD 100. During the Migration Period, the Germanic tribes expanded southward and established successor kingdoms throughout much of Europe. Beginning in the 10th century, German territories formed a central part of the Holy Roman Empire (Reinhold, 2006; Mangold, 1994). During the 16th century, northern German regions became the centre of the Protestant Reformation while southern and western parts remained dominated by Roman
Catholic denominations, with the two factions clashing in the Thirty Years' War, marking the beginning of the Catholic–Protestant divide that has characterized German society ever since. Occupied during the Napoleonic Wars, the rise of Pan-Germanism inside the German Confederation resulted in 1871 in the unification of most of the German states into the German Empire, which was Prussian dominated. After the German Revolution of 1918–1919 and the subsequent military surrender in World War I, the Empire was replaced by the Weimar Republic in 1918, and partitioned in the Treaty of Versailles. Amidst the Great Depression, the Third Reich was proclaimed in 1933. The latter period was marked by Fascism and World War II. After 1945, Germany was divided by allied occupation, and evolved into two states, East Germany and West Germany. In 1990 the country was reunified.

Germany was a founding member of the European Community in 1957, which became the EU in 1993. It is part of the Schengen Area and since 1999 a member of the eurozone. Germany is a Great Power and member of the United Nations, NATO, the G8, the G20, the OECD and the Council of Europe, and took a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2011–2012 term.

It has the world's fourth largest economy by nominal GDP and the fifth largest by purchasing power parity. Germany is the second largest exporter and third largest importer of goods. The country has developed a very high standard of living and a comprehensive system of social security. Germany has been the home of many influential philosophers, scientists and inventors, and is known for its cultural and political history.
Table 5: Socio-Economic and Political Data of Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (and largest city)</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official language(s)</td>
<td>German[^1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Germans 91.5%, Turks 2.4%, other 6.1% (made up largely of Greek, Italian, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonym</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Federal parliamentary constitutional republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Joachim Gauck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chancellor</td>
<td>Angela Merkel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of the Bundestag</td>
<td>Norbert Lammert</td>
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<tr>
<td>President of the Bundesrat</td>
<td>Horst Seehofer</td>
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<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Bundesrat</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bundestag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation</td>
<td>Holy Roman Empire 2 February 962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unification 18 January 1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Republic 23 May 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reunification 3 October 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Total 357,021 km² (63rd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>137,847 sq mi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water (%) 2.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2010 estimate 81,799,600 (16th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Density 229/km² (55th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>593/sq mi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (PPP)</td>
<td>2011 estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total $3.099 trillion (5th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per capita $37,896 (18th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (nominal)</td>
<td>2011 estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total $3.577 trillion (4th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per capita $43,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini (2006)</td>
<td>27 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI (2011)</td>
<td>0.905 (very high) (9th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Euro (€) (2002 – present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swiss franc (de facto in Büsingon) (EUR, CHF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like Japan, Germany makes huge financial contributions to the UN. It's the third largest contributor of funds to the organization's operations. Given German stability and growth, especially since reunification, it is arguably just as powerful as the UK and France and was only excluded from the Security Council because it was knocked from dominance at the end of WWII. A number of European Union member nations (though definitely not all) support Germany, as it would extend the EU presence on the Security Council. Russia, France, and the UK are all in favor of German inclusion, and the US has sent mixed signals (Mangold, 1995).

3.5 UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND BRAZIL’S QUEST FOR PERMANENT SEAT

Brazil, officially known as the Federative Republic of Brazil, is the largest country in South America (Clifford, 2009). It is the world's fifth largest country, both by geographical area and by population with over 192 million people. It is the only Portuguese-speaking country in the Americas and the largest lusophone country in the world (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008).

Bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the east, Brazil has a coastline of 7,491 km (4,655 mi). It is bordered on the north by Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and the French overseas region of French Guiana; on the northwest by Colombia; on the west by Bolivia and Peru; on the southwest by Argentina and Paraguay and on the south by Uruguay. Numerous archipelagos form part of Brazilian territory, such as Fernando de Noronha, Rocos Atoll, Saint Peter and Paul Rocks, and Trindade and Martim Vaz. It borders all other South American countries except Ecuador and Chile (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008).

Brazil was a colony of Portugal from the landing of Pedro Álvares Cabral in 1500 until 1815, when it was elevated to the rank of kingdom and the United Kingdom of Portugal,
Brazil and the Algarves was formed. The colonial bond was in fact broken in 1808, when the capital of the Portuguese colonial empire was transferred from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, after Napoleon invaded Portugal. Independence was achieved in 1822 with the formation of the Empire of Brazil, a unitary state governed under a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system. The country became a presidential republic in 1889, when a military coup d'état proclaimed the Republic, although the bicameral legislature, now called Congress, dates back to the ratification of the first constitution in 1824. Its current Constitution, formulated in 1988, defines Brazil as a Federal Republic. The Federation is formed by the union of the Federal District, the 26 States, and the 5,564 Municipalities (http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/titleI.html).

The Brazilian economy is the world's sixth largest by nominal GDP and the seventh largest by purchasing power parity (as of 2011) (World Bank, 7 October, 2009). Brazil is one of the world's fastest growing major economies. Economic reforms have given the country new international recognition (Clendenning, 2008 & Associated Press, 2008). Brazil is a founding member of the United Nations, the G20, CPLP, Latin Union, the Organization of Ibero-American States, the Organization of American States, Mercosul and the Union of South American Nations, and is one of the BRIC countries. Brazil is also one of the 17 Megadiverse countries, home to diverse wildlife, natural environments, and extensive natural resources in a variety of protected habitats (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008).
Table 6: Socio-Economic and Political Data of Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Brasília</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latitude</td>
<td>15°47′S 47°52′W / 15.783°S 47.867°W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Largest city | São Paulo |

| Official language(s) | Portuguese |

| Ethnic groups (2010) | 47.73% White, 43.13% Brown (Multiracial), 7.61% Black, 1.09% Asian, 0.43% Amerindian |

| Demonym | Brazilian |

| Government | Federal presidential constitutional republic |
| President | Dilma Rousseff (PT) |
| Vice President | Michel Temer (PMDB) |
| President of the Chamber of Deputies | Marco Maia (PT) |
| President of the Senate | José Sarney (PMDB) |
| President of the Supreme Federal Court | Ayres Britto |

| Legislature | National Congress |
| Upper house | Federal Senate |
| Lower house | Chamber of Deputies |

| Independence | from United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves |
| Declared | 7 September 1822 |
| Recognized | 29 August 1825 |
| Republic | 15 November 1889 |
| Current constitution | 5 October 1988 |

| Area | Total 8,514,877 km² (5th) |
|      | 3,287,597 sq mi |
| Water (%) | 0.65 |

| Population | 2011 estimate 192,376,496 |
| 2010 census | 190,732,694 (5th) |
| Density | 22/km² (182nd) |
| 57/sq mi |

| GDP (PPP) | 2011 estimate |
| Total | $2.294 trillion (7th) |
| Per capita | $11,769 (75th) |

| GDP (nominal) | 2011 estimate |
| Total | $2.493 trillion (6th) |
| Per capita | $12,788 (53rd) |

| Gini (2012) | ▼ 51.9 |
| HDI (2011) | 0.718 (high) (84th) |

| Currency | Real (R$) (BRL) |

Ordinarily Brazil's claim to a seat is the weakest, especially given its inferior military and struggling economy. However, with the United States as the only country from the Americas holding a permanent seat, Brazil can make a case for equality: it would be the first Latin American permanent member. And to be fair, Brazil's economy continues to develop in ways that are often considered model. It's also the world's fifth most populous nation, behind the likes of China, India, the US, and Indonesia. Of the five permanent members right now, Russia, France, and the UK are Brazil's strongest backers, though the United States has signified its willingness to entertain a Brazilian seat in some form. Also, Brazil contributes, by proportion, more UN peacekeeping troops to worldwide missions than almost any other country.

3.6 OPPOSITIONS TO THE PERMANENT SEAT BID QUEST OF THE G4 NATIONS

There are high hurdles in place preventing the G4 from completely reforming the UN Security Council. Publicly, the G4 nations all support each other's bids, as well as a stronger representative presence for Africa too. That said, each G4 nation has different supporters and detractors. No G4 country seems to have unequivocal, universal support among all five permanent members, and each G4 country neighbors at least one member of the so-called UN Coffee Club nations (Uniting for Consensus) that are reasonably powerful and which object to their relative peers' inclusion over their own. For instance, South Korea objects to Japan, Pakistan (another nuclear state) objects to India, Italy objects to Germany, and Argentina objects to Brazil. These objections are based on a variety of cultural conflicts, territorial disputes, economic tensions, and other hard-to-ignore squabbles.

Though former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan did propose a "Plan A" and "Plan B" for expanding the United Nations Security Council to 24 nations, but it's unclear if such a dramatic expansion will take place anytime soon.
3.7 THE AFRICAN GROUP AND UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

There is a general consensus within the United Nation that reformation of the Security Council is necessary (Souare, 2005 and Goodman, 2005). Africa position in the organization has been a major source of discussion within the UN Security Council, but it is rarely the source of influence. Events such as the Rwandan genocide, Darfur conflict, Somali civil conflict, the Libyan revolt or uprising, etc., have all been analysed in the council in the absence of an African permanent member. The concept of path dependence states that “individual incidents may turn out to be formative moments that shape a path of institutional development” (Voeten, 2007). The failures to effectively preempt or administer civil conflicts in Rwanda, Darfur, Somalia, etc. all warrant an African permanent member.

African opinion leaders are of the view that the continent is marginalized from the global economy. A permanent seat in the Security Council will enable Africa to negotiate or veto resolutions that infringe on African economic interests. Global issues that affect Africa’s economy such as global warming, will impact the developing world more than the developed. Africa can better discuss such issues as a globally recognised political player and the UN Security Council presence can give it such prestige.

HIV/AIDS has kept Africa hostage for long time. The disease has had devastating effects on the continents’ labour force which is crucial for Africa’s labour induced economy. According to Akokpari (2001) out of the 36 million people carrying the virus, 70% of them are found in Sub-Saharan Africa and of the 22 million deaths, 16 million are Africans. These are alarming figures that serve to hinder Africa’s growth. This issue deserves the same recognition as the war against terror and the Middle East revolt in the Security Council. An African country in the Security Council can greatly improve the chances of such issues being brought to the discussion table. Africa cannot fight this pandemic and others on its own or in
isolation. It needs the international community’s assistance as it has large-scale transnational and devastating social effects.

Obtaining the permanent seat will enhance the African Union’s goal for human security. With a permanent member, African recommendations have a great potential of being taken more seriously at the international sphere. The inclusion of Africa will also highlight the progressive democratic nature of the Security Council and thus will legitimise it within the continent. It will also highlight a movement away from the 1945 setup to a more 21st century setup that fairly presents the state of the global community (Nobuaki, 2005).

There are several obstacles that can hinder Africa’s likelihood of attaining a seat. Africa’s own UN reform proposal, the “Ezulwuni Consensus” has met with resistance from the US. According to Weiss (2003), the “US will not participate in an institution whose purpose is to limit its power.” Africa’s demand for veto powers represents just that. Another obstacle to Africa’s quest stems from history. The UN Security Council has only been amended three times since its creation in 1945. The last time was in 1965 when the Security Council member number was increased from 11 to 15 (Weiss, 2003).

Tempering with the Security Council design is not a straightforward assignment to accomplish. It is theoretically possible to add veto-wielding members, but in practical terms it would “alter the ratios between the number of votes required for a decision, as set down in Article 27 and the total number of members on the Council” (Padelford, 1960). To obtain veto-wielding seats requires amending the UN Charter and particularly Chapter V which will be a lengthy process that can affect the effectiveness of Security Council pending the modification (Goodman, 2005).

African countries are competing with each other for a seat and they are: South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. The AU has failed to come up with a criterion of choosing which country to endorse (Okumu, 2005). This fighting amongst African states has the potential of
demolishing the concepts of African Unity and African Renaissances. Egypt and Libya are currently concerned with internal uprisings, severely hindering their quest for a permanent seat. Nigeria’s hopes are also dented by their high levels of corruption found within the country (Goodling, 2003) and the country has frequent clashes between Muslim and Christian gangs, together with high levels of abductions in the Niger Delta as well as the insurgence of domestic terrorism in the Northern part of the country by a blood thirty group known as Boko Haram.

South Africa is advancing with its quest for UN reform and it is likely to be chosen from the continent. As a member of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations, SA has a huge opportunity to hold a permanent seat. BRICS are the top strong and emerging economies internationally. Russia and China are current permanent seat holders and they both are accepting of a Security Council reform (Taipei Times, 2011). South Africa is the only Africa nation with a permanent seat at the G20 economic summit that comprises of the G8 (US, Canada, Germany, Russia, France, UK, Italy & Japan) and other strong emerging economies (Times Live, 2010). SA is also invited to G8 summits. The country has hosted numerous international events such as the FIFA soccer world cup. The country’s constitution is “one of the most progressive in the world and enjoys high acclaim internationally” (SA Government Information, 2009). It has the biggest economy on the African continent. The country is currently serving its second spell as a non-permanent seat holder at the UN Security Council.

South Africa is the most likely candidate from Africa to get a permanent seat. But to what extent will the country push for Africa’s interests abroad? South Africa’s top five major trading partners in respective order are; China, US, Japan, Germany and UK. SA’s major trading partners are oversees and not within the continent. Africa ranks as SA’s fourth largest export destination and the value of exports keep rising while the same can’t be said vice
versa. SA has a trade advantage with the rest of Africa; it has trade surpluses when it comes to trading with SADC and Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa COMESA (Trade Beat, 2011). If push comes to shove, one only wonders if SA will use its seat at the Security Council to promote or protect its own interest over Africa’s.

African leaders may view SA’s inclusion as threat. SA is a democracy and some African states have leaders that abuse their position of power. This is evident in Zimbabwe, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, etc. In these nations leaders violently suppress political opposition with little regard to human rights. Questions can be asked about SA’s legitimacy for representing Africa. SA’s economy is controlled by a white minority, while the black majority is excluded.

There will be a growing resistance to allow emerging economies at the highest political body internationally. This is because the Arab revolt is indicating the instabilities that are still evident in developing nations. South Africa has high inequality levels and a growing sense of frustration amongst the poor demonstrated by the xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals and the frequent service delivery strikes. Whether or not an African nation will get a seat at the UN Security Council remains to be seen.

At this juncture let us critically review the ethnographic makeup of each of the African countries that are contesting the proposed African slot and/or seat at the expanded and reformed United Nations Security Council namely, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt.

3.8 SOUTH AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR AFRICAN PERMANENT SEAT IN THE UNSC

South Africa, officially the Republic of South Africa, is a country located at the southern tip of Africa. It is divided into nine provinces and has 2,798 kilometres (1,739 mi) of coastline (The World Factbook, 2011 & SouthAfrica.info. April, 2007). To the north of the country lie the neighbouring territories of Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe; to the east are
Mozambique and Swaziland; while Lesotho is an enclave surrounded by South African territory (Arnold, 1996).

South Africa is a multi-ethnic nation and has diverse cultures and languages. Eleven official languages are recognised in the constitution (SouthAfrica.info. April, 2007). Two of these languages are of European origin: South African English and Afrikaans, a language which originated mainly from Dutch that is spoken by the majority of white and Coloured South Africans. Though English is commonly used in public and commercial life, it is only the fifth most-spoken home language. All ethnic and language groups have political representation in the country's constitutional democracy comprising a parliamentary republic; unlike most parliamentary republics, the positions of head of state and head of government are merged in a parliament-dependent President. About 79.5% of the South African population is of black African ancestry, divided among a variety of ethnic groups speaking different Bantu languages, nine of which have official status (Statistics South Africa, 2011).

Today South Africa enjoys a relatively stable mixed economy that draws on its fertile agricultural lands, abundant mineral resources, tourist attractions, and highly evolved intellectual capital. It is ranked as an upper-middle income economy by the World Bank, one of only four countries in Africa in this category (the others being Botswana, Gabon and Mauritius) (Data.worldbank.org). It has the largest economy in Africa, and the 28th-largest in the world. About a quarter of the population is unemployed and lives on less than US $1.25 a day (UNDP, 2008).
Table 7: Socio-Economic and Political Data on South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Pretoria (executive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bloemfontein (judicial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cape Town (legislative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest</td>
<td>Johannesburg (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official language(s)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>79.5% Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.0% White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.0% Coloured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5% Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonym</td>
<td>South African</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Constitutional parliamentary republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Jacob Zuma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy President</td>
<td>Kgalema Motlanthe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOP Chairman</td>
<td>M. J. Mahlangu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly Speaker</td>
<td>Max Sisulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Justice</td>
<td>Mogoeng Mogoeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper house</td>
<td>National Council of Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower house</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>from the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>31 May 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statute of Westminster</td>
<td>11 December 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>31 May 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,221,037 km² (25th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>471,443 sq mi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water (%)</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 estimate</td>
<td>48,810,427 (24th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 census</td>
<td>44,819,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>41.4/km² (169th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>107.2/sq mi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (PPP)</td>
<td>2011 estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$555.134 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>$10,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (nominal)</td>
<td>2011 estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$408.074 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>$8.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini (2009)</td>
<td>63.1 (high) (2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI (2011)</td>
<td>0.619 (medium) (123rd)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Africa’s Foreign Relations

As the Union of South Africa, the country was a founding member of the United Nations. The then Prime Minister Jan Smuts wrote the preamble to the United Nations Charter (Rosenberg, 2001 and Schlesinger, 2004). The country is one of the founding members of the African Union (AU), and has the largest economy of all the members. It is also a founding member of the AU’s New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). South Africa has played a key role as a mediator in African conflicts over the last decade, such as in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Comoros, and Zimbabwe. After apartheid ended, South Africa was readmitted to the Commonwealth of Nations. The country is a member of the Group of 77 and chaired the organisation in 2006. South Africa is also a member of the Southern African Development Community, South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, Southern African Customs Union, Antarctic Treaty System, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, G20 and G8+5. South African President Jacob Zuma and Chinese President Hu Jintao upgraded bilateral ties between the two countries on 24 August 2010, when they signed the Beijing Agreement, which elevated South Africa's earlier "strategic partnership" with China to the higher level of "comprehensive strategic partnership" in both economic and political affairs, including the strengthening of exchanges between their respective ruling parties and legislatures (Xinhua News Agency, 24 August 2010 and SouthAfrica.info, 11 April 2011). In April 2011, South Africa formally joined the Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRICS) grouping of countries, identified by President Zuma as the country's largest trading partners, and also the largest trading partners with Africa as a whole. All five BRICS member countries are currently on the UN Security Council; Brazil, India and South Africa as non-permanent members. Zuma asserted that BRICS member countries would also work with each other through the UN, the Group of Twenty (G20) and the India, Brazil South Africa (IBSA) forum (SouthAfrica.info, 2011).
Military Capacity

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was created in 1994, as an all volunteer force composed of the former South African Defence Force, the forces of the African nationalist groups (Umkhonto we Sizwe and Azanian People's Liberation Army), and the former Bantustan defence forces (South African Government, 1993). The SANDF is subdivided into four branches, the South African Army, the South African Air Force, the South African Navy, and the South African Medical Service (South African Government, 2003: 18). In recent years, the SANDF has become a major peacekeeping force in Africa, and has been involved in operations in Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi, amongst others. It has also served in multi-national UN peacekeeping forces (Lekota, 2005).

South Africa is the only African country to have successfully developed nuclear weapons. It became the first country (followed by Ukraine) with nuclear capability to voluntarily renounce and dismantle its programme and in the process signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 (Horton III, 1999). According to the country’s former President F.W. de Klerk, the decision to build a "nuclear deterrent" was taken "as early as 1974 against a backdrop of a Soviet expansionist threat (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1993).

3.9 EGYPT AND QUEST FOR AFRICAN PERMANENT SEAT IN THE ENLARGED UNSC

Egypt, officially the Arab Republic of Egypt, is a country mainly in North Africa, with the Sinai Peninsula forming a land bridge in Southwest Asia. Egypt is thus a transcontinental country, and a major power in the Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East and the Muslim world. Covering an area of about 1,010,000 square kilometers (390,000 sq mi),
Egypt is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Gaza Strip and Israel to the northeast, the Red Sea to the east, Sudan to the south and Libya to the west.

Egypt is one of the most populous countries in Africa and the Middle East. The great majority of its over 82.2 million people live near the banks of the Nile River, in an area of about 40,000 square kilometers (15,000 sq mi), where the only arable land is found (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 2011). The large areas of the Sahara Desert are sparsely inhabited. About half of Egypt's residents live in urban areas, with most spread across the densely populated centres of greater Cairo, Alexandria and other major cities in the Nile Delta.

Monuments in Egypt such as the Giza pyramid complex and its Great Sphinx were constructed by its ancient civilization. Its ancient ruins, such as those of Memphis, Thebes, and Karnak and the Valley of the Kings outside Luxor, are a significant focus of archaeological study. The tourism industry and the Red Sea Riviera employ about 12% of Egypt's workforce.

The economy of Egypt is one of the most diversified in the Middle East, with sectors such as tourism, agriculture, industry and service at almost equal production levels.
Table 8: Socio-Economic and Political Data on Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (and largest city)</th>
<th>Cairo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official language(s)</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonym</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Mohamed Morsi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Kamal Ganzouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper house</td>
<td>Shura Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower house</td>
<td>People's Assembly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Establishment**

| Unification of Upper and Lower Egypt | 3150 BC |
| Independence from the United Kingdom | 28 February 1922 |
| Declaration of the republic | 18 June 1953 |

**Area**

| Total | 1,002,450 km² (30th) |
| Water (%) | 0.632 |

**Population**

| 2012 estimate | 90 million (82 million inside + 8 million abroad) (16th) |
| 2006 census | 76,699,427 (total) incl. 3,901,396 abroad |

| Density | Real density: 2,755.2/km² (38th) 7,136/sq mi |
| GDP (PPP) | 2011 estimate |
| Total | $518.976 billion |
| Per capita | $6,540 |
| GDP (nominal) | 2011 estimate |
| Total | $235.719 billion |
| Per capita | $2,970 |
| Gini (1999–00) | $4.5 (medium) |
| HDI (2011) | 0.644 (medium) (113th) |

**Source:** http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt
Foreign Relations of Egypt

Egypt's foreign policy is supported by its population size, historical events, military strength, diplomatic expertise and a strategic geographical position. It has extensive political influence in Africa and the Middle East. Cairo has been a crossroads of regional commerce and culture for centuries, and its intellectual and Islamic institutions are at the center of the region's social and cultural development.

The permanent Headquarters of the Arab League are located in Cairo and the Secretary General of the Arab League has traditionally been Egyptian.

Egypt was the first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, with the signing of the treaty. Despite the peace treaty, Israel is still largely considered an enemy country within Egypt (Egyptian Mail, 2010). Egypt has historically played an important role as a mediator in resolving disputes between various Arab states, and in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Egypt is a major ally of the United States. Former Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali served as Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1991 to 1996.

In the 21st century, Egypt has had a major problem with immigration, as millions of Africans flee poverty and war. Border control methods can be "harsh, sometimes lethal" (Jerusalem Report, 1953).

Military

The Egyptian Armed forces have combined troop strength of around 450,000 active personnel (Globalfirepower.com). According to the Israeli chair of the former Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Yuval Steinitz, the Egyptian Air Force has roughly the same number of modern warplanes as the Israeli Air Force and far more Western tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft batteries and warships than the Israeli Defence Force (Yuval, 2006).

The Egyptian military has recently undergone massive modernization, mostly in its Air Force. Egypt is speculated by Israel to be the second country in the region with a spy
satellite, EgyptSat1, and is planning to launch 3 more satellites (DesertSat1, EgyptSat2 & DesertSat2) over the next two years (Yaacov, 2007).

The United States of America provides an annual military assistance, which in 2009 amounted to US$ 1.3 billion (inflation adjusted US$ 1.41 billion in 2012) (US Department of State, 2009).

3.10 NIGERIA AND QUEST FOR AFRICA PERMANENT SEAT IN THE ENLARGED UNSC

Nigeria, officially the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is a federal constitutional republic comprising 36 states and its Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The country is located in West Africa and shares land borders with the Republic of Benin in the west, Chad and Cameroon in the east, and Niger in the north. Its coast in the south lies on the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean. The three largest and most influential ethnic groups in Nigeria are the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba.

The people of Nigeria have an extensive history. Archaeological evidence shows that human habitation of the area dates back to at least 9000 BCE (Keech, 1981). The area around the Benue and Cross River is thought to be the original homeland of the Bantu migrants who spread across most of central and southern Africa in waves between the 1st millennium BC and the 2nd millennium. The name Nigeria was taken from the Niger River running through the country. The British colonised Nigeria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century setting up administrative structures and law while recognizing the traditional chiefs. Nigeria became independent again in 1960.

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, the seventh most populous country in the world, and the most populous country in the world in which the majority of the population is black (Library of Congress - Country Profile, 2008). It is listed among the "Next Eleven" economies, and is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.
Table 9: Socio-Economic and Political Data on Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Abuja</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Goodluck Jonathan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Namadi Sambo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper house</td>
<td>Senate</td>
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<td>Lower house</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>From the United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unification of Southern and Northern Nigeria</td>
<td>1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared and recognized</td>
<td>1 October 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic declared</td>
<td>1 October 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>356,667 sq mi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water (%)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2012 estimate 170,123,740 (7th)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006 census 140,003,542</td>
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<tr>
<td>Density</td>
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<td>477.0/sq mi</td>
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<td>GDP (PPP)</td>
<td>2011 estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>GDP (nominal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI (2011)</td>
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In his address to the visiting United Nations Secretary General at the State House, Aso Rock, Jonathan (2011) ceased the opportunity to inform his visitor that the exigency of the contemporary world demands the reformation of the entire United Nations system;
especially that of the Security Council, in order to accommodate Africa representation among the veto wielding permanent members in the United Nations Security Council. He also cashed in on the occasion to inform him of his Nigeria’s quest and desire for a permanent seat in the expanded United Nations Security Council, while at the same time soliciting for his support as the Secretary General of the United Nations in paving way for Nigeria to be granted one of the seats that is proposed for Africa. When he opined that:

> A situation where Africa is totally excluded from the permanent membership of the Council [United Nations Security Council] is unfair and untenable. Mr. Secretary-General, given the realities of today's world, a comprehensive reform of the United Nations system is imperative at this time. Specifically, the expansion of the Security Council, it is therefore my hope that the United Nation system will support Nigeria's quest for permanent membership of the United Nation Security Council (Jonathan, 2011:1).

**Foreign Relations**

Upon gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria made the liberation and restoration of the dignity of Africa the centrepiece of its foreign policy and played a leading role in the fight against the apartheid regime in South Africa (Young, 2006). One notable exception to the African focus of Nigeria's foreign policy was the close relationship the country enjoyed with Israel throughout the 1960s.

Nigeria's foreign policy was soon tested in the 1970s after the country emerged united from its own civil war and quickly committed itself to the liberation struggles going on in the Southern Africa sub-region. Though Nigeria never sent an expeditionary force in that struggle, it offered more than rhetoric to the African National Congress (ANC) by taking a committed tough line with regard to the racist regime and their incursions in southern Africa, in addition to expediting large sums to aid anti-colonial struggles. Nigeria was also a founding member of the Organisation for African Unity (now the African Union), and has
tremendous influence in West Africa and Africa on the whole. Nigeria has additionally founded regional cooperative efforts in West Africa, functioning as standard-bearer for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and ECOMOG, economic and military organizations respectively.

With this African-centred stance, Nigeria readily sent troops to the Congo at the behest of the United Nations shortly after independence (and has maintained membership since that time); Nigeria also supported several Pan African and pro-self government causes in the 1970s, including garnering support for Angola's MPLA, SWAPO in Namibia, and aiding anti-colonial struggles in Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) military and economically. Nigeria retains membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, and in late November 2006 organized an Africa-South America Summit in Abuja to promote what some attendees termed "South-South" linkages on a variety of fronts (http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/Past/2006/November/SummitASA/summit.htm). Nigeria is also a member of the International Criminal Court, and the Commonwealth of Nations.

Nigeria has remained a key player in the international oil industry since the 1970s, and maintains membership in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which it joined in July, 1971. Its status as a major petroleum producer figures prominently in its sometimes vicissitudinous international relations with both developed countries, notably the United States and more recently China and developing countries, notably Ghana, Jamaica and Kenya (Timothy, 1984).

**Military**

Nigeria have played a major role in the country's history since independence. Taking advantage of its role as Africa's most populated country, Nigeria has repositioned its military as an African peacekeeping force. Since 1995, the Nigerian military through ECOMOG mandates have been deployed as peacekeepers in Liberia (1997), Ivory Coast (1997–1999), Sierra Leone 1997–1999 (O'Loughlin, 1998), and presently in Sudan's Darfur region under an African Union mandate.
CHAPTER FOUR
LIKELY OUTCOMES OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) occupies a unique position in the regime governing the use of force in international politics. Two key principles underpin this regime: first, a ban on the individual use of force other than for purposes of self-defence (in the face of actual or imminent attack); and second, it is the responsibility of the UNSC to determine whether there exists a 'threat to international peace and security' (Article 39), a prerequisite to its authorization of the collective use of force to uphold 'international peace and security' (Article 42). It is upon the UNSC that, 'in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations', the organization's 192 members 'confer ... primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' (Article 24), and in so doing 'agree to accept and carry out [its] decisions ... in accordance with the present Charter' (Article 25). Crucially, however, action by the Security Council can only be taken with the assent of its five permanent, veto-bearing Members (P-5) (Article 27) (Morris and Wheeler, 2007).

Some observers of the debate on UN reform, such as Jim Paul of the Global Policy Forum, say that the stumbling blocks to finding agreement are so formidable that the outcome may only be a slight increase in non-permanent members. Nevertheless, the prospect of reform has led to intense competition for the possible new permanent seats. Japan, India, Germany, and Brazil are the strongest candidates for new permanent seats from Asia, Europe, and Latin America. South Africa is the strongest single candidate from Africa. But candidates for one of the possible African seats also include Nigeria, Egypt, and Senegal (Africa: Security Council Expansion AfricaFocus Bulletin Apr 30, 2005).
4.1 NEED FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

According to Sutterlin (2005) the enlargement of the Security Council has three main objectives:

1. **Increased Operational Effectiveness**.

   Greater operational effectiveness is needed to reassure member states that the Security Council is able to provide timely protection against threats to security and to dissuade them from acting unilaterally (or in coalition) without Security Council endorsement. Neither of the models suggested by the High-level Panel would do much to meet this objective. Because of the increase in size and the more varied political orientation of Council members, decision making would be more time consuming and difficult under both models.

   Had the Council been reconfigured according to either Model A or Model B, its action, or inaction, would not have been different on Kosovo, the war in Iraq, or Darfur—on each of which the Council has been criticized for ineffectiveness or irrelevance. Model A, which foresees an increase in the number of permanent members, might enhance operations to a limited extent by (a) making more money available for peacekeeping operations, assuming that a larger contribution would be forthcoming from the new permanent members; and (b) having leading states of significant influence within every region represented permanently on the Council.

2. **Enhanced Symbolic Power as a Source of Legitimization**.

   States might more willingly accept resolutions of a Security Council that was more representative and that, as under Model A, included leading regional countries on a permanent basis. On the other hand, as long as the veto remains, the Security Council cannot symbolize democracy, and the introduction of a new class of members, especially under Model A, could brand the Council for operating on a class basis with an “underclass” at the bottom comprising the large majority of members.
3. **Satisfaction of Member States.**

Permanent membership as foreseen under Model A would give substantial satisfaction to the most likely candidates for this status; although their satisfaction would decline somewhat as they realized that they gained little increased power (O’Neill, 1997). On the other hand, pretenders for permanent membership status that are not chosen would be dissatisfied—in some cases bitterly so—and the large majority of member states that would remain eligible only for two-year terms (to which they could expect to be elected only rarely, if at all) would gain no satisfaction from the new class order. In terms of satisfaction, then, Model A would at best be a wash. Model B would be no better, in that it would slightly reduce the already meager opportunities for small countries to be seated on the Council.

On the basis of a purely rational analysis neither of these models (or indeed any other one that has been proposed elsewhere) is worth pursuing at this point, leaving aside the very relevant consideration that neither model is likely to receive the approval needed to permit the necessary amendment of the Charter. So there is much to say for simply dropping the subject before it causes further disharmony among states.

4.2 **UNSC – AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB OR REPRESENTATIVE ORGAN?**

It could be argued that the current structure of the UN’s most powerful organ has been challenged since the moment of its inception. The outcome of the San Francisco Conference in 1945 was, indeed, endorsed by its participants. However, the actual negotiations on the rules of the new organization remained in the hands of the two major actors – The United States and the Soviet Union. The first formal proposal for the reform in the UN Security Council was made in 1956 by 18 Latin American countries. As more countries became independent the pressure for reform increased and, finally, the current fifteen state composition of the Security Council was ratified by two thirds of UN member states in 1965. The pressure continued in the period between 1970 and 1990 as the members of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) developed a platform with the objective “to work towards further democratization of the UN” and “secure the widest participation of member states” in the UN decision-making (Bourantonis, n.d: 90). No progress, however, could be made at that time due to the superpower competition that hindered any attempts at reform. In fact, the deadlock in the Security Council prevented any change, be it to the benefit of the poorer countries or the industrialized world, as any aspirations of the Western states to add new members to the UNSC were equally blocked.

With the end of the Cold War the situation changed drastically. The UNSC was no longer a stage for superpower rivalry and could now fully assume its functions of maintaining global peace and security as outlined in Article 24 of the UN Charter. The first steps in this direction were encouraging. A settlement of the Iran-Iraq crisis and consensus (though with some reservation) on the action during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 made the idea of an active and productive Security Council seem possible. However, the issues of lack of representation and usurpation of the UNSC by the permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) soon resurfaced and the legitimacy of the Security Council was undermined. Describing the cause of the problem Justin Morris notes:

The UN was forced to rely on the major Western Powers for political leadership and material help and found itself on the horns of a dilemma. Inactivity attracted disapprobation not dissimilar to that of the Cold War…yet where the UNSC became engaged, its actions were often accompanied – on occasion with good cause - by allegations of inappropriate self-interested motives on the part of the United States and, to a lesser extent, the UK and France (so-called P-3) (Morris, 2000:268).

Many UN member-states, especially those from the developing world, have come to see the Security Council as an undemocratic and neo-colonialist institution. The attacks on the right of veto held by the Council’s five permanent members were particularly harsh.
Ofuaku and Ukaga quote Alounkhed Kittikhoun of Lao’s People’s Democratic Republic stating that “most countries were of the view that the veto power was anachronistic, anti-democratic, and contrary to the principle of sovereign equality of states” (Afoaku and Ukaga, 2001:158).

Though it is clear that the P-5 nations will not give up their right of veto, nor will they endorse the abolishment of this institution, the attempts were made to address the issue. The Commission on Global Governance, for instance, suggested that the permanent members should only exercise their right to veto in the circumstances they deem exceptional. Furthermore, it suggests the creation of “standing members” of the Security Council i.e. permanent members without the right to veto (United Nations, 1995). The Netherlands put forward an idea, according to which “two negative votes by permanent members would be required to veto a decision instead of one” (Bourantonis, n.d: 104). Whatever the proposal may be it is inevitably linked to the issue of the composition of the Security Council and by extension, its enlargement.

4.3 THE EXPANSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS FROM 1946-1960s

In the first ten years the United Nations membership did not change much. “During the period 1946-54, 31 states had applied for admission to the UN membership, but only nine of them were admitted”. The reason why many states were not admitted to the UN is because of the East-West conflict during the Cold War. “Each camp made use of the veto to block candidates supported by the other. Many qualified states were kept out for years solely because the use of the veto prevented the Security Council from making favourable recommendations to the General Assembly” (Bourantonis, 2005:12). In 1955 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to block the admittance of qualified states into the United Nations. This agreement led to a phenomenal increase of the United Nations
Sixteen new members were admitted in that same year, four in 1956, six in 1957, and twenty in the period between 1957 and 1960. In 1963 the UN counted 114 member states. In the period between 1946 and 1963 the number of African and Asian members increased significantly. In the original UN’s fifty-one members only twelve came from Africa and Asia. In 1963 African and Asian members constituted more than half of the UN’s membership.

4.4 THE EXPANSION OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Before 1965 the distribution of the non-permanent seats in the Security Council followed the lines of the gentlemen’s agreement reached informally by the five permanent members of the Security Council in 1946. In that agreement the P-5 agreed to “undertake to support the election to the Council of candidates nominated by the countries of the five main regions of the world. In accordance with that plan it was agreed that, in the election of non-permanent members, support would be given to two countries from the Latin American region, one seat to the British Common Wealth, one to the Middle East, one to Western Europe and one to Eastern Europe” (Bourantonis, 2005:13). Africa and Asia were left behind. With admittance of new members including African and Asian states in the 1960s, the ratio of elective seats on the Security Council to the total membership of the UN had fallen down. The Security Council’s composition did not represent the geographical distribution of the UN membership any more. The selection criteria for non permanent members, forthcoming from the gentlemen’s agreement of 1946, had become obsolete.

The first proposal for an increase of the Security Council non-permanent members was surprisingly not proposed by African and/or Asian states but by 16 Latin American states and Spain at the 11th session of the General Assembly in 1956. “The Latin proposal called for an increase of the non-permanent members from six to eight and a change in the number of
votes required for Council decisions from seven to eight” (Bourantonis, 2005:15). The reason why the Latin American states took leadership in proposing an expansion of the Security Council non-permanent seats was unfortunately not because they wanted a more representative Security Council including non-permanent seats for African and Asian member states; But because they feared losing seats in the Security Council since several member states, including the permanent members, argued that expansion of the Council was not necessary and the “unfairness of the gentlemen’s agreement of 1946 could be corrected by redistribution of the six elective seats among the overrepresented geographical regions” (Bourantonis, 2005:16). The proposal of the Latin American states was not accepted and no action was taken on this matter for seven years.

In order to play a greater political role in the world affairs the African and Asian states in September 1961 created a new international political organisation called the Non Alignment Movement. “The common purpose of these states was the formulation of policies independent of the superpowers or associated blocs; then polarized by the Cold War” (Bourantonis, 2005:20). The Movement counted 24 Afro-Asian members plus Yugoslavia in 1961. In 1983 the members of the NAM increased to 99 states. Also Latin American and Caribbean states joined the NAM. Today the NAM counts 118 member states from over the globe. On 13 December 1963 the NAM submitted a draft resolution seeking to increase the number of non-permanent seats in the Security Council to 15 by addition of four non-permanent members (Bourantonis, 2005:23). The debate on the draft took place in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on December 1963. The United States, Britain and France did not agree with the draft and proposed to negotiate about the issue a year later. The American and British delegates said that they only had permission to vote in favor of an increase with two new seats and not four. The French delegation did not justify its position.
The Soviet Union stated not to negotiate until China received its right to its seat in the UN back. To secure its position the Soviet Union even made up that China was against an expansion of the Security Council and favoured redistribution of the actual seats. The Soviets were actually using China to justify their position. The Soviet Union attitude was not well received by the African-Asian states and by the western permanent members. They argued that the expansion of the Council and the readmission of China were two different matters. In September 1963 Peking send a communication to the African-Asian states in which they stated that the readmission of China and the expansion of the Security Council were two different matters and should not be bundled together (Bourantonis, 2005:25). On 17 November 1963 the draft resolution sponsored by the African-Asian states was put it to the vote in the General Assembly; against the will of the Soviet Union. The result was 97 in favour and 11 against. The draft was adopted as Resolution 1991A. By the Resolution the number of non-permanent seats in the Security Council was increased from six to ten bringing the total number of members from eleven to fifteen. In the following order:

- three from Africa
- two from Asia
- two from Latin America
- two from Western European States
- one from Eastern European States

In August 1965 the Resolution was ratified by more than two-thirds of the UN including the permanent five and entered into force. The votes required for an affirmative decision of the Council on procedural matters was also amended in 1965. An affirmative Council decision originally required an affirmative vote of seven members out of eleven after August 1965 was this amended to nine members out of fifteen. This alteration decreased the influence of the permanent members. Before August 1965 the permanent members could
easily pass a resolution by the number of votes required when they unanimous agreed on a procedural matter. They only needed to convince two other members to share their view. After August 1965 it became a little more complicated to pass a resolution by the votes required since now they had to convince four members in stead of two to support them. The voting power of the non-permanent members on the contrary increased. They now had the power to defeat any procedural decision. The African and Asian states were the most benefited in the amendments of 1965. They went from zero seats to five seats (together). In coalition with other non-permanent members the Afro-Asian member states can block decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters. Since a large majority Afro-Asian states and later also the Latin states were members of the NAM, this block became a significant power in the Security Council. The Afro-Asian states plus the Latin states together possessed seven seats and could so block any procedural decision which requires nine affirmatives from the fifteen members of the Security Council.

4.5 THE EXPANSION OF THE UNITED NATION MEMBER STATES AFTER 1965

Due to the process of decolonization in the 1960s and the1970s and the admission of newly independent states to the UN, mostly from Africa but also from other developing regions of the world, the UN membership continued to increase significantly. In 1979 the UN counted 152 member states. Today, the UN counts 192 member states. The last addition was in 2011 when South Sudan became member of the UN. Today the NAM is the majority of the General Assembly. This development, the increasing UN member States, decreased the ratio of elective seats on the Security Council to the total membership of the UN.

For several years after the Security Council’s enlargement in 1965 there was no serious pressure to expand the Security Council or make changes its composition. During this period, the Cold War, the Council became a battle field between East and West and North
and South. Its members were too busy in trying to shape the Council’s agenda and paralyzing the organ for its own interests. Surprisingly during this period, when the Council was definitely not really effective and/or efficient, there was no serious pressure to change the organ in order to make it more effective.

4.6 IMPULSE FOR REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE 1990’s

The passive attitude towards reforming the Security Council changed in the late 1980s with the end of the Cold War. During the late 1980s and begin 1990s the international political environment within which the UN had been operating for years, changed. Key points are:

1. First the end of the Cold War, with the coming to power of Gorbachev in 1985.
2. Secondly the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and unification of Germany.
4. Fourth the increased member states from Africa and Asia and other developing states in the UN.
5. Fifth the end of France and Great Britain as colonial superpowers, and the emerging of new regional powers such as Japan, Germany South Africa, Nigeria, and Brazil.

The happening that contributed most to the discussion about the composition of the Security Council was the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War did not only throw the UN, after decades of frustrated relationships between its powerful members, into the centre of international affairs. It also was, surprisingly but understandably, an impulse for reforming the UN Security Council. After the Cold War the Security Council was busier than ever. It passed resolution after resolution, the number of peacekeeping operations and blue helmets in troubled regions increased significantly. “By the end of 1992 there were nearly
100,000 peacekeepers’ in fourteen missions costing around US$4 billion” (Gareis & Varwick, 2005). It is precisely because the Security Council, became more active in intervening in its members political and security affairs questions of how, why, and by whom its decisions were being made became a hot issue in the 1990s (Luck, 2006). The questions about the composition, transparency, and legitimacy of the UN Security Council gained force again. Critics began to argue that the distribution of the permanent seats reflected the balance of powers of 1945 and should for that reason be redistributed and/or enlarged. Others argued that the Council’s decisions did not reflect the will of the UN members as a whole, but “the will of the few who dominate it because of their disproportionate representation in the Council’s membership” (Bourantonis, 2005). Japan, Germany, the NAM and other member states began to express their will for the admission of new permanent members. In 1993, when the General Assembly in Resolution 48/26 set up the Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the questions of Council reform, the debate on the reform of the Security Council started and it continues to present. The Working Group is divided in two clusters:

- Cluster 1 deals with the enlargement of the Council, the veto and voting procedures;
- Cluster 2 deals with accountability and transparency of the Security Council by improving the Council’s methods and decision-making procedures.

The following paragraph will give the recent position of several member states and formal groups, in cluster I.

There have been dozens of reform proposals but only the most discussed and recent ones will be analysed. The position of member states in cluster II will not be presented but only achievements reached in this cluster until today.
4.7 UNSC ENLARGEMENT AND THE ISSUE OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION

There seems to be an overall consensus in that the Security Council needs to be enlarged for it to be more representative. The proposed mechanisms of the enlargement, however, differ significantly. Some authors have attempted to look at these variations in regional perspective. Indeed, at least one region has expressed its wish to represent its views collectively. The Organization of African Unity has stated that its members should occupy at least two permanent and five non-permanent seats, where the permanent seats would be allotted based on the system of rotation to the states selected by the OAU (Morris, 2000).

Norway proposed the “two permanent plus three permanent but rotating” formula that would add two permanent members to the existing P5 plus three “regional” seats for Africa, Asia and Latin America occupied on the basis of rotation (Knight, 2002:31). Although the NAM does not endorse the idea of rotation, it holds the view that each southern region - Africa, Asia and Latin America - should have one permanent member-state on the Security Council.

Considering the creation of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it would be sensible for Europe to have one “regional” voice on the Security Council. The Maastricht treaty suggested that “permanent European members of the Security Council use their influence for Union interest” (Schmidt, n.d: 63). This option, however, is problematic since Germany aspires to become a permanent member of the Council and would hardly support this scheme. Another possible reform in the same realm would be the replacement of Britain and France with Japan and a European Union seat. Advocating this type of reform, Helen Leigh-Phippard notes:
If the Council is to be reformed in a way that will give it more authority without making it unworkable, then reform, which does not add to the total number of members and so does not increase the number of potential vetoes may be preferable (Leigh-Phippard, 1994:170).

However, she further acknowledges that such a reform would be highly problematic due to the resistance of the Great Britain and France that would not relinquish their positions on the Security Council. Thus, the idea of one voice for every region does not seem to be workable. As Justin Morris points out:

The wisdom of the approach appears questionable…even within Western Europe, the most politically cohesive region in the world; the leading states are unwilling to countenance regional representation within the Council. (Morris, 2000:273).

Indeed, the differences and tensions in regions outside Europe are more pronounced, which makes the consensus on regional representation hard to achieve. The example of Asia illustrates the controversies around the issue. On the one hand, the idea of rotational seats backed by some states, such as Malaysia, Syria and Turkey is criticized by other states in the region. India holds that the principle of the rotation should not be extended to permanent membership as it “will militate against the objective of continued accumulation of experience by the developing countries,” while Indonesia is preoccupied that the rotational representation may “sharpen the regional animosities” (Murthy, 1998:115).

On the other hand, Pakistan is opposed to the idea of one Asian state representing the whole region as it believes that it would “fuel the tendencies towards hegemony and domination which are manifest in some regions” (Bourantonis, n.d: 95). The tendencies are similar in other regions. In Latin America, for instance, Argentina opposes the permanent membership for Brazil and no agreement is likely to be reached on rotational representation
of any kind. Furthermore, the developing countries in and outside Asia alike oppose the piecemeal enlargement of the UNSC as they are determined to prevent Japan, a candidate most likely to be approved by the P-5, from becoming a permanent member in the first round (Murthy, 1998:118). As we have seen, the consensus on regional representation is problematic in most cases.

Moreover, disagreements on certain candidatures can go beyond regional borders. It appears, therefore, that should the reform go ahead, the UNSC would have to review individual candidatures not necessarily endorsed by the region they are supposed to represent. There is also a possibility of two or more rival candidates from the same region. However, the idea of representation by regions remains workable, as no better alternative seems to have been found. The NAM maintains that Japan and Germany should become permanent members if the representation of other developing regions is ensured. The United States supports this view and suggests three permanent members representing Africa, Asia and Latin America be admitted to the UNSC beside Japan and Germany.

Other P-5 members seem to concur in this view at least to some degree (Bourantonis,n.d: 97). The impediment of the reform then is the opposition of the developing states to the piecemeal enlargement of the Council and, by extension, the necessity to agree on the three members other than Japan and Germany that are to join the Security Council. As we have seen from the discussion above, such agreement may be difficult to reach. In addition, this brings to the fore the issue of requirements that a candidate has to meet in order to become a permanent member of the UNSC.
4.8 POSITION FROM MEMBER STATES AND FORMAL GROUPS IN CLUSTER I ON THE UNSE ENLARGEMENT STRUGGLE

4.8.1 The Quick Fix Formula and the G4

The “quick fix formula” is a formula that would grant permanent membership to Germany and Japan only. From the very beginning of the debates Japan and Germany strongly expressed their will to become permanent members of the UN Security Council since they were respectively the second and the third largest financial contributors in the UN regular budget, and the respectively the second and the third largest contributors to the UN peacekeeping operations budget. Both states demanded equal status and no discrimination between them and the present permanent members. Implicitly they were saying they want to have the veto right. “France and Britain underlined their support for Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India as future permanent members and permanent seats for Africa as well”, arguing that their admission would have a positive effect in the Council’s effectiveness (Reform the UN.Org, 2006, para 2.4). The United States, the Bush administration, openly showed support for a permanent seat for Japan only, it did not openly oppose German’s bid for a permanent seat but it also did not openly support it (Brian Knowlton, 2007, para 3).

The three permanent members did not precisely explain why they did or did not support the quick fix formula. This is not completely odd. If the permanent members precisely explained their support for certain nations states as permanent members, their explanation could be regarded as the criteria required to become a permanent member. This could bring into life another discussion which would probably sound like: Are the criteria set by the permanent members of the UN Security Council for the admittance of new permanent members fair? The three permanent members did not discuss the right to veto to new permanent members either. Russia and China were more reserved towards the formula and
did not give a clear point of view. Not surprisingly the quick fix formula did not receive support from the African and Asian states. They argued that the expansion of the UN Security Council with only two industrialised countries would further contribute to the existing imbalance and it would be an insult to the developing states. The majority of the European states did not support the admission of Japan and Germany only. Japan, Germany and other member states have been adapting their proposals over the time and have also been forming blocs in order to win support for their draft Resolutions. Japan and Germany became both members of the G4 bloc composed of Germany, Japan, India and Brazil. All four states are interested in having a permanent seat in the Security Council and for different reasons they have found themselves appropriate candidates. Japan and Germany are respectively the UN's second and third largest funders, while Brazil the largest South American nation and India the world’s second most populous country are two of the largest contributors of troops to UN peace-keeping missions.

The G4 proposed an enlargement of the Security to 25 members. By adding six new permanent seats: two from Asia, two from Africa, one from Latin America, one from Europe and four new non-permanent seats. The G4 also proposed that new permanent members shall not possess the right of veto until “the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members has been decided upon in the framework of the review” (as cited Luck, 2006. p. 119). Under this proposal decisions of the Security Council would require an affirmative vote of fourteen of the twenty-five.

That is 56% of the total votes, the smallest majority. However Japan decided to leave the alliance. This because in September 2005 the G4, then supported by Japan, had failed to have their resolution passed by the General Assembly. Brazil, India, and Germany resubmitted the same draft resolution in 2006. Japan did not participate and chose to submit
its own draft resolution. In Japan’s latest submitted draft resolution, Japan expresses the desire to expand the Security Council from 15 to 21 by adding 6 new permanent members. Japan also favours not granting the veto power to new permanent members. “Candidates that receive a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly would become permanent members, while others would be eligible for semi-permanent seats, meaning they could be re-elected after their terms end” (Bill Varner, 2006) “Japan seeks 6 new seats on UN Council to end expansion deadlock” (para. 2). Japan submitted this draft resolution in order to win support from the United States, which favours a small enlargement of the Security Council’s seats with no more than six seats and seems to not be in favour of extending the veto right to new permanent members.

4.8.2 The Non Aligned Movement

As mentioned above, the NAM opposed the expansion of the UN Security Council with Germany and Japan only. The group supported the candidacy of these states on the condition that permanent seats would also be given to the members of the NAM. The majority of the NAM was in favour of a balanced expansion of the Security Council, with the expansion of permanent as well as non-permanent seats. The group however disagreed on a number of issues concerning the expansion of the permanent seats such as the extension of the veto right to new permanent members, and the method of selection. The group was divided into two groups.

The first group consisted mostly of Latin American and Asian states. This group favour expansion of the Council with two industrialised countries and three from the developing regions. One seat for Asia, one for Africa, and one for Latin America and the Caribbeans. The proposal is well known as the two plus three formula. They further agreed, like Japan and the G4 that the right of veto should not be extended to new permanent
members. The General Assembly would be responsible for the selection of the new permanent members, but selection criteria should be designed by the regions itself. India stated that “the level of participation in political and economic affairs and in peacekeeping operation of the UN and the financial contribution to the UN, the population of the state, and the size of its economy should be the selection criteria” (Bourantonis, 2005). Smaller states like Costa Rica, Guatemala and Ecuador favoured the selection criteria of the Charter that regulated the selection of the non-permanent members.

The second group consisted mostly of African States. For that reason the group acted under the African Union flag. The African states proposed two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for Africa; two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asia; one non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe; one permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean; and one permanent seat for Western Europe. This draft Resolution would increase the Security Council from 15 to 26 members. Contrary to the first group the African states were in favour of granting the veto the new permanent members in order to avoid the creation of second-class permanent members. The motto of the African was that states all privileges of the current five permanent members should be extended to the new permanent member states. Concerning the method of selection the African states favoured a regional selection and the regions itself should be responsible for the selection of its representatives in the Security Council. The African states further opt for rotational permanent seats for Africa.

4.8.3 Model A and Model B from the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change had produced a report in December 2004 in which they say that the Security Council decisions often “lacked realism,
equity and consistency, resulting in inadequate follow-up and implementation by the UN’s membership as a whole” (as cited in Luck, 2006. p. 117). To improve the Council’s credibility and capacity the Panel “offered a series of four principles to guide its enlargement which it termed a necessity” (Ibid). Ironically, like the member states, the Panel also could not agree in a single formula. The Panel created two models: Model A and Model B.

**Model A.**

Model A proposes the addition of six new permanent seats with no veto and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, thereby increasing the Security Council to 24 members, divided as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional area</th>
<th>No. of States</th>
<th>Permanent seats (continuing)</th>
<th>Proposed new permanent seats</th>
<th>Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals model A</strong></td>
<td><strong>191</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to this model the Security Council would be composed of: two permanent seats and four non permanent seats from Africa; three permanent seats and three non permanent seats from Asia and Pacific; four permanent seats and two non-permanent seats from Europe; and two permanent seats and one four non-permanent seats from the American continent. (Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes: 67).
**Model B**

Model B proposes no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows: (Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes: 68).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional area</th>
<th>No. of States</th>
<th>Permanent seats (continuing)</th>
<th>Proposed new four-year-renewable-term seats</th>
<th>Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals model A</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According this model the Security Council would be composed of: two four-year renewable-term seats and two non-permanent seats from Africa; one permanent seat, two four-year renewable-term seats, and three non-permanent seats from Asia and Pacific; three permanent seats, two four-year renewable-term seats, and one permanent seat for Europe; one permanent seat, two four-year renewable-term seats, and three non-permanent seats from the American Continent (Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes p. 68).
4.8.4 Uniting for Consensus

A group which was founded in the 1990’s in opposition to the expansion of the Security Council permanent seats. The group aims is counter the G4 nations’ bid for permanent seats. The group has about 40 member states. The leaders of the group are Italy, Pakistan, South Korea, Argentina, and Mexico. This group is against the expansion of the permanent seats and favours only the extension of the non permanent seats. In their draft the group proposes adding ten non-permanent members thereby expanding the Council to 25 members. They also proposed non-permanent members to be eligible for re-election to the Security Council, leaving formalities of re-election and rotation to regional groups. The twenty non-permanent seats should be elected according to the following pattern: six from African states, five from Asian states, four from Latin American and Caribbean states, three from Western European and other states, and two from Eastern European states. The group further proposes the restraining of the veto. Under this plan decisions of the Council would require an affirmative vote of 15 of the 25.

The Open-ended Working Group cluster I, also called the never ending talking group, did not make much progress. The majority of the member states agreed that the Security Council should be enlarged, however they disagreed deeply on key issues, such as whether to add new permanent members or to extend the veto to new permanent members.

4.9 ACHIEVEMENTS IN CLUSTER II

Since the beginning of the discussion about the reform of the Security Council most of the attention has been given to Cluster I. Quite understandable since Cluster I deals with the question: Who sits permanently around the high desired Council’s table? However, for the majority of the member states reforms in Cluster II, which deal with the Council working methods, are more important than reforms in Cluster I. The UN counts 192 members of
which relatively few have a chance of becoming a permanent member. But altering the working methods of the Council in a way to assure greater transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of non-members of the Council could increase the level of participation of all member states in the Security Council’s decision-making forum. This could increase the Council’s legitimacy and could positively affect its effectiveness. Further an expanded Security Council with deficits in its working methods could result in a new demand for enlargement of Security Council’s seats in the future. Greater progress has been reached on Cluster II than on Cluster I. This is not surprising knowing that reforming the working methods of the Security Council does not require Charter amendment nor Assembly resolution while enlargement requires both. Examples of achievements in Cluster II are:

1. “To assist transparency and accountability, it has become common practice for the President of the Council to brief non-members, and often the press”, on the results of informal (private consultations) (Luck, 2006. p. 123).

2. “Tentative monthly forecasts and the provisional agendas for the Council’s upcoming work are now provided regularly to non-members, as are provisional draft resolutions” (Ibid).

3. Through the work of its subsidiary bodies, as well as in plenary, the Council has begun to include non-members in its work on a more regular and substantive basis.

However it is questionable if achievements in Cluster II would result in a more effective and efficient Security Council. The fact is that achievements in Cluster II do not directly tackle the problem of representation and legitimacy of the UN membership in the Security Council.
4.10 ATTITUDE OF THE P-5 TOWARDS EXPANSION OF THE PERMANENT SEATS

How does the P-5 think about the enlargement of the Security Council’s seats? Do they support the idea or reject it? Are they prepared to share their privileges including the right to veto with other UN member states? This subchapter describes the position of members of the P-5 vis-à-vis the enlargement of the permanent seats. At this moment the P-5, generally speaking, agrees that the expansion of the Security Council would help the organ better fulfil its responsibilities. This because the UN member states, including the P-5, have recognised that in order to be capable of acting against the new challenges, such as the management of internal conflicts, humanitarian crisis, and the fight against terrorism, a more representative and legitimatised Security Council is required. This was also the conclusion of the High Level Panel on Challenges and threats in 2004.

The United States and other members of the P-5 even publicly stated the above mentioned. “We believe the Council would be more effective if Japan-the second largest financial contributor to the UN, a strong and vibrant democracy, a defender of human rights, and a leader contributor to peacekeeping operations and development worldwide became a permanent member of the Council” stated the US UN ambassador, John R. Bolton, in the (General Assembly in June 2006). However, the P-5 disagrees in certain issues concerning the expansion of the Council and some of them do not take a clear position on this issue.

The United States favours a modest enlargement of the Security Council with no more than six new seats, permanent and non-permanent. A Council with more than 21 members would decrease its effectiveness and efficiency as the US diplomatic body stated in the UN. The P-5 agreed that the Council should remain organised on the principles of responsibility and efficiency, rather than on the principle of democratic representation (Bourantonis, 2005).
Another reason why the US, and perhaps the rest of the P5, favours a modest enlargement of the Security Council is because they fear losing their privileged position, and their ability to determine outcomes. A large increase of the permanent as well as the non-permanent seats would be a threat to the P-5. They would no longer be the only members with the ability to determine outcomes. Developing states would have the possibility (by their permanent and non-permanent seats) “to create a solid bloc and exercise an effective group veto”, (Bourantonis, 2005). As stated above the US welcomes Japan as a new permanent member. Concerning the extension of the veto right to new permanent members, the US did not take a clear position on this issue. The United States seems to not favour extension of the veto right to new permanent members. Stating this publicly could upset permanent seat candidates which have friendly political and economical relationships with the US. As result this could have a bad influence on the diplomatic relationship between the US and permanent seat candidates. By avoiding comments on this issue the US avoids diplomatic tensions.

France and the UK support the G4 as candidates for a permanent seat and also favour the permanent representation for Africa. Both the permanent members further support the creation of more non permanent seats. France is against extending the veto right to new permanent members. The UK does not give a clear position on this issue. This could be for the same reason as the United States.

China and Russia both also favour the enlargement of the Council but they do not have a clear position on the issue. On the plenary consultations 20 and 21 July Russia stated to consider any proposal reached by consensus. Wang Guangya representative of China stated at the 61st session of the GA on the Security Council Report and Security Council Reform that any reform formula only addressing the concerns of a few big powers will not get
support from China. Enhancing the representation of the developing countries, especially Africa, should be the priority stated the Chinese representative.

### 4.11 SHOULD THE VETO RIGHT BE EXTENDED TO NEW PERMANENT MEMBERS?

On this particular issue there seems to be an informal consensus between the G4, a part of the NAM, Japan, and the High Level Panel on Threats. They all stated in their tabled draft resolutions that new permanent members should not have the right to veto. However the African states do not favour the idea of second range permanent members, a position/status they believe permanent members without veto right will possess. These states are in favour of granting the veto right to new permanent members.

The veto and its practise has been seen over the decades as a negative element for the credibility, legitimacy, democracy and effectiveness of the Security Council. Think about the situation during the Cold War and/or the consequences of the US veto in the Rwanda conflict. New permanent members with the right to veto would only increase these deficits. And although the Cold War is over, certain nations still find themselves in a kind of ‘Cold War’ status quo. These nations would probably use the veto, in case they had the opportunity to do so, to weaken the position of its “enemy” and strengthen its own political and/or economic position. Examples of nations in this situation are: India and Pakistan. A paralysed and less effective Security Council would probably be the result if new permanent members would have the right to veto. Moreover, because it is impossible to predict the future of the international political relationships, another Cold War can reoccur. Imagine a Cold War with 12 permanent members with the right to veto. However, not granting the veto to new permanent members would create an unstable Security Council. Original permanent members will still be capable of forcing and/or blocking decisions by using the veto or the hidden veto. The power to decide will still be in the hand of the original five. The undemocratic deficit
will remain and the legitimacy of the Security Council’s decisions will still be questionable. This can have undesirable consequences for the Council’s effectiveness; it is possible that nations would not accept, respect and/or execute the Council’s mandates because of these deficits. Abolishing the veto right is also an option. All decisions in the Security would then be taken by majority voting. This would make the organ more democratic. However, it could result in a weak Security Council when acting without the support of its powerful states. In case powerful states in the Security vote against the decisions and decide not support the resolutions materially and politically, resolutions could be passed but would not be carried out (or not properly) and would be weak from character because of the lack of the support from powerful nation states. Too much of such situations would jeopardise the Council’s credibility. On the other hand, this option seems to be practically impossible at this moment. The permanent members do not favour this option and would certainly block such a draft with a veto. However, elimination of the veto requires Charter revision, which itself is subject to the veto process. Any reform proposal containing such a demand would be vetoed.

4.12 CONTROVERSY OVER THE REFORM AND ENLARGEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council was conceived to be the key UN organ for peace and security, by virtue of being, in principle, empowered to impose sanctions and approve the use of force. But more often than not, the Council has in practice failed to play its role effectively. During the Cold War, it was virtually paralyzed. Since the end of the Cold War, the Council has been much more active than before, but, a few remarkable successes apart, it has continued to be deadlocked when trying to prevent or solve serious crises. Not surprisingly, Security Council reform, which last took place some 47 years ago, has been an outstanding issue for a long time (Zedillo, 2005). Various attempts to adapt the Council have failed due to strong disagreements among UN members, particularly on the issue of enlargement.
To address the issue of enlargement, and purportedly to increase both the effectiveness and credibility of the Council, the High-level Panel proposes two alternative models for enlarging the Council from 15 to 24 members. In Model A, there will be six new permanent seats with no veto power, whereas in Model B there will be no new permanent seats, but eight four year renewable-term seats. The Panel’s only other proposal on Security Council reform is to introduce a system of “indicative voting” in order to make members establish explicitly their positions on a proposed action.

Not surprisingly, commentators on the issue have expressed a range of views on Security Council Reform. Some are very skeptical about the chances and even the value of any reform that can result in the enlargement of the membership of the United Nations Security Council in the near future. Others are rather optimistic; they see a much more transformational reform than is proposed by the Panel not only as advisable but as capable of achievement, albeit over the longer term (Zedillo, 2005).

Those in the skeptical camp based their argument on the experiences of previous attempts at Security Council reform, and suggest that the circumstances underlying the failed experiences remain firmly in place. On this view, the conjunction of regional rivalries, the reluctance of the permanent five members to see their power diluted, and the voting thresholds that are required for an amendment of the UN Charter would make it very likely that minorities capable of blocking any proposal would emerge before a reform is brought to a vote. Taken to the extreme, the skeptical view considers that an attempt now to change the structure of the Security Council stems from a fundamental misjudgment about what most ails the Council: deep political differences among the major players rather than a faulty institutional design. In fact, the reform skeptics argue that given the events that have recently shocked the international system, the present is a very bad time to attempt to enlarge the Security Council. They judge that the Panel’s bow to Security Council reform is just a
formality, designed to appease widespread national interests, but should not really be expected to go far (Zedillo, 2005).

On the side of the intellectual divide are the optimists, who without neglecting the enormous difficulty involved, believed that the reform must be attempted urgently on the grounds that the present arrangement is simply unsustainable. They see no future viability in a Security Council which, among other deficiencies, usually excludes the world’s second biggest economy and the world’s second most populated country, and grossly under-represents Africa and Latin America. Reform-inclined participants would go as far as to claim that any reform of the Security Council, almost irrespective of its specific content, has now become indispensable, if only to show that something substantive in a core UN institution can change.

Most of the writing as well as the discussion provided opinions about the pros or cons of each of the two proposed models for Council enlargement. Only a minority of the commentators prefer Model A over Model B. Those who favor Model A think that it would reflect more firmly the contemporary distribution of international power and provide the new permanent members with a clear incentive to contribute more resources to the Security Council’s functioning. The validity of these two reasons was, however, disputed by others. It was argued that, actually, assured permanency in the Security Council would not only fail to respond over time to changes in the distribution of power but would also conspire against more ample and steady funding. In this view, renewable chairs, as proposed in Model B, would keep their holders more inclined to contribute the required resources.

In assessing the proposed models and other possible designs for restructuring the Security Council, participants were mainly concerned about the question of legitimacy versus efficiency. In terms of legitimacy, most of them thought Model B superior to Model A, because the former potentially allows for a bigger representation of the world’s population
and GDP over time. As regards efficiency, most of the participants thought Model B superior in that it avoids the risk of ossification that might be caused by the addition of new permanent members. They also believed that Model B would be more likely to prevail over Model A if brought to a General Assembly vote. It was generally considered that although countries such as Germany, Japan, and India would do their utmost to get Model A approved in order to finally get permanent seats, they would, in the end, also support Model B if this were the option put to a vote against the status quo. Those countries, it is believed, would have a strong expectation of being regularly elected to the non-permanent seats contemplated in Model B.

Having granted that Model B is not only better and more likely to pass than Model A, it was generally conceded that Model B would not guarantee a more efficient Security Council than the present one. Indeed, as the number of members rises, crafting the necessary agreements is likely to become more difficult. And although the Council’s enlargement would raise the political cost that a single member would have to pay if it opposed decisions endorsed by a vast majority of the members, no country is likely to give up its effective power simply to avoid paying such a cost.

Enlargement by itself will not overcome the unpleasant verdict given by bargaining theory: veto gives high power; no veto gives nil or very little power (Barry, 1996 and Eyal, 1996). It is then understandable why many a commentator generally doubted the efficacy of a Security Council reform based solely on enlargement. This is not to say that they tended to endorse the abolition of the veto, an option that most considered to be totally out of the question in the foreseeable future.

A few, however, believe that the possibility of veto reform is being dismissed too soon. Failure to consider veto reform leaves the discussion at a cul-de-sac: enlargement alone will not bring about better resolutions, and without better resolutions the Security Council
will not prove effective, and without effectiveness whatever legitimacy is provided at first by enlargement will eventually be lost. Consequently, no matter how improbable, veto reform must be entertained at least as a long-term objective. One made the point observer simply but persuasively by asking the others: “Can you really believe that in 25 years from now, the Security Council will be like it is today with the existing vetoes?” If the answer is no, governments had better make sure that any immediate reform of the Security Council will make it easier, not harder, to undertake deeper changes in the long term. Under this criterion, if the choice were only between Model A and B, it is clear that the latter would again be preferable (Zedillo, 2005).

It had been recalled that ideas to moderate the power of veto have been available for some time. A new one that captured momentarily the imagination of the world opinion was that of requiring governments with veto power to have it tied, on a subject-by-subject basis, to the backing of their national parliaments or congresses. Needless to say, this idea would make sense only if all the permanent members were democracies, which is not the case at present.

A model for a Security Council without the present veto was tabled as a proposal for the long term, and has been outlined in a newly published book by one of the participants (Kemal, and Ozer, 2005). This would be a Security Council of six permanent and eight nonpermanent members. The nonpermanent members would represent regional constituencies. Each member of the UN would have a weight determined as a function of population, GDP, contribution to global public goods, and military capacity. Regional representatives would carry the aggregation of their respective constituencies’ weights. In this sense, it would be a system of universal participation. It would also be a system of weighted voting and one in which supermajorities would be required for the most important decisions. Ideally, the European Union would be represented in one permanent seat, naturally with the
very significant weight that such a seat would carry as a function of the factors mentioned above.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

The founders of the Security Council wanted the organ to be small in order to be efficient. Efficient in this case means that the Security Council can rapidly take the necessary decisions. It is logical that it is very simply to reach a consensus when only few have to be persuaded. The founders created the Council based on four features (Luck, 2006).

1. The council had to be ruled by the most powerful states;
2. To these powerful states would be given special rights and responsibilities concerning the maintenance of international peace and security;
3. The council had to be small without “exaggerated equality between the great and small Powers”;
4. The Council had the authority to enforce its decisions while its members had the power to impose its decisions.

The legitimacy of the P-5 lays among others in their military, economical, and political power. It was not the intention of the founders of the Security Council to create a Council that represented the entire UN membership. The element of power was its basis. The founders of the UN Council believed that “the UN as an entity of sovereign states could only work effectively when individual states, particularly its most powerful members, conferred on it sufficient authority and competences” (Bourantonis, 2005).

However its founders recognised that the element of power was not enough to maintain the authority of the Council. Ultimately they realized that the Security Council, when acting on behalf of all members of the UN, should be seen as representatives of the interests of the entire UN membership otherwise its legitimacy and effectiveness could be jeopardised. To make the Security Council more representative the founders created a
secondary category of members in the Security Council, the non-permanent members. The distribution of the non-permanent seats had to reflect the main geographical regions of the UN member States: Africa, Latin American, West and East Europe (Frank, 2007).

In this connection therefore, the study examined the struggle for permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. We were basically concerned with the reorganisation of the Security Council in such a manner that not only reflect the geo-political make-up and constituents of the United Nations by making it more democratic and accountable to the larger global community. To carry out this study, two specific issues were selected and empirically studied so as to determine the practical possibility of granting more permanent membership to new and developing countries within the organization.

In more specific terms, the study sought to determine the struggle and quest by the members of the United Nations to reform and enlarge the composition of the Security Council both in terms of membership and voting pattern as predicated in the right to veto by the so-called P-5; all of which are believed by the reformist and their apostles to have implications on the efficiency and legitimacy of the councils resolutions and decision as it will draw moral and legal support from all the regions of the world rather than a club of select few; that masquerade to protect and promote the interest of the entire globe, while in reality they parochially serve and primarily pursue their selfish national interest which is implicated in the manner that the veto have been (ab)used since the inception of the organization (Zedillo, 2005). When reality, the veto is meant to be used in ensuring balanced viewpoint and inclusiveness in all matters that pertains to global peace and security; and by ensuring that all parties are agreed and carried along before any major decision can be reached.
5.2 CONCLUSION

The reform of the Security Council represents a major challenge for the United Nations. The increase of the number of permanent members of the Council, improving on the transparency of its decision-making and ensuring equitable representation of all UN member-states on the Council are just some of the issues surrounding the reform. The addition of new non-permanent members that was not discussed in this essay due to the lack of space is another issue of considerable importance. The consensus on the necessity of the reform has been reached and, thus, the idea is not hopeless. Some reform proposals are workable, though many issues remain controversial. Moreover, the legitimacy of the UN as an international organization is still quite considerable.

It should not be forgotten that the United Nations is an institution created by its members, as is the Security Council. Therefore, reinforcing the legitimacy of the UN will only be possible if the member-states are determined to commit to the reform. It is the commitment of member-states and particularly of the permanent members of the Council that will likely decide the future of the UN Security Council in the years to come.

Established as one of the principle organs of the United Nations (UN), the Security Council bears the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (Malone, 2007:117). The Council’s mandate, outlined further in Article 24 of the Charter, coupled with its ability to make legally binding decisions, makes the Security Council arguably the most powerful organ of the UN. The Council has retained its importance in international relations and is arguably of increased importance as a result of heightened international co-operation in the post-Cold War era (Malone, 2007). The lack of reform since its creation, has however led to doubts over the Council’s legitimacy and effectiveness in contemporary politics. Commentators have referred to its lack of reform as
'one of the most successful failures in the history of the United Nations’ (Terraviva, 2009). The most commonly debated areas for reform revolve around the veto power, the size of the Council and in the event of an enlargement, the powers and selection of new members.

Currently, the Security Council is comprised of five permanent members, referred to as the P-5, and ten non-permanent members, each elected for a two-year term. In addition to having a permanent seat on the Council, Article 27 of the UN Charter grants the P-5 a veto power. Reform of the Council requires support from two-thirds of the General Assembly and all of the P-5. Whilst reform is not impossible, as seen by the successful 1965 reform that enlarged the Council from eleven to fifteen members, consensus on necessary reform is hard to achieve.

With a seat of the Council seen as ‘a proxy for global influence on peace and security issues’ (Malone, 2007) competition for the ten non-permanent seats is high. The size of the Council is therefore a key concern for member states. With the Italian delegation pointing out that 77 countries have never had a seat on the Council and 47 have sat just once, questions over the Council’s size have been raised (Knight, 2002: 24-25). This disparity is due to the fact that, having increased in size just once since its formation, the size of the council is no longer proportionate to the size of the General Assembly. At its formation, the number of member states compared to seats at the Council was 11 to 51, representing a ratio of 1 to 4.6. In spite of the increase in the number of seats on the Council from eleven to fifteen, the dramatic increase in the General Assembly, largely as a result of decolonisation and the breakup of the Soviet Union, has seen this ratio increase, reaching 1 to 12 (Peterson, 2007:106).
The significant increase in the number of States in the General Assembly indicates that enlarging the Council is a necessary reform. Enlarging the Council, however, must not hinder efficiency (Global Policy Forum, 2010). The majority of proposals for an increased Council have therefore varied between the low to high twenties. Proposals such as ‘In Larger Freedom’ and ‘Uniting for Consensus’ for example, recommended an increase to 24 and 25 seats respectively, aiming to enhance ‘both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the Council’ (Global Policy Forum, 2010:1).

Whilst referred to as ‘the apex body of the United Nations’ (Knight, 2002) the Council’s current composition is no longer representative of the values of the General Assembly. Formed in the aftermath of World War II, the Council’s composition has not adapted to reflect contemporary political realities, notably decolonisation. The stagnant nature of the Council in turn undermines its legitimacy. Social institutions derive their power from their perceived legitimacy. This means that a reformed Council ‘will find compliance with its rules more easily secured than in the absence of legitimacy’ (Knight, 2002:24). Unlike the large consensus that surrounds calls for the increased size of the Council, plans such as ‘In Larger Freedom’ that call for an increase in permanent members have led to fierce debate. Vocal calls for inclusion as permanent members of an increased Council have largely come from the G4 countries, Africa Group and developing countries.

The G4 members states, in particular Japan and Germany, the second and third largest financial contributors to the Council respectively, argue their case for permanent membership on the grounds of Article 23 (1) of the Charter. The Article states that selection to the Council must take into account the country’s commitment to the ‘maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization’ and ‘geographical distribution’ (Global Policy Forum, 2010:1). This argument is supported by advocates of the functionalist
perspective such as Schwartzberg, in what he refers to as the ‘entitlement quotient’ for entry into the Council (knight, 2002: 27). Under a functionalist framework, such as Schwartzberg’s, Japan for example would be a more favourable candidate than Nigeria. Whilst Japan contributes more to the UN, this approach does not take into account the fact that Japan has a 4.91 trillion dollar economy and that an Asian country is already a member of the P-5. Nigeria on the other hand is Africa’s most populous country and although home to the most UN members, no African country has a permanent seat at the Council. Whilst taking a more literal approach to Article 23 (1), a purely functionalist perspective places too much emphasis on the financial capabilities and neglects geographic distribution.

The financial requirement of the functionalist perspective also gives preference to developed countries, therefore ensuring the continued underrepresentation of the developing world. It is important to note that the majority of population growth is occurring in the developing world with predictions that in fifty years, the populations of India, Pakistan, China, Indonesia and Nigeria will exceed four billion (knight, 2002). Representation by region would minimize this disparity and give increased geo-political legitimacy to the Council by rewarding both contribution and ensuring regional representation.

The existence of the veto power is possibly the most contentious feature of the Council. Whilst arguably an inevitable reaction to the failure of the League of Nations, the P-5 no longer represents the great powers in international relations. The two-tiered structure of the Council reinforces the notion that “some states are more equal than others”, resulting in entrenched institutional elitism within the UN whilst ‘a splendidly egalitarian idea’ (Kennedy and Russett, 1995: 56-71). To abolish the veto, with the P-5 eager to “cling fiercely to their veto privileges and reform requiring unanimous P-5 support”, debate surrounding the abolition or expansion of the veto is largely redundant (Terraviva, 2009:1).
However, reforming the veto is unlikely. We strongly conclude that enlarging and altering the composition of the Council would significantly increase its legitimacy and ensure it remains of contemporary relevance. Although a country’s contribution to the Council is important, the exponential growth of the developing world indicates that regional representation in an enlarged Council is imperative to ensure legitimacy.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Still, the mantra of Security Council reform has been so often and widely repeated that a failure to try to enlarge the Council would further promote the image of the United Nations as a hopelessly ossified security organization. Moreover, failure to act could alienate Germany and Japan, both of whose sustained financial support and potentially significant peacekeeping contributions are of considerable importance.

On the basis of the findings made above in the study we therefore make the following suggestions:

1. The member states of the G4 and the African groups should come together and harmonise their interests and demands to have a common front at the General Assembly, for their demand to secure the required votes at the assembly when the need arises.

2. The African Union need to put its house in order and select a candidate for the proposed permanent seat that they propose and struggle for in the UNSC if they wish the world community to take them seriously.

3. Each of the contestants should go back to its region and try as much as possible especially Brazil, India and Nigeria to lobby the member states in those regions to support their bid for permanent seats even if it means granting them concessions.
4. There is also the need for the third world countries to reinvigorate the now moribund Non-Aligned Movement and use it as a veritable mechanism in forcing the so-called P5 to reform and enlarge the membership of the UN Security Council.
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