NIGERIA - UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OIL RELATIONS IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to God Almighty, and to my beloved family, Mrs. Biobelemoye K Sawari, and my precious children, Emmanuella Ayebaye Sawari, Sylvia Ayebaye Sawari, Kevin A. Ayebaye Sawari and Josephine Muna Ayafa.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title page - - - - - - - - - - i
Approval page - - - - - - - - - - ii
Dedication - - - - - - - - - - iii
Acknowledgement - - - - - - - - - - iv
Table of content - - - - - - - - - - v
Abstract - - - - - - - - - - vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION - - - - - 1
1.1 Background Of Study - - - - - - 1
1.2 Statement Of Problem - - - - - - 3
1.3 Objective Study - - - - - - 5
1.4 Significance Of The Study - - - - - 5
1.5 Literature Review - - - - - - 6
1.6 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - 14
1.7 Research Hypotheses - - - - - - 17
1.8 Methodology - - - - - - 17
References - - - - - - 19

CHAPTER TWO: THE GULF OF GUINEA AND ITS STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE - - - 23
2.1 The Geographical Location of the Gulf Of Guinea - - 23
2.2 Strategic Economic Significance - - - - - - 24
2.3 Political Significance - - - - - - 26
2.4 Commercial Significance - - - - - - 27
2.5 Nigeria’s Strategic Significance in the Gulf Of Guinea - 27
References - - - - - - 29

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA U.S RELATIONS - - - - - 31
3.1 Dynamics of Nigeria-US Relations - - - - - 31
# 3.2 Determinant of US Interest in Relations with Nigeria - 33
# 3.3 Determinants of Nigeria-US Relations - - - 34
# References - - - - - - 42

**CHAPTER FOUR: NIGERIA-U.S ENERGY SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA - 44**

# 4.1 Nigeria’s Energy Security in the Gulf Of Guinea - - 44
# 4.2 U.S Energy Securities in the Gulf Of Guinea - - 46
# 4.3 U.S Military Activities in the Gulf Of Guinea - - 48
# 4.4 Convergent Energy Security Interest in the Gulf Of Guinea 51
# References - - - - - - 53

**CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS - - - 55**

# 5.1 Summary of Findings - - - - - - 55
# 5.2 Conclusion - - - - - - 60
# 5.3 Recommendations - - - - - - 62

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**
The collapse of the strategic oil relationship between the U.S and the Middle East suppliers brought the Gulf of Guinea and the Niger Delta into a high profile global energy partnership. The strategic shift had developed as a form of buffer or counter weight against the insecurity of supply in the Persian Gulf. This study, therefore explores the rise of the Gulf of Guinea and Niger Delta as strategic partners. It illustrates the character of strategic or resource – rich region and the security challenges orchestrated by the attempts to protect and subsequently explore these resources. Predicated on Immanuel Wallerstein World System Theory which reveals that the direct consequences of capitalist drive for raw materials such as oil, market and profit often engender violence, the study illustrates the character of strategic oil resource – rich region and the security challenges orchestrated by attempts to protect and explore these resources. Our method of data collection is qualitative technique. We made use of secondary sources of data. In our method of data analysis we adopt the qualitative descriptive analysis. The study hypothesizes a causal relationship between crisis in the Niger Delta and the increase in U.S military presence or deployment in the region. It concludes that the resort to naked force for the protection of oil infrastructure and installations by the Nigerian State and the U.S has ignited crises and attendant deaths in the region. Finally, the study suggests addressing observable contradictions in the system engendered by oil wealth and distributive politics. This calls for the strengthening of the security institutions and policies of the Nigerian State to ensure strict adherence to global best practices in security considerations, good governance and the development of a comprehensive national security strategic plan that would holistically address the main security challenges facing the country and the region.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Nigeria has vast oil reserves and oil is currently seen as a “strategic commodity”. As a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the sixth highest oil exporting nation in the world, Nigeria has long perceived itself and by others as a potential force for regional stability and development in Africa (Nwackukwu, 1960).

During the Cold War, the United States viewed Africa as a major battle ground with the Soviet Union. As a result, it poured billions of dollars in economic and military aid into the continent. After the collapse of communism, American interest in Africa waned. In 1995, a Pentagon report concluded that the United States had “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa”. Incidentally, as the Middle East region becomes more volatile, the Nigeria oil industry gained increasing attention of the Bush Administration as it aimed to diversify the U.S oil imports.

The Bush Administration’s national energy policy, released on May 2005, predicted that West Africa would become “one of the fastest growing sources of oil and gas for the American market (Onuoha, 2005). Paul Michael Wihbey of Washington Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies described West Africa as “an area of vital US interest” in his testimony before Congress. He proposed the creation of a new South Atlantic military command that would “permit the US Navy and Armed Forces to more easily project power to defend America’s interests and allies in West Africa” (Klare, 2006). The September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre heightened American attention to Africa, with national security planners urging that the United States should diversify her strategic oil interest in the Middle East.
To make the matter worst, Klare (2006) revealed that oil is now a matter of national security to the United States. According to him, oil is not just a commodity that could be bought and traded on international markets but a strategic commodity, a commodity that bears on the survival of nations.

President Carter in 1980 formally declared access to oil a matter of national security. The “Carter Doctrine” implied that the United States is prepared to use force to protect her access to that vital resource. Carter followed up his doctrine by announcing the formation of what became the US Central Command, originally called the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1983. The purpose of the Command was to protect the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. This shows that the use of military force to protect the flow of oil has been institutionalized in the U.S Defence policy.

In the wake of the September 11th 2001 attack and the consequent US government – led war on Iraqi, Nigeria’s geo-political significance to the United States has come into sharper relief. The geo-strategic relation between the United States and Nigeria was significantly affected or influenced by the tragedy of September 11, 2001. One of the effects and consequences of the United States response in the wake of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre, is the current shift of the United States strategic oil interest in the Middle East to the Gulf of Guinea with Nigeria as a king pin (Kanisteriner, 2002).

It is significant to note that before the September 11, 2001 incidence, the strategic oil relations between the Gulf of Guinea countries – Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote’d Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo – generally and Nigeria in particular and the United States have not been very strong (Gerlach, 2008).
This was mainly because the major oil exporters from the Middle East, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia, were politically stable and oil supplies to the United States were secured. However, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the situation began to change. The United States, feeling in secured, started to look up for alternative sources of oil and the Gulf of Guinea States “emerge as the new Gulf”, “the vital partners”, in U.S national securities. Interestingly, in view of its new strategic significance, the Gulf of Guinea now receives better Western (United States) attention. Big American oil companies like Exxon-Mobil and Chevron-Texaco have started to invest heavily in the region’s oil sector amidst major competitors from China (China Petroleum Corporation), Dutch (Dutch National Corporation) and France (Total Fina, Elf-Aquitaine). Consequently, predictions by the United States National Intelligence Council reveal that about 25 percent of the United States oil import may come from this region, mainly from Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea by 2015 (Servant, 2003).

The worrisome aspect of the above development is that while Nigeria emerges as a major source of crude oil supplies to the United States, the Niger Delta region where majority of these oil installations are located is boiling with insecurity orchestrated by discontent arising from the neglect of the area by the Nigerian State and their foreign compradors. As a result, oil pipelines are vandalized and supply disrupted. Currently, some restive youths are kidnapping expatriates oil workers and blocking supply lines in protest of the abject conditions in the Niger Delta. These actions constantly threaten mining operations in the area with dare consequences on the global strategic oil relations. In the face of the mounting restiveness, the American government and its Nigerian counterpart have resorted to joint military security operations in the area. The United States Navy had increased its presence in the area by maintaining vigil in the Gulf of Guinea. It has also
been donating boats and helicopters to the Nigerian Navy (Adogambe, 2006).

Consequently, Nigerian Government security operatives are common sigh in the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta and this has resulted in the militarization of the region. This has also led to human rights violations which engendered more hostilities against the Nigerian State and the multinational oil companies.

This no doubt, poses severe risks, not only to global oil supplies, but also to Nigeria and the entire Gulf of Guinea. Against this background, this study investigates the Nigeria – U.S. strategic oil relations in the Gulf of Guinea with a view to highlighting the challenges and the prospect. The interface between the US government pursuit of energy security as well as her military presence in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigerian internal security will particularly come under detailed examination.

1.2 Statement of Problem

Nigeria-US strategic oil relations alternatively imply that there is increasing US demand for Nigeria’s oil which generate over $9 billion in favour of Nigeria (Lyman, 1988, Ate, 1986). The United States is the world’s largest consumer of energy and it is indicated that by 2020 U.S oil consumption will increase by 33 percent (National Energy Policy, 2006). Accordingly, Nigeria annual production is expected to rise from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2005 to as much as 5 million barrels per day in 2020 (IMF 2006). Achieving these unprecedented out put level, however, requires extending and deepening democratic governance across Nigeria and strengthening internal security in the Niger Delta.

A critical component of the American energy policy is the shift of its supply focus from the turbulent Middle East to other areas, especially the Gulf of Guinea where Nigeria (the leading producer), Equatorial Guinea,
Sao Tome and Principe, Cote’d Ivoire, Gabon and Angola are estimated to contribute about 25 percent of oil export to the US. This shift is as a result of the crisis in the enforcement of democratic culture in place of theocratic system. More so, the strong attachment the Middle East countries have on OPEC, the anti-Jews and anti-American sentiments have fundamentally caused a crack on America-Arab relations.

The reality is that while U.S responses to the September 11 have been to wage war on Iraq and Afghanistan under the banner of protecting national security and as well wean itself off oil import from the Middle East, the United States is also engaged in an equally strategic battle target oil reserves South of the Sahara (Gulf of Guinea). The large part of supply problems caused by the Niger Delta insurgency and the wholesale theft of oil, U.S import from Nigeria has dropped. Nigeria’s maximum production capacity of about 3.5 million barrels per day, was seriously affected (Goldwyn, 2008). According to the Energy Information Administration, [EIA] (2009), the United States imported 13.9 million barrels of oil from Nigeria in February 2009, making Nigeria the Seventh largest supplier to the United States. This compared with the importation of 29.7 million barrels in February 2008. Also, insurgents have reduce Nigeria’s oil output significantly through attacks on oil infrastructure and stealing directly from oil pipelines for sale on both licit and illicit markets, in a process known as “bunkering” (Ukiwo, 2007). Nigeria’s oil output, declined by 2499 thousand barrels per day in 2005 to 2061 thousand barrels per day in 2009 (BP. 2010), the decline in large part attributed to militant attacks. Such attacks have direct repercussion on the global energy market. The attacks in 2008 by militants on off-share platform and a pipeline in the Delta, 340,000 barrels of crude oil were removed from Nigeria’s output (The Economist, 28th June 2008). Insecurity in the Niger Delta, therefore, not just a problem
for the Nigerian government; it is a serious problem in the United States national security.

As already indicated above, the United States is notorious for using the case of national security to interfere and undermine other nation’s national security, particularly those of the developing countries. By this action of the United States, it has shown that when it comes to protecting her needs and interests, the U.S will stop at nothing to achieve her interest. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to investigate the future of Nigeria and Niger Delta in relation to the U.S strategic interest in the Gulf of Guinea.

The extensive review of related literature, it is obvious that scholars are yet to address the critical issues in strategic oil interest, particularly the challenges and prospects of U.S increased appetite for Nigeria’s oil and the endemic crisis in the Niger Delta. More importantly scholars are yet to critically analyze the implication of the U.S government pursuit of oil security as well, her military presence in the Gulf of Guinea. Therefore, this study has been designed to fill the vacuum in the literature.

In the light of the above, this study is guided by the following research questions.

1. Does the U.S pursuit of oil security in the Gulf of Guinea compatible with Nigerian security interest?
2. Does the U.S military presence in the Gulf of Guinea poses threat to Nigeria’s internal security?
3. Does the wake of the U.S military presence in the Gulf of Guinea increase violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta?

1.3 Objective of Study

This study has broad and specific objective. With respect to the broad objective, this study examines Nigeria – US strategic oil relations in the
Gulf of Guinea. Specifically the study intends to achieve the understated objective.

Specifically this work wants to investigate.

(a) To ascertain whether the U.S pursuit of oil security in the Gulf of Guinea compatible with Nigeria’s security interest.

(b) To find out whether the US military presence in the Gulf of Guinea poses a threat to Nigeria’s internal security.

(c) To find out whether the U.S military presence in the Gulf of Guinea increases violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta and Nigeria as a whole.

1.4 Significance of Study

This study has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, the study contributes in its modest form to the existing literature on the United States interest in control of oil, the politics and security of oil producing communities and states of the Niger Delta as case study. This study is therefore significant in attempting to fill the gap on Western strategic oil interest in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigerian national security.

Practically so doing, policy makers would be abreast of the teeming security challenges in the region, and enunciate strategic policies and informed decisions of common benefits of all participating countries within the Gulf of Guinea oil project.
1.5 Literature Review

A study of this nature can not be completed without the review of related literatures on the subject matter since effective research much be founded upon previous knowledge.

According to Sellitiz (1976) said, “the essence of literature review is to ensure that issues are not duplicated and this is one of the simplest ways of economizing efforts in an enquiry to ensure that review are built on works already done by others”. Therefore this part of the study presents a review of related literatures under the following headings:

1. The meaning of strategic
2. The nature of strategic regions and
3. The Gulf of Guinea as a strategic region

1.5.1 The Meaning of Strategic

Several efforts had been made in attempting the meaning of strategic. But in view of the scope of this study we attempt the meaning of strategic as follows.

The word “Strategic” is an adjectival derivative of the word strategy. The term strategy refers to as the planning and directing of military operations during war as different from ‘tactics’, which is the actual movement of troops on the battle field. Thus strategy is the skilful planning and management of any thing. From the above submissions therefore, we can extrapolate that the concept of strategy can better be comprehended when it is related to specific variable and cases. Thus we can have strategic interest, strategic planning, strategic location and even strategic materials or resources. Deriving from the above, we can thus see strategy as a military term used precisely to describe the ground plan for winning a war. The nature of strategy as a broad approach to winning a war is emphasized in a definition offered by Brigadier, Hayward (1975: 10) when he argue strategy
as the “plans for conducting a war in the widest sense including diplomatic, political and economic considerations as well as purely military nature”. However, today business studies, and other disciplines like international relations studies have adopted the word strategy and it has fast become of common usage.

In the business studies discipline strategy has come to mean a unifying force behind the company’s efforts to deploy means to achieve ends. For instance James (1992) sees strategy as the pattern or plan that integrates an organization’s major goals, policies and actions sequence into a cohesive whole.

Contributing further on the expanding meaning of strategy from purely military term to include political considerations, Foster (2006) defined strategy as the planning and integration of the war making potentials of the state with the larger political and economic ends. He contended that “strategic actions are geared towards the domination of a whole geographical region. Moving further, he argued that strategy represents the marriage of the ends and means and is the very antithesis of crisis management. According to him, strategy seeks to forestall crises which tend to be catastrophic out growth of unanticipated events. This has special relationship to the Gulf of Guinea and the pursuit of U.S interest in the region as it shows that strategic actions are not only overt military actions.

The public sector is important to the survival of any society. According to Bryson (1993) refers to strategic planning as “a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that will shape and guide the leaders on what to do and why it should be done”. He concluded by arguing that in state craft, strategic planning is designed to help leaders and decision – makers think and act strategically.

Also writing on policy and strategic studies, Aja (1999) argued that strategy is the use of appropriate means to achieve policy objectives within
a set time and at a minimum cost possible. He concluded by saying that strategic decision involves the use of military force (grand strategy) to achieve national defence and national security.

Expatiating on the above view, Al Mashet (1988) argued that a careful glance at the concept of national security will reveal that it is concerned with the strategic (military) aspects of the nation state goals and competitions for sovereignty and economic development.

Also contributing further, Robert (1988) argued that strategic definition of national security conceives it in terms of abstract values cum phenomena concerned mainly and primarily with the preservation of independence and sovereignty, the maintenance of the flow of vital economic resources and other non–military aspects of nation functions; a view of the use of the term strategy (strategic) in military, corporate, development and important aspects of strategy.

Writing on strategic resources, Mac-Ogonor (2003) seems to agree with those views when he opined that in International relations, nations search or plan for strategic materials or resources, which he named as “oil and gas, uranium, thorium, helium, lithium, for various strategic reasons. He contended that because of their strategic nature, nations struggle to acquire and control as much of these resources as possible and where these resources are not within their boundaries they must necessarily acquire them from other countries even by “force”. He argued further that the quest for strategic raw materials rest on the fact that major high – technology equipment can not be fabricated or powered without them. Their acquisition is therefore synonymous with power. He concluded by saying that this is why most nations, big or medium powers have planned to wage war to ensure or take advantage of these strategic resources or materials even at a high cost.
Mac-Ogonor (2003) also in another insightful contribution on strategic location observed that some nations naturally endowed and as such occupy more “strategically important geographical positions than others. He specifically mentioned such advantageous positions to include such geographical configuration as access and control of key water – ways, mineral resources, demographic resource of population and climatic factors. He contended that the control of the strategically, important narrow water–ways of the peninsula and strait of Gibralter are crucial to great powers status. He concluded that as these principal sea routes had become the major internal and international communication links to the whole world, they are therefore important to great power status. Accordingly, the Panama Canal, Suer, Canad, Straits of Malachi are all typical example of these all important “Choke Print” that nations struggle to control to their advantage with serious consequences like wars and death.

1.5.2 The Nature of Strategic Regions

Conspicuous from the above observation is that strategic regions are those geographical regions with either natural endowment of minerals (both solid and gas) or those geographical advantageous countries bordering and controlling the Choke points or narrow water – ways of the world which are essential for communication.

The relationships among capitalism, power and war in the struggle for strategic raw materials have long been noted. Writing on the nature of strategic regions, Mac-Ogonor (2003) noted that the search for these strategic raw materials by the advance capitalist countries in the third world dates back to 1884, the popular scramble and partitioning of Africa. He contended that these search imposed onerous socio-political and economic burdens on the later as strategic regions and the burdens which ranges from human pillage to misery. These ugly experiences, according to him, became
necessary in view of the facts that these countries must be subordinated, dominated and protected from the penetration of act adversaries or contestants. He concluded that the practical manifestation of these struggles for control is suppression, violence and underdevelopment in the strategic regions.

In another interesting contribution on the nature of strategic regions, noting the role of oil and it emergence as a strategic resource. The Economist (Jan, 2003: 1-4) in an insightful but pathetic article, “oil and natural gas in conflicts” writes thus:

Black Gold often brings hardships and misery to societies where it is found, petroleum producing countries are plagued by corrupt and authoritarian governments, developments and violence conflicts. Foreign powers and their huge multinational oil corporation often maneuver for control of the oil fields through clandestine operations or outright military intervention. In addition, disaffected rebels challenge governments with hope of winning a share of the lucrative oil resources. Environment damage try oil extraction can spark off protest movement, which is frequently met by repressions. Boundary disputes between states represent yet another link between oil and violence. As world wide oil and gas production peaks and consumer demand continue to rise, price soar, making conflicts for this increasingly scare resource even more likely in the future.

Writing in like manner Salun (2007) in an article on oil and strategic regions” noted that in contemporary world economy, oil has become one of the determining factors and cynosure of international business. In view of these, investments in the strategic regions both the advanced and underdeveloped nations have been comparatively staggering especially, since the Second World War (1939 -1945). He contended that the existence of oil in an area have become an influential yardstick in internal and international politics. He concluded by saying that this strategic significance
had made all regions, localities or communities bearing oil, to inexorably face the wrath of their governments particularly in the so called third world nations. Citing the Bakassi Peninsula as an area, that has known no respite, politically, socio-economically and even culturally; because through a stroke of providence, oil and other valuable solid minerals and natural resources have been discovered in its vicinities. He further contended that Bakassi Peninsula, South Eastern Nigeria and far South Western Cameroon was a calm, quite steeping unpopular territory until oil was discovered there and soon after this, the situation has changed.

Contributing further on the sudden rise of the Bakassi Peninsula to international recognition and the horrible experiences, Salanu (2007) argued that the discovery of oil on this land instead of becoming a blessing to the aborigines of the land has on the contrary brought the governments of Nigeria and the Cameroon to the brink of war, an imminent hostility which took the two sisters neighbouring black nations as far as the international court of justice, popularly known as “World Court”, in the Hague. He concluded by saying that the bone of contention was as usual, which of the two sisters state takes possession of the oil – rich Peninsula as against and definitely not, who takes care of the socio-economic well being of the natives and residents.

George (2001) in an interesting view on the Katanga region in the extreme Southeast of the Congo Basin, argued that this region is undoubtedly one of the world greatest actual and potential mineral producing areas with almost unparallel richness and abundance in ores of coppers, cobalt, radium, gold, diamond, and oil amongst a host of others. He contended that the pathetic story of the region and its people is better imagined that narrated. He lamented on the history of colonization on the country and opined that the gory experience was specifically because of the strategic interest of the major world powers on rare metals in Congo. He
impressively argues that since World War II, when Congolese uranium was used to produce the first ever atomic weapons, the United States has found for itself a major stake in Congo. He concluded by saying that the Great Diamond fields are the only permanent interest of the multinational conglomerate, which in the mean time wars and wars unending reduce the country to mere rubbles.

In another impressive contribution on the strategic region Mac-Ogonor (2003) argues that the Middle East is one of such region because it links Europe, Africa and Asia. He further argues that for Britain, this area and especially the Suez Canal had traditionally been the life line of its old empire and it represents common wealth. He also contended that before the discovery of the North Sea oil reserves, without oil from the Middle East; European civilization would have collapsed. To the United States as he argued, resolution of conflicts in this area had been the major plank of its “foreign policy”. He cited President Jiminy Carter who said “let our position be absolutely clear, an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States of America and such assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. The import of this implies violence on the people of the region.

The index for Censorship (1997) in its introductory article “the high price of oil” argues that the quest for oil goes on regardless of the rights of the indigenous people, the destruction of the virgin forest and the murderous habits of dictators or the pollution of the earth. It concluded by saying that in Baju, or Tulsa, Riyadh of Jakarta, the petroleum industry is interested in the political and strategic interests of the West rather than concerns and the well being of the population. And that in these areas the people are suffering from the effects of civil wars which have cut deep into the fabric of their daily lives.
In the same vein and even more, the Caspian region, represent a veritable example of non OPEC strategic region to the Western Countries. It is reputed not only for being the second largest sources of oil and gas after the Middle East but also as a fulcrum of strategic conflicts like its Middle East counterparts. Reserves estimates suggest that the Caspian Basin could produce 3.05 million barrels of oil per day by 2011 and that its three principal producers; Azerbazan, Fukmenistan and Kazakhstan are strongly linked to the European hydrocarbon markets by a net-work of pipeline crisscrossing Russia.

Oliver (1997) also argues that this region is a Cockpit of hostilities, duplicity and distrust. He strongly argued that in the United States four of regional super powers such as, Russia and Iran and its open intransigent opposition to any cooperation with Iran, the compelling issues here are more of strategic than ideology. He concluded on the note that the pipeline terminal and ports have become festering sore in the security land scape of the East and Russia in particular and shall continue to define the security challenges in the region.

Also writing on the nature of strategic region, Watmsley (1997) said that the story is the same with the Amazon region. She argues that until Texaco arrived to drill the first oil wells, the Oriente, Ecuador’s Amazon Jungle was in accessible, its indigenous people living virtually undisturbed for centuries. According to her, this quietness was broken when oil pipeline brought roads to the poor Andeans encouraged by what the Ecuador’s government call “Living frontiers policy”. She added that the problem of the region started when the oil companies, the “Colonos” as they are called, cut thousands of acres of farm lands for their operation thereby alienating the people from their land. She opined that the invasion had been disastrous for the indigenous people of the Oriente. In the same vein she lamented the ugly experiences of the Socoya indigenes arguing that they were the worst hit by
the oil development in the Ecuador Amazon region. She persuasively asserted that because of the effects of oil pollution in the area some indigenous populations have been wipe out and some like the Cofans have had their numbers drastically reduced. She contended that it is oil production in the Oriente that funds more than half the Ecuador’s Government Budget. Consequently in only 25 years of operation the entire region had been opened up to the oil industry. She concluded in a rather sad note that since the discovery and subsequent development of oil in 1967, the booming oil industry had operated with virtually no environmental and public health regulation. This situation according to her had continued for 20 years with no one outside noticing that millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the rainforest with concomitant health hazard.

Coming home to the Niger Delta as an oil producing region, and writing on the ugly experience of the states in the Niger Delta region, Salanu (2007) argues that in view of the strategic significance of this region to the Nigerian States laws outlawing the rights of ownership of land resources, freedom of expression and of opinion, as well as, protests among others, tyrannical polices were promulgated to ensure that oil bearing communities and the complaints are kept silent. He concluded by saying that the militarization embraced by the youths and the military repression of the Federal Government, are natural outcome of these sad developments that have aggravated the plight of the region and the people.

One thing that is common to all the above oil bearing regions, states, or communities is the abject poverty and attendant crisis and underdevelopment.

1.5.3 The Gulf of Guinea as a Strategic Region

As the United States search for new ways to reduced its reliance on the Middle East oil, suppliers from Latin America, Central Asia and in
particular from the Gulf of Guinea will take on centre stage. The interesting
thing to us is that the Gulf of Guinea had taking on a new strategic
significance. Although, a long time provider of oil to the United States only
in the last few years had the Guild of Guinea region been accorded a first –
rate strategic status in global energy architecture by the United States.

In a groundbreaking work on the strategic importance of the Gulf of
Guinea to the West and to America in particular, Pitman (2002) asserted that
as America tries to ease to dependence on the volatile Middle East oil, West
African oil (Gulf of Guinea) appears on the front and centre stage. He
described the Gulf of Guinea oil a light and sweet and contended that with
burgeoning 4.5 million barrels of oil (led by Nigeria). The Gulf of Guinea
currently supplies about 15 per cent of America’s oil. He also emphasized
that there are indications that this might increased to 25 percent by 2015. He
concluded that in the next five years 1 – 3 out of every five new barrels of
oil in the global market will come from the Gulf of Guinea and that this will
attract about $330 billion worth of investment to the region with 40 per cent
of it from American companies.

In the same manner, but with more optimism on the burgeoning
importance of the Gulf of Guinea, Walter Kansteiner, America’s Secretary
of State on Foreign Affairs in 2001 said thus “African oil (Gulf of Guinea)
is of national strategic interest to us and it will increase sand become more
important as well move forward”.

It is also worthy of interest to note that the strategic significance of
the Gulf of Guinea had transcends economic considerations. In a related
work and on the political importance of this region, Matthew (2004) noted
that the Gulf of Guinea offers some political advantage than other regions
because there are few known terrorist outfits in the waters of West Africa
that is with enormous amount of oil. He asserted that the Gulf of Guinea
possess an estimated 80 billion barrels of oil which is about 18 percent of
the world’s total crude reserves. He conclude that the 16 percent U.S oil imports from this region is expected to leap-frog to 25 percent by 2015, thereby making African oil a priority for U.S national strategic interest.

It is also significant to note that the Gulf of Guinea location along the major sea-lanes of the world also makes it a strategic region. Emphasizing on the strategic location of the Gulf of Guinea, the United States Congress man, Williams Jefferson impressively said “the Gulf of Guinea in all strategic assessment is the best”. He contended that in all consideration, West African countries appears as the best partners because the Gulf of Guinea is located closer to Europe and therefore it is easier to move the products. He concluded by saying that these assessments are true because in West Africa “oil resources in most cases are not land-locked and therefore things usually work well if you are out in deep waters”.

In the same vein, but on a demographic dimension, the Africa Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) in a report to the House of Representative African Sub-Committee in 2002, said the Gulf of Guinea oil Basin in West Africa is of greater Western interest, with its attendant market of 25 million people located astride key sea lane of communications, it is a vital interest in U.S national security calculations.

Writing in an interesting and comprehensive fashion, a recently declassified U.S Department of Defence Conference on the strategic nature of the Gulf of Guinea declared thus:

West Africa is a serving production region that allows oil companies to leverage production capabilities to met the fluctuating world demands. West African oil is of high quality is easily accessed offshore, and is well positioned to supply the North American market. Production in two major oil producing states (Nigeria and Angola) is expected to double or triple in the next 5 – 10 years. Already Nigeria and Angola provide as much oil to the United States as Venezuela or Mexico, making it of strategic importance (DDC, 2003:29).
The strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinean to the West and America particularly, is no longer in doubt stressing on the strategic importance. Max Gbanite (2004), did not mince words when he stress that this region has become the most active exploration and production zone for oil and gas in the African continent and possibly in the world. He buttress on the studies carried out by U.S groups indicated that the Gulf of Guinea’s oil bearing Basin will surpass the person Gulf in oil supplies to the United State by almost a ratio of 3:1. And the region also surpasses the Gulf of Mexico with potentials reserves. Moreover, its also have important strategic solid and natural minerals such as cobalt, chromium, uranium, titanium diamonds, gold, bauxite, copper, phosphate, manganese and fisheries to say the least. All these identified resources are considered to be of strategic importance to the United States and given the fact that the unstable political environment in the Middle East is worsening the U.S will do every thing necessary to protect its interest in this region without apology. Conclusively, the Gulf of Guinea strategic importance to the Western Nations and that of the United States in particular of course can not be without some implications.

The Gap

From the extensive review of related literature it is obvious that scholars are yet to address the critical issues in strategic oil interest, particularly the challenges and prospects of U.S increased appetite for Nigeria’s oil and the endemic crisis in the Niger Delta. More importantly scholars are yet to critically analyze the implication of the U.S government pursuit of oil security as well, her military presence in the Gulf of Guinea. Therefore, this study has been designed to fill the gap in the literature.
1.6 Theoretical Framework

Our study is based on the Immanuel Wallerstein World System Theory. Immanuel Wallerstein world system theory was developed in the 1970s. Other proponents of this theory includes; Christopher Chase Dunn, Voker Bornschier, Janet Abu Lughod, Thomas D. Hall, Kunibert Raffer, Theotonio dos Santos. The Immanuel Wallerstein World System Theory offers an explanation for the socio-economic behaviour of countries in a world system. Wallerstein’s argument is that all social phenomena in the world could be understood using the world system theory.

According to Wallerstein, the world capitalist system is propelled by international capitalism, which is a system of production for sale in the market for profit maximization and the appropriation of this profit based on the individual ownership of the means of production. Wallerstein believes that this system emerges in the fifteen century in Europe, following the crisis of the feudal system, and expanded to cover the entire world-globalization-creating the centre and the peripheries. He noted that the centres are the advanced or industrialized countries of the West, while the peripheries are the other countries including the underdeveloped countries of Africa.

He argued that behind this seemingly relentless process of expansion and subsequent incorporation has been the ceaseless accumulation of capital, which is the embodiment of capitalism. From these peripheries, surplus economic gains are reaped off, even through force, for the advancement of the centre to the detriment of the former. Immanuel Wallerstein has thus asserted that, International capitalism, having incorporated these peripheral nations into its capital vortex must also mould the social and economic structure to conform to its requirement for profit maximization. The natural outcomes of this are therefore, crises, underdevelopment and insecurity. This theory helps in the understanding
that the United States strategic oil interest in the Gulf of Guinea is a form of capitalist expansion in search for profit, raw materials and market for finished goods. This must remind us of the 19th century scramble and partitioning of Africa which, the legacies are still with us till date-crises and underdevelopment in the third world countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia.

Therefore, it is no doubt that the present spates of violence in the Niger Delta are informed by these capitalist expansion tendencies. Capitalist expansion has always relied on militarism which has been institutionalized in the US defence policy. We need to remember the roles violence played since the beginning of the expansion in the 1100s through the era of European State formation, to conquest and plunder of non-European societies and down to the present (The Envoy, Thur, August 28, 2007). The current phase of capitalist expansion is not different; we need to remember that globalization and militarism are actually two sides of the same coin. Maintaining the processes and ensuring its reproduction requires violence and ultimately war while on the other hand it fuelled the means to wage war by protecting and promoting the military industries needed to produce sophisticated weaponry.

The establishment of African Command (AFRICOM) is alleged to deepen the agenda, militarization of energy security. The particular implementation of the ambitious AFRICOM agenda feed directly into the consequences that the apparent militarization of energy security is having for the Niger Delta. Instead of dedicating resources to the developmental goals envisaged in the palling stages of AFRICOM, security assistance and arms transfers characterized the organization’s engagements with Nigeria. Indeed, arms transfers to African countries have increased since AFRICOM was established, from $8.3 million of transfers in 2009 to $25.6 million in 2010, in a budget for AFRICOM that does not appear to include money set
aside for development projects. Nigeria alone received arms shipments of $1.3 million as well as receiving surplus speedboats from U.S Coastguard and increased finance for military training (Volman, 2010; 2009).

However, the Niger Delta crisis is the result of complex interactions between a number of causal factors, involving exclusionary political structure, an inequitable economic structure within Nigeria and unaddressed grievances relating to social deprivation and environmental degradation. As Idemudia and Ite (2006: 402) argued that:

… any genuine attempt at resolving the crisis must address the root causes of the conflict that arose from structural deficiencies, proximate and trigger causes that are due to systematic anomalies within Nigerian society addressing only one issue (e.g. political, social, economic or environmental) would not guarantee peace in the region.

The U.S approach doe not address issue, it instead reinforce the military capacity of the Nigerian state in the name of protecting her National security which actually work against the creation f conditions necessary to end hostilities in the Niger Delta. We must remember that the U.S seeks through its security strategy to establish flexible “defense capability that allows for “rapid intervention in order to keep supply open. As a military strategy, arms sales and transfers, military education and training and military base have form the three major pillars and this has lead to crisis and underdevelopment in Nigeria state.

1.7 Hypotheses

This study will examine the following hypotheses

(1) The U.S pursuit of oil security in the Gulf of Guinea undermines Nigeria’s security interest.
The U.S military presence in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria’s internal security.

The U.S military presence in the Gulf of Guinea increases violence and insecurity in Niger Delta and Nigeria in general.

1.8 Methodology

There is no doubt that the quality of data is inextricably tied to the methods and techniques used for gathering the data. As Lege and Francis (1984) noted, no amount of sophistication with statistical manipulation can overcome deficiencies inherent in data generated by inappropriate instrument. Therefore, our method of data collection is qualitative technique. Qualitative technique in research evaluation involves an in–depth and substantial approach to the study of a given phenomena. Through this method a study is able to intellectually navigate with a study problem most importantly, reflexively or reflexivity evaluating the study work in order to arrive at a plausible meaning (Punch, 2005:9).

To that effect, this study will be evaluating the empirical materials not just literally, but also deconstructing coded information in order to get the best of the materials. It is also through qualitative method bring the analysis to a high level of reflexivity. The evaluation of the analysis will also be important in order to reach a coherent result and conclusion.

To critically evaluate and analyse the issue at stake, we shall adopt the secondary sources of data. This study relies heavily on the secondary sources of data such as textbooks, journals, seminar and conference papers, monographs, magazines and internet. The secondary sources of data is particularly useful in a research, such as ours where information, data and other related statistical issues are already documented in official documents. These are useful for past events and their contents are independent for our own selection (Madge, 1965). More importantly, expressive documents are
capable of identifying the significant variables in a specific problem. In fact, critical utilization of secondary sources of data will help us to determine the trend of scholarly thought and research, and broaden the research base from which specific generalizations and intellectual navigation can be made in the Murky water of Nigeria – United States strategic relations.

To ensure reliability and validity, the use of qualitative descriptive analysis of documents will be rigorously and systematically used in this analysis. This technique will be used in gathering and analyze the diverse materials accumulated in accordance with the scholarly value, authenticity and relevance to the subject matter.
REFERENCE


* B.P. Statistic Review of World Energy June 2010.


The envoy, Thursday, August 28, 2007


CHAPTER TWO

2.0 THE GULF OF GUINEA AND ITS STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

2.1 THE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

The Gulf of Guinea is said to be a large area encompassing twenty three (23) countries, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, (Cape Verge, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote’d Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leon, and Togo and Nigeria (Gabriel Metego, Army War Cull and Carlisle Bar track Pa http://www.stormingmedia,US/17/1748/A174844,htm).

The Gulf of Guinea is been described as that part of the Atlantic South Coast of West Africa, lying on zero degrees longitude and latitude, where the Equator and prime meridian meet. It is argued that the Gulf of Guinea derives its name from the former names of the coasts of Africa. The South coast of West Africa, north of the Gulf of Guinea was historically called “Upper Guinea”, the West Coast of Southern Africa, to the east, was historically called “Lower Guinea”. The name “Guinea” is still attached to the names of three (3) countries in Africa: Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea, as well as New Guinea in Melanesia (The Gulf of Guinea Dec 9,2006). Among the many rivers that drain into the Gulf of Guinea are the Niger, the Volta and the Congo. The coastline on the Gulf includes the Bight of Benin and the Bight of Bonny.

If we are to describe the region in the context of the institutional mechanism for the security of this sub-region, the Gulf of Guinea could also be made to represent the eight West Africa countries namely, Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe (STP) and Republic of Congo (Gbanite,
2004). It is clear that these countries and their strategic significance of the Gulf of Guinea to American and the West generally cannot be underestimated. It is indeed a region of enormous economic benefit to all the stakeholders who for the purpose of security established the “Gulf of Guinea Commission” on July 3, 2001 as an institutional mechanism for peace in the sub-region.

However, for the purpose of this study the Gulf of Guinea is taken as the eleven Coastal countries along the Coastal West of Africa that lie between Ghana and Angola. The sub-region has a coastline of some 5,500 kilometres, roughly the size of the Gulf of Mexico. Each of these countries has its territorial waters, 12 nautical miles from the coast; contiguous economic zones or coastal water, 24 nautical miles from the coast and the exclusive economic zones (EEZ), 200 nautical miles from the coast.

As indicated above, the Gulf of Guinea is a vast and rapidly developing region with a lot of potentials. It has a population of well over three hundred (300) million people living in the regions coastal communities. It incorporates two oceans namely, the Pacific Ocean in the East and the Indian Ocean in the South. These oceans serve as the major communication links, linking the region with the other parts of the world. The vital minerals, energy and fisheries resources of this area have been quite appealing to the Western industrialized powers, U.S. and other countries. Thus, the significance of the Gulf of Guinea is economic cum political and therefore strategic. It is now regarded as one of the World’s top oil and gas hotspots which is the attraction of the U.S.

2.2 STRATEGIC ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE

The Gulf of Guinea as indicated above is a region endowed with mineral resource wealth including oil and gas, fisheries and other solid minerals. The region is also estimated to hold about 80 billion barrels of oil
with about 50 million barrels in deep waters offshore, with 33 fixed crude oil production platform, 20 floating production storage, 13 floaters and off-take vessels, all of which are estimated at several billions of dollars. Considering the importance of this region and speaking on the need for improved security with in the region, Dr. Levi Ajounoma (The GG, Dec 2006) said “this region is expected to host about 159 fixed platforms and 700 oil wells as at 2008 and that any disruption of activities in this area would therefore affect the world’s energy supply. Besides, every additional flow of one million barrels of crude oil from the Gulf is expected to attract about $100 billion fresh investments to the contiguous countries (Nigeria-US Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Initiative. http://www.gasandoil.com/go/new/nta63972.hym). It must be stressed that the Gulf of Guinea region is also estimated to contain about 18 percent of world crude oil reserves, as a further boost to the region’s emerging strategic economic significance”. In this score the region is said to comparatively surpass the Gulf of Mexico potentials reserves (UNCTAD, 2006).

The overall economic significance of the Gulf of Guinea is depicted by former Vice President Chiney in his energy report (2002) thus.

Oil analysis project that a quarter of all the New, non-Persian Gulf oil that comes into the world market over the next five years will come from sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria is expected to raise production over 3 million barrels a day by 2009.

Large oil companies, too, seek opportunities and open markets now unavailable in Middle Eastern states. Oil activities continue to rise and reserve amounts seem only to increase. Numerous companies are flooding the area investing their money, eager to dip their hand into the promise that
lies beneath the soil. “About $52 billion was invested in deepwater African field in 2010, with approximately 32 percent coming from the United States” (Ondo, 2005). However, tapping into the Gulf of Guinea’s oil reserves is not without its challenges. The large deposits are located in areas known as ultra-deep water, currently classified at 5,000 feet of depth, thus extraction is extremely difficult and expensive, challenging for all but large companies (Alexander, 2004). The extremely, the depths also limit the ability to determine the actual number and size of reserves. That being said, forecasts of available crude continue to rise as additional sites are found. In April 1996, the French firm Girassol discovered the first ultra-deep water site, Angola’s Girassol giant oilfield in the Gulf of Guinea (Oliveira, 2004). Within four years, there were 43 additional discoveries, the highest rate of any location in the world (Harbinson and Westwood, 2000). Deep-water oil fields provide the region and potential investors with a distinct advantage over shallow and onshore drilling-a physical location removed from political instability and security issues. Deep offshore sites provide a buffer from regional turmoil. Despite the threat of occasional unstable situations, investors consider the region a politically safe alternative to the radicalized oil exporters in the Middle East. Although members of OPEC, neither Nigeria nor Angola has sought overly restrictive policies to production or development (Oliveira, 2006). As a whole, the region continues to work outside the topical OPEC strategies: production quotas, price fixing, and restricted investment. Another advantage of the Gulf of Guinea oil is its extremely high quality. Crude oil is evaluated through a scale known as API gravity (EIA, 2005). The industry average is 30.2 degrees, while the Gulf of Guinea consistently measures close to 40 degrees, a significant difference (U.S EIA, 2005). This higher API gravity directly translates into reduced refining costs. The level of sulphur in extracted oil is another marker of crude quality, and the region’s reserves contain small amount by
international standards (Ondo, 2005). The potential for continued discoveries of high quality crude oil is extremely likely, spurring interest and development in the region.

The geographical position of the Gulf of Guinea proves extremely favourable to the western oil markets. West Africa’s proximity to Europe and North America provides western consumers a comparative edge through reduced shipping costs. Furthermore, the region “benefit from the absence of narrow shipping lanes,” known as “chokepoints” (Ondo, 2005). In 2007, world oil production totalled approximately 85 billion barrels per day: nearly one-half, or over 43 million barrels, transited through chokepoint (U.S EIA, 2008). The strategic significance of the Gulf of Guinea does not rest on oil alone. Africa now account for 8 percent of the world’s total natural gas reserves, with estimates well over 100 trillion cubic feet under the Gulf of Guinea (U.S EIA, 2005). Consequently, the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S Export-Import Bank are actively pursuing assistance opportunities within the region to bolster production. The Gulf of Guinea is home to large mineral deposits of manganese, iron ore, copper, tin, uranium, Colton, and cobalt. The Gulf region is the second largest producer of a mental called columbine-tantalite, a key component used in the production of cellular phones, satellite telecommunication hardware, and computer microchips (Ondo, 2005). The U.S government identified columbine-tantalite, commonly referred to as colton, as a “strategic and critical” mineral in the Critical Minerals Stockpiling Act of 1946 (Barbera, 1982). Further, the DRC along with Angola, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia have significant reserves of gold and diamonds. Logging, another vital source of employment and revenue for the entire region, is second only to oil in export percentages. In Cameroon 80 percent of forests, outside of protected areas, are zoned for commercial purposes with Gabon close behind at 50 percent (Wilke and
Hakizumwami, 2001). Timber accounts for 28 percent of Cameroon’s non-hydrocarbon export revenues (Dept of Int.l Dev, 2006). Clearly, the Gulf of Guinea offers the world and specifically the U.S a great deal more than oil; it holds a vast supply of strategic resources, critical to America’s technologically advanced economy.

2.3 POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Despite the appearance of chaos, the Gulf of Guinea tract record is rather positive if compared to other regions of the developing world. When it comes to international politics, its oil producers are pliant and cooperative, showing no hint of anti-Western radicalism or likelihood of a joint price hike, like the 1973 style. Quite contrary, when most other states were fully nationalizing their oil sector and either booting out or at least hampering the activities of multinational oil companies, the Gulf of Guinea oil exporters kept pragmatic relationship with the indispensable foreign partner. This was particularly evident in the case of the Marxist governments in Congo Brazzaville and Angola until late 1980s.

The Gulf of Guinea only OPEC member, Nigeria, enacted a number of indigenization measures in the 1970s, but allowed foreign operators to retain managerial control over the fundamental of the oil industry. In regards to the widespread violence, in particularly, in the Niger Delta, most of it is directed not at the oil industry per se (except in recent years when miscreants have hijacked genuine protest for the spoils of the state between the ruling elites and their challengers) rather than a campaign against foreign firms. Furthermore, the industry is in a growing number of cases, re-entering offshore away from the political mayhem of the host state which makes development and lifting very easy.
2.4 COMMERCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

The third sets of advantages are business related. To start with, the Gulf of Guinea has some of the most attractive tax regimes in the world for oil companies different from other regions such as the Persian Gulf, where they are barely allowed in, or Venezuela and Russia, where there is great contractual uncertainly, oil firms have full access to the regions investment opportunities. The fact is that, the Gulf of Guinea is one of the few promising oil regions where companies can take ownership in reserve they discover. Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and several other big producers bar foreign ownership and investors still face equity obstacles in Russia and Iraq.

2.5 NIGERIA’S STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Nigeria is the crux of the Gulf of Guinea and has been at the forefront of the region’s emergence on the global scene. Nigeria possesses vast petroleum and gas reserves, climatic variation supporting large scale and variegated agricultural production, a citizenry with a deeply embedded entrepreneurial ethnic and by African standards a gigantic internal market of 150 million consumers. In fact, one of every five sub-Saharan African lives in Nigeria. Compare to all other African states. Nigeria’s unusual scale means that it is in the unique position to develop a large-scale manufacturing sector that could easily be supplied by regionally specialized commercial agricultural enterprises (Spinoza and Vallee, 2008). The Nigerian oil resource curse weighs heavily on the head of the Nigerian polity. Once a regionally diversified agro-commodity exporter (e.g. cocoa, palm products, peanuts, timber), with a substantial industrial manufacturing base poised for deep import substitution in various regions, petroleum and natural gas production have overwhelmed and marginalized all other
economic sector since the mid seventies. Unfortunately, strategic shifts in the global politics of energy security since 9/11 have decisively inflated the significance of Nigeria’s energy sector. The U.S. has defined the Gulf of Guinea as a new energy security zone, one expected to supply 25% of American imports by 2025, with Nigeria destined to provide 60-70% oil import. Nigerian crude oil’s lightweight, low sulphur content, lower transport cost and security advantage over the Persian Gulf fetches a premium price from U.S. refiners in 2007, Nigeria supplied 12% of American oil imports, nearly 46% of Nigerian production, and total U.S-Nigerian trade reached $29 billion (U.S DOS, 2009). Oil and natural gas represent at least 37-40% of Nigeria’s GDP, 95% of it foreign exchange earnings, government revenue, with estimated annual export value of $90 billion in 2008 (U.S DOE, 2009).

Nigeria is located in the heart of the region and home to more than half of the population, it has been an instrumental member and leader in regional organizations such as ECOWAS, the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission. The 2008 World Bank report on the African Development Indicators continues to place Nigeria as one of the two dominant economies on the African continent (World Bank Report, 2008). In addition, in terms of size and potential, many believe that Nigeria has the capacity to overtake South Africa to claim Africa’s strongest economy. Nigeria also boasts the region’s largest and most capable military force. Active duty personnel number approximately 76,000 members, 8,000 of whom serve in the Navy and Coast Guard (Alexandria, 2009). The Nigerian navy maintains the most significant naval presence in West and Central Africa. It has two primary commands: the West Command based in Apapa, Lagos and the Eastern Command in Calabar, as well as five forward operating bases in Bonny Island, Forcados, Egueme, Ibaka, and Igbokoda. The naval fleet is comprised
of one frigate, one corvette, two fast attack crafts and 15 patrol boats (Alexandria, 2009). Nigeria also maintains a small naval aviation capability that includes two Lynx Mk 89 maritime patrol type aircraft. The coast guard has been limited to brown water operations, maintaining 38 small craft acquired in the 1980s (Alexandria, 2009). In addition to the navy and coast guard, Nigeria utilizes a maritime police force and a port security police. They function completely independently of the military and provide inland waterway and port security.


CHAPTER THREE

3.0 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA U.S. RELATIONS

3.1 DYNAMICS OF NIGERIA – U.S. RELATIONS

Africa, in the rhetorical metaphor of empirical Jingoism, was a ripe melon awaiting carving. In the late nineteenth century, those who scrambled fastest, won the largest slices and right to consume at their leisure, the sweet succulent flesh. (Crawford, 1995:23)

Nothing captures the objective of Nigeria-U.S. relations more than the apt statement of Crawford (1995:23) above. Hence, the endemic problems of underdevelopment and poverty in Africa have always provided subterfuge for the so-called “assistance” and by implication, relations with Western countries in terms of aid, trade, democracy, and conflict resolution in Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa with abundant natural and human resources is a shin example of the above illustration.

Nigeria and the United States are linked by history, language and trade. Many Americans are said to have traced their heritage to Nigeria. Indeed Nigeria – U.S. have been tied together by the interchange of people over the decades and by deeply held values, which they have long shared. They also equally share belief in free economies as a way to improve the lives of people. The extensive commercial and economic ties between Nigeria – U.S. have promoted an exchange of ideas, resources and technologies which is said to be in the mutual interests. The government of the two countries have also encouraged and supported the establishment of private sector organization.

The interaction between Nigeria – U.S. predates Nigeria’s political Independence in 1960. In fact, the interactions between the two countries which could be traced to the pre-second World War blatantly increase
thereafter. This inform the quick recognition of the Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the United States has emerged rather dramatically as the most dynamic component in the determination of post Colonial Nigeria foreign economic and political policies. Accordingly, Ate (1987) contend that from the Nigerian perspectives, the evolving relationship between Nigeria – U.S. has been determined by combined requirements of dynamics, political security, economic advancement and a perceived leadership obligation in the regional decolonization movement. He further argues that the interest of U.S. in Nigeria grew substantially in the face of the Soviet Union challenge to Western domination in Africa. He therefore juxtaposes the bilateral and political level of Nigeria – U.S ties in order to offer a structurally coherent explanation of the purpose and result of the Nigeria – U.S. relations.

The political relations between the U.S. – Nigeria obviously started on a low note. It was the leadership of John F. Kennedy that increased Nigeria – U.S. relations greatly, especially in the field of economic assistance and education. Be that as it may, the attitude of the United States toward Nigeria, in the first six years of Nigeria Independence, was hallmarked by political indifference even though her interest in Nigeria’s economy was noticeable. This largely derived from the traditionally political attitude of the United State towards the entire African states which were then seen to be within the European sphere of influence and as such, unwillingness to deal directly within political matters. Thus, the United States looked up to Nigerian military Training and also respected Nigeria’s non-alignment policy and commitment to peace in Africa. Again, since the United States felt that Nigeria was ideologically a democratic state, it did not worry about her political developments. Therefore, her ultimate concern was to assist Nigeria economically and by so doing promote political stability in the country. This attitude of the United States toward Nigeria principally derived from her age old conviction that it should use her
economic power to erect a just and better world. On her part, Nigeria saw the United States as her friend. According to Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in the address to the Nigeria House of Representative in 1961 “We admire the American way of life and we respect the people of the United States for their love of freedom (Balewa 1964:104).

Meanwhile, the strength and depth of the romance between the U.S. and Nigeria was ultimately measured when the later was engulfed in a civil war six years after her political independence. During the war, both Nigerian Military Government and Biafran Government sought the military and diplomatic assistance of the United States. Under this diplomatic dilemma, United States Government displayed extreme caution because it did not have colonies in Africa. It felt less obliged to formulate independent feigned neutrality and ostensibly regarded the Civil War as an internal problem that should be resolved by regional organization of African Union (OAU). However, in reality, it ignored the request made by the Nigerian Federal Government head (Ngoh 1982) by General Gowon and instead gave humanitarian assistance to Biafra in form of relief materials. Thus, United State from 1966 – 1970s provide more than $600 million financial aids to provide relief materials to Biafra, eradication of small pox and control of measles in Nigeria (Onuoha 2008).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has remained the only super power with its capacity of “Liberty” and “democracy” in Nigeria. It has positioned itself to “liberate” the world including Africa in order to make it safe for the operation of liberal democracy, as well as uninterrupted movement of goods and investment across territorial boundaries.
3.2 DETERMINANT OF U.S. INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH NIGERIA

In articulating and assessing U.S. interest in her relations with Nigeria, Moose (1995.1) maintains that “in light of Nigeria’s size and importance, it is understandable that U.S. interests are multiple and diverse”. Indeed George E. Moose the former United States Assistant Secretary for African Affairs advertised five (5) points areas of U.S interest in her engagement with Nigeria. According to him

- Our principal interest is to have a stable, democratic Nigeria with which the U.S. can pursue productive, cooperative relations. We do not wish to see Nigeria became a pariah state that might use its influence and resources recklessly and irresponsibly.
- The United States has significant economic interest in Nigeria with $3.9 billion invested mainly in the petroleum sector.
- We have specific interest in curbing narcotics trafficking and other criminal activities centred in Nigeria.
- We also have interest in enlisting Nigeria’s cooperation on a range of regional and international issues.
- Of central importance to all goals, however, is our interest in seeing Nigeria established an open, democratic system. It is our firm belief that a democratic Nigeria that respect human rights and resolves issues of governance through the democratic process will create a context with which our other interest can best be pursued.

In the same vein, Ake (2002) revealed in categorical terms that the United States primary interest in relations to Nigeria is oil. Another of the U.S. interest in Nigeria is to maintain ties to the nation once described as giant of Africa or “the most African country” in the world, a country that is rich in both human and natural resources, despite the fact that these are, as indicated earlier, poorly managed. A third U.S. is the maintenance of
American Cultural-historical linkages to the country of Nigeria. Finally America needs Nigeria helps in its campaign against international drug trafficking (that is Nigerians to desist or disallowed its borders being used as major routes for the trafficking of Cocaine and heroin into the United States.

In a similar connection Onuoha (2008) in explicating on the determinants of Nigeria – U.S. relations argues that Nigeria – U.S. relations since 1960 have been hoisted on a tripod, namely trade, foreign investment and democracy. Indeed, Onuoha was so keen to compartmentalize the key factors that determined U.S. interest in her relations with Nigeria. In respect of the above, we shall present our in-depth analysis on the determinants of Nigeria – U.S. relations.

3.3 DETERMINANTS OF NIGERIA – U.S. RELATIONS

As noted above, Nigeria – U.S. relations since 1960 have been hoisted on at tripod, namely trade, foreign investment and democracy. Nigeria ranked second only to Saudi Arabia as the most important supplier of petroleum to the United States, which buys over one million barrels a day of the highly desirable light, low sulphur sweet crude. More importantly, Nigeria provides about 10 percent of U.S. oil imports. Annual trade amounts to more than $6billion and U.S. companies have about $7billion investment in the country (Onuoha 2008).

According to Nwoke (2000) crude oil continue to dominate Nigeria’s exports scene, constituting over 90 percent of total exports. The directional flow of Nigeria’s exports, analysis in terms of crude oil, shows that the bulk of Nigeria’s crude oil is exported to United States. Ake (2002) unequivocally stated that the U.S. primary interest in relations to Nigeria is oil according to him, as a voracious consumer of the country’s ‘sweet’ (low sulphur) petroleum, United States recognizes Nigeria worth as the largest oil producers in Africa and the fifth largest in the OPEC. Since 1974, Nigeria
has been one of the largest exporters of crude oil to the United States. Securing the U.S., supply of Nigerian oil was one of the bases for then President George Bush’s visit to Nigeria in 1982. American companies such as Exxon Mobil and Chevron have substantial investments in the lucrative Nigerian oil sector, which along with other western oil companies they dominate.

According to the U.S. Information Agency Reports (1985), Nigeria and United States have enjoyed increasingly active trade since Nigerian Independence. That two way trade rose from about $76 million in 1960 to about $12 billion in 1980, making the U.S. Nigeria’s best consumers. Currently, the United States investment in Nigeria is larger than any other African country.

Ate (2000:243) state thus

The U.S. is the largest foreign investor in Nigeria, as stated before, American Multinational oil companies, like Chevron, Mobil and Texaco have a great stake in the economic growth environmental well-being and political stability of Nigeria, especially in the Niger Delta.

From the above, the U.S., in fact has remained the major investor in Nigeria’s oil sector with Mobil-Exxon, Texaco, Chevron etc as key players. Total U.S. investment in Nigeria as at 2000, is estimate at $18 billion most of which represent investment in the oil and gas sector by the American companies operating in that sector. (State visit by President Bill Clinton to Nigeria, August 26-28, 2000). Nigeria is the largest trading partner for the United State in Africa total overall trade is over $5 billion. Moreover, Nigeria is the second largest market for American products in the continent. Over 300 American companies of various sizes operate in different spheres of the Nigeria economy (Ate, 2000)

The U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Howard Jeter, re-emphasized the determinants of Nigeria-U.S. relations during his testimony to the United States House of Representative sub-committee on Africa Affairs as follows:

Nigeria is our second largest trading partner in all Africa. American companies have invested over $76 billion in the country’s petroleum sector, we import approximately 40 percent of Nigeria’s oil production and Nigeria supplies nearly 8 percent of our total import. U.S. companies have invested substantively in the food and drink industry such as coco cola, pepsi, 7-up etc.

The above is the Citation Squared into Ayo Olukotun’s argument that “by 1970, apart from the United States Prominent firm’s presents in the oil sector, the United States was beginning to emerge as Nigeria’s dominant bilateral trading partner (Olukotun 1992.50). Even while the political relations becoming Weaker before 1999. There was increasing U.S. demand for Nigeria’s oil which generated over U.S. $9 billion in favour of Nigeria. In fact, important factor that tended to have influenced Nigeria – U.S relations is oil diplomacy (Salii and Aremu 2006).

It is pertinent to note once again, that Nigeria’s relations with the United States has been conditioned by the oil factor. The United States which had not been Nigerian Significant trading partner until the 1960s, becomes by 1970s, the major consumer of Nigeria’s oil. Thus, the United States had maintained the policy of not intervening in Nigeria’s domestic crisis, if such crisis does not disrupts the flow of oil. Based on this policy,
during the crisis, which generated the Nigeria Civil War between 1967-1970, Nigeria-U.S. relations deteriorated. General Gowon in charge of the Nigerian Federal Government had requested weapons from the United States to prosecute the war. The United State refused to honour the request, probably because the super power was not sure how the war would end, bearing in mind her interest in the oil rich Biafra. The United States instead of obliging to this request gave humanitarian assistance to the Biafra in form of relief materials. Thus, from 1996-1970s, the United States provided more than $600 million financial aids to provide relief material to Biafra, eradication of small pox and control of measles in Nigeria (Howard 1985, and Onuoha 2008). This as a result forced Nigeria for the first time to move toward the East-Soviet union. This in fact marked the beginning of Nigeria-communist countries relations. The crucial issue to note is that, even the crisis generated by Nigeria-Biafra War did not stop the flow of oil and the economic relations between the two countries.

The cogent point of the Nigeria-U.S relations was when the U.S. intervened in the face-off between the Niger Delta War lord, Alhaji Asari Dokubo and President Obasanjo. The question is why did the U.S. intervened openly? Njoku (2008) gave the answer to the above question. According to him, the United States depends on Nigeria oil and seems to show more concern in respect of the interruption of the nation’s oil flow. And that is why the United States today wants the crisis in the oil rich Niger Delta resolved with urgency. Nigeria is one of the major oil supplier-nation to the United States. And America cannot afford to lose that supply, about three of the multinational companies operating in the Niger Delta are owned by the United States. The United States opposed using force to resolve the crisis in the Niger Delta. They want the crisis to be resolved amicably through negotiations, and not through force (Njoku, 2008)  
The point is, “why the U.S forced Obasanjo to negotiate with a rebel (Asari Dokubo) over the Niger Delta crisis, oil pipeline bursting, and vandalization?. Historically, the development of the Niger Delta people’s volunteer force (NDPVF) marked the apotheosis of the Niger Delta Crisis. The NDPVF which claimed to be fighting for the interest of the Ijaw ethnic group for which it demands self-determination and control over the region’s oil wealth, has kept the region under great tensions through killings, kidnapping vandalization of oil pipelines and outright stealing of crude and refined oil (Bunkering). According to the Financial Time of London, the theft is estimated at about $4 billion yearly (The News, Vol. 23, 2004).

At the outset of the crisis, the Rivers State Government reacted by constituting a joint security force to deal with Dokubo and his gang. But the effort failed as the activities of the NDPVF became more rampant. When Sari Dokubo and his gang invaded Port Harcourt, the Rivers State capital in September 2004, there was total breakdown of law and order in the city. Amnesty international estimated that about 500 lives were lost in the crisis. The failure of the Rivers State Government to contain the activities of the gang, the Federal Government waded in and opted to treat Dokubo’s militia like cancer that requires excision. A task force comprising all armed forces was given the mandate to unhinge Dokubo’s operations, led by Brigadier General Yaduma, code named “OPERATION FLUSH 3”, the task force sent naval speed boats into creeks and order a 24 hour patrol in Port Harcourt. The Federal Government’s offensive move also failed to contain the activities of the rebels.

To worsen the situation, Dokubo, the leader of the group emerged from his hide out and ordered oil companies and their workers to leave the region, as his group would blow oil installations from October 1, 2004. As if that was not enough, the war lord unveiled his war plan codenamed “OPERATION LOCUS FEAST”. Its main feature is unrestrained bombing
of oil installation in the Niger Delta, beginning from Friday October 1st Nigeria’s Independence day; unless the region is granted autonomy and control of the vast region, as well as its vast oil wealth. The rebel leader warned that foreigners in the Niger Delta should stay away for their safety (Ibeanu and Luckham, 2006 and Onuoha, 2008).

This threat from the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVP) had immediate impact on the international system. World oil price rose to more than 50 dollars per barrel as a result of Dokubo’s threat to unleash a locust feast, which including government infrastructures anywhere in Nigeria. Earlier Dokubo had warned that his force were ready to attack flow stations, rigs, and production platforms belonging to oil companies in the area. Agip, an Italian oil firm whose presence is also very dominant in the Onshore and swampy region of Nigeria hurriedly shut its 28,000 barrel of crude oil per day facility.

Immediately, President Obasanjo summoned prominent leaders in Rivers State who are known to be in the forefront of the agitation for the improvement of living condition in the Niger Delta. Those invited are Ledum Mitee, president of the movement for the survival of Ogoni people – MOSOP; Von Kennedy, an Ijaw activist, Stephen Davies, a Briton, and Judith Asunni, a German married to a Nigerian. The interaction revealed that Dokubo’s threat was real and require urgent attention. The then President Obasanjo immediately mandated Davies to reach out for Dokubo and his gang for possible negotiation. In the main time, while Davies was still negotiating with the rebel leader mid September, government forces commanded by Brigadier General Zakariah Yaduma in an operation codenamed operation flush 3 deployed Helicopter gunship and an amphibious platoon to attack Dokubo’s position. His hometown of Buguma also came under heavy aerial attack leading to much casualty on both sides.
The attack infuriated the rebels, especially, the allegation that government forces unleashed chemical weapons on the rebels.

This allegation of chemical weapons were used in what the army consistently described in an internal security situation increased diplomatic interest immediately, responded by dispatching a 10-man delegation, including military attaché in Nigeria to Aso Rock and the Niger Delta region to ascertain the true situation. As the battle wore a force outlook, international pressure began to mount on Obasanjo who was visibly worried at the turn of events.

However, when President Obasanjo attended the meeting of the United Nation’s General Assembly in September 2004, President George Bush of the United States invited him to a dinner. The American president used the opportunity to persuade the Nigerian leader to negotiate with the rebel in order to find a lasting solution to the recurrent Niger Delta crisis. Bush intervened in the Dokubo – Obasanjo face-off due to the huge American investment in the Niger Delta region and the possible disruption of crude oil from the region to the United States (Onuoha, 2008). A diplomatic source said, Bush reminded Obasanjo about the deep interest the United States has in the region and advised him to avoid a replay of what happened in Iraq where oil supply to the West was adversely affected (Insider Weekly, No. 12, October 2004).

Immediately, when Obasanjo arrived in Nigeria, he was embarrassed and ordered the withdrawal of his authority to Odili empowering him to deploy troops to the troubled areas. He quickly summoned Davies and directed him to intensify discussion with the rebels. As he received the nod that Dokubo and his gang were ready to fly to Abuja for the talks, he quickly granted approval for one of his presidential fleet jet to airlift Dokubo and some of his commanders to Abuja.
On September 29, 2004 precisely, Dokubo headed to Abuja after putting in place some chilling contingency plans. Part of such plans was the deployment of some of his dreaded fighters to Abuja, days before he arrived. He also put his troops in Port-Harcourt on red alert with clear instructions that should anything happens to him, his Abuja fighters should blow up a strategic areas like National Assembly Complex, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Headquarters, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and other targets. His fighters at Kula base also had orders to immediately blow up oil installations and pipelines. Fortunately, the meeting was successful without any dramatic incidence.

The Insider Magazine, No. 42, October 18, 2004 reported vividly what transpired between the warlord and the President Obasanjo during the negotiation. According to magazine, as soon as the warlord and his team arrived at the venue, the president asked Dokubo to outline his grievances. The NDPVF leader told the President Obasanjo that top on the list of the demand of his people is vexed issue of resource control, autonomy for the Niger Delta and convocation of the sovereign National Conference. At the end of his presentation, the president urged him to disband his group immediately. He informed the president that his forces were volunteers who usually come for operation from their communities with their own arms. The president retorted, “What do you mean, you are talking nonsense”. He got up and walked out of the meeting. But when President Obasanjo finally resumed his seat after a lot of persuasion, the warlord opened up.

Sir, you know me very well. We have met five times and you also know my temperament. If you don’t what this meeting, I will go my own way, after all you invited me. (Insider, September 18, 2004.

However, to ensure that the existing relations between Nigeria – U.S. is maintained and to keep the crude oil supply open, Obasanjo did the
unpredictable namely, tolerating the excesses of the rebel leader and conceding to their requests. It was part of this development that forced Obasanjo to convene the political reform conferences which Dokubu (Rebel leader) refused to attend.

Indeed, American government is seriously worried about the security implication of Dokubu’s activities, particularly the fear that he might be connected to the dreaded Al Qaeda’s network. The C.I.A. and MOSSAD are verified a report that Osama Bin Laden is involved in weapon shipment to Dokubu and through out West Africa. (Insider Weekly, Nov. 1, 2004).

According to the magazine, operatives of the two intelligence agencies have presently infiltrated the Niger Delta and put Asari Dokubo under 24 hours surveillance to find out the extent of his link with Al Qaeda and links to other military groups with Osama Bin Laden group. The International Security Community was also alarmed when Dokubo said.

I have also been labelled a terrorist. But the real terrorist are the people who fly planes and bombs over homes, those who use armoured tanks to ravage our villages, those who send troops to defile our women, those who go to Iraq to look for non-existent weapons of mass destruction. They are more of terrorist then the people who blew up the World Trade Center (Insider magazine, Nov. 2004)

In order to safeguard its interest, the United States Naval Task Force, comprising an aircraft carrier, guided missiles cruiser, two guided missile destroyers; an attack submarine and a supply ship which passed through the Gulf of Guinea as part of U.S. grand strategy to fight terrorism any where in Africa. Adogamhe (2006) reveals that: the United States has donated no fewer than three ships to the Nigerian Navy, to assist it policing Nigeria’s waters and protect U.S. investment in the oil sector.
It is worthy of note that it was America’s interest in Nigeria’s oil in the Niger Delta that determine her interest in the peaceful negotiation and resolution of the crisis in the Niger Delta. In order to buttress this fact, Taliban’s activities in the North-Eastern states of Borno and Yobe was so fierce and brutal between 2002-2003, yet the United States did not intervene, but rather looked elsewhere because it did not affect the flow of oil, nor threaten it investments in Nigeria.

Interestingly, due to the place of oil in Nigeria’s bilateral relations with other nations of the world, especially the United States, the former president of Nigeria Alhaji Umaru Yar’dua in a way to pin down on the Niger Delta crisis issue as one of his seven-points Agenda and even created the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs as ways of safeguarding the foreign investors interest in Nigeria’s oil sector and calming the restiveness for easy economic activities.

Be that as it may, though the U.S. policy towards Nigeria has been consistently dominated and directed by two core elements: Bilateral economic relations (trade, investment and energy) and regional security (curbing corruption, promote Democratic values and Human right and strengthening democratic institutions). The Nigeria – U.S. relations, from all indications have been unhealthy and lopsided in the sense that they have remained relationship of domination and subordination. The implication of this is that the bilateral relationship between the two countries has not engendered the type of autonomous and self-reliant development which Nigeria requires to overcome the historical antecedent of colonialism. Hence, Nigeria’s romance with the United States has entrenched and reinforced poverty and underdevelopment instead.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NIGERIA – U.S. ENERGY SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

4.1 NIGERIAN ENERGY SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA.

Nigeria is the energy exporting giant and the most attractive leg of the “Oil Triangle”. Currently, its proven oil reserves are estimated at 40 billion barrels, but new offshore discoveries will raise reserves significantly. Importantly, most of its oil is derived from onshore fields in the Niger Delta, however offshore discoveries like the Bonga fields are rapidly changing this picture. Depending on the future price of oil, and internal Security in Nigeria, daily production could rise from 2.5 million barrels per day from 2005 to as much as 5 million barrels per day by 2020. Achieving this unprecedented output level, however, requires extending and deepening democratic governance in Nigeria, strengthening Internal Security in the Delta as much as increasing foreign Investment of G8 Countries. The Stakes are high and raising daily.

Today Nigeria accounts for over 60 percent of the Gulf of Guinea’s oil wealth. Its output makes Nigeria the eleventh largest oil producer and the largest natural gas reserves in Africa (176 trillion cubic feet) now possessing a large-scale LNG Complex (eg. Five train lines) on Bonny Island with more plants planned. According to the I.M.F in 2005 oil revenue accounted for 99 percent of all Nigerian exports revenues, 88 percent of government income and 50 percent of Nigerian GDP, amounting to over $50 billions. Based on an oil price $50 per barrels between 2006 and 2020 Nigeria alone could pocket more than $750 billion in oil income, the whole of West Africa, more than $1 trillion. For Africa, these are colossal numbers. Tight and Volatile markets, coupled with short-term upward price pressures, suggest there is every reason to assume that these estimates of Nigeria’s and the region’s future oil wealth are quite conservatives.
But since the end of 2002, the Onshore and Offshore oilfields of the Niger Delta—the major source of Nigerian oil and gas—has essentially became ungovernable. Political instability and violent conflicts have deepened to the point that some of the oil multinational oil and oil servicing companies working there, including Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil and Julius Berger felt that their “Social licenses to operate” is rapidly eroding and therefore withdrawing from the region.

Until now, however, insufficient attention and funding have been paid to resolving the Conflicts and human rights abuses in the Niger Delta. A “hard line” security approach has failed abysmally, with grotesque human rights abuses only igniting more insurgencies and deepening criminality. Similarly, the American policy favouring “Stability at the costs” has also failed to deliver energy Security. Governing the Niger Delta democratically, moreover poses a truly daunting agenda for both American energy Security and Nigeria National Security interests.

The political economy of Nigerian “oil Complex”, with a structure broadly similar to other oil States such as Venezuela, Gabon, or Indonesia challenges both American and Nigerian Security interest. These problems have become institutionalized though decades of extreme negligence. Key elements of the “oil Complex” are a federal Statutory monopoly over mineral exploration (the 1969 Petroleum law, Revenue Allocation Decree 13 of 1970; The Land Use Decree of 1978), a nationalized oil Company (NNPC) that has majority holding in its production arrangements with foreign Companies, the security agencies of the Nigerian State along with the private Security forces of the Companies (to ensure that costly investments are secured) multilateral financial and regulatory agencies, the oil bearing communities themselves within whose customary jurisdiction the wells, refineries and pipelines are located. Oil has brought neither
prosperity nor tranquillity to the Delta or the Country as a whole (Nekabari, 2001).

The paradoxes and Contradiction of oil are nowhere greater than in the oilfield of the Niger Delta, or “Nigeria’s Kuwait” as it is popularly known. It was precisely an abiding sense of disenfranchisement and exclusive among the Delta minorities and of the Ijaws in particular, that sparked the first insurgency within the oil producing Communities or region.

Since March 12, 2003, mounting Communal violent over oil fields resulted in at least 150 deaths and the levelling of about eight Communities. Employees of the oil Companies have also been killed prompting all the major oil Companies to withdraw Staffs, close down operations and reduced output by more than 750,000 barrels per day which is equivalent to 40 percent of national output. This in turn provoked President Obasanjo to dispatch a large troop deployment to the oil producing areas (Human Right Watch, 2003).

The costs of insurgency are vast. A report prepared for the Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and published in 2003 under the title “Back from the Brink” paints gloomy “risk audio” for the Delta. Nigeria National Petroleum Company estimated that between 1978 and 2003, there were four hundred “Vandalization” on Company facilities each year (and 581 between January and September 2004), with oil losses amounting to over $1 billion annually (Clear Water Research Services, 2003).

Since 1999, the cost of instability in the region has been $6.5 billion in lost oil revenues according to the federal government. And in the first three months of 2006, $1 billion in oil revenues was lost and national output was cut by one thirds. The escalating political crisis in the Delta threatens Nigeria’s Security, American Energy Security and West African region as a source of reliable energy (IPR, 2007, Kennedy &Stephen, 2005).
4.2 U.S ENERGY SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

The geo-Strategic Significance of Nigeria and other Countries of the Gulf of Guinea oil to the United States, particularly against the global backdrop of rising prices, tight markets and political instability in the Persian Gulf, Indonesia and parts of Latin American is widely understood. In the wake of Al-Qaeda attacks and the Gulf war, Nigeria and other West African producers have emerge as “The New Gulf Oil States” (NEPD, 2001)

Consequently, over the past Seven (7) years, amidst deepening Crisis in the Middle East and tightening Petroleum markets, the United States has quietly Institutionalized the West African-based oil Supply Strategy and Nigeria Currently providing 10-15 percent of U.S. Imports serves as the cornerstone of this Gulf of Guinea Strategy. During the next decades, it is expected to become even more Crucial along with other Oil-Producing Countries in the West African “Oil Triangle” as former Vice President Cheney’s National Energy Policy Report Stated in 2001,

“Along with Latin American, West African is expected to be one of the fastest growing sources of oil and gas for American Market. Nigeria, in Partnership with the private sector, has set ambitious production goals as high as 5 million barrels of oil per day over its coming decades(Wilbey,2006;1-6).

The ascending of the Gulf of Guinea to the enviable Strategic position is corroborated by Paul Michael Wilbey in a paper presented at the Institute of Petroleum Studies at the University of Port-Harcourt in March 2006, when he said. “a Combination of the Circumstances (the September 11, 2001 attack and the war in Iraq/Afghanistan) have conspired to thrust the Gulf of Guinea into the Centre of geo-Strategic energy Security Competition”. According to him, “the combination of Nigeria, Equatorial
Guinea and Angola has Surpassed Saudi Arabia as supplier to the United States”. He went further to say that “Hemmed in by failures of the Saudi replacement become very aggressive (Ibeji, 2006).

The Gulf of Guinea is not only reputed for having the cheapest to produce Crude, huge new reservoirs are also being discovered while most other regions are declining in their production. The Gulf of Guinea in the last few years has undoubtedly become the leading deep water market for oil and gas in the World with about U.S $ 20 billion of the projected U.S $ 50 billion deep water expenditure in the five years targeted to exploration, field development and petroleum facilities in the region (Oil & the Gulf of Guinea; http www.nigeria first/org/printer/230 Shtml).

In full realization of the new States of the Gulf of Guinea, the California Republic and former chairman of the House Committee on Africa, Mr. Ed Royce had this to say.

“It is clearly in our national Interest to diversity our energy Supply especially in turbulent times. West African oil doesn’t have the Strategic bottleneck that other Countries have. We generally have good Political relationship with the African oil producers. And if it lessens our dependence on a particular region of the world, that is good”(2006;126).

In the same light, the congressional Black Caucus and the African Oil Policy Initiative Group, AOPIG a Washington think talk, have all backed fully and in fact influenced the Shift in U.S. Identification of Nigeria, and other West African States as “Strategic Partner” in a white paper it released in 2002. The AOPIG wrote inter alia: “African oil is not an end, but a means to both greater U.S. energy Security and more rapid African economic development”(Servant,2003).

Consequently, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) had said that by 2025 American imports will rise from today’s 13 million
barrels (bbl) per day to more than 18 million, depending on price that oil come from. Roughly two-thirds of the World’s oil and gas reserves are found in the Middle East, a geological reality that no grandiose rhetoric about “extending freedom” to that region can change. Indeed, report by the DOE said by 2025 the Middle East’s share of World oil production could increase from 21 to 34 million barrels per day or more. Yet, since 2001, not with standing oil prices in the $60 per barrel range, the prospects for a dramatic growth in the Persian Gulf output have dimmed in large part due to the Civil war in Iraq and rising tensions over Iran’s nuclear research program. Therefore there is growing Skittishness about investing heavily in the region (U.S. explain presence in the Gulf of Guinea, http://www.Afrik.com.article900.hm. (Accessed 18/5/2011)

It goes therefore, without saying that it is oil from other sources that could increase the security of supply and make the United States less beholden to potentially unstable hostile regimes. As a result, American energy security planners have redefined the Gulf of Guinea as “strategic interest of the United States; more stable and reserves as high as 60 billion barrels”. Most production of date has been onshore, but new offshore finds have made the Gulf a major and growing global Supplier of high quality and relatively low cost oil, in fact, the West African “oil Triangle” currently Supplies about 15 percent of daily export into the United States, which some predicted could rise to 25 percent by 2015.

4.3 UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA.

The rising strategic significance of the Gulf of Guinea Countries as the next gulf and as a counterweight to the Middle East, the United States Military had radically revised its strategic vision for the West African region. Strategy has shifted primarily from training for peace-keeping’s

As indicated above, the United States is likely going to imports 25 percent of its oil from the Gulf of Guinea by 2015 about 90 percent of that is from Nigeria, it is therefore natural that the United States be concerned about the defences and security of its interest in this region and in Nigeria in particular. However, local hostilities to U.S. bases in Nigeria has succeeded in delaying EUCOM now AFRICOM from establishing a “forward operation base” in the country. However, there are indications to the contrary now, as there are evidences pointing to a U.S. Military Base in the country (EIA, 2004).

Despite these doubts and denials, United States Military involvement in West Africa has mushroomed since 2001, focusing on three broad goals; (i) getting U.S. forces on the ground in order to advice and upgrade the region’s Militaries in support of the GWOT; (ii) establishing maritime Surveillance Service the Gulf in order to secure off shore’s oil installations and if necessary Unilaterally defending American energy assets; and (iii) building and sub attracting access to new air and naval bases, to provide both forward supplies, Surveillance and air cover capacities. As former EUCOM’s General Jones told the wall Street Journal “Africa plays an increased Strategic role Military, economically and Politically…, therefore, the European command, now spends 70 percent of its time and energy on Africa…up from nearly none in 2000”( Navy New stand “U.S. Increasing Operation in Gulf of Guinea” http//www.news.navymil/search/display. asp? Story-Id2452. (Accessed 18/5/2011).

In response, the EUCOM had jointly steeped up operations in the Gulf of Guinea to enhance security. The former Commander of the United States European Commands Naval Surface Combatant Warships Captain
Tom Rowdens Commander of Task Forces 65, said during a pentagon interview thus:

U.S. Military engagement along South Western Africa’s Atlantic Coast has increased exponentially. Its increased from almost no activity in 2004 to 130 “Ship days” in 2005 to even more planned ship as time progresses (Alhaji & Williams, 2003:39-40).

All four Military services are involved in the “new scramble for Africa”, with European Command (EUCOM) taking responsibility for North, West and Central Africa. To bolster intelligence on Africa generally and the Gulf of Guinea in particular, EUCOM has created and Africa clearing House on security information, supported by Pentagon think tank, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, housed at the National Defence University.

Base on intelligence obtained General Jones has recommended that the Pentagon establish a Separate Command for Africa “AFRICOM”. Indeed, according to CIA report, the Pentagon has accepted and concluded arrangement to create a separate African Command to take over from EUCOM (Servant, 2003). In lieu of AFRICOM, EUCOM, had set up a forward operating base in East Africa, its combined Joint Task Forces in the Horn of Africa is bases at camp Lemonier, built on a former French base, in Djibouti a tiny nation strategically located where the Red Sea opens to the Gulf of Indian Ocean. Consequently, Camp Lemonier will soon be expanded from “88 acres to about 500” so that house at least 1,800 personnel rotating in and out from all the four services and the CIA.

The United States Navy has also becomes a Semi-permanent fixture in the Gulf of Guinea, represented by EUCOM’S sixth fleet, General Jones has stated that he expects EUCOM’S Navies to spend about half of their times off the coast of West Africa, and to sustain this effort, he has
requested Congressional funding for the Gulf of Guinea Guard, a ten-year initiative to train Navies, implement a maritime radar system (the Automated Identification System) for the Securities of oil Supplies in the Gulf of Guinea.

Congressional funding for this initiative has proved difficult due to inter-State rivalries, uneasiness about Nigeria’s domination of the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the absence, so far of terrorist attacks on oil facilities. Yet there is little question that the United State Military presence will increase in the region. This is true because at a West Africa oil and gas Conference held in London in June 2005, General Wald reassured producers with a talk on measure to protect Operations in the Gulf of Guinea. Also in July 2006, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies had issued a report recommending that “Security and governance in the Gulf of Guinea (should be) an explicit priority in U.S foreign Policy”. And during August 2006 appearance in Washington, the former Navy Secretary Gorden England said “that navy was looking to enhance its operations in what he termed the ungovernable areas in Africa” (Klare, 2004). It is therefore not surprising that while the Navy laments a shortage of ships and resources, the American Naval presence in the Gulf has continued to grow. According to Navy Captain Thomas Summer Rowden, had of a 6th Fleet Task Forces on the Gulf of Guinea, U.S Military activities in the Gulf has increased exponentially from almost no activity in 2004 to 130 “Ships days” in 2005, with mere planned for 2006. He added that his forces “have worked with the Navies of Sierra Leone, Congo, Cameroon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Benin, Sao Tome and Principe, Liberia, Gabon, Cape Verde, Senegal and Ghana to protect the Gulf of Guinea (Sanger, 2006). The marine groups are also gearing up for growth in its Africa deployments. In January 2006, the Marine Research Centre at Quantico Sponsored a Conference attended by over 130 participants on the topic: The 21st Century Marine in West and
Central Africa”. The Conference report reads like a recruitment proposal or a “jobs fair” detailing the Specializations required in Africa. Not to be missed either is an informative Conference Presentation entitled “Marine In Africa now and in the Future”, which provides mundane but nitty-gritty information about job opportunities, prior deployments, upcoming training, Joint task forces and overall goals for fighting terrorism in West Africa (Oduniyi & Onyebuchi, 2005).

From the above Observations, it is very obvious America is quietly increasing its Military presence in the Gulf and in Nigeria since the meeting between the Deputy Commander of the United States European Command, General Charles Wald with Nigeria’s Defence Minister Roland Oristsejafor and other Military Chiefs in Abuja in November 2004. The meeting, of course was specifically arranged to discuss how the United States could “help” Nigeria the West Africa’s regional Superpower and larges oil producer, to improve Security for her oil industry and throughout the region. Wald told reporters afterwards, although he gave no further details that “we talked with Nigerian Military Leaders about having a way that we could cooperate together in monitoring the waters of the Gulf of Guinea (Bryan, 2006).

One ugly manifestation of this cooperation is the emergence of American weapons in the Niger Delta. Patrick Naagbanton, former Director of the Niger Delta Project for Environment, Human Rights and Development had argued that, “there is clearly an increase in U.S. weapons in the hands of the Nigerian Army and Navy in the Niger Delta” (Trevelyan, 2006). As a result of this scenario many in the Niger Delta have expressed apprehension and worry about increasing American Military intervention describing that what is best for American energy Security is not the best for the millions of people who live in the Delta. To them the militarization can only heighten tensions and in all probability lead to more
violent conflict. Ledum Mittee— the former president of MOSOP. The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People described thus: “The American policies that have had doubtful effects in the Middle East, have therefore focused their attention around the Gulf of Guinea. It is not peopling – Centred, it is just barrel Centred. It could become so bad that in five years time it will be impossible to get a barrel of without a life (This day, May 31, 2006).

4.4 CONVERGENT ENERGY SECURITY INTEREST IN THE GULF OF GUINEA.

The Gulf of Guinea despite its myriads of problems including extreme ethnic violence and Militancy still remains strategically important to Nigeria and the United States. In the light of this, it is obvious that the United States should be interested in the security and stability of the region. On the oil, it is equally important that it achieves political stability and maintains strong defence and security outfits in this region. Also involved in this mosaic of security strategy are the oil Companies in the region. Caught between the need to secure the flow of oil and to avoid offending Nigerian nationalist’s Sensibilities, the United States Embassy in Abuja Constantly repeated that America does not have or desire permanent bases in Nigeria. But news, stories and evidence about American bases, Collaborative exercise, Security Cooperation meetings and alleged local sitting of Special Forces are on the increase, suggesting precisely the opposite. This was the case that in 2003 when the breakdown of Social and Political order in the Delta had become so serious that experts like Okonta of Oxford University was quoted as saying that local people feared that “the United States government was preparing a Military Strike force to attack insurgents and release kidnapped oil workers (Eugene, 2006).
By July 2005, the Spiralling Crisis in the Delta had forced American and Nigerian officials to overcome their misgivings about the downside risks associated with deepening their security cooperation. After Consultation with the United Kingdom and other European allies, the United States Lead the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy (GGESS) plan for a joint working group on security in the Gulf of Guinea. By December 2005, the American ambassador and the Managing Director of NNPC made a joint announcement that the these Countries had agreed “to establish four special committees in the GGESS to coordinate action against trafficking in small arms in the Niger Delta, bolster maritime and coastal security in the region, promote Community development and poverty reduction, and combat money laundering and other financial crimes (Daily Independence, Sept 2006).

Also important is Major Ulrich’s reassuring admission that the United States Navy is often “there” protecting Shell’s Bonga oil fields. This is a revealing confirmation of U.S. mission creep; it is an especially interesting admission given Gragonette’s reported comments about Shells Security request. It is worthy of mention that it is Securing Nigerian oil exports that prompted the United States to recruit the U.K. and EU observers to join Nigeria at the August 2006 GGESS meeting in Abuja. At this meeting Linda Thomas Greenfield, American Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs said, “the United States was eager to help Nigeria address Security Challenges in the Niger Delta through offshore Surveillance and interdiction (Caryle, 2007). In addition to assisting Nigeria in offshore Surveillance and interdiction, the GGESS group announced that the United Kingdom will forward a joint reconnaissance team to assist in the training and equipment requirements of Three Amphibious Brigades, upgrade the training of Nigerians in Computer and radar capacity as well as strengthen
the ability of maritime security to “Finger point” illegal oil Cargos (Fredrick, 2006).
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

Over the past 15 years, amidst a deepening crisis in the Middle East and tightening petroleum market, the U.S has systematically institutionalized a West African – based oil supply strategy. The supply of oil sourced from the Gulf of Guinea countries constitutes 1/3 of the United States imports, West African oil producers become a “vital strategic partner”. Nigeria provides 12 – 15 percent of U.S imports, serves as the cornerstone of this Gulf of Guinea strategy. Consequently, West African oil producing countries become an important piece of the U.S government’s violent oil policy. As the former Vice President of the U.S; Cheney’s National Energy Policy Report Stated in 2001,

Along with Latin American, West Africa is expected to be one of the fastest – growing sources of and gas for the American market …. Nigeria, in partnership with the private sector, has set ambitious production goals as high as 5 million barrels of oil per day over the coming decade (NEPR, 2001: 8 – 11).

Not long after the attack of September 11, 2001, the U.S military radically revised its strategic vision for the West African region. There has been an important and clear strategic continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations, with the central objectives of the American State in relation to oil – rich state in West Africa remain largely unchanged. As Obama’s National security strategy makes clear. “As long as we are dependent on fossil fuels, we need to ensure the security and free flow of global energy resources” (White House National Security Strategy, 2010). It is obvious that the overarching objective in relation to energy security is not significantly different from that of the past administrations and continues to frame U.S strategy towards, among other regions, West Africa.
Interestingly, the United States energy security is more than a matter of assuring short-term supplies reliable access to affordable, clean and efficient energy services is crucial to her economic growth, development and security. One manifestation from the above is that Nigeria has a big role in the United States oil interest in the Gulf of Guinea, which necessitated for an oil relationship.

In order to safeguard the sovereign independence pillar of Nigeria, her national security policy become a source of paramount interest. Nigeria’s population of relatively equal strength between Muslims and Christians, its location on the Gulf of Guinea straddling Western and Equatorial Africa, its long-term and coastal boundaries and its off shore oil deposits defined the country’s security and risk. Nigeria’s concerns and threat perception should therefore naturally emanate from different dimensions especially the country’s mixed population of the two major religions (Islam and Christianity), large coastal frontiers and dependence on the production and export of oil from the Niger Delta which is, now made insecure by military deployments of the only super America.

The United States is the World Largest consumer of energy and it is indicated that by 2020, its oil consumption will increase by 33 per cent, and the Gulf of Guinea alone produce 1/3 of the U.S imports. And as well Nigeria annual production is expected to rise from 2.5 million barrels per day to as much as 5 million barrels per day in 2020 to meet U.S demand. Achieving these unprecedented out put levels, requires extending and deepening democratic governance across Nigeria and strengthening internal security in the Nigeria Delta (Goldwyn, 2008). The large part of supply problems, is the Niger Delta insurgency and the wholesale theft of oil. As a result, the U.S import from Nigeria is seriously affected. Nigeria’s maximum production capacity of about 3.5 million barrels per day dropped almost half. The United States import of 13.9 million barrels of oil from
Nigeria in February 2009, compared to the import of 29.7 million barrels in February 2008 has negative effect on her energy policy. Therefore, insecurity in the Niger Delta is viewed as a threat to the United States national security (Energy Information Admin; 2009).

The U.S interest in securing West African oil is translated into enhanced strategic presence in the region. The region encompassed the area of responsibility of U.S European command (EUCOM), a decision reflecting the traditional subordination of Africa to wider geo-political concerns. In 2006 the strategic significance of the region’s oil reserves become more apparent in Washington; EUCOM staff spend more than half of their time focusing on the region’s, operational activity which accelerated significantly declared one high – level defence official, that U.S carrier group to spend significant time going down the West Coast of Africa” (Guardian, 7 July 2003). A move designed to provide stability in the region. This strategic significance has also led to the establishment of an enlarged presence in the region, focused on “forward operating locations’ (FOLs’ also known as forward operating sites, FOSs) as a basis to project national security. Several sites of FOLs in West Africa have been explored, as wariness over the permanent military presence, in the region.

In a related development, the creation of Pentagon Combatant Command – Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 helped to consolidate Washington’s strategic push into oil – rich West Africa. Of course, the creation of AFRICOM, accorded higher priority to the region in the mind of U.S planner, which is primary oil interest; invariably determines the nature and direction of U.S strategy toward West Africa. Pentagon officials are not shy in declaring this to be so. Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Commander for Civil – Military Activities, argued in January 2011 that, “all the U.S wants is to ensure that the system operates with out disruption which is a very important issue for U.S”. It is
absolutely essential to our security interests globally, in addition to Africa (U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, January 2011). The enhanced U.S strategic presence in the region has led to accelerated levels of assistance to Key West African States. For instance, the Bush administration tried to justify its assistance to Nigeria by reference to attempts to build a strategic relationship with the country, focused on economic progress and democratic consolidation in order to make it a reliable and increasingly important trading partner. But specifically, programmes were directed towards U.S interests in the country, which include its large oil and gas reserves; and crucially, the avoidance of any disruption of supply from Nigeria which represent a major blow to oil security strategy of the U.S.

The Obama’s administration has not only maintained this aid, but has increased it by over 30 percent. As senator James Inhofe declared in March 2009 during testimony by AFRICOM’s Commander – in – chief, General Ward: “You know, once there was a time when we thought we were doing them a favour in this program, International Military Education and training (IMET). But quickly we learned that once they are tied into us that kind of relationship remains” (AFRICOM, 17 March, 2009). The overall, U.S oil interests in West Africa in general, and Nigeria in particular, have grown increasingly central to energy planning in Washington and American strategic power is now deployed as never before in order to secure these interest. All the assistance and programs to Nigeria from U.S are geared toward oil security; therefore it undermines Nigeria’s security interest.

Nigeria’s population of about 140 million people has, even by the most conservative estimate, fairly equal percentage of Muslims and Christian. The Muslims segment like their counterpart must no doubts is very much conscientious of, and sensitive to what is going on around them globally. Consequently, Nigerian Muslims would evaluate Nigeria - U.S relations on the basis of their perception of the United States and its conduct
towards the Muslims in Nigeria, as well as towards their brethren — fellow Muslims — Spread around the globe. Citing Kennedy (1994), Neuman Mohammed Habibs (2006) argues that, it is something of an irony that through actions and deeds, the United States, along with other nations in the West, has helped to raise further awareness of an Islamic identity — the Islamic Ummah. He also argued that to the Muslims, the State is not the primary focus of identity but religion. He demonstrated this with the introduction of Shariah by some State Governments in Nigeria. The Muslims seized to their advantage, however, is not without implications for the Nigerian State. We argued that we are all living witnesses to the legal and constitutional encumberment of Shariah. This will without doubt have political implication for the Nigerian–U.S strategic relations in the Gulf of Guinea, realizing the U.S stance on Islamic identities and civilization. The above scenario will likely pose some security threat to the Nigerian State as the U.S is avowedly anti-Islamic in its war against terror. We also know that terrorism is a convenient clichés that is used when its suits the fancy of the United States and other Western countries.

The threat of anti-Western terrorism is credible and present, though precise level and nature of the threat vary. Concern is also concentrated in Nigeria’s northern region, the fear that indigenous terrorist groups, abetted radical Islamist groups following Osama Bin Laden’s exhortation in early 2003 to focus on Nigeria has seek to exploit rising discontent in Nigerian government and its close ties with the U.S, policy makers have also conclude that the radical Islamist movement, the Nigerian Taliban or Boko Haram have operational linkages or collaboration with groups affiliated with Al-Qaida. Theresa Whelan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for African Affairs declared the discovery of a “new threat paradigm” — the threat of “Ungoverned space” in Northwest and West Africa (Whelan, 2005). Strategist at the pentagon had invented a new security threat which
increased the funding of European Command’s (EUCOM) foot print in West Africa. Maya Rockey Moore of Trans Africa forum argues that “the United States is creating this military build up under the guise of counter terrorism. The reality is they are protecting oil flow disruption as their national interest (Lasker, 2006). Also testifying before the senate Armed services committee in 2005, EUCOM’s then Commander, General James Jones emphasized that his command’s “objective in Africa should be to eliminate ungoverned areas, to counter extremism and to end conflict and reduce the chronic instability” because of Africa’s “potential to become the next front in the Global War on Terrorism” (James, 2005). In the same vein John Pike of Global Security organization noted that “they are not just training. They are going in there and tracking down evil – doers, they have a license to hunt (Lasker, 2006).

However, the function of EUCOM initiatives in West Africa Constantly invokes the security and stability of Nigeria. General Jones presented Nigeria a threatened from the North by Jihadists hiding in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel, allegedly supported by transnational Islamist net works extending into Nigeria. EUCOM main objective focuses on securing Nigerian and Gulf energy supplies. In a way to achieve this strategic goal American military planners have launched a two pronged pincer movement whose main objective was the “Ring – Fencing Nigeria” from the north and South. In the South, the Navy rapidly increase their patrols in the oil fields of the Gulf of Guinea, bolstered by U.S funding of an $800,000 port and airfield feasibility study of STP. In the North, American troops funded by the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) are deployed in training and advised missions designed to monitor and if necessary, seal Nigeria’s Northern border. An intensive search was carried out for any evidence linking northern Nigerians with International Islamic terrorism. This pincer strategy, of course, extremely troubled many
Nigerian, which actually undermined Nigeria’s internal security interest and its security implication on Nigeria.

Also the United States military presence in the Gulf of Guinea and the Niger Delta in particular is no longer in doubt. However, the disclosures that followed the invasion of Iraq by the United States led forces leave us with worry as it places Nigeria at risk and underpins the United States strategic relations in the Gulf of Guinea. The revelations that there were no Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq and that the decision to invade Iraq was predicated on the need to secure oil supply line to the United States and other Western nations indicates that as major oil supplier, Nigeria is similarly at risk. Nigeria as indicated above is heavily dependent on oil and therefore a major player in the Gulf of Guinea Project. Any disruption of this precious supply is likely going to impact negatively on Nigeria economy, which no doubts is not without colossal implications on its national security concerns. In the light of this necessity of oil to the United States, it is only natural that the United States would do anything possible to protect its interest even it is including subversion of Nigerian security in favour of its own strategic interest in the region.

The United States thrust is underpinned by a doctrine fashioned out by her Defence Department over the past ten years that takes into consideration the relationship between capitalism, and resources control and conflicts on the other hand, and the potential impact of such conflict on the West’s energy requirements. Developed by the U.S and apparently endorsed by the G8, the overall security concern is how to deal with actual or potential crises from resources – rich areas in the Southern hemisphere.

The key objective among other issues is to prevent “hostile power” from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control be sufficient to generate “global power rivalry”, the power of the United States. Thus, the doctrine fashioned out military strategy and
ideological justification for intervention to ensure that resource-rich areas keep pumping resources for capitalist interest. We must remember that the U.S seeks through its new security strategy to establish flexible “defence capability” that allows for “rapid intervention” in order to keep supply open. As a military strategy, arms sales and transfer, military education and training, and military bases have formed the three major pillars. These of course, have heightened the crises in the Niger Delta in particular and Nigeria in general.

5.2 CONCLUSION

From the above discussions, it is clearly shown that the Gulf of Guinea and the Niger Delta, in particular, is treated as an economic colony and that the United States will do anything possible to protect her interest without apology. Again, given our study that Nigeria and the United States oil relations have convergent and yet contradictory security interest in the Gulf of Guinea, it is entirely predicable that security cooperation is moving forward in the Delta and the Gulf of Guinea. Meanwhile, Nigeria–U.S security can not be compatible, because the interests are divergent.

Again, we have seen evidence confirming the scale of mission creep into West Africa since 2001 on the part of the American forces. Today the U.S military is patrolling the Gulf, training Nigerian security forces and sending them to the Niger Delta, and “ring fencing” the northern borders with the help of American advisors. No large scale American military intervention in Nigeria is on the horizon. However, the reluctance could be seen from the “over stretched” and “distressed” U.S military to become mixed in another quagmire like in Iraq. Nonetheless, there is an unmistakable trends towards increased American military involvement in West Africa’s oil regions and more specifically, in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. As long as America’s energy security policy relies on increasing amounts of
imported oil from the Gulf of Guinea, and Nigeria depends completely on oil and gas exports to fund its mono-export economy, the security interest of Nigeria and the United States will remain deeply intertwined and also conflictual.

In sum, AFRICOM is the principal tool of a U.S Realpolitik agenda in Africa. We should therefore, understand it as being only partially constructed; contested by African nations, as well as, other institutions within the U.S government which is, largely unable to carry out anything other than security functions for which it receives little in the way of resources when compared with other regional commands.

The particular challenges of implementing the ambitious AFRICOM agenda feed directly into the consequences that the apparent militarization of energy security is having for the Niger Delta. Instead of dedicating resources to the developmental goals envisaged in the planning stages of AFRICOM, security assistance and arms transfers have characterized the organization’s engagement with Nigeria. Indeed, arms transfers to African countries have actually increased since AFRICOM was established; from $8.3 million of transfer in 2009 to $25.6 million in 2010 in a budget for AFRICOM that does not appear to include money, set aside for development projects. Nigeria has received arms shipments totalling $1.3 million, as well as receiving surplus speedboats from the U.S coastguard, and increased financing for counter-narcotics and military training (Volman, 2009; 2010). This suggests that the U.S is indeed committed to prioritising counter-insurgency operations above developmental goals. The Niger Delta crisis is the result of complex interactions between a number of causal factors, involving exclusionary political structures, an inequitable economic structure within Nigeria, and unaddressed grievances relating to social deprivation and environmental degradation. As Idemudia and Ite (2006:402) argue:
“any genuine attempt at resolving the crisis must address the root causes of the conflict that arose from structural deficiencies, proximate and trigger causes that are due to systemic anomalies within the Nigerian... addressing only one issue (e.g. political, social, economic or environmental) would not guarantee peace in the region...”

The problem with the U.S approach is that it does not seek to address any one of these issues, choosing instead to reinforce the military capability of the Nigerian state. We can thus understand counter-insurgency as a deficient approach to resolving the Niger Delta, actually working against the creation of conditions necessary to end hostilities.

Finally, in the Niger Delta, however, a “hand line” security approach has failed abysmally, with grotesque human right abuses only igniting more insurgencies and deepening criminality. Similarly, the American policy favouring stability at all lost has failed to deliver energy security. We argue here that democratic governance and conflict resolution are the only routes to securing the Niger Delta and those multilateral institutions, the United States and Nigeria must increase funding and support for democratization programs in the Niger Delta and Nigeria in general. The only way to secure the Niger Delta is to raise health, education and living standards, ameliorate conflicts over resources and broadly transform residents of the region into bona fide stakeholders who will benefit from oil revenues. Ultimately, unless democracy is consolidated in the Niger Delta, American energy security will be at risk as supplies will be threatened by chaos.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Deriving from the above observations Nigerian policy makers must as a matter of urgency study the implication of U.S presence in the Gulf of Guinea region and take advantage of the situation for the interest of Nigerians.
This being the case, it is imperative that Nigeria and the United States pursue the following goals and actions.

1. Pay more attention to the issues affecting the Niger Delta. This is because if the Niger Delta were to be engaged in protracted hostilities, involving ethnic fighters and the Nigerian Army, the impact would certainly affect all other oil producing regions of West Africa. The reason being that the conditions that apply in the Niger Delta also apply to the countries including the oil producing communities in Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Angola etc. Basically throughout the aforementioned countries, the indigene of the region in which oil is founds are the most deprived and marginalized. The present situation can be easily altered by a change of policy and attitude on the part of Nigerian leaders, Western oil companies and Western Nations. In this light, Government at the various levels should cease to lip services to the plight of the oil producing communities, quit – project base or interventionist measures to adopt programme – based development process. The authorities should adopt a more holistic and proactive approach to the abject conditions of this region.

2. As a follow up to the above, the authorities should persuade the oil companies to institute an affirmative action plan that should include the following requirements.

(a) That a certain percentage of their work force comes directly from the region.

(b) That a certain percentage of their incomes must be reinvested in the region through infrastructural and institutional development.

(c) The provision of skill – building educational and training programmes, medical facilities and community development.
(d) Payment of certain percentage of land rights directly to the communities in which they explore oil and gas.

(e) A proactive community relation program.

3. It is necessary that Nigeria must seek the cooperation of the U.S in military activities to protect its vast territorial frontiers and develop its local capacity. However, Nigeria must be very careful not to surrender her sovereignty to the U.S.

4. Nigeria must constantly review its defence preparedness by establishing guidelines for the Air Force, Navy, Army and all existing intelligence and security authorities.

5. National Security Agency (NSA) must be empowered financially to collate and analyze intelligence data gathered by all the existing security agencies to give Nigeria an added advantage within the region.

6. Nigeria must endeavour to closely monitor what the U.S intends to do within the region before it is acted out.

It is our utmost conviction that these actions are necessary if peace and stability are to be established in the Gulf of Guinea and the Niger Delta in particular.
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The envoy, Thursday, August 28, 2007