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ASSERTIVENESS, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ANCHORING AS PREDICTORS OF PREFERRED CONFLICT RESOLUTION STYLES

BY

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DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

NOVEMBER, 2012

ASSERTIVENESS, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ANCHORING AS PREDICTORS OF PREFERRED CONFLICT RESOLUTION STYLES

An M. Sc thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Master of Science (M.Sc) Honours Degree in Social Psychology

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DR. L.I. UGWU

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TITLE PAGE

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SUPERVISORS: PROF. P.N. IBEAGHA

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that Ome, Blessing Nneka, a postgraduate student of the Department of Psychology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka with registration number PG/M.Sc-PhD/10/52650 has satisfactorily completed the requirement for course and research work, for the award of Master of Science (M.Sc) degree in Social Psychology. The work embodied in this thesis is original and has not been submitted in part or full for any other diploma or degree of this or any other university.

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DEDICATION

This piece of work is dedicated to my parents, Dr. and Mrs. Ome, whose wholehearted support and encouragement both financially and otherwise brought me this far.

Most importantly, it is dedicated to the Lord God Almighty, for His unfailing grace and enablement all through the way.

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However, the author takes full responsibility for inaccuracies of facts, and any other deficiencies that might exist in this work.

Ome, Blessing N.

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ABSTRACT

Assertiveness is proffered as a panacea to conflict which ought to promote peaceful co-existence, but individuals in a bid to be assertive often create more problems. Thus, the study investigated the predictive relationships of assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring with five conflict resolution styles in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. It involved 403 participants composed of 248 males and 155 females randomly sampled from Ebonyi State University, Abakiliki. Their ages ranged between 18-38 years, with a mean age of 22.68 years, *SD* = 3.70. The study adopted a cross-sectional survey. The Rathus Assertiveness Schedule (RAS) (Rathus, 1973) was used to assess assertiveness; the Nigerian version of the Tromso Social Intelligence Scale (TSIS) (Silvera, Martinussen & Dahl, 2001) was used to measure three facets of social intelligence – social-information processing, social awareness, and social skills; the Anchoring scale, developed by the researcher was used to assess two facets of anchoring – haste and insufficient adjustment; and the Conflict Scenarios and Rating scale of Preference for Methods of Conflict Resolution (Ojiji, 1998) was used to assess preference for threat,

acceptance, negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Results indicated a significant negative relationship between assertiveness and acceptance (β = -.13, t = -2.40, p = .02) in intergroup conflict situation; and assertiveness and negotiation in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations (β = -.11, t = -1.10, p = .05; β = -.13, t = -2.48, p = .01, respectively). There was also a significant positive relationship between social-information processing and negotiation in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations (β = .12, t = 2.34, p = .02; β = .11, t = 2.09, p = .04, respectively), as well as social-information processing and arbitration (β = .12, t = 2.25, p = .03) in intergroup conflict situation. Social-information processing had a significant negative relationship with threat (β = -.13, t = -2.51, p = .01), and insufficient adjustment had a significant positive relationship with threat (β = .14, t = 2.59, p = .01), while social awareness had a significant positive relationship with negotiation (β = .12, t = 2.27, p = .02), all in interpersonal conflict situation. Also, there were significant ethnic group differences in preferred conflict resolution styles, with Igbo showing higher preference for negotiation, mediation and arbitration in both conflict situations. There were no significant interaction effects of the predictor variables. These findings imply that negotiation might not be effective when the parties are highly assertive, and adequate and accurate information processing as well as awareness of socially acceptable behaviours facilitate negotiation.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable part of human existence. It is a condition of disharmony in an interactional process, and represents part of the dynamics of the relationship between human beings (Imobighe, 1995). It is an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance within or between social entities (Rahim, 1992), in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party (Wall & Callister, 1995). It may involve direct confrontations between groups or

individuals in which each side fears that the other is about to frustrate its major interests (Acland, 1990; Gire & Carment, 1993a; Hollander, 1971; Isard, 1992; Weeks, 1992). It occurs when there is a sharp disagreement or clash of divergent ideas and interests between people and nations (Oyeshola, 2005), and the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs or concerns.

Conflict is the simultaneous occurrence of two or more mutually antagonistic impulses or motives (Chaplin, 1979; Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Wilson & Hanna, 1990). It is a pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different individuals or groups, and connotes disagreement, dispute or controversy in ideas, opinions or viewpoints which are often rooted in people's beliefs and perceptions as opposed to objective facts. People tend to have different perceptions of conflict, and one's perception of a conflict tend to influence the approach one employs in solving the conflict. Conflict can either be latent or manifest (Robey, Smith & Vijayasarathy, 1993), which can be expressed overtly or subtly (Ting-Toomey, 1985). Simply put, conflict is a difference that matters (LeBaron, 2003).

Conflict is not limited to interpersonal relationships. Rather, it involves relationships between and among groups, societies, organizations, and nation-states (Cosher, 1968; Forsyth, 1990). It may also have personal (internal or external), ethnic, political, socio-economic, cultural or religious undertone. It is therefore a clash of divergent ideas, values, beliefs, and interests, which occurs along cognitive, emotional and behavioural dimensions in an interactive process.

Conflict poses considerable challenge to the human race. Stories of different forms of conflict dominate reports in local, national, and international news media. Within the African continent alone, communal disputes have claimed tens of thousands of lives and several thousands more are in refugee camps in different sections of the continent (Ojiji, 1998). Conflict

spots in Africa still include – Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan. In Europe, the Bosnian crisis was a big embarrassment to the continent.

In Nigeria, people are conversant with the incessant ethno-religious conflicts in the Northern parts of the country which has made life in that region very insecure. According to Yakubu (1995), between 1980 and 1985, violent sectarian clashes were witnessed between Muslim extremists (Marwa Maitatsine sect) and the more moderate Muslim groups in Kano, Maiduguri, Gombe, and Yola. However, between 1987 and 1992, the conflict pattern changed and became Muslim-Christian conflict, with clashes erupting in Kafanchan, Zaria, Kano, Bauchi, and Kaduna. Yakubu further documented instances of conflicts occurring along inter-ethnic group lines to include blood conflicts in Zangon Kataf between the Hausa-Fulani and Kadara of Southern Kaduna; the Kasuwan Magani conflict involving Hausa-Fulani, Kadara and Gwari; the Ogoni-Adoni conflict in Rivers state; the Tiv-Jukun in Taraba state; the Tiv (Mbaduku)-Udam in Benue and Cross River states; the Tiv (Masev)-Northern Idoma in Benue state; Tiv (Nongov-Iharev)-Doma in Awe of Benue and Plateau states, and many more recorded in the media (Ojiji, 1998; Otite & Albert, 2007). Recently, it was the Boko Haram menace which is a Muslim sect that seeks to abolish the secular system of government, and establish Sharia law in the country. This sect was responsible for more than 450 killings in Nigeria in the year 2011 (AlJazeera, 2011; Olugbode, 2011). According to the United States Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, Boko Haram carried out 136 attacks and killed 590 people in 2011 (The Nation, 2012).

Furthermore, piece-meal reports in both foreign and local media have shown increasing cases of interpersonal conflict resulting in overt aggressive acts between parties. For instance, a farmer strangled a 92-year old colleague over a land dispute (The African Social News Network,

2012), while a bloody clash between some Hausas and Yorubas over a commercial sex worker claimed the lives of three persons and left no fewer than thirty vehicles burnt (The African Social News Network, 2012). In terms of material cost, Tamen, Eki and Ihaji (1994) estimated the cost of the numerous social conflicts in billions of naira. On the other hand, Northern Nigeria lost more than nineteen billion naira on a daily basis due to the crisis and insecurity caused mainly by the frequent Boko Haram bomb attacks in the region (The Moment Newspaper, 2012). Today, the picture presented about human life is one of increasing helplessness in spite of technological sophistication (Ojiji, 1998). This picture shows that the human ability to resolve conflicts has stagnated (Gire & Carment, 1993a; Ojiji, 1998), despite the fact that human beings have gone to the moon and returned, have split the atom, have started human life in test tubes, have reached the inner recesses of the brain, have achieved even the unimaginable, but have remained shackled with problems that are primarily human (Ojiji, 1998). However, human helplessness is not in the sense that nothing is being done at all. Rather, it is in respect of the limited success of human effort at reducing conflict.

Conflicts do not erupt suddenly, instead they unfold through stages – the emerging stage, the escalating stage, the most severe, the de-escalating stage, and the rebuilding and reconciliation stages (Oyeshola, 2005). According to Sandole (1993), conflict is a dynamic phenomenon which consists of five stages – initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination or resolution. It arises from the pursuit of divergent interests, goals and aspirations by individuals and groups in defined social and physical environments. Once it begins, it often acquires an unsettling, self-perpetuating nature (Brockner, Rubin & Lang, 1981).

One of the challenges facing social scientists in the 21st century is being able to manage conflicts in the intra and interpersonal domains (Onyeizugbo, 2008). Conflict is generally

conceptualized as an incident of mutual opposition, and so its resolution requires actions that terminate the oppositional exchange (Collins & Laursen, 1992; Jensen-Campbell, Graziano & Hair, 1996). Conflict resolution is a process and involves a wide range of methods used in addressing sources of conflict.

Over the years, approaches to conflict have manifested in many ways from power-bargaining techniques, normative and legal approaches, to psychological attempts to change attitudes of participants in simulation groups, problem-solving, conflict management to conflict resolution. Conflict resolution as a field of study focuses on reducing violence, and helping people develop communication and problem-solving skills. It involves the use of both verbal and non-verbal means of communication. It is a variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems, distinct from management or transformation of conflict (Miller, 2003). It is essentially aimed at intervention to change or facilitate the course of a conflict. It performs a healing function in societies, and provides opportunity for the examinations of alternative pay-offs in a situation of positioned disagreements. It restores normalcy in societies by facilitating discussions, and placing conflicting parties in situations where they can choose alternative positive decisions to resolve differences.

The evolving movement toward Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), sometimes referred to simply as conflict resolution, grew out of the belief that there are better options than using violence or going to court, and describes informal methods used by disputants to resolve disputes (Acland, 1990). It includes such non-formal legal arrangements as negotiation, arbitration, mediation, conflict avoidance and threats (Acland, 1990; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Gire & Carment, 1993b; LaTour, 1978). Conflict resolution therefore refers to a wide range of processes that encourage non-violent dispute resolution outside of the traditional court system.

Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) indicate that in conflict resolution, it is expected that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved; there is a changed structure of the conflict; with non-violent behaviours and hostile attitudes exterminated. In conflict resolution, the issues in conflict are satisfactorily dealt with through a solution that is mutually acceptable to the parties, self-sustaining in the long run and produces a new, positive relationship between parties that were previously hostile adversaries (Mitchell & Banks, 1996). In other words, conflict resolution connotes a sense of finality, where the parties to a conflict are mutually satisfied with the outcome of a settlement, and the conflict is resolved in its true sense. Conflict is normal and the conflict resolution strategy adopted depend on both one's conflict style (patterned responses to conflict in a variety of situations) and conflict resolution skills.

It has been asserted that conflicting parties in natural settings typically have a range of strategic options which they must evaluate and select from (Lawler & Bacharach, 1976). In other words, apart from the formal legal approaches to resolving conflicts, other non-formal methods have been used by individuals and groups since prehistoric times. However, as Acland (1990) stated, it appears that modern society simply generates too much conflict and too much complexity for all of it to be resolved through the courts (cited in Ojiji, 1998). According to Acland, over 90% of the disputes in Britain are resolved out of court. Considerable interest is therefore being shown in the non-formal methods of resolving disputes. In Western societies, for instance, the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Movement in North America has discouraged dependence on formal legal means of resolving conflicts. The central thrust of this movement is to provide people with satisfactory means to resolve disputes without all the time, expense and complication of formal court procedures (Acland, 1990).

The strategies employed to overcome conflict commonly encompass the categories of overt anger, compromise, avoidance, social support, obliging and distraction (Bird & Harris, 1990; Feldman & Gowen, 1998; Gross & Guerrero, 2000; Maccoby, 1988; 1990). Conflict resolution as a process of defusing antagonism, and reaching agreement between conflicting parties generally includes peaceful negotiation, mediation, arbitration, diplomacy, collaboration, compromise, community conferencing, negotiated rulemaking, reconciliation and the "peace process" (peacemaking, peace keeping, peace enforcement and peace building). Other strategies include self-enhancement, threatening to leave the relationship, coalition formation and conflict avoidance (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962). Nigerians were found to prefer the use of negotiation and arbitration in resolving their conflicts (Gire & Carment, 1993a, 1993b).

Thus, this study is concerned with five approaches to conflict resolution which have been the focus of concerted research (Heuer & Renrod, 1986; Ojiji, 1998; Sternberg & Dobson, 1987). These methods include; threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration (Gire & Carment, 1993a).

Threat to the other party – This is when one of the parties in conflict notifies the other party of an intention to publicize the other party's action, and thus damage the other party's image and reputation.

Acceptance of the situation – This implies that one of the parties complies with the demands of the other party. This corresponds with what Blau (1964) called conflict avoidance which enables a person avoid the risk or effort associated with confrontational strategies.

Negotiation – In this case, the parties seek compromise in order to reach a solution acceptable to both parties. In Blau's typology, this is called self-enhancement, and involves an attempt to

persuade the other party that one's position is good enough to warrant attention by the other party.

Mediation – This is when the parties seek the assistance of a third party to assist them in negotiation. In this way, they try to reach an agreement (settlement) by following the mediator's guidance.

Arbitration – An arbitrator is someone who has the power and authority to settle disputes decisively. Parties seek the assistance of an arbitrator so that both parties will explain their viewpoints. The arbitrator will then make a final decision that must be followed by both parties (Gire & Carment, 1993a); because they have agreed in advance to the impartial judgement of the arbiter (Acland, 1990).

It appears that there is a new awareness of the efficacy of these methods of resolving conflicts, prompting Acland (1990) to describe the upsurge in interest in them as the sudden outbreak of common sense. This new awareness comes with increasing interest on the part of scholars on the determinants of preference for these methods (Ojiji, 1998). As the extant literature indicates, method preference is related to perceived fairness of the procedure (Thibaut & Walker, 1975); the type of conflict (Gire & Carment, 1993a); gender of disputant (Gire & Carment, 1993a, 1993b; Tehrune, 1970); and culture (Rahim, 1983, 1992; Ting-Toomey, 1985). Lawler and Bacharach (1976) observed that in conflict settings, persons typically evaluate the context and alternatives available to them before undertaking some action which they regard as cognitive processes preceding the development of plans of action.

Conflict is a conscious act involving personal or group contact and communication (Otite & Albert, 2007), and one of the factors in interpersonal conflict is lack of communication (Berne,

1964; Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991; Johnson & Johnson, 1999; Verderber & Verderber, 2001). At the root of communication problems is social skills deficit (Alberti & Emmons, 1995; Richmond & McCroskey, 1995; Rook, 1998), and among the social skills deficit implicated in interpersonal relationship difficulties is lack of assertiveness (Alberti & Emmons, 1995; Bower & Bower, 1991; Onyeizugbo, 2001, 2003; Phelps & Austin, 1997). When faced with difficult situations, animals have two options; flight (non-assertion) or fight (aggression); humankind has a third option – assertiveness, which is essentially a considered response to difficult situations (Bishop, 2010).

Assertive behaviour focuses on the inalienable right of the individual to openly express his/her feelings to the person who generates the feeling (Alberti & Emmons, 1978; Ezeilo, 2005). Assertiveness is being able to express yourself with confidence, without having to resort to passive, aggressive or manipulative behaviours. In conflict situations, one may choose to be passive or aggressive, but an assertive response is invariably the preferable one, and leads to win-win situations where both parties feel good about themselves (Bishop, 2010). Passive and aggressive behaviours often come naturally to human beings, whereas assertive behaviour requires a cognitive process (learning) rather than a gut reaction. In other words, assertiveness encompasses multidimensional aspects of human expression, including behaviour, cognition and affect (Yong, 2010). Behaviourally, assertive individuals are able to express their emotions, defend their goals, and establish favourable interpersonal relationships (Colter & Guerra, 1976; Herzberger, Chan & Katz, 1984), while cognitively and affectively assertive individuals can appropriately deal with both positive and negative emotions (Gladding, 1988).

Assertiveness is seen as the ability to express one's own thoughts and feelings, and defend one's own right to behave in certain ways without violating the rights of others (Alberti &

Emmons, 1986; 2001; Galassi & Galassi, 1977). It is social boldness and frankness (Rathus, 1973) and reflects people's expression of their genuine feelings, standing up for their legitimate rights, principles, values, goals, preferences and beliefs, as well as refusing unreasonable requests (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Nevid & Rathus, 2007; Wilson & Gallois, 1993; Yong, 2010). Assertive behaviour refers to the ability to make requests; actively disagree; express personal rights and feelings; initiate, maintain or disengage from conversations; and to stand up for self (Fensterhem & Baer, 1975; Lazarus, 1973; Rathus, 1972, 1973; Rich & Schroeder, 1976). It is the appropriate expression of feelings in ways which do not infringe upon the rights of others (Alberti & Emmons, 2001; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966). It is also the appropriate expression of any emotion other than anxiety toward another person (Wolpe, 1982). It is the expression of social boldness by which an individual claims right, and voices out true feelings in social settings in ways that would maximize reinforcement (Onyeizugbo, 2001, 2003). Assertiveness therefore implies ability to express one's thoughts and feelings with confidence, without having to resort to passive, aggressive, or manipulative behaviours. Its communication involves respect for the boundaries of oneself and others which presumes an interest in the fulfillment of needs and wants through cooperation (Gottman, 2000). Cassell and Blackwell (2002) maintained that assertiveness exists on a continuum, including positively assertive, non-assertive and negatively assertive.

The assertiveness context has received increased attention from communication researchers (McCroskey, Beatty, Kearney & Plax, 1985), and assertiveness is communicated both verbally (Rose & Tyron, 1979) and nonverbally (McFall, Winnett, Bordewick & Bornstein, 1982). Assertive communication of personal opinions, needs and boundaries has been conceptualized as the behavioural middle ground lying between ineffective passive and

aggressive responses (Donohue & Fisher, 2008), which emphasizes expressing feelings forthrightly, but in a way that will not spiral into aggression (Goleman, 1996). It is more adaptive than either passivity/submissiveness or aggressiveness (Alberti & Emmons, 1995; Bower & Bower, 1991; Zakahi, 1988). It is the mid-point in the submissive-aggressive behaviour continuum, and enhances self-esteem, satisfactory interpersonal relationships, and effective conflict management (Onyeizugbo, 2001, 2003, 2008; Weiten & Lioyd, 2003).

However, assertiveness is often criticized on the premise that it is not practiced in a balanced way, because it is complex, sensitive and situation-specific (Dalamater & McNamara, 1987), that is, behaviours that are assertive in one circumstance, may not be so in another (Argyle, 1981). It is sometimes conceived to imply the attempt to satisfy one's own needs and desires at the expense of the other person(s) being related with (Ojiji, 2009), which manifests in defending one's rights in a given situation and pushing a position favourable to oneself or one's group. More particularly, while unassertiveness courts one set of problems, over-assertiveness creates another (Swiss, 2001), and most often, self-assertion (a determined advancement of one's own rights, claims, opinions, or wishes in a conceited manner) is misconstrued for assertiveness. Assertiveness manuals indicate that many people in a bid to be assertive tend to go too far, beyond basic assertion and escalating assertiveness, thereby readily abusing assertiveness techniques and crossing the assertive threshold bridge. Experts in assertive behaviour research have noted that the appropriateness of an assertion depends on the skill with which it is emitted (Eisler, Hersen, Miller & Blanchard, 1975) and on the extent to which it adheres to the social and cultural norms of the environment in which it is emitted.

Thus, as a remedy to the problems that stem from assertiveness, there seems to be a need to combine assertiveness with social intelligence in human relations. Social intelligence is

pivotal in managing the complexity of being social animals. Studies on intelligence over many years focused mainly on the adaptive use of cognition, but in recent years theorists such as Gardner (1983, 1999) and Sternberg (1985, 2002) have suggested more encompassing approaches to conceptualizing intelligence. Sternberg suggests that there are other dimensions of intelligence – social intelligence, emotional intelligence and practical intelligence. Over the last few decades, theories of multiple intelligences have broadened the concept of intelligence beyond intelligence quotient (IQ) to include emotional, creative, practical, social, existential, and spiritual intelligences (Bar-On, 2000; Emmons, 1999, 2000; Gardner, 1983; Goleman, 2001; Halama & Strizenec, 2004; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2004; Silvera, Martinussen & Dahl, 2001; Sternberg, 1997a, 1997b).

Thorndike (1920) divided intelligence into three facets as pertaining to the ability to understand and manage ideas (abstract intelligence), concrete objects (mechanical intelligence) and people (social intelligence). According to Gardner's (1983) theory of multiple intelligences, intelligence is not a unitary cognitive ability, but there are eight (and perhaps more) quite different kinds of intelligence. Two are explicitly personal and social in nature, that is, intrapersonal (ability to understand one's own emotions) and interpersonal (ability to understand the emotions of others). Likewise, social intelligence is explicitly represented in Sternberg's triarchic view of intelligence (Sternberg, 1984, 1985). According to the triarchic theory, intelligence is composed of analytical, creative and practical abilities. Practical intelligence is defined in terms of problem solving in everyday contexts and explicitly includes social intelligence (Sternberg & Wagner, 1986). Bar-On (2005) talked of emotional-social intelligence, and according to him, it is composed of a number of intrapersonal and interpersonal competencies, skills and facilitators that combine to determine effective human behaviour. To

Albrecht (2004) human intelligence has six primary dimensions – abstract (conceptual reasoning, ability to manipulate verbal, mathematical and symbolic information); social (ability to interact successfully with others in various contexts); practical ("common sense" capabilities; the ability to solve problems and get things done); emotional (self-insight, and the ability to regulate or manage one's reactions to experience); aesthetic (appreciation of form, design and relationships); and kinesthetic (whole-body competence, e.g. singing, dancing or flying an airplane). Undoubtedly, social intelligence is a multifaceted construct, and among others, Bjorkqvist, Osterman and Kaukiainen (2000) argued that social intelligence has three different components: perceptual, cognitive-analytical and behavioural. In this sense, a socially intelligent individual is one who is capable of producing adequate behaviour for the purpose of achieving desired social goals.

Social intelligence is required for all types of conflict behaviour, both prosocial and antisocial (Bjorkqvist, Osterman & Kaukiainen, 2000), because it incorporates interpersonal compassion and social concern. It is the ability to act wisely in human relations (Moss & Hunt, 1927; Thorndike, 1920; Vernon, 1933) as well as understand other people, and how they will react to different social situations (Delic, Novak, Kovacic & Avsec, 2011; Livergood, 2006; Silvera, Martinussen & Dahl, 2001). Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987) defined social intelligence as the individual's fund of knowledge about the social world and an ability to comprehend social situations (Campbell & McCord, 1996; Honeywill, 2012; Rapaport, Gill & Shafer, 1968) for socially successful conduct (Foleno, 2009; Humphrey, 2003). It encompasses specific abilities such as perceptiveness of others' internal states and moods, general ability to deal with other people, knowledge about social rules and social life, insight and sensitivity in complex social situations, use of social techniques to manipulate others, perspective taking, and social

adaptation (Albrecht, 2006; Buzan 2002; Kosmitzki & John, 1993; Marlowe, 1986; Silberman 2000). It is the extent to which one is able to adapt one's behaviour to what is appropriate in any situation.

Social intelligence is simply people's skills. It is an awareness of situations and the social dynamics that govern them, and knowledge of interaction styles and strategies that can help a person achieve his/her objectives in dealing with others. It also involves a certain amount of self-insight and a consciousness of one's own perceptions and reaction patterns (Albrecht, 2006; Walker & Foley, 1973; Wedeck, 1947). It may be regarded as an overall construct for understanding how successfully people manage social relationships (Friborg, Barlaug, Martinussen, Rosenvinge & Hjemdal, 2005).

However, social intelligence quotient is not a fixed model or attribute (Piaget, 1972), but a complex hierarchy of information-processing skills underlying an adaptive equilibrium between the individual and the environment. An individual can therefore change their social intelligence quotient by altering their attitudes and behaviours in response to their complex social environment. It is closely related to cognition and emotional intelligence and involves cognitive processing and emotional information (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Silvera, Martinussen and Dahl (2001) operationalised social intelligence into a scale (TSIS) containing three distinct components: social information processing (the ability to understand and predict other peoples' behaviours and feelings); social (un)awareness (the tendency to be unaware of or surprised by events in social situations) and social skills (the ability to enter new social situations and social adaptation). The first two factors are related to cognitive aspects of understanding and interpreting ambiguous social information, while the last factor, social skills, is vastly different and relates to positive beliefs about one's social performing abilities. Social intelligence is

therefore, the application of social knowledge and skills in social situations for ease of social interactions.

Social intelligence is made up of social cognition (Goleman, 2006), and is closely related to the theory of the mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). At some point, human beings do not actually perceive reality, instead they create it at the instant of perception. Each person ingests his/her own reality, which becomes the net result of one's perceptions, reactions, interpretations, and distortions. They respond not to reality as it is but reality as construed, and much of our social information processing is automatic (Myers, 2010). In other words, one's perception is not devoid of cognitive biases.

There are startling and often-confirmed biases and logical flaws in how individuals perceive and understand one another (Jussim, 2005). With precious little time to process so much information, one's cognitive system is fast and frugal and therefore, specializes in mental shortcuts. As a result, one uses heuristics to form impressions, make judgements, and invent explanations (Myers, 2010). Heuristics are simple, efficient thinking strategies which enable one to live and make routine decisions with minimal effort (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008), and using heuristics often involves fallacies and biases (Baron & Byrne, 1987).

Biases are the errors and distortions that crop up in the way people use social information and think. Therefore, cognitive bias is psychological. It does not arise from any calculated pursuit of self-interest. Instead, it is a reflection of cognitive and motivational processes or biases in the way human beings interpret information and situations, evaluate risks, set priorities and experience feelings of gain or loss. A cognitive bias is a pattern of deviation in judgement that occurs in particular situations, and used to describe many observer effects in the human mind,

some of which can lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgement, or illogical interpretation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Cognitive biases can have undesirable effects, because persons' judgements and consequently, behaviours are fraught with errors and mistakes of various sorts. They are systematic deviations from normative models that prescribe rational behaviour, as articulated by game theory and other normative principles (Gelfand & Brett, 2004), and presumably result from information-processing heuristics, such as framing, anchoring and overconfidence (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). According to Gelfand and Brett (2004), they emanate from faulty information processing.

The study of heuristics and biases has been an active topic in cognitive psychology for over three decades now (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Khaneman & Tversky, 1973, 1996, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the last decade, researchers have become concerned with cognitive heuristics and biases affecting negotiation behaviour and outcomes (e.g. Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Hastie, 1988, 1990). There are a host of seemingly benign beliefs and cognitions that interfere with effective conflict resolution, but often go undetected (Thompson & Nadler, 2000). Common ways of thinking which are effective and accurate in normal circumstances can systematically produce errors and wrong judgements in a conflict situation, because a conflict situation challenges the cognitive and physiological resources of the actors involved (Ojiji, 2009).

In conflict, bias is apt to occur because conflict often leads to inadequate communication between parties, arousal of emotional tensions that constrict thinking to stereotypes and to black-and-white viewpoints, as well as primary focus on opposed interests and anxiety (Thompson & Nadler, 2000). One of the biases that garnered scholarly attention in negotiation research is

anchoring. The anchoring heuristic stems from Tversky and Kahneman (1974), where one starts with a salient or convenient value and adjusts to an estimate that seems right. It reflects the human tendency to rely too frequently on a piece of information despite other alternatives when making decisions. This influence is also virtually immune to corrective attempts (Wilson et al, 1996).

Much of the information needed to be known about people is not easily accessible. Thus, it is inferred from their behaviour and spoken words. This leads to misperception and misunderstanding because of individual differences in background (gender, class, culture, ethnic group, social role, religion, values, etc.). As a result, misunderstanding, error and bias in judgement occur, which in turn influence decision-making. People make many decisions based on biases and heuristics (shortcuts) in their thinking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Stanovich, Sai & West, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1973). These mental shortcuts lighten the cognitive load of making decisions, but also allow for a much greater chance of error (Sternberg, 2006). The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic is a mental shortcut by which people adjust their evaluations of things by means of certain reference points called end-anchors (Sternberg, 2006). This heuristic is most often statistically derived and expressed, despite the possibility that it could be a tendency in human beings which might exist as a behavioural trait.

Anchoring occurs when individuals overly rely on a specific piece of information to guide their thought-process. Once the anchor is set, there is a bias toward interpreting other information and this in turn affects decisions. For instance, in Nigeria, sometimes, individuals take certain decisions that could make or mar one's life based on previously garnered information or experiences, despite other alternatives. Decisions are taken on the basis of what has happened in the past, or in reference to something else to which the partners involved might

not be directly connected. In other words, decisions made tend to reflect the "anchored" information and not the objective facts. Humankind has the tendency of exhibiting this trait in certain circumstances where they are required to take decisions or make choices. Through this cognitive bias, the first information learned can affect future decision-making and information analysis, and this could be implicated in one's preference for conflict resolution styles both in interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. In conflict situations, one's approach or resolution style reflects past information or experience, which in turn renders the notion of individual differences null and void. Moreover, anchoring seems to be related to other judgemental phenomena, like over-attribution (Leyen, Yzerbyt, & Corneille, 1996; Quattrone, 1982) and hindsight (Pohl & Hell, 1996).

From the foregoing, assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring are some individual differences variables that could be linked to preference for conflict resolution styles, and this study is concerned with five approaches to conflict resolution (Heuer & Renrod, 1986; Ojiji, 1998; Sternberg & Dobson, 1987). These methods include; threat to the other party (threat), accepting the situation (acceptance), negotiating with the other party (negotiation), seeking the assistance of a third party (mediation), and seeking the assistance of an arbitrator (arbitration) (Gire & Carment, 1993a). This approach is adopted because, studies indicate that management/superior officers or labour unions/subordinate officers were proposed to often use confrontation, withdrawal, forcing, smoothing and compromise whenever conflict occur in organizations (Eze & Uzuegbunam, 2010) and not in interpersonal or intergroup relationships. However, differences in preferred conflict resolution styles could be as a result of ethnic affiliation. Hence, differential socialization could result in differences in value for threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation and arbitration.

According to Ojiji (1998), apart from Gire and Carment's studies (Gire & Carment, 1993a, 1993b), evidence relating to procedural preference has come from the Western world. Thus, very little is known about the psychological factors involved in the choice of different methods of conflict resolution in Nigeria. This calls for more work in this area in Nigeria. Evidence from Nigeria and other cultures will increase knowledge about the determinants of procedural preference (Ojiji, 1998).

Statement of the Problem

The focus of this study is to determine if assertiveness, social intelligence, and anchoring could predict one's preference for conflict resolution styles in interpersonal and/or intergroup contexts.

Assertiveness is proffered as a panacea to conflict which ought to promote peaceful co-existence. However, individuals in an attempt to be assertive often create more problems. They tend to go too far, particularly when there is divergence of interests, consequently, worsening the situation. On the other hand, one's level of social intelligence might be a factor implicated in the promotion of peaceful resolution or an aggravation of the conflict situation. Nevertheless, in the process of making decisions, certain biases tend to inhibit objectivity in the perception of information, and accurate interpretation of situations. Studies of the anchoring effects usually ask people to compare an anchor number to some unknown quantity, thereby presenting anchoring bias as stemming from comparison. However, there is a paucity of research where anchoring is assessed as a behavioural bias which tends to influence decision and choice-making, despite the fact that recent research on anchoring indicates that an active thought process underlies the emergence of this bias (Bodenhausen, Gabriel & Lineberger, 2000). On the other hand, ethnicity

could be a factor in preferred conflict resolution style. Thus, societies that have remained relatively peaceful might differ from those with recurrent episodes of conflict in their preferences.

Hence, the study seeks to answer the following questions;

1. Would assertiveness predict preference for particular conflict resolution style among threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration in interpersonal and intergroup contexts?
2. Would social intelligence predict preference for particular conflict resolution style among threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration in interpersonal and intergroup contexts?
3. Would anchoring predict preference for particular conflict resolution style among threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration in interpersonal and intergroup contexts?
4. Would ethnicity predict preference for particular conflict resolution style among threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation and arbitration in interpersonal and intergroup contexts?

Purpose of the Study

The study seeks to:

1. Examine whether assertiveness would predict preference for particular conflict resolution style among threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration in interpersonal and intergroup contexts.

2. Examine whether social intelligence would predict preference for particular conflict resolution style among threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration in interpersonal and intergroup contexts.
3. Examine whether anchoring would predict preference for particular conflict resolution style among threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration in interpersonal and intergroup contexts.
4. Examine whether ethnicity would predict preference for particular conflict resolution style among threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration in interpersonal and intergroup contexts.

These are done with the purpose of finding out if preference for conflict resolution styles could be predicted by multiple variables (assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring), as well as determine the extent of collinearity between these predictor variables. In addition, the study is proposed with the intention of contributing information on factors that could be implicated in the evaluation of and selection from the range of strategic options available to conflicting parties in natural settings. It will also contribute to research in this area from African (Nigerian) viewpoint, which will hopefully facilitate comparison across various cultures.

Operational Definition of Terms

Assertiveness: This refers to the extent one expresses one's thoughts and feelings with confidence in social settings, without having to resort to passive, aggressive or manipulative behaviours, as measured by Rathus Assertiveness Schedule (RAS) (Rathus, 1972, 1973).

Social Intelligence: This refers to the ability to understand and predict other peoples' behaviours and feelings, not to be unaware of or surprised by events in social situations, and to enter new

social situations and social adaptation, as measured by the Nigerian version of the Tromso Social Intelligence Scale (TSIS) adapted from Tromso Social Intelligence Scale (TSIS, Silvera, Martinussen & Dahl, 2001).

Anchoring: This refers to a behavioural bias characterized by tendency to rely too frequently on a piece of information despite other alternatives when making decisions or choosing from multiple options, which occurs in form of haste and insufficient adjustment, as measured by the Anchoring Scale developed by the researcher.

Preference for Conflict Resolution Methods: This refers to the degree to which a person would adopt any of these approaches in resolving conflict: - threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration as measured by the Conflict Scenarios and Rating Scale of Preference for Methods of Conflict Resolution (Ojiji, 1998).

Students: This refers to undergraduates of Ebonyi State University, Abakailiki.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with theoretical positions relevant to the study, while the second section involves review of relevant empirical studies.

Theoretical Review

In this section, two theories of assertiveness; two theories of social intelligence; four theories of anchoring; and four theories that have been used by researchers to support the view that various factors tend to influence one's preference for methods of conflict resolution are discussed.

Theories of Assertiveness

Behavioural Theory (Wolpe, 1958, 1973)

This theoretical proposition posits that, one's failure to develop assertiveness is conceived to be a function of learned anxiety responses. Wolpe (1949) advocated using assertive behaviour as an anxiety inhibitor. Based on this, the principles of operant conditioning and reciprocal inhibitor suggest that non-assertive behaviour results primarily from the punishment of assertive behaviour, and the concomitant conditioning of anxiety responses to assertive cues (Galassi & Galassi, 1977).

This position implicitly assumes that non-assertive behaviour represents an avoidance reaction due to anxiety experienced in situations which require assertive behaviour. However,

non-assertive behaviour may be as a result of one's lack of assertiveness skills, or a failure to differentiate appropriate information regarding what constitutes an appropriate response (Galassi & Galassi, 1977; Mac Donald, 1975). People who have mastered the skill of assertiveness are able to greatly reduce the level of interpersonal conflict in their lives. This implies that assertiveness reduces the negative effects of conflicts. Thus, one's level of assertiveness or non-assertiveness could influence one's preference for conflict resolution styles, and consequently accounts for the resolution of conflict or its aggravation.

Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1978; Galassi & Galassi, 1977)

This theory opines that assertiveness or non-assertiveness is learned through the observation of significant models rather than direct conditioning of anxiety. Consequently, inhibition of assertive behaviour is as a result of observed punishment of the model's assertiveness, whereas, expression of assertiveness as opposed to direct anxiety reduction techniques relies primarily on the results from observed rewards of the model's behaviour (Rich & Schroeder, 1976).

To this perspective, an individual who fails to learn and perform assertive behaviours may have had limited exposure to assertiveness-competent models (Bandura, 1978; Richman, 1972). In other words, assertiveness is learned through observation of positively reinforced assertive behaviour of role models in social settings. Through socialization experiences, assertiveness is inculcated in an individual. Thus, the learned assertiveness or non-assertiveness from assertiveness competent or incompetent models tends to manifest when faced with conflicting situations, thereby determining preference for conflict resolution styles.

Theories of Social Intelligence

Triarchic Theory of Intelligence (Sternberg, 1985)

Fundamental to Sternberg's theory of intelligence is the idea that intelligences are developing abilities rather than fixed characteristics of an individual (Sternberg, 1998). It is a cognitive approach to intelligence which defines human intelligence as mental activity directed toward purposive adaptation to, selection and shaping of, real-world environments relevant to one's life (Sternberg, 1984). Thus, intelligence is how well an individual deals with environmental changes throughout his/her life span. His theory includes three facets – analytical (componential); creative (experiential); and practical (contextual). Analytical intelligence is similar to the standard psychometric definition of intelligence which reflects how an individual relates to his/her internal world or academic problem-solving skills. Creative intelligence involves insights, synthesis and the ability to react to novel situations and stimuli which reflects how an individual connects the internal world to external reality. Practical intelligence involves the ability to grasp, understand and deal with everyday tasks which reflects how the individual relates to the external world about him/her.

It is defined in terms of problem solving in everyday contexts and explicitly includes social intelligence (Sternberg & Wagner, 1986). Therefore, social intelligence is practical intelligence directed toward goals, operates in the real world and is indicated by one's attempts to adapt to one's environment. It involves individuals applying their abilities to the kinds of problems that confront them in daily life, such as on the job or in the home. This centres on tacit

knowledge which is what one needs to know, in order to work effectively in an environment and it is often not verbalized. Sternberg and colleagues found that practical intelligence as embodied in tacit knowledge, which increases with experience, and is socially acquired (Sternberg, Forsythe, Hedlund, Snook, Williams, Wagner & Grigorenko, 2000). Therefore, practical intelligence is exercised in social settings which are not devoid of conflicts. As a result, one's level of practical intelligence is often manifested in how he/she tackles disagreement that stems from social relationships and interactions. It could also influence one's preference for methods of resolving conflict.

Theory of Multiple Intelligences (Gardner, 1983)

Instead of focusing on the analysis of test scores, Gardner (1983) proposed eight distinct intelligences that are based on skills and abilities that are valued within different cultures. These are - visual-spatial intelligence, verbal-linguistic intelligence, bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, logical-mathematical intelligence, interpersonal intelligence, musical intelligence, intrapersonal intelligence, and naturalistic intelligence.

Two of these are explicitly personal and social in nature – intrapersonal (ability to understand one's own emotions) and interpersonal (ability to understand the emotions of others). Interpersonal has to do with interaction with others, and it is the ability to understand others. In theory, individuals who have high interpersonal intelligence are characterized by their sensitivity to others' moods, feelings, temperaments and motivations, and their ability to cooperate in order to work as part of a group. Emotional intelligence is viewed as part of social intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Thus, Gardner (1983) conceptualizes personal intelligences based on intrapersonal (emotional) intelligence and interpersonal (social) intelligence.

This theory states that not only do human beings have several different ways of learning and processing information, but these methods are relatively independent of one another. Social intelligence which is interacting successfully with others in various contexts continues to increase throughout one's life, given the appropriate experiences, challenges, and growth opportunities. It is the ability to get along well with others and to get them to cooperate with you, which involves an awareness of situations, the social dynamics that govern them, a knowledge of interaction styles and strategies that can help a person achieve his/her objectives in dealing with others, a certain amount of self-insight and a consciousness of one's own perceptions and reaction patterns.

In interpersonal relationships and skills, behaviour toward others is classified as either producing "toxic" and/or "nourishing" effects (Albrecht, 2006). Nourishing behaviour makes people feel valued, respected, affirmed, encouraged and competent, whereas, toxic behaviour makes people feel devalued, angry, frustrated, guilty or otherwise inadequate. A continued pattern of toxic behaviour (inability to connect with people and influence them effectively) indicates a low level of social intelligence, while a continued pattern of nourishing behaviour makes one much more effective in dealing with others and indicates high social intelligence. Thus, toxic behaviour could lead to conflict, while nourishing behaviour could reduce it, and one's level of social intelligence could determine one's preference for conflict resolution styles.

Theories of Anchoring

Four theoretical accounts of anchoring effects have been proposed and they suggest that anchoring results from – insufficient adjustment from a starting point, conversational inferences,

numerical priming, and mechanisms of selective accessibility. It is noteworthy, that these theoretical propositions are connected to one another.

Insufficient Adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)

They initially described the phenomenon of anchoring in terms of insufficient adjustment from a starting point. They opined that people tend to make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer, and these adjustments are typically insufficient. In other words, different starting points yield different estimates which are biased toward the initial value.

Adjustment may be insufficient because it terminates at the boundary of a region of acceptable values for the estimate (Quattrone, Lawrence, Warren, Souza-Silva, Finkle & Andrus, 1984). For example, participants who are asked whether the percentage of African nations in the UN is higher or lower than 65% may use this anchor value as a starting point; determine whether it is too high or too low, and then adjust in the appropriate direction until the first acceptable value is found. However, such insufficient adjustment to the boundary of a distribution of acceptable values is only possible if the anchor value falls outside this distribution, in that it constitutes an unacceptable value itself. This may be the case because the anchor value is absurdly extreme or it is known to be wrong. For instance, participants who in order to estimate the freezing point of vodka, self-generate the freezing point of water as an anchor. They are likely to know that 0° C constitutes an unacceptable value because the freezing point of alcohol is below that of water (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). As a result, they may adjust from this unacceptable value until the first acceptable value is reached.

However, anchoring effects are not only obtained for clearly implausible and unacceptable anchor values (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Therefore, it seems difficult to explain effects of plausible and acceptable anchors by an insufficient adjustment because for such anchors, there is no reason to adjust in the first place. Thus, the scope of the insufficient adjustment account appears to be limited to implausible anchors that are clearly unacceptable (Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). Consistent with this assumption, it has been demonstrated that insufficient adjustment only appears to contribute to anchoring effects if the critical anchors are unacceptable, self-generated values rather than acceptable, provided values (Epley & Gilovich, 2001).

Conversational inferences (Grice, 1975; Schwarz, 1994)

A second account attributes anchoring to conversation inferences. According to this reasoning, applying implicit rules of natural conversations (Grice, 1975) to standardized situations (Schwarz, 1994) allows participants to use the anchor value to infer the actual range of possible answers. Participants who expect the experimenter to be maximally informative in asking his/her questions, may assume that the provided anchor value is close to the actual value and consequently, position their estimate in its vicinity (Grice, 1975). Such conversational inferences may well underlie the effects of considering anchor values that are of clear relevance for the estimate to be made (Northcraft & Neale, 1987),

To this theory, the anchor value is seen as informative enough for judgement. Anchoring effects, however, also occur if the anchor values are clearly uninformative because they were clearly randomly selected (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), are implausibly extreme (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) or are not related to the question at all (Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke,

1996). In sum, although conversational inferences are potential determinants of anchoring in natural situations, they are not a necessary precondition (Mussweiler, Englich & Strack, 2004)

Numeric priming (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Wilson et al, 1996; Wong & Kwong, 2000)

This theoretical account assumes that anchoring effects are rather superficial and purely numeric in nature. In particular, solving a comparative anchoring task may simply render the anchor value itself more accessible so that this value is likely to influence the subsequent absolute judgement. From this perspective, the sole determinant of anchoring effects is the anchor value, regardless of its context, the target with which it is compared, and the judgemental operations in which it is involved.

Wong and Kwong (2000) opines that anchoring effects may be so superficial that not the anchor itself, but only its absolute value (e.g. “50” for an anchor of “-50°C”) is represented in memory and exerts the primary anchoring influence. However, evidence demonstrates that the semantic content that is associated with the anchor necessarily has to be taken into account to understand the complete pattern of findings in the standard paradigm. A purely numeric account cannot explain that anchoring effects depend on changes in the judgemental dimension (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). In other words, if anchoring effects were indeed evoked by the anchor value itself, then identical effects should result irrespective of the semantic content with which the anchor is associated. For instance, comparison made to a given anchor value should have identical effects on subsequent judgements because the numeric properties of the anchor value are left unchanged by changing the judgemental dimension. For example, comparing the height of the Brandenburg Gate to a given anchor value should have identical effects on subsequent judgements of the height and the width of the gate. However, this is not the case. Instead, the

magnitude of the anchoring effect is reduced if the comparative anchoring question pertains to another dimension than the absolute anchoring question (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997).

This numeric account implies that anchoring effects are fairly transitive and short-lived. Thus, because people are constantly exposed to arbitrary numbers, it assumes that one's daily routines should immediately wipe out the effects of solving a comparative anchoring task. However, anchoring effects can prevail for a week (Mussweiler, 2001) which conflicts with this implication. Therefore, a purely numeric conceptualization of the standard anchoring paradigm is rendered unconvincing (Mussweiler, Englich & Strack, 2004).

Selective accessibility (Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a, 1999b; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997)

The basic assumption of this model is that anchoring is in essence a knowledge accessibility effect and is thus semantic in nature. It attempts to explain anchoring by linking it to two principles that are fundamental to social cognition research – hypothesis-consistent testing and semantic priming.

It postulates that comparing the judgemental target to the anchor value changes the accessibility of knowledge about the target, and the accessibility of an anchor-consistent subset of target knowledge is selectively increased. This hypothesis-consistent testing is a general tendency that contributes to a variety of judgemental processes (Klayman & Ha, 1987), thereby increasing the accessibility of anchor-consistent knowledge. In order to generate the final numeric estimate, judges then rely primarily on easily accessible knowledge (Higgins, 1996), so that their estimate is heavily influenced by the anchor-consistent knowledge generated.

Conceivably, using this knowledge leads to high estimates, so that the final estimate is assimilated to the anchor value.

In sum, anchoring effects depend critically on the applicability of the knowledge that was rendered accessible during the comparative task; and the magnitude of anchoring depends on how applicable the knowledge that was rendered accessible during the comparative task is to the critical absolute judgement.

However, in this study, anchoring is postulated as a behavioural bias which is characterized by tendency to rely too frequently on a piece of information despite other alternatives when making decisions or choosing from multiple options. Thus, it is seen as an aspect of one's personality, which manifests when certain situations which require decision and choice making arise. This behavioural bias could be as a result of the retrieval of anchor-consistent information in decision-making and information-processing.

Theories of Preference for Conflict Resolution Styles

Dual-Concern Model (Blake & Mouton, 1979; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992) and Motivational Orientations (Messick & McClintock, 1968)

Over the last century, interpersonal conflict behaviour has been linked to underlying motivations variously identified as preferences, concerns, priorities, orientations, and values, which is concerned with interaction-specific objectives and general social motives (Mussweiler, Englich & Strack, 2004). Most studies revolve around dual-concern theory (e.g. Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992) and motivational orientations (e.g. Messick & McClintock, 1968), which posit that people vary in their attitudes about their own and their conflict partners' outcomes.

The dual-concern model makes predictions about strategic choice and it is an extension of Blake and Mouton's (1979) conflict grid (Filley, 1975; Thomas, 1976; Rahim, 1986). It views self-concern (concern about own outcomes) and other-concern (concern about the other party's outcomes) as dimensions that run from weak to strong. These dimensions are regarded as independent, rather than as opposite ends of the same dimension. High self-concern coupled with low other-concern (individualistic orientation) is assumed to produce use of a contentious strategy, while high other-concern and low self-concern is assumed to produce concession making. On the other hand, high self-concern and high other-concern is assumed to produce problem solving, while low self-concern and low other-concern is assumed to produce inaction, which implies absence of strategy.

In addition, four mutually exclusive "motivational orientations" appear to have a large impact on conflict resolution behaviour – individualistic orientation (exclusive concern about one's own outcomes); altruistic orientation (exclusive concern about the other parties' outcomes); cooperative orientation (concern about both parties' outcomes); and competitive orientation (desire to do better than the other party) (Deutsch, 1958; Messick & McClintock, 1968). The individualistic orientation tends to dominate thinking on negotiation, because all of the mathematical models of negotiation assume an individualistic orientation, and in much of the experimental research, participants have been instructed to be concerned only with their own outcomes. Also, many negotiators in reality are cooperatively or competitively oriented, and altruistic orientation is probably less common.

However, the psychometric tradition views strategic preferences as individual differences in "conflict style". Ruble and Thomas (1976) factor-analyzed self-reports about the use of various strategies in conflict situations, and found that a two-dimensional solution is always

found, with the largest distances between contending and yielding, and between problem solving and avoidance (van de Vliert & Prein, 1989), with the closeness between yielding and inaction being consistently different in the model. Oftentimes, a “compromise” strategy is included which seeks a solution in which both parties make concessions. It sometimes falls in the middle, equidistance from the four other strategies, but factor analysis usually locates it between yielding and problem solving, at a considerable distance from contending and inaction (van de Vliert & Prein, 1989). Thus, suggesting that a preference for compromise results from moderate self-concern coupled with high other-concern.

A combination of these dimensions yield different orientations that are often labeled pro-self or competitive (concerned with maximizing the positive difference between self and other), individualist (concerned solely with one’s own outcome) and pro-social or cooperative (concerned with maximizing joint outcomes). These social value orientations have been linked to assertive behaviours in social dilemmas and games (McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange, 1999) and in conflict and negotiation (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; De Dreu, Weingart & Kwon, 2000; Olekalns & Smith, 2003). Other interpersonal motives have been linked to conflict behaviour, such as communal values (Amanatullah, Morris & Curhan, 2008), agreeableness (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Jensen-Campbell, Graziano & Hair, 1996) and need to belong (De Cremer & Leonardelli, 2003). In addition, evidences show that identity motivations, such as the need to save face or maintain an image of toughness can affect conflict behaviour (White, Tynan, Galinsky & Thompson, 2004), and what people care about (their motives) affect their assertiveness in conflict and negotiation (Ames, 2010) consequently influencing their preference for a particular style of resolving conflict over the other.

Human Needs Theory (Burton & Sandole, 1986)

This theory operates on the premise that a pre-condition for the resolution of conflict is that fundamental human needs be met (Burton & Sandole, 1986). These needs include control, security, justice, stimulation, response, meaning, rationality, esteem/recognition and role-defense. Burton (1990) called these ontological needs because he regarded them as a consequence of human nature, which were universal and would be pursued regardless of the consequences. To him, conflict is a consequence of frustrated human needs, and the extent to which these fundamental human needs are met by the various conflict resolution strategies determine one's preference for conflict resolution styles.

Face-Negotiation Theory (Ting-Toomey, 1985)

This theory was first postulated by Ting-Toomey (1985) to explain how different cultures manage conflict and communicate. In essence, the theory applies specifically to conflict, and is based on identity management and a culture. The various facets of individual and cultural identities are described as "faces". The concept of "face" has been used to explain linguistic politeness rituals, apology acts, embarrassment episodes, requesting behaviours, and conflict interactions. "Face" is the claimed sense of favourable social self-worth and/or projected other-worth in a public situation (Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998), and conflict occurs when an individual or a group has their "face" threatened.

The locus of "face" is thus implicated in the direction of interaction, and is relevant to the communicators when navigating through an interaction or negotiation. People from collectivist cultures usually adopt conflict resolution methods more suitable to the group than to any

individual face in that group, because the "mutual face" or the face of the group is the top concern. People from an individualistic culture adopt conflict resolution methods depending on its suitability to the individual, because an individual has "a face" independent of that of the group.

The core assumptions of this theory include – people in all cultures tend to maintain and negotiate "face" in all communication situations; individualism and collectivism value patterns shape members' preference for self-oriented face concerns (i.e. verbal, direct tendency) versus other-oriented or mutual-oriented face concern (i.e. verbal, indirect-accommodating tendency); etc. However, overall empirical research evidence revealed that: individualists (e.g. German and U.S respondents) tended to use more direct, self-face conflict styles (i.e. dominating and competing), and collectivists (e.g. Chinese and Mexican respondents) tended to use more indirect, other-face concern conflict styles (i.e. avoiding and seeking third party help) (Oetzel, Garcia & Ting-Toomey, 2008; Oetzel, Ting-Toomey & Masumoto, 2001); while, individuals with independent self-construal personality types tended to use self-face concern defensive conflict strategies, and that interdependent self types tended to use avoiding and obliging conflict tactics (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Ting-Toomey, Oetzel & Yee-Yung, 2001), etc.

In other words, culture (collectivist-individualist), personality, etc. influence peoples' communication and resolution of interpersonal and intergroup conflict.

Theory of Procedural Justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975)

A procedure is an objectively defined process for decision making or dispute resolution that involves disputants, and a third party (Shapiro & Brett, 1993). Procedural justice refers to the idea of fairness in the processes that resolve disputes and allocate resources. This theory is

mostly credited to the empirical work of Thibaut and Walker (1975). Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) argued that disputants' preference for procedures for resolving disputes are influenced by three factors. The first is the judgement of procedural fairness, the second is the distribution of control within procedure and the third is the control exercised over the development and selection of information relevant to resolving the dispute (process control) or what Lind, Kanfer and Earley (1990) have called "voice effect."

According to Houlden, LaTour, Walker and Thibaut (1978) conflict resolution procedures can be distinguished in terms of the roles in which process control and decision control are vested. Process control refers to control over the argument and evidence to be considered in a conflict resolution session or hearing, whereas, decision control refers to power to specify and enforce a resolution of the conflict (Lind, Kartz, Musante, Walker & Thibaut, 1980). According to Ojiji (1998) this theory is the clearest statement of the determinant of procedural preference.

Since these views were expressed, a number of studies have been done to explore the factors relevant to preference for methods of conflict resolution (Gire & Carment, 1993a, 1993b; Leung, 1989; Lissak & Sheppard, 1983; McGillicuddy, Wilton & Pruitt, 1987; Shapiro & Brett, 1993). Whereas, Sternberg and Soriano (1984); Sternberg and Dobson (1987) reported strong consistencies in styles of conflict resolution with the same individual across various interpersonal conflicts, Gire and Carment (1993a) found type of conflict and gender to be related to (or influence) methods of resolving conflicts.

In a recent study, Shapiro and Brett (1993) found that judgement of procedural justice is significantly influenced by three mediating processes, namely, instrumental process, non-

instrumental process and procedural enactment. Instrumental process involves subjects having a say in the processes involved in conflict resolution while non-instrumental is the opposite, and subjects have no say in the process. On the other hand, procedural enactment refers to the actual conduct of the process by a third party (Shapiro & Brett, 1993). The authors reported that each of these processes explained a significant amount of the variance in judgement of procedural justice across procedures and contexts, with one exception; across outcomes. Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker and Thibaut (1980) found that the procedure used to determine an outcome can affect the perceived fairness of the outcome. They examined the relationship between perceptions of distributive justice and perceptions of procedural justice by examining the effects of outcome on an adjudication procedure and the effects of procedure on reaction to an adjudication outcome. Results showed that disputants saw the adversary procedure as fairer than the non-adversary, and that they saw the verdict as more fair and satisfying and as more accurate and unbiased when it followed an adversary trial. Outcome did not affect overall perception of procedural justice.

Thus, preference for conflict resolution styles is attributed to interaction-specific objectives (“faces,” value and cultural orientations, perceived procedural fairness, distribution of procedural control, and process control) and general social motives (human needs – control, security, justice, stimulation, response, meaning, rationality, esteem/recognition and role defense).

Empirical Review

Ames and Flynn (2007) conducted a study on the curvilinear effect of assertiveness on leadership relations which involved 42 women and 126 men with a mean age of 28.36 years (*SD* = 2.70) and found that a high level of assertiveness worsens relationships (social outcomes);

while a low level of assertiveness limits goal achievement (instrumental outcomes). Thus, the curvilinear effects of assertiveness were linked to underlying tradeoffs between social outcomes and instrumental outcomes. In organizational relationships, assertive people tend to be seen by others as more powerful than passive employees and they tend to adopt more structurally advantageous positions in social networks (Ames & Flynn, 2007). In the domain of interpersonal exchanges, assertive behaviour, such as an extreme opening offer in a negotiation, and reluctance to make concessions can dramatically increase instrumental outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart & Kwon, 2000; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).

Although a high level of assertiveness may entail instrumental benefits, it often carries social costs. Assertive people tend to be seen as less likeable and less friendly than unassertive people, even when assertive behaviour is considered effective, justified and appropriate (Kelly, Lawrence, Bradlyn, Himadi, Graves & Keane, 1982; Kern, 1982). Highly assertive people may damage their relationships and reputations because they are more willing to engage in conflict and to use defensive and/or unconstructive tactics with others (Graziano, Jensen-Campbell & Hair, 1996; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980). Conflict behaviours have been to a prediction that one's conflict partner may be aggressive, hostile or trustworthy (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Diekmann, Tenbrunsel & Galinsky, 2003; Kelly & Stahelski, 1970; Van Lange, 1992).

Kraft, Litwin and Barber (1986) found that cognitively assertive people possess the internal skills to cope with tragedies, while Saigh (1988) supported that such individuals are able to regain their assertiveness after experiencing traumatic events. Cassell and Blackwell (2002) reported that positively assertive individuals are able to express their emotions, attain specific goals, and experience peace and joy in their daily lives. In contrast, non-assertive individuals

tend to be highly anxious about their interpersonal interactions and fail to set logical goals, with the negatively assertive individuals setting socially undesirable goals despite their high anxiety.

On the other hand, research indicates that individuals high in social intelligence exhibited more pro-social behaviour, perspective taking, self-control in social situations, adaptation and compromise in relationships, value close relationships and have general advantage in social skills (Schutte, Malouff, Bobik, Coston, Greeson, Jedlicka & Wendorf, 2001). Thus, high social intelligence is described as beneficial to those with whom the individual interacts (Delic, Novak, Kovacic & Avsec, 2011). Newcomb, Bukowski, and Pattee (1993) reported that socially intelligent students have a behavioural repertoire (social problem-solving skills, positive social actions, and pro-social traits) that promotes success in friendships, while Adler, Kless and Adler (1992) observed that adolescents who reflect social intelligence seem to have some kind of social control that made them popular as well as acceptable among their mates. This finding was also buttressed by Meijs, Cillessen, Scholte, Segers and Spijkerman (2010) who found that perceived popularity was significantly related to social intelligence.

However, human judgement is often influenced by salient anchors, which may be one of the most remarkable influences. Anchoring effects pervade a variety of judgements (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a; Plous, 1989). They have been observed in people's evaluation of lotteries and gambles (Carlson, 1990; Chapman & Johnson, 1994, 1999; Lopes & Ekberg, 1980), estimates of risk and uncertainty (Plous, 1989; Wright & Anderson, 1989), perceptions of self-efficacy (Cervone & Peake, 1986), anticipations of future performance (Switzer & Sniezek, 1991), answers to general knowledge questions (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke, 1996), and willingness to pay for

consumer items (Ariely, Loewenstein & Prelec, 2003). These varieties of judgements range from the trivial (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999) to the apocalyptic (Plous, 1989). They have also been observed in price estimates and pricing decisions (Mussweiler, Strack & Pfeffer, 2000; Northcraft & Neale, 1987), probability assessments (Plous, 1989; Switzer & Sniezek, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), legal judgement (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Englich & Mussweiler, 2001) and negotiation (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Ritov, 1996).

Anchoring effect is influential in a plethora of laboratory, and real-world settings (Mussweiler, Englich & Strack, 2004) and is independent of many potentially moderating variables. Anchoring occurs even if the anchor values are clearly uninformative for the critical estimate, for example, because, they were randomly selected (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Also, anchoring remains uninfluenced by the extremity of the anchor (Chapman & Johnson, 1994) so that even implausible extreme values yield an effect (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). In addition, anchoring effects appear to be independent of participants' motivation (Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke, 1996) and participants' expertise (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). They persist over fairly long periods of time, and are characterized by exceptional temporal robustness (Mussweiler, 2001), that explicit instructions to correct for a potential influence of an anchor do not mitigate the effect (Wilson et al., 1996). Thus, anchoring effect is difficult to avoid (Mussweiler, Englich & Strack, 2004).

On the other hand, anchoring has been used to explain attitudinal phenomena (Quattrone, 1982) and more recently, the egocentricity of social judgement has also been attributed to an anchoring mechanism (Gilovich, Medvec & Savitsky, 2000). In addition, applications of the

anchoring concepts are also found in applied contexts, such as negotiations in organizational psychology (Neale & Bazerman, 1991).

Gluckman (1959) found that disputants in a “simplex” relationship (i.e. relationship confined to a single interest) rely on adjudication or arbitration in settlement, while those in “multiplex” relationship (i.e. relationship that serves many interests) rely on negotiation and mediation. On the other hand, Benjamin (1975) demonstrated that individualism-collectivism orientations are related to procedural preference. He found that Americans (individualists) were more likely to respond positively to statements that endorsed adversary adjudication (i.e. litigant process control), whereas, the Japanese (collectivists) were more likely to endorse statements in line with inquisitional procedure (i.e. judge process control). In addition, Leung and Lind (1986) further supported the notion that collectivists and individualists differ in their preference for procedures.

Leung, Bond, Carment, Krishnan and Liebrand (1990) examined the impact of cultural femininity on procedural preference and found that, in “feminine” cultures, interpersonal cooperation, friendly atmosphere and sympathy for the weak were most emphasized, whereas, in “masculine” cultures, achievement recognition and challenge were more emphasized. In the study, Dutch subjects (representing the feminine culture) preferred having enhancing procedures such as mediation and negotiation more, and confrontational procedures such as threats and accusations less, while Canadian subjects (representing the masculine culture) showed the opposite effects (Hui, 1988).

Gire and Carment (1993) compared Nigerian subjects (collectivists) with Canadian subjects (individualists) on preference for five methods of dealing with conflicts. One hundred

and twenty (120) Nigerian undergraduates were compared with one hundred and ten (110) Canadian undergraduates on the rating of their degree of willingness to use five methods in resolving hypothetical conflicts. It was found that Canadian subjects showed a clear preference for negotiation with Nigerian subjects showing an almost equal preference for both negotiation and arbitration. Furthermore, they reported that female subjects showed greater preference for negotiation than male subjects did, whereas, male subjects indicated a greater tendency to use threats. Ojiji (1998) investigated the influence of ethnic group, gender differences and value orientations on conflict resolution methods preference. He reported significant differences in preference for five methods of resolving conflict in six ethnic groups in Nigeria. The ethnic groups differed in threats, negotiation and mediation in interpersonal conflict, while in intergroup conflicts, they preferred acceptance of the situation and mediation most. On the other hand, males preferred arbitration and mediation, while females preferred threats, acceptance of the situation and negotiation more in interpersonal conflicts. However, in intergroup conflicts, males were higher in preference for threats, and arbitration, while females preferred negotiation, acceptance of the situation and mediation more.

Chaudhry, Shami, Saif and Ahmed (2008) investigated male-female differences in interpersonal conflict management styles in work settings using integrating, obliging, avoiding, dominating and compromising styles. They found that men and women did not differ significantly in handling interpersonal conflicts. However, women tend to excel in avoiding, obliging, and dominating styles, whereas, men appear to adopt integrating, and compromising styles. The preferred primary style among both during interpersonal conflict with their superiors is integration, while the secondary style among men is compromising and avoiding for women.

Shockley-Zalaback and Morley (1984) assessed male-female preferences for conflict styles, using 61 university students (20 males, 41 females) and 100 employed adults (28 males, 72 females). They completed a conflict mode instrument measuring preference for competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommodating conflict styles. Results showed significant differences between males and females for competitive and compromising conflict styles. Furthermore, Duane (1989) compared the extent to which 63 men and 7 women used five methods of conflict management in resolving 1st-step grievances of employees. Women were less inclined to avoid grievance-related issues, tended to be more competitive, and were less likely to accommodate their opponents' demands compared with men.

James and Owens (2004) investigated the peer victimization and conflict resolution experiences of adolescent girls attending a single-sex school (n = 325). Non-victims used less overt anger and avoidance than victims. Collectively, girls used more compromise, avoidance, social support and obliging than overt anger. Lawler and Bacharach (1976) observed that in conflict settings, persons typically evaluate the context and alternatives available to them before undertaking some action which they regard as cognitive processes preceding the development of plans of action.

These differences in choice of conflict resolution strategies could be influenced by other individual differences factors such as; level of assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring tendencies rather than being solely attributed to gender differences.

Summary of Literature Review

As the extant literature reveals, preference for conflict resolution styles is influenced by various factors such as motivational orientations (e.g. individualistic, altruistic, cooperative or

competitive) (Messick & McClintock, 1968); individual differences factors (Barry & Friedman, 1998); humankind needs (Burton & Sandole, 1986); individual and cultural identities (faces) (Ting-Toomey, 1985); value orientations (Ojiji, 1998); perceived fairness of the procedure; distribution of control within procedure; and process control (Thibaut & Walker, 1975); the type of conflict (Gire & Carment, 1993a); gender of disputant (Gire & Carment, 1993a, 1993b; Tehrune, 1970); and culture (Rahim, 1983, 1992; Ting-Toomey, 1985). Thus, in this study, individual differences variables – assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring would be explored pertaining to their relationship with preference for conflict resolution styles.

Research showed that the absence of anxiety is an indication of assertiveness, and failure to develop assertiveness is conceived to be a function of learned anxiety responses (Wolpe, 1958, 1973). However, some theorists opine that one could actually learn assertiveness through the observation of significant models rather than direct conditioning of anxiety (Bandura, 1978; Galassi & Galassi, 1977). Assertiveness influences one's behaviour and could be potent in predicting one's preference for conflict resolution styles.

On the other hand, social intelligence implies the application of knowledge in social settings which tends to increase with experience, and is needed for one to work effectively in an environment. It is interacting successfully with others in various contexts, and continues to increase throughout one's life given the appropriate experiences, challenges and growth opportunities (Gardner, 1983; Sternberg, 1985). It could be implicated in one's preferences, specifically in relation to preference for conflict resolution styles.

Also, the study intends to explore the extent to which anchoring predicts one's preference for conflict resolution styles. Anchoring is a behavioural bias which seems to manifest in various

contexts including conflict situations. Literature showed that anchoring effects is numeric in nature and statistically derived. Statistically, it was theorized that people tend to make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer, and these adjustments are typically insufficient, because different starting points yield different estimates which are biased toward the initial value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The initial value or starting point may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation.

However, some theorists were of the opinion that anchoring stems from conversational inferences where people apply implicit rules of natural conversations to standardized situations, and the anchor value is seen as informative enough for judgement (Grice, 1975; Schwarz, 1994). Furthermore, some studies suggest that anchoring is numeric, such that to solve an anchoring task, the anchor value is rendered more accessible that the value is likely to influence the subsequent absolute judgement (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Wong & Kwong, 2000). Thus, recent theories of anchoring effects highlight the role of biased memory retrieval process. However, according to this selective accessibility model, the presence of the anchor activates a confirmatory retrieval process that favours anchor-consistent information at the expense of anchor-inconsistent information. As a result, anchor-consistent information becomes more accessible at the time of numerical judgement and thus exerts more influence on judgement than anchor-inconsistent information (Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a, 1999b). Therefore, anchoring is perceived as being semantic in nature.

Preference for conflict resolution styles are influenced by various factors and in conflict situations, one's level of assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring tendencies could be implicated. Assertiveness techniques are situation-specific, readily abused and its

appropriateness depends on the extent to which it adheres to the socio-cultural norms of the environment in which it is emitted. On the other hand, its adherence to social and cultural norms of the environment in which it is emitted implies the need for social intelligence in assertiveness. However, certain errors crop up in the way people use social information and think, which could impede on objectivity in the perception of conflict and consequently, influence the resolution process. There is a dearth of studies in which one's level of assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring tendencies were combined to determine the extent to which they predict preference for conflict resolution styles. Thus, the study seeks to determine whether assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring will be critical variables in the prediction of preference for conflict resolution styles.

Hypotheses

1. Assertiveness would not significantly predict preference for any of the five conflict resolution styles – threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation and arbitration.
2. Social Intelligence would not significantly predict preference for any of the five conflict resolution styles – threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation and arbitration.
3. Anchoring would not significantly predict preference for any of the five conflict resolution styles – threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation and arbitration.
4. Ethnicity would not significantly predict preference for any of the five conflict resolution styles – threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation and arbitration.

CHAPTER THREE

Method

Participants

The study involved 403 undergraduates (248 males and 155 females) selected from Ebonyi State University, Abakiliki, Nigeria, using probability sampling technique. There are four campuses in the university, and two campuses were randomly selected. Using a table of random

numbers, two classes were selected from each of four departments, and from the class list, fifty undergraduates and an additional three students were randomly selected from each class. They were mostly single (96%) and Christians (97.5%). The ethnic groups involved were Igbo (n = 333), Hausa (n = 8), Yoruba (n = 15) and Others (n = 47). Their ages ranged from 18 to 38 years (M = 22.68; SD = 3.70).

Instruments

Four instruments were used in the study, namely: the Rathus Assertiveness Schedule (RAS, Rathus, 1973), the Nigerian version of the Tromso Social Intelligence Scale (TSIS) adapted from Tromso Social Intelligence Scale (TSIS, Silvera, Martinussen & Dahl, 2001), the Anchoring Scale developed by the researcher; and the Conflict Scenarios and Rating Scale of Preference for Methods of Conflict Resolution (Ojiji, 1998).

The Rathus Assertiveness Schedule (RAS)

The RAS is a standardized psychological assessment instrument developed by Rathus (1973) and validated for use with Nigerian samples by Anumba (1995). It is a 30-item inventory designed to assess assertive behaviour as a component of personality. The RAS requires participants to describe themselves using a code (3 = very much like me; 2 = rather like me; 1 = slightly like me; -3 = very much unlike me; -2 = rather unlike me; -1 = slightly unlike me).

In terms of scoring, more than half of the items (1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 26, 30) are reverse scored, and a sum of the results of the direct and reverse scored items gives the client's overall score, which could range from +90 to -90. Separate norms have been reported for male and female Nigerian samples as follows; males = 48.25, females = 48.61, (Anumba, 1995). The Nigerian norms were the basis for interpreting the scores of the

participants. Scores higher than the norms indicate that the client is assertive, while scores lower than the norms indicate non-assertiveness.

Previous research showed that RAS has high reliability (Del Greco, Breitbach, Rumer, McCarthy & Suissa, 1986; Kearney, Beatty, Plax & McCroskey, 1984; McCroskey & Beatty, 1984; Norton & Warnick, 1976; Pearson, 1979; Rathus, 1972, 1973), and high validity (Harris, 1979; Takashi, Shiomi, Masako, Ayako, Shinya, Norio & Shoji, 2003). Rathus (1973) reported a split-half reliability coefficient of .77, and an eight-week interval test-retest coefficient of .78, while Anumba (1995) obtained a concurrent validity coefficient of .25 by correlating RAS with Index of Peer Relations (IPR) (Hudson, Nurius, Daley & Newsome, 1986).

The Nigerian version of the Tromso Social Intelligence Scale (TSIS-IV)

The Nigerian version of the Tromso Social Intelligence Scale (TSIS) adapted from the Tromso Social Intelligence Scale (TSIS, Silvera, Martinussen & Dahl, 2001) (cited in Gini, 2005) purports to measure three facets of social intelligence; social information processing (SP), social awareness (SA), and social skills (SS). It is a 21-item questionnaire with each factor having seven items. Half of the items are reverse scored, while responses are scored along a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (describes me extremely poorly) to 7 (describes me extremely well). Gini (2005) reported internal consistency using Cronbach's coefficient alpha .80 for SP, .70 for SA, and .79 for SS.

However, for the purpose of this study, responses were scored along a 5-point Likert scale from 5 (very often) to 1 (never). As a result, some of the items that had conjunctions such as 'often' were modified. For instance, item 2 viz; "I often feel that it is difficult to understand others' choices" was changed to "I feel it is difficult to understand others' choices." This was

done in a bid to control for social desirability bias as well as reduce language barrier. These semantic labels (Very often; often; sometimes; rarely; never) were attached to each endpoint.

The instrument was subjected to face and content validities by 5 Lecturers (two industrial psychologists, one experimental psychologist, one developmental psychologist, and one clinical psychologist) in the Department of Psychology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Permission was also obtained from the author on its face and content validation.

Two hundred and seventy-one (271) participants drawn from the Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka were involved in the determination of the reliability of the scale in a Nigerian sample. Their responses to the TSIS were subjected to item and factor analyses and internal consistency using Cronbach's coefficient alpha .71, .54, .73, and .76 were obtained for Social information processing (SP) subscale; Social awareness (SA) subscale; Social skills (SS) subscale; and the entire Social intelligence (SI) scale respectively.

In terms of scoring, items 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, and 21, which are negatively worded, are reverse-scored. A sum of the direct and reverse-scored items gives the participant's overall score: the higher the score, the higher the level of social intelligence.

The Anchoring scale

The third instrument which is the Anchoring Scale developed by the researcher was used to measure anchoring as an aspect of personality. From the existing literature, 25 items were generated which require clients to rate themselves on a scale of 5 (very often) to 1 (never) in terms of frequency of reliance on available information in making decisions. It was subjected to

face and content validities by eleven Lecturers (two clinical psychologists, three experimental psychologists, four industrial psychologists, one developmental psychologist, and one counseling psychologist) in the Department of Psychology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Two hundred and seventy-one (271) participants drawn from the Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka were involved in the determination of the reliability of the scale. Their responses were subjected to item analysis, and items that had item-total correlation of less than .30 with the total scale were removed. Thus, items that loaded clearly on only one factor, with factor loading of ≥ .30 and attained factor structure of non-significant chi-square goodness-of-fit were selected. On this basis, 15 items were subjected to series of factor analyses. Exploratory factor analysis led to the emergence of two factors, and a factor correlation .61 was obtained, which implies that the two factors could be combined to form a scale. Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 loaded on one factor, Haste; while items 6, 7, 8, and 9 loaded on the second factor, insufficient adjustment. The scales' internal consistency reliability estimate is Cronbach's coefficient alpha .75. The reliability estimate for Haste is Cronbach's alpha .71; while that of insufficient adjustment is Cronbach's alpha .57. The anchoring scale was correlated with the five subscales of the Big Five Personality Inventory (BFI), and it correlated negatively with extraversion (-.16), agreeableness (-.31), conscientiousness (-.37), and openness (-.17), but positively with neuroticism (.41). This was done because it was assumed that anchoring is a relatively stable pattern of behaviour. Hence, it was necessary to determine that in its measurement, the personality traits reflected in the Big Five Personality Inventory used in the study were not being duplicated. Thus, there was a need to establish discriminant validity for the anchoring scale. It had a significant goodness-of-fit index .43.

In terms of scoring, item 3, which is positively worded, is reverse-scored. A sum of the direct and reverse scored items gives the client's overall score: the higher the score, the higher the anchoring tendencies.

The Conflict Scenarios and Rating Scale of Preference for Methods of Conflict Resolution

The fourth instrument which is the Conflict Scenarios and Rating Scale of Preference for Methods of Conflict Resolution is a standardized psychological instrument developed by Ojiji (1998). It consists of descriptions of two separate conflict scenarios reflecting interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations in which participants assumed principal roles in the conflict described. Each scenario was followed by a full description of five possible methods of resolving the conflict and participants were required to rate the methods on a 7-point scale for preference of usage to resolve the conflict ranging from 7 (most preferable) to 1 (least preferable). The measure was coded in terms of original ratings assigned to methods of resolving conflict (Ojiji, 1998). A sum of the ratings assigned to each method on all the items of a particular conflict scenario forms the participant's preference score for that particular method in the specific conflict situation: the higher the score, the higher the preference for the method.

Ojiji (1998) reported an inter-correlation of the ratings for the two types of conflicts done over two periods after a two-week interval to be as shown below:

Table 3.1: Inter-correlations of the preferences for methods of resolving two types of conflicts over two test situations

Methods of conflict resolution	Interpersonal conflict	Intergroup conflict

Threats	.88**	.84**
Accept the situation	.75*	.81**
Negotiation	.90**	.68*
Mediation	.86**	.74*
Arbitration	.76*	.83**

Key: * significant at $P \leq .05$; ** significant at $P \leq .01$.

This indicated a significant and positive relationship between the preference ratings of the methods over the two periods in both conflict situations, which serves as evidence of reliability of the rating scales.

Procedure

Four hundred and three (403) copies of the questionnaires were administered to participants individually in their classrooms with the aid of five research assistants. The nature of the study was explained to the participants in writing; their sincere responses were sought; and they were sufficiently guided and assisted in completing the questionnaires after eliciting informed consent from them. The instruments were collected immediately after completion. They received no monetary reward for participating in the study, and the researcher thanked the participants in groups after their completion of the instruments.

Design/Statistics

The study adopted a cross-sectional design. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was used for data analysis to test the hypotheses of the study. This is because the research aimed at predicting values on a criterion variable from multiple predictor variables, and regression analysis has predictive relationship ability, and estimated the level of collinearity between the predictor variables.

Chapter Four

Results

Descriptive statistics on the general use of the different styles of conflict resolution is presented first, followed by the descriptive statistics on the use of the styles by respondents from different ethnic groups involved in the study: the only demographic variable found to be significantly related to the use of the styles. This is followed by the results of statistical analysis performed to test the hypotheses. A summary of major findings is presented at the end of the chapter.

Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations for the Five Conflict Resolution Styles in both Interpersonal and Intergroup Conflict Situations

	Interpersonal		**Intergroup**	
	Mean	***SD***	**Mean**	***SD***
Threat to the other	**12.94**	**7.12**	**13.44**	**7.36**
Accept the situation	**18.32**	**7.00**	**16.71**	**6.68**
Negotiation	**25.79**	**7.66**	**25.78**	**7.27**
Mediation	**26.72**	**6.57**	**27.25**	**6.43**
Arbitration	**29.12**	**8.80**	**30.42**	**8.28**

The table of means show that use of arbitration had the highest mean both in interpersonal (M = 29.12; SD = 8.80) and intergroup (M = 30.42; SD = 8.28) conflict situations, while threat had the least mean usage both in interpersonal (M = 12.94; SD = 7.12) and intergroup (M = 13.44; SD = 7.36) conflict situations.

An examination of the mean scores of participants based on age, gender, religion and marital status showed that they did not differ significantly in preference for the five conflict resolution styles. However, there were ethnic group differences in preference for the styles in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. Therefore, the analysis controlled for ethnic group as a demographic variable in the analysis for testing of the hypotheses.

Table 4.2: Means and Standard Deviations of the Ethnic Groups for the Five Conflict Resolution Styles in Interpersonal Conflict Situation

	Threat		Acceptance		Negotiation		Mediation		Arbitration	
	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Igbo	12.95	7.37	18.35	7.02	26.24	7.73	27.23	6.39	29.99	8.52
Hausa	16.88	8.49	18.00	6.48	23.50	4.81	23.75	4.37	22.50	10.62
Yoruba	14.00	6.18	18.80	8.25	24.00	7.34	22.00	6.35	21.93	8.66
Others	11.89	4.91	17.96	6.74	23.60	7.33	25.11	7.37	26.43	8.66

Table 4.2 indicates that in interpersonal conflict situation, Igbo participants had the highest preference for arbitration, likewise other ethnic groups (*M* = 29.99, *SD* = 8.52; and *M* = 26.43, *SD* = 8.66, respectively), while Hausa had the highest preference for mediation (*M* = 23.75, *SD* = 4.37), and Yoruba had the highest preference for negotiation (*M* = 24.00, *SD* = 7.34). The least preferred style by all the ethnic groups in interpersonal conflict situation was threat (*M* = 12.95, *SD* = 7.37; *M* = 16.88, *SD* = 8.49; *M* = 14.00, *SD* = 6.18; and *M* = 11.89, *SD* = 4.91, for Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba and other ethnic groups respectively); and the second least preferred by all the ethnic groups was acceptance (*M* = 18.35, *SD* = 7.02; *M* = 18.00, *SD* = 6.48; *M* = 18.80, *SD* = 8.25; and *M* = 17.96, *SD* = 6.74 for Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba and other ethnic groups respectively).

Table 4.3: Means and Standard Deviations of the Ethnic Groups for the Five Conflict Resolution Styles in Intergroup Conflict Situation

	Threat		Acceptance		Negotiation		Mediation		Arbitration	
	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Igbo	13.38	7.60	16.75	6.82	26.14	7.34	27.80	6.16	31.45	7.93
Hausa	17.00	8.09	19.50	4.47	21.63	4.90	24.25	6.34	23.00	9.97
Yoruba	13.67	6.16	17.33	7.38	24.00	6.43	23.33	6.82	23.60	7.10
Others	13.21	5.74	15.77	5.63	24.53	7.08	25.13	7.37	26.53	8.21

Table 4.3 shows that in intergroup conflict situation, Igbo participants had the highest preference for arbitration (M = 31.45, SD = 7.93) likewise other ethnic groups (M = 26.53, SD = 8.21), while Hausa had the highest preference for mediation (M = 24.25, SD = 6.34), and Yoruba had the highest preference for negotiation (M = 24.00, SD = 6.34). The least preferred style by all the ethnic groups in intergroup conflict situation was threat (M = 13.38, SD = 7.60; M = 17.00, SD = 8.09; M = 13.67, SD = 6.16; and M = 13.21, SD = 5.74, for Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba and other ethnic groups respectively); and the second least preferred by all the ethnic groups was acceptance (M = 16.75, SD = 6.82; M = 19.50, SD = 4.47; M = 17.33, SD = 7.38; and M = 15.77, SD = 5.63, for Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba and other ethnic groups respectively).

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Table 4.4 shows that in interpersonal conflict situation, Hausa participants differed significantly from Igbo in preference for arbitration (β = -.12, t = -2.44, p = .02) with Igbo showing higher preference for the use of arbitration, while Yoruba differed significantly from Igbo in preference for both arbitration (β = -.17, t = -3.55, p = .00); and mediation (β = -.15, t = -3.06, p = .00) with Igbo showing higher preference for both styles than Yoruba. Other ethnic groups differed significantly from Igbo in preference for negotiation (β = -.11, t = -2.22, p = .03); mediation (β = -.10, t = -2.10, p = .04); and arbitration (β = -.13, t = -2.66, p = .01) with Igbo showing higher preference for all the three styles.

On the other hand, Hausa participants did not differ significantly from Igbo in preference for threat (β = .08, t = 1.54); acceptance (β = -.01, t = -.14); negotiation (β = -.05, t = -1.00); and mediation (β = -.07, t = -1.50); neither did Yoruba differ significantly from Igbo in preference for threat (β =.03, t =.56); acceptance (β = .01, t = .24); and negotiation (β = -.06, t = -1.11); nor did other ethnic groups differ significantly from Igbo in preference for threat (β = -1.05, t = -.95); and acceptance (β = -.02, t = -.36).

The table indicates that in interpersonal conflict situation, preference for threat was negatively and significantly influenced by social-information processing (β = -.13, t = -2.51, p = .01), and positively and significantly influenced by insufficient adjustment (β = .14, t = 2.59, p = .01). However, its preference was not significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = .05, t = .86); social awareness (β = .04, t = .83); social skills (β = -.04, t = -.67); and haste (β = -.01, t = -.17); nor were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

The table also shows that preference for acceptance was not significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = -.09, t = -1.70); social-information processing (β = .08, t = 1.43); social

awareness (β = .01, t = .22); social skills (β = .03, t = .50); haste (β = .10, t = 1.79); and insufficient adjustment (β = .04, t = .66); neither were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

In addition, the table indicates that preference for negotiation was negatively and significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = -.11, t = -1.10, p = .05); but positively and significantly influenced by social-information processing (β = .12, t = 2.34, p = .02); and social awareness (β = .12, t = 2.27, p = .02). However, preference for negotiation was not significantly influenced by social skills (β = .01, t = .11); haste (β = .04, t = .68); and insufficient adjustment (β = -.06, t = -1.17); neither were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

On the other hand, the table shows that preference for mediation was not significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = .01, t = .21); social-information processing (β = .02, t = .35); social awareness (β = .04, t = .77); social skills (β = .02, t = .38); haste (β = .03, t = .59); and insufficient adjustment (β = -.02, t = -.40); nor were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

Likewise, the table indicates that preference for arbitration was not significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = .02; t = .44); social-information processing (β = .01; t = .22); social awareness (β = -.03; t = -.61); social skills (β = .01; t = .09); haste (β = .01; t = .20) and insufficient adjustment (β = -.03; t = -.51); neither were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

Table 4.5 shows that in intergroup conflict situation, Yoruba and other ethnic groups differed significantly from Igbo in preference for mediation (β = -.13, t = -2.67, p = .01; β = -.13, t = -2.71, p = .01, respectively), while Hausa, Yoruba and other ethnic groups differed significantly from Igbo in preference for arbitration (β = -.14, t = -2.96, p = .00; β = -.18, t = -3.73, p = .00; (β = -.19, t = -3.96, p = .00, respectively) with Igbo showing higher preference for both mediation and arbitration.

However, Hausa, Yoruba and other ethnic groups did not differ significantly from Igbo in preference for threat (β = .07, t = 1.37; β = .09, t = .15; β = -.01, t = -.15, respectively); neither did they differ significantly in preference for acceptance (β = .06, t = 1.15; β = .02, t = .33; β = -.05, t = -.94, respectively); nor in preference for negotiation (β = -.09, t = -1.74; β = -.06, t = -1.12; β = -.07, t = -1.43, respectively).

In addition, the table indicates that preference for threat was not significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = .09, t = 1.65); social-information processing (β = -.10, t = -1.90); social awareness (β = .02, t = .37); social skills (β = -.04, t = -.73); haste (β = .03; t = .43); and insufficient adjustment (β = .06; t = 1.06), neither were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

Also, the table shows that assertiveness negatively and significantly influenced preference for acceptance (β = -.13, t = -2.40, p = .02), but its preference was not significantly influenced by social-information processing (β = -.08, t = -1.53); social awareness (β = .02, t = .43); social skills (β = -.01; t = -.18); haste (β = .06; t = .96); and insufficient adjustment (β = .06;

t = 1.05), nor were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

Furthermore, the table shows that preference for negotiation was negatively and significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = -.13; t = -2.48; *p* = .01); and positively and significantly influenced by social-information processing (β = .11; t = 2.09; *p* = .04), but was not significantly influenced by social awareness (β = .08; t = 1.57); social skills (β = -.03; t = -.44); haste (β = .04; t = .69); and insufficient adjustment (β = -.10; t = -1.90), neither were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

On the other hand, preference for mediation was not significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = -.07; t = -1.20); social-information processing (β = .09; t = 1.66); social awareness (β = .03; t = .48); social skills (β = -.01; t = -.24); haste (β = -.05; t = -.93); and insufficient adjustment (β = -.02; t = -.31), neither were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

Finally, preference for arbitration was positively and significantly influenced by social-information processing (β = .12; t = 2.25; *p* = .03), but was not significantly influenced by assertiveness (β = -.04; t = -.71); social awareness (β = -.04; t = -.75); social skills (β = .00; t = .04); haste (β = -.01; t = -.15) and insufficient adjustment (β = -.04; t = .76), neither were there any significant interaction effects of the predictor variables on its preference.

Summary of Findings

The results showed that;

- Preference for threat to the other party was negatively and significantly influenced by social-information processing; but positively and significantly influenced by insufficient adjustment in interpersonal conflict situation.

- Preference for acceptance of the situation was negatively and significantly influenced by assertiveness in intergroup conflict situation.

- Preference for negotiation was negatively and significantly influenced by assertiveness in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations; positively and significantly influenced by social-information processing in both conflict situations, and positively and significantly influenced by social awareness in interpersonal conflict situation. In addition, other ethnic groups differed significantly from Igbo in preference for negotiation in interpersonal conflict situation, with Igbo showing higher preference for negotiation.

- Preference for mediation was not significantly influenced by any of the predictor variables in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. However, Yoruba and other ethnic groups differed significantly from Igbo in preference for mediation, with Igbo showing higher preference for mediation in both conflict situations.

- Preference for arbitration was positively and significantly influenced by social-information processing in intergroup conflict situation. In addition, Hausa, Yoruba and other ethnic groups differed significantly from Igbo in preference for arbitration, with Igbo showing higher preference for arbitration in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations.

Chapter Five

Discussion

The hypothesis that assertiveness would not significantly predict preference for threat as a conflict resolution style was supported in both conflict situations. This finding confirms Eze and Uzuegbunam, (2010); Ojiji, (1998), who found that men and women report least use of threat and imposition in conflict situations. Moreover, the use of threats could be perceived as unassertiveness, which seems to veer more toward verbal aggression. In addition, assertiveness implies self-expression without having to resort to passive, aggressive or manipulative behaviours, which is considered the appropriate response to difficult situations (Bishop, 2010). Hence, the adoption of threat might be a violation of this assumption.

On the other hand, the hypothesis that assertiveness would not significantly predict preference for accept the situation was not confirmed. This is because assertiveness negatively and significantly predicted preference for acceptance of the situation in intergroup conflict situation. Thus, as assertiveness increased, preference for accept the situation (avoidance) reduced. This finding could be explained by the tendency to interpret acceptance of the situation as passivity and cowardice, and once an individual expresses a divergent opinion in a conflict situation, the implication is that the situation is unacceptable. According to Uzoka (1995), people rarely confront issues that need to be settled for good relationship to continue, they may rather

withdraw or perhaps deny the existence of the conflict. However, this might not be obtainable in situations where the individuals/parties are highly assertive.

Furthermore, the hypothesis that assertiveness would not significantly predict preference for negotiation was not confirmed, because assertiveness negatively and significantly predicted preference for negotiation in both conflict situations. Thus, as assertiveness increased, preference for negotiation reduced in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. This finding is in line with the findings of Ames and Flynn (2007) who found that assertiveness worsens relationships. This contradicts the goal of negotiation, which advocates for consideration and respect for the boundaries of oneself and others, and presumes an interest in the fulfillment of needs and wants through cooperation (Gottman, 2000). In addition, negotiation may be related to the concepts of inclusion and compromise which students adopted more in resolving conflicts (Eze & Uzuegbunam, 2010; Ojiji, 1998), and assertive behaviour though considered effective, justified and appropriate, often caries social costs (Kelly et al., 1982; Kern, 1982). This is because highly assertive individuals tend to insist on having their expected reinforcement.

In addition, the hypotheses that assertiveness would not significantly predict preference for mediation and arbitration were supported in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. This could be explained using the dual-concern theory (e.g. Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992) and motivational orientations (e.g. Messick & McClintock, 1968), which posit that people vary in their attitudes about their own and their conflict partners' outcomes. High self-concern coupled with low-other concern could predispose individuals to adopt a competitive orientation. As a result, may not be willing to input more efforts in seeking the assistance of a mediator or the intervention of an arbitrator in conflict situations. It could also be presumed that assertive behaviour involves the interests of the parties "directly" involved, and seeking the assistance of a

third party might deprive one of one's expected reinforcement. On the other hand, the involvement of a third party could be perceived as intrusion, while the decisions of an arbitrator could be seen as impositions by assertive individuals.

The hypotheses that social intelligence would not significantly predict preference for threat, negotiation, or arbitration conflict resolution styles were not confirmed, while the hypotheses that social intelligence would not significantly predict preference for acceptance and mediation conflict resolution styles were supported in this study. Social intelligence is made up of three distinct components; social-information processing (ability to understand and predict other peoples' behaviours and feelings); social awareness (tendency to be unaware of or surprised by events in social situations); and social skills (ability to enter new social situations and social adaptation). Social-information processing negatively and significantly predicted preference for threat in interpersonal conflict situation; positively and significantly predicted preference for negotiation in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations; and positively and significantly predicted preference for arbitration in intergroup conflict situation.

Thus, in interpersonal conflict situation, as social-information processing abilities improved, preference for the use of threat diminished, while preference for negotiation increased. This finding could be explained by the assertion that social-information processing is related to the cognitive aspects of understanding and interpreting ambiguous social information (Silvera, Martinussen & Dahl, 2001), and a clear understanding of situational requirements and demands could dispose one to abandon the use of threat and concede to negotiation. In addition, social intelligence centres on tacit knowledge which is socially acquired and increases with experience (Sternberg et. al., 2000), and one's accurate interpretation of the ambiguous social information perceived disposes one to reduce the use of threat, and seek concession.

Also, as social-information abilities improved, preference for arbitration in intergroup conflict situation increased. Thus, its significant influence on preference for arbitration in intergroup conflict situation could be explained by differences in opinions among group members, and an understanding and accurate interpretation of other peoples' behaviours and feelings might necessitate the involvement of a third party whose word would be law to the parties involved.

In addition, social awareness positively and significantly predicted preference for negotiation in interpersonal conflict situation. Thus, as social awareness improved, preference for negotiation increased. This could be explained by the notion that social awareness is also related to the cognitive aspects of social intelligence. It is the tendency to be aware of and not be surprised by events in social situations. The tendency of a conflicting party resorting to negotiation, which is similar to inclusion and compromise, is often based on one gaining an insight into the cause(s) and course(s) of disagreement, which could make one more inclined to negotiation. However, this is most likely the case when the conflicting parties have a cooperative orientation (concern about both parties' outcomes). According to the dual-concern theory (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), high other-concern and low self-concern is assumed to produce concession making, and this orientation is the outcome of an understanding and objective interpretation of what is socially expected and accepted, which stems from social awareness.

On the other hand, social skills did not significantly predict preference for any of the conflict resolution styles in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. This finding could be explained by the fact that social skills specifically relates to positive beliefs about one's social performing abilities, and not just the act of applying social knowledge and skills in social situations for ease of interactions (Silvera et al., 2001). It focuses on the emotional aspect of

social intelligence, rather than the cognitive or behavioural aspects; and one's rating of one's social skills might be prone to social desirability bias. Consequently, it was not a significant factor in predicting preference for conflict resolution styles. Also, subjective ratings of oneself could differ from actions (attitude-behaviour inconsistency).

The hypothesis that anchoring would not significantly predict preference for threat as a conflict resolution style was not confirmed in this study. Anchoring is made up of two distinct components; haste (tendency to make decisions hurriedly) and insufficient adjustment (tendency to make choices or take decisions based on anchor-consistent information). Insufficient adjustment positively and significantly predicted preference for threat in interpersonal conflict situations. Thus, as the tendency to insufficiently adjust to anchor-consistent information increased, preference for threat increased in interpersonal conflict situation. This significant prediction could be explained by the assumption that insufficient adjustment in the process of making decisions predisposes one to retrieving anchor-consistent information based on past beliefs and experiences, which might be fraught with errors and distortions (Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Mussweiler, 1997). As a result, in as much as men and women report the least use of threat and imposition in conflict situations (Eze & Uzuegbunam, 2010; Ojiji, 1998), they would use threat when they insufficiently adjust to anchor-consistent information, because decision-making would then be based on easily accessible knowledge (Higgins, 1996), rather than on objective facts.

However, anchoring was not predictive of preference for acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. This finding could be explained by the report that an active thought process underlies the emergence of anchoring (Bodenhausen, Gabriel & Lineberger, 2000), and this bias could predispose people to

adopt the least preferred approach (threat) to conflict resolution, rather than accepting the situation, negotiating or seeking the assistance of a mediator or an arbiter. On the other hand, the tendency to retrieve anchor-consistent information in information processing and decision-making processes might constrict participants' ratings to rely primarily on biased opinions and beliefs, rather than taking a purely objective approach to issues.

In addition, the findings indicate that Hausa, Yoruba and other ethnic groups, differed significantly from Igbo in their preference for negotiation, mediation and arbitration in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations, with Igbo showing higher preference for these styles. This finding is in line with Ojiji (1998), who found significant ethnic group differences in preference for negotiation and arbitration in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. It appears that these differences between ethnic groups are due to differential socialisation resulting in differences in value for negotiation, mediation and arbitration. On the other hand, the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts influence the evaluation and use of different styles of conflict resolution. According to Ojiji (1998), societies that have remained relatively conflict-free may show less preference for threats, and other more confrontational strategies.

Implications of Findings

The findings have both theoretical and practical implications.

Firstly, in theoretical terms, the findings relating to assertiveness and conflict resolution styles indicate that preference for negotiation which is often seen as an assertive approach to conflict both in interpersonal and intergroup situations, tend to reduce as assertiveness increases. Thus, negotiation might not be effective when the parties are highly assertive. This finding should be explored, since assertiveness is often proffered as a panacea to conflicts.

Secondly, social-information processing and social awareness which are components of social intelligence reduce the use of threats, and increase the use of negotiation and/or arbitration in the peaceful resolution of conflicts both in interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations. Thus, adequate and accurate information processing as well as awareness of socially acceptable behaviours would facilitate negotiation. Therefore, interaction-specific objectives and general social motives that underlie interpersonal conflict behaviours should be taken into consideration in the resolution processes.

Thirdly, objectivity or subjectivity in the interpretation of motives influences preference for conflict resolution styles, and in conflict, bias is apt to occur which constricts thinking to stereotypes and to black-and-white viewpoints (Thompson & Nadler, 2000). Thus, the tendency for bias to permeate the information-process should not be over-looked in conflict resolution.

Furthermore, social-information processing and social awareness advocate for cooperative orientation which produces concession making as well as a win-win situation, and should be adequately employed in conflict situations.

It is noteworthy that highly assertive behaviour does not encourage compromise or concession making, and might inhibit negotiation processes. Accurate social-information processing as well as adequate social awareness would encourage negotiation.

In addition, conflicting parties should be aware of the human tendency to perceive differences subjectively, owing to the fact that humankind tend to adjust insufficiently toward anchor-consistent information when making decisions, especially in conflict situations. As a result, there is a need to explore the extent to which behaviours of conflicting parties are based on hasty decisions or insufficient adjustment to anchor-consistent information.

In terms of practical implications, assertiveness has been found to be negatively related to acceptance and negotiation. Thus, there is a need to objectively assess the positions of the parties as well as their level of assertiveness, and resolve the conflict in a manner that would not advocate for concession, when they are highly assertive, and at the same time promote a win-win situation. Based on this, one can rightly say that the belief that assertiveness easily escalates to over assertiveness or self-assertion stems from the tendency that highly assertive individuals might not resort to negotiation, because assertiveness insists on one having one's desired reinforcement. Thus, the more assertive they are, the less likely they are to accept the situation or negotiate.

In addition, conflicting parties should be encouraged to reach an objective agreement with regards to the source of divergence devoid of biases by an accurate interpretation of social information. There is also a need to ensure that the interveners perceive, understand and interpret social situations objectively and accurately before one can implement any of the conflict resolution styles considered most appropriate in either conflict situations.

Furthermore, there is a need for conflicting parties as well as interveners to take accurate and objective cognizance of the common causes of social disagreements in order not to be taken unaware by social events. This would guide the adoption of the most appropriate resolution style.

On the other hand, insufficient adjustment to anchor-consistent information should be made with caution in a manner that will not worsen the conflict situation or spiral into aggression. Just as the findings indicate, in as much as men and women report least use of threat and imposition in conflict situations (Eze & Uzuegbunam, 2010; Ojiji, 1998), they have a tendency to adopt the use of threats when they insufficiently adjust to information consistent with their anchors (beliefs, opinions, and past experiences).

In addition, the findings relating to the influence of ethnic group membership on preference for conflict resolution styles seem to imply that there is a need to consider the degree of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts, as well as the rate of recurrent episodes of conflicts between and among the conflicting parties, including their groups' beliefs and opinions about the various conflict resolution styles prior to adopting any of the resolution styles. It is plausible that societies that have remained relatively conflict-free may show less preference for threat and other more confrontational strategies than for negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Theoreticians also need to focus more attention in exploring the area of group influence on preference for the various conflict resolution styles.

Limitations of Findings

The generalisability of the findings of this study may be limited to university undergraduates. In addition, only the students of Ebonyi State University, Abakailiki were involved in the study. No comparison was made between these students and students in other higher institutions at other locations within Nigeria.

Another limitation is in the attribution of relationship to the variables studied. There are other variables such as self-esteem, religion, culture, self-efficacy, exposure and other demographic variables that may bring about differences in preference for conflict resolution styles. These factors could be confounding variables to the study.

An additional limitation exists in terms of the method employed in this research. A purely quantitative method relying on surveys may be inadequate in understanding preferences of people, because preferences are expressed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Thus, some qualitative methodology which involves interactions with participants would have allowed for

direct observation that increases internal validity of the findings, which was quite limited in this study.

Recommendations for Future Research

Following the limitations highlighted above, it is recommended that in subsequent research, it will be necessary to carry out further studies on the moderating effects of the individual variables used in this study as well as other demographic, social and personality variables.

On the other hand, it would be necessary to incorporate qualitative methodology with quantitative approach in the study of preferences for conflict resolution styles, for better understanding.

In addition, it is recommended that one adopts an experimental approach in the study of anchoring (haste and insufficient adjustment) which could involve the performance of tasks that would permit a very conscious and active thought process, in a bid to ascertain the percentage of variance it contributes in predicting preference for conflict resolution styles.

Summary and Conclusion

Individuals and groups involved in conflict typically have a range of strategic options which they must evaluate and select from. The strategies employed to overcome interpersonal and intergroup conflicts commonly encompass the categories of threat, acceptance, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. The present study focused on three factors – assertiveness, social intelligence and anchoring – that seem to influence preference for conflict resolution styles. The findings showed that assertiveness negatively and significantly influenced preference for acceptance (avoidance) in intergroup conflict situation, and negotiation (compromise) in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations.

On the other hand, social-information processing negatively and significantly influenced preference for threat (in interpersonal conflict situation) and negotiation in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict situations; and positively and significantly influenced preference for arbitration in intergroup conflict situation, while social awareness positively and significantly influenced preference for negotiation in interpersonal conflict situation.

Furthermore, insufficient adjustment positively and significantly influenced preference for threat in interpersonal conflict situation. Thus, assertiveness, social-information processing, social awareness and insufficient adjustment significantly predicted preference for threat, acceptance, negotiation and arbitration in different conflict situations.

It could be concluded that highly assertive individuals are least likely to accept the situation or engage in negotiation. Also, in as much as most people show the least preference for the use of threat, they would adopt the use of threat when they insufficiently adjust to anchor-consistent information.

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APPENDIX A

RATHUS ASSERTIVENESS SCHEDULE (RAS) (Rathus, 1973)

Instructions: Indicate how well each item describes you by using this code:

CODE NUMBER	MEANING
+3	Very much like me
+2	Rather like me
+1	Slightly like me
-1	Slightly unlike me
-2	Rather unlike me
-3	Very unlike me

1. Most people seem to be more aggressive and assertive than I am.
2. I have hesitated to make or accept dates because of “shyness.”
3. When the food served at a restaurant is not done to my satisfaction, I complain about it to the waiter or waitress.
4. I am careful to avoid hurting other people’s feelings, even when I feel that I have been injured.
5. If a salesperson has gone to considerable trouble to show me merchandise that is not quite suitable, I have a difficult time saying “No.”
6. When I am asked to do something, I insist upon knowing why.

7. There are times when I look for a good, vigorous argument.
8. I strive to get ahead as well as most people in my position.
9. To be honest, people often take advantage of me.
10. I enjoy starting conversations with new acquaintances and strangers.
11. I often don't know what to say to attractive persons of the opposite sex.
12. I will hesitate to make phone calls to business establishments and institutions.
13. I would rather apply for a job or for admission to a college by writing letters than by going through with personal interviews.
14. I find it embarrassing to return merchandise.
15. If a close and respected relative were annoying me, I would smother my feelings rather than express my annoyance.
16. I have avoided asking questions for fear of sounding stupid.
17. During an argument, I am sometimes afraid that I will get so upset that I will shake all over.
18. If a famed and respected lecturer makes a comment which I think is incorrect, I will have the audience hear my point of view as well.
19. I avoid arguing over prices with clerks and salespersons.
20. When I have done something important or worthwhile, I manage to let others know about it.
21. I am open and frank about my feelings.
22. If someone has been spreading false and bad stories about me, I see him(her) as soon as possible and "have a talk" about it.
23. I often have a hard time saying "No."
24. I tend to bottle up my emotions rather than make a scene.
25. I complain about poor service in a restaurant and elsewhere.
26. When I am given a compliment, I sometimes just don't know what to say.
27. If a couple near me in a theatre or at a lecture were conversing rather loudly, I would ask them to be quiet or take their conversation elsewhere.
28. Anyone attempting to push ahead of me in a line is in for a good battle.
29. I am quick to express an opinion.
30. There are times when I just can't say anything.

APPENDIX B
THE NIGERIAN ADAPTATION OF THE TROMSO SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE SCALE (TSIS) (Silvera, Martinussen & Dahl, 2001)

Instruction: Indicate how well each item describes you by ticking any of these:

- Very often
- Often
- Sometimes
- Rarely
- Never

1. I can predict other people's behaviour.
2. I feel that it is difficult to understand others' choices.
3. I know how my actions will make others feel.
4. I feel uncertain around new people who I do not know.
5. People surprise me with the things they do.
6. I understand other peoples' feelings.
7. I fit in easily in social situations.
8. Other people become angry with me without my being able to explain why.

9. I understand others' wishes.
10. I am good at entering new situations and meeting people for the first time.
11. It seems as though people are angry or irritated with me when I say what I think.
12. I have a hard time getting along with other people.
13. I find people unpredictable.
14. I can understand what others are trying to accomplish without the need for them to say anything.
15. It takes a long time for me to get to know others well.
16. I have hurt others without realizing it.
17. I can predict how others will react to my behaviour.
18. I am good at getting on good terms with new people.
19. I can understand what others really mean through their expression, body language, etc.
20. I frequently have problems finding good conversation topics.
21. I am surprised by others' reactions to what I do.

SPSS 17 ANALYSIS

Scale: Social Intelligence

Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	271	100.0
	Excluded[a]	0	.0
	Total	271	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.763	.761	21

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
VAR00001	66.7712	70.725	.305	.262	.755

VAR00002	67.3801	72.318	.197	.141	.761
VAR00003	66.7380	70.787	.266	.218	.757
VAR00004	67.7196	68.899	.318	.239	.754
VAR00005	67.6162	72.030	.169	.131	.764
VAR00006	66.8192	68.875	.423	.305	.747
VAR00007	66.9077	68.225	.378	.283	.749
VAR00008	67.2509	69.729	.280	.290	.756
VAR00009	67.2103	70.107	.314	.266	.754
VAR00010	66.9926	67.748	.398	.387	.748
VAR00011	67.2251	69.508	.280	.354	.757
VAR00012	66.9299	67.095	.465	.410	.743
VAR00013	67.3026	69.760	.320	.179	.754
VAR00014	67.2952	70.120	.269	.279	.757
VAR00015	67.3358	65.646	.512	.371	.739
VAR00016	67.4908	71.829	.173	.150	.764
VAR00017	67.0406	71.461	.243	.276	.758
VAR00018	66.7712	67.666	.433	.383	.746
VAR00019	66.5461	69.108	.346	.306	.752
VAR00020	67.3173	67.573	.365	.288	.750
VAR00021	67.2288	71.710	.189	.191	.762

Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
70.4945	75.799	8.70626	21

Internal Consistency Reliability for Social Information Processing Subscale

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.707	7

Internal Consistency Reliability for Social Skills Subscale

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.726	7

Internal Consistency Reliability for Social Awareness Subscale

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.544	7

Internal Consistency Reliability for the Social Intelligence Scale

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.763	.761	21

APPENDIX C

Developing an Anchoring Scale

The response pattern would be:

- Very Often
- Often
- Sometimes
- Rarely
- Never

This would be scored – 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.

THE ANCHORING MEASURE

1. I do not think some things over before doing them.
2. Previous information about an issue is better than listening to new information on the issue.
3. I do the first thing that comes into my head in a clash.
4. I check all alternatives before taking a decision.
5. Too much information on an issue gets me confused.
6. Particular types of persons need to be dealt with in particular ways.
7. I make hasty decisions.
8. I act quickly to avoid indecision.

9. I do not remain calm in handling emotionally-provoking messages.
10. I act without asking too many questions in making decisions.
11. Delay is dangerous in decision-making.
12. I react quickly to information that provokes conflict.
13. I am open to new ideas.
14. I do not deliberate long over an issue before I act.
15. Curiosity kills the cat.
16. I find it difficult to make up my mind when too much information on an issue is presented.
17. Putting oneself in the other person's shoes before taking decisions concerning him/her is not necessary.
18. Thinking things over is time-wasting.
19. I doubt my instincts in making decisions.
20. Feelings of the moment tend to influence my decisions.
21. What comes to the mind first is always right.
22. My hunches do not fail me in making conclusions.
23. My choice of an option on an issue depends on what I already know about it.
24. I stick to what I know.
25. I frequently rely on already available piece of information in decision-making rather than looking for new information.

SPSS17 Scale analysis results

(Anchoring scale)

Gender

	Frequency	Percent
Male	129	47.6
Female	142	52.4
Total	271	100.0

Reliability Statistics of Initial Scale

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.774	.772	25

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Item1*	70.4834	97.710	.379	.327	.762
Item2*	70.2583	98.970	.315	.213	.766

Item3*	70.3875	96.060	.554	.411	.753
Item4	70.8413	101.230	.273	.332	.768
Item5*	69.9705	99.525	.335	.301	.765
Item6	69.3690	106.315	.013	.153	.782
Item7*	70.3690	96.656	.505	.447	.756
Item8*	70.3247	97.998	.401	.346	.761
Item9*	70.1513	96.818	.427	.285	.759
Item10*	70.2251	96.027	.475	.341	.756
Item11	69.7860	101.887	.209	.178	.772
Item12	69.9262	103.128	.168	.193	.774
Item13	70.9889	105.204	.059	.240	.780
Item14*	70.0738	100.595	.307	.208	.766
Item15	70.0554	103.252	.131	.125	.777
Item16*	69.9483	99.368	.364	.306	.763
Item17	70.3395	99.603	.252	.149	.771
Item18*	70.7638	93.581	.535	.438	.751
Item19*	70.6015	99.500	.344	.338	.764
Item20*	69.9188	98.623	.433	.276	.760
Item21*	70.2066	99.090	.371	.292	.763
Item22	69.8413	101.578	.277	.233	.768
Item23	69.4723	106.183	.034	.179	.779
Item24	69.4391	105.855	.035	.195	.781

Gender

	Frequency	Percent
Male	129	47.6
Female	142	52.4

Item25*	70.1181	97.482	.428	.287	.759

Scale: Anchoring Scale - selected 16 items

Reliability Statistics of Final Scale

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.816	.816	16

Item-Total Statistics for 16-item Anchoring Scale

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Item1	42.0037	66.152	.450	.307	.804
Item2	41.7786	68.410	.316	.172	.814
Item3	41.9077	65.654	.585	.402	.796
Item4	42.3616	68.921	.364	.213	.810
Item5	41.4908	68.303	.373	.270	.809
Item7	41.8893	65.669	.565	.424	.797
Item8	41.8450	67.776	.394	.288	.808
Item9	41.6716	66.947	.411	.244	.807
Item10	41.7454	65.953	.480	.310	.802
Item14	41.5941	70.338	.301	.177	.815
Item16	41.4686	68.680	.372	.280	.809
Item18	42.2841	63.671	.553	.402	.796
Item19	42.1218	68.100	.395	.295	.808
Item20	41.4391	68.588	.409	.216	.807
Item21	41.7269	68.740	.361	.242	.810

Scale: Anchoring Scale - selected 16 items

Reliability Statistics of Final Scale

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.816	.816	16

Item-Total Statistics for 16-item Anchoring Scale

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Item1	42.0037	66.152	.450	.307	.804
Item2	41.7786	68.410	.316	.172	.814
Item3	41.9077	65.654	.585	.402	.796
Item4	42.3616	68.921	.364	.213	.810
Item5	41.4908	68.303	.373	.270	.809
Item7	41.8893	65.669	.565	.424	.797
Item8	41.8450	67.776	.394	.288	.808
Item9	41.6716	66.947	.411	.244	.807
Item10	41.7454	65.953	.480	.310	.802
Item14	41.5941	70.338	.301	.177	.815
Item16	41.4686	68.680	.372	.280	.809
Item18	42.2841	63.671	.553	.402	.796
Item19	42.1218	68.100	.395	.295	.808
Item20	41.4391	68.588	.409	.216	.807
Item21	41.7269	68.740	.361	.242	.810
Item25	41.6384	67.476	.414	.235	.807

Pattern Matrix[a]

	Factor	
	1	2
Item1	.684	-.086
Item2	-.076	.537
Item3	.552	.216
Item4	.557	-.132
Item7	.634	.009
Item10	.455	.130
Item20	.160	.370
Item21	.015	.452
Item25	-.088	.666

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

	Factor	
	Haste	Adjustment
Item1	.684	
Item7	.634	
Item4	.557	
Item3	.552	
Item10	.455	
Item25		.666
Item2		.537
Item21		.452
Item20		.370

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Factor Correlation Matrix

Factor	1
2	.611

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

Reliability of Haste Domain of Anchoring Scale

Reliability Statistics: Haste Domain

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.726	.728	5

Reliability of Adjustment Domain of Anchoring Scale

Reliability Statistics: Adjustment Domain

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.572	.572	4

Reliability of Final 9-item Anchoring Scale

Reliability Statistics: Final Scale

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.744	.747	9

Anchoring Scale and BFI

Anchoring and BFI Correlations

		Anchoring_total	Anchoring_Haste	Anchoring_Adjustment	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Neuroticism
Extraversion	Pearson Correlation	-.158	-.088	-.193				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.009	.150	.001				
	N	271	271	271				
Agreeableness	Pearson Correlation	-.314	-.273	-.255	.200			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.001			
	N	271	271	271	271			
Conscientiousness	Pearson Correlation	-.369	-.389	-.211	.130	.555		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.033	.000		
	N	271	271	271	271	271		
Neuroticism	Pearson Correlation	.411	.400	.279	-.301	-.456	-.407	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
	N	271	271	271	271	271	271	
Openness	Pearson Correlation	-.174	-.182	-.102	.063	.331	.391	-.176
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.004	.003	.094	.298	.000	.000	.004
	N	271	271	271	271	271	271	271

FINAL ANCHORING SCALE

Instruction: Indicate how well each item describes you by ticking any of these:

- **Very Often**
- **Often**
- **Sometimes**
- **Rarely**
- **Never**

This would be scored – 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.

THE ANCHORING MEASURE

Haste Domain

1. I do not think some things over before doing them.
2. I do the first thing that comes into my head in a clash.
3. I check all alternatives before taking a decision.
4. I make hasty decisions.
5. I act without asking too many questions in making decisions.

Adjustment Domain

6. Previous information about an issue is better than listening to new information on the issue.
7. Feelings of the moment tend to influence my decisions.
8. What comes to the mind first is always right.
9. I frequently rely on already available piece of information in decision-making rather than looking for new information.

APPENDIX D

Conflict Scenarios and Rating Scale of Preference for Methods of Conflict Resolution
(Ojiji, 1998)
Scenario One

Your roommate at the university has a habit of using your things without permission. Not only this, he/she does not care about the state of things he/she uses. Many a time, he/she uses your drinking cup for beverage without washing it. Each time you complain about his/her behaviour, he/she will snob you and warn you not to disturb him/her because of a mere cup. In the last few weeks, there has been an acute water shortage in your university campus and you have to struggle long hours to get water from the university water tanker. Each time you store water for your use, your roommate will use it without replacing it, thereby depriving you the use of water when you need it. On one occasion when you used your roommate's water without replacing it, your roommate was so angered that he/she poured abuses on you. Your response to this abuse led to a fight between you and he/she during which both of you sustained injuries. The hall officers will not allow any of you to change room and you have to live with your roommate for another two years. But the misunderstanding between you and your roommate is causing you a lot of difficulty. This animosity between you and your roommate needs to be resolved before things get out of hand.

Please read the following possible methods of resolving this quarrel/conflict.

(1) Threaten the student and say that you will publicize his/her action and damage his/her image and reputation.

(2) Accept the situation like that, hoping he/she will change.

(3) Negotiate with the student so that both of you will reach a solution acceptable to both of you.

(4) Seek the assistance of someone who will assist the two of you in negotiation.

(5) Seek the assistance of someone who has the power and authority to settle the problem between the two of you decisively.

Instruction:

Now answer the questions that follow. After each question, a 7-point rating scale is provided. The scale is to be used to rate each of the five methods. For example, a method could be seen by you as least preferable, in which case you will rate that method 1, but if you think another method is preferable, you could use number 5 or 6 in the space beside the method. The number indicates the degree of preference or otherwise of each method to you. All the methods should be rated. Put your ratings of each method on the blank space provided after each method. For example, Method 1 2; Method 2 6. This instruction applies to all the items in this section. The methods are listed in the order they have been described above.

1. What is your degree of willingness to adopt the above-mentioned methods? Please, write the appropriate number in the blank beside each method as provided below:

Least preferable Most preferable

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

2. How favourable do you think that each of these methods will be to you?

Very unfavourable Very favourable

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

3. How fair would you rate each method?

Very unfair Very fair

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

4. What is the likelihood that each of these methods would reduce the intensity of this conflict?

Very unlikely Very likely

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

5. What is the likelihood that each of these methods would leave grudges between you and your roommate?

Very likely Very unlikely

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

6. What degree of control does each method allow you to have over the final outcome?

No control at all Complete control

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

Scenario Two

Members of your ethnic group have been engaged in a protracted boundary dispute with a neighbouring ethnic group. The other group claims that some part of your people's land belongs to them. Your family house and property are situated on the disputed portion of land. The two groups have engaged in violent actions to claim the land for themselves. As a result of a recent clash between your ethnic group and the other group, property worth thousands of naira and several lives were lost on both sides. A part of your family house was burnt down and some members of your family beaten up and seriously wounded. Your ethnic group has repeated over and over again that the claims of the other group are false, but the other group would not give up the disputed land. This has led to heightened conflict between your ethnic group and the other group which needs to be resolved before more damage is done.

Please, read the following possible methods of resolving this quarre/conflict.

(1) Threaten the other party and say that you will publicize their actions and damage their image and reputation.

(2) Accept the situation like that, hoping they will change.

(3) Negotiate with the other party so that both groups will reach a solution acceptable to both parties.

(4) Seek the assistance of someone who will assist the two parties in negotiation.

(5) Seek the assistance of someone who has the power and authority to settle the problem between the two parties decisively.

Instruction:

Now answer the questions that follow. After each question, a 7-point rating scale is provided. The scale is to be used to rate each of the five methods. For example, a method could be seen by you as least preferable, in which case you will rate that method 1, but if you think another method is preferable, you could use number 5 or 6 in the space beside the method. The number indicates the degree of preference or otherwise of each method to you. All the methods should be rated. Put your ratings of each method on the blank space provided after each method. For example, Method 1 2; Method 2 6. This instruction applies to all the items in this section. The methods are listed in the order they have been described above.

1. What is your degree of willingness to adopt the above-mentioned methods? Please, write the appropriate number in the blank beside each method as provided below:

Least preferable Most preferable

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

2. How favourable do you think that each of these methods will be to you?

Very unfavourable Very favourable

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

3. How fair would you rate each method?

Very unfair Very fair

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

4. What is the likelihood that each of these methods would reduce the intensity of this conflict?

Very unlikely Very likely

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

5. What is the likelihood that each of these methods would leave grudges between your group and the other group?

Very likely Very unlikely

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

6. What degree of control does each method allow your group to have over the final outcome?

No control at all Complete control

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Method 1 _ Method 2 _ Method 3 _ Method 4 _ Method 5 _

Factor Analysis Results for the Selected 16 items

Pattern Matrix[a]

	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
Item1*	.706	-.174	-.073	.092
Item2*	.018	.043	.498	-.109
Item3*	.583	-.082	.208	.045
Item4*	.416	.009	-.130	.211
Item5	-.114	.593	.055	.112
Item7*	.623	.204	-.180	.096
Item8	.474	-.032	-.002	.057
Item9	.237	.348	.107	-.136
Item10*	.476	.148	.160	-.195
Item14	.387	-.120	.113	-.085
Item16	-.120	.709	-.037	.100
Item18	.168	.032	.187	.481
Item19	.002	.122	-.018	.636
Item20*	.182	.140	.270	-.033
Item21*	-.091	-.092	.542	.265
Item25*	.009	.049	.482	.086

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

Factor Analysis Results for the Selected 16 items

Pattern Matrix[a]

	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
Item1*	.706	-.174	-.073	.092
Item2*	.018	.043	.498	-.109
Item3*	.583	-.082	.208	.045
Item4*	.416	.009	-.130	.211
Item5	-.114	.593	.055	.112
Item7*	.623	.204	-.180	.096
Item8	.474	-.032	-.002	.057
Item9	.237	.348	.107	-.136
Item10*	.476	.148	.160	-.195
Item14	.387	-.120	.113	-.085
Item16	-.120	.709	-.037	.100
Item18	.168	.032	.187	.481
Item19	.002	.122	-.018	.636
Item20*	.182	.140	.270	-.033
Item21*	-.091	-.092	.542	.265
Item25*	.009	.049	.482	.086

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.

Factor analysis of the selected 16 items of the Anchoring Scale

Pattern Matrix[a]

	Factor	
	1	2
Item1*	.674	-.143
Item2*	.281	.078
Item3*	.721	-.032

Item4*	.354	.110
Item5	-.138	.716
Item7*	.486	.220
Item8	.472	-.002
Item9	.250	.274
Item10*	.498	.072
Item14	.473	-.186
Item16	-.123	.683
Item18	.375	.290
Item19	.161	.364
Item20*	.343	.145
Item21*	.285	.148
Item25*	.316	.164

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Item-Total Correlation results for the Initial 25 items of the Anchoring Scale

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

	Item1*	Item2	Item3	Item4	Item5	Item6	Item7	Item8
Item2*	.159							
Item3*	.429	.209						
Item4*	.323	.060	.282					
Item5	.089	.144	.197	.188				
Item6	-.078	.012	.006	-.212	-.030			
Item7*	.395	.143	.432	.323	.310	.048		
Item8	.218	.176	.329	.130	.171	.071	.412	
Item9	.177	.131	.265	.132	.233	.063	.309	.219
Item10*	.318	.244	.390	.246	.187	-.049	.352	.192
Item11	-.012	-.020	.111	.008	.117	-.027	.158	.185
Item12	.031	-.021	.112	-.047	.058	.088	.077	.159
Item13	.110	.034	.099	.319	.028	-.155	.007	-.155
Item14	.253	.102	.230	.107	-.029	.077	.126	.274
Item15	-.024	.079	.023	-.054	.141	.009	.035	.084
Item16	.121	.113	.179	.158	.417	.004	.272	.072
Item17	.110	.141	.117	.082	.091	-.014	.118	.130
Item18	.287	.175	.343	.329	.255	-.059	.311	.301
Item19	.216	.079	.234	.189	.215	-.139	.302	.169

Item20*	.222	.213	.333	.108	.190	.156	.266	.136
Item21*	.156	.232	.331	.146	.199	-.004	.120	.097
Item22	.031	.130	.139	-.021	-.053	.143	.035	.165
Item23	-.071	.153	.004	-.211	-.062	.104	-.084	-.010
Item24	-.044	-.012	.048	-.197	-.097	.141	-.061	.051
Item25*	.151	.309	.281	.116	.168	.041	.254	.178

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

	Item9	Item10	Item11	Item12	Item13	Item14	Item15	Item16
Item10	.373							
Item11	.142	.179						
Item12	.244	.129	.225					
Item13	.065	.049	-.130	-.121				
Item14	.158	.212	.132	.119	-.015			
Item15	.105	.067	.118	.065	-.137	.136		
Item16	.295	.215	.027	.054	.109	.094	.187	
Item17	.077	.159	.067	-.070	.103	.090	.119	.132
Item18	.279	.291	.159	.049	.216	.130	.003	.233
Item19	.107	.088	.135	.041	.084	.079	.096	.295
Item20	.200	.236	.100	.193	.001	.217	.087	.215
Item21	.124	.164	.099	-.024	.063	.101	-.017	.097
Item22	.049	.161	.146	.176	.013	.134	.023	.035
Item23	.034	.038	.020	.046	-.069	-.045	.005	-.043

Item24	.016	-.025	.056	-.037	-.113	.091	.091	-.038
Item25	.201	.193	.014	.116	.122	.128	.025	.145

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

	Item17	Item18	Item19	Item20	Item21	Item22	Item23	Item24
Item18	.261							
Item19	.108	.452						
Item20	.023	.207	.194					
Item21	.216	.362	.231	.158				
Item22	.160	.132	.026	.234	.223			
Item23	.033	-.026	-.135	.058	.083	.159		
Item24	.030	-.058	-.109	.065	.019	.175	.299	
Item25	.083	.283	.229	.300	.288	.247	.054	.114