THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE US MISSILE DEFENCE SHIELD IN EASTERN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN AND US MILITARY RESOURCES.

BY

EMECHEBE, UGONNA CHIJOKE
PG/MSC/03/35071

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA

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SUPERVISOR: PROF. JONAH ONUOHA Ph.D.

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Emechebe, Ugonna Chijioke a postgraduate student in the Department of Political Science with Registration Number PG/MS.c/03/35071 has satisfactorily completed research requirements for the award of Master of Science in Political Science (International Relations). The work embodied in this thesis is original and has not been submitted in part or in full for another degree of this or any other university, to the best of our knowledge:

Prof. Jonah Onuoha Ph.D (Supervisor)  
Prof. E. O. Ezeani, Ph.D (Head of Department)

External Examiner  
Dean
DEDICATION

To Engr. and Mrs. Ken Emechebe
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To the rest of the people whose works I cited and others I cannot mention here. I say may God bless you. I remain responsible for any short falls to the content of this thesis.
ABSTRACT
This study sets out to investigate the Bush Doctrine and the US Missile Defence shield in Eastern Europe, with the central objective of exploring its implications for Iran. To achieve the objective of this study, two research questions and two hypotheses were raised. To substantiate the claims made in this study, we anchored analysis on the theoretical framework of political realism. This is because the Bush Doctrine which advocates preemptive strike, unilateralism and global spread democracy is a pure demonstration of military strength. Our research design was experimental and ex post facto. The choice of ex post facto design is necessitated by the nature of our research questions. The essential variables in our hypotheses are such that control groups cannot be introduced to address the various effects of the Bush Doctrine and the proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe. We relied heavily on primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources of data are from the American Embassy, Congressional research report among others. While text books, journals, unpublished works and official documents constituted our secondary sources. After a critical analysis of available data and extant literature, the study revealed as follows; first, that the US suffered about 4,185 fatalities since the war began in Iraq. This figure excludes the number of US military casualties in Afghanistan where security situation has seriously worsened. The study further revealed that the war has badly depleted the America’s National Guard's domestic store of vehicles, weapons and communications gear, officials with the service say, leaving units with one-third of the equipment needed to meet requirements for homeland security, its primary mission. Second, the study also revealed that the two wars have cost America $604billion, excluding Obama’s budgetary request for the war. Defense spending during those two wars accounted for a far larger share of the American economy. Adjusted for inflation, it is higher than the costs of the Korea and Vietnam conflicts. It was further revealed that the American intention of using its missile defence system in Eastern Europe to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon leveraged Iran from pursuing nuclear capability. In the final analysis, the Bush defence policy for America is both a mixed blessing in that he ruled at a time that America needed a personality that can confront headlong the growing anti-American sentiments in the world and particularly in the Middle East. But this he achieved with enormous cost and grief to the American people.
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<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty</td>
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<td>AEOI</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Organization of Iran</td>
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<td>BMDO</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence Organization</td>
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<td>BMDS</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
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<td>DPBAC</td>
<td>Defence Policy Board Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>DRDO</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Organisation</td>
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<td>GBI</td>
<td>Ground Based Interceptors</td>
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<td>GMD</td>
<td>Ground Based Mid Course Defence</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
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<td>UCF</td>
<td>Uranium Conversion Facility</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

For much of the last century, America’s defence relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence - the promise of massive retaliation against nations means nothing against a shadowy terrorist network with no nation or citizen to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies...Homeland defence and missile defence are part of stronger security, and they are essential priorities for America. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act (George W. Bush Jnr. Remarks at West Point Commencement Ceremonies, June 1, 2001)

After the September 11 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States of America, the vulnerability of US as a major power and other states to rogue states became crystallized. It threw into sharp relief the nature of the threats the whole world face today. Today’s threats come less from massing armies than from small, shadowy bands or terrorist. In the middle are a handful of otherwise “weak” derelict states whose possession or imminent possession of nuclear weapons makes them rising powers in the narrow-military sense. With such weapons, these states’ aggressive habits have far greater consequences (Donnelly, 2006).

The Bush administration believed that terrorists and states, who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), represent strategic threat, and doubted whether they could be deterred by conventional means. Thus, the administration believed that the bases of American foreign policy should be reviewed and its National Security Strategy reexamined to capture today’s new realities of international politics. As Bolton (2002) noted:
In countering these urgent threats, the Bush administration believes that the Cold War concepts of mutual assured destruction—the threat of an overwhelming retaliatory strike in response to provocation—and containment are no longer appropriate. These tactics made sense when our greatest threats come from a nuclear armed enemy superpower. But they do not make sense when in a world where itinerant terrorists are poised to do the bidding of dictatorial regimes hostile to the United States and its allies. The international security situation has changed, and we must adapt our defences and resources to it.

On June 1, 2002, in an address at West Point, U.S. President George W. Bush announced a new set of foreign policy principles that has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine consists of three basic elements, first, the US would no longer rely solely on Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence, but would instead pursue a strategy of preemptive intervention in order to take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. Second, the US would concentrate on exporting democracy, since the requirements of freedom apply to Africa, Latin America, and the entire Arab world. Finally, the US would maintain its military supremacy beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace (Kaplan and Kristol, 2003).

On September 20, 2002, the Bush administration released the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, which formalized these three elements of the Bush Doctrine: preemptive strike, promotion of democracy, and military supremacy. The NSS has generated four key controversies. First, it calls for preemptive military action against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second, the NSS announces that the US will not allow its global military strength to be challenged by any foreign power. Third, the NSS expresses a commitment to multinational international
cooperation, but makes clear that the US will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary to defend her national interests and security. Fourth, the NSS proclaims the goal of spreading democracy in the Muslim world.

To prove that his new NSS for America was not merely a policy statement, the Bush administration invaded Afghanistan and Iraq on October 7, 2001 and March 22, 2003 respectively for allegedly harboring terrorists and possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), built long-range missile defence bases in Alaska and California against adversary missile threats, especially from North Korea and proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defence System in Eastern Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat and similar threats from the Arab world.

The study therefore, seeks to look at the nature of Bush Doctrine and its impact on US defence policy. It also seeks to ascertain the strategic implication of the proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe for Iran.

1.2 Statement of Problem

America today is facing threats to its national security which seem strange and unprecedented. The vicious and versatile insurgency in Iraq, the widespread and deadly transnational network of Islamist terrorists, the steady and relentless efforts by Iran to develop nuclear weapons—its own Islamic bomb, the relentless and sustained efforts by North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons and the prospect that Islamist terrorists might themselves acquire nuclear weapons all combine to pose a truly momentous challenge to American security strategy.
Marshalling international efforts to deny proliferation of the material, equipment, expertise, and technology necessary to pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them was a priority of the Bush administration. But the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax deaths spurred a new sense of urgency. The attacks of September 11, 2001 caused a tectonic shift in the national security strategy thinking in the United States. In a relatively brief moment what had once been unthinkable became a very distinct possibility. This new reality was acknowledged at the 2002 graduation speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point when President Bush noted that:

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends – and we will oppose them with all our power.

Subsequent to the President’s West Point speech the Whitehouse published The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. This document contains the foreign policy principles of the Bush administration that has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine advocates preemptive use of military force against terrorists or state sponsors of terrorism that attempt to gain or use WMD. It also confidently acknowledges America’s unparalleled position of power in the world and unapologetically holds that a fundamental goal of US grand strategy should be to maintain US primacy by dissuading the rise of any Challengers. It further advocates of what scholars call a go it alone and unabashed unilateral approach to international politics and the global promotion of democracy especially, in the Arab world. The shock of 9/11 immeasurably strengthened the hand of those within the
administration, and particularly within the US Department of Defence, who favoured a new sense of urgency.

To prove that the new security policy was not a mere rhetoric, the administration invaded Afghanistan for allegedly harboring terrorist and showed its policy of preemptive strike on Iraq which it allegedly accused of having WMD which it intend using on America and its allies. The Bush Administration built long-range missile defense bases in Alaska and California to protect against adversary missile threats, especially from North Korea. Although the system has been tested, most agree that further testing is necessary. The Bush administration proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat.

Thus, in the Financial Year of 2008 defense budget, the Bush administration requested about $310 million to begin design, construction, and deployment of a ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe. According to the administration, the proposed GMD European capability would help defend U.S. forces stationed in Europe, U.S. friends and allies in the region, as well as to defend the United States against long-range ballistic missile threats, namely from Iran. For the Financial Year of 2009, the administration requested $712 million for development, fielding, and military construction of the European GMD element. The proposed system would include 10 silo-based interceptors to be deployed in Poland, a fixed radar installation in the Czech Republic, and transportable radar to be deployed in a country closer to Iran. Deployment of the GMD European capability is scheduled to be completed by 2013 at a current estimated cost of $4
billion (includes fielding and Operation and Support), according to the Bush administration (Hildreth and Ek, 2009).

The administration signed agreements with both Poland and Czech Republic permitting GMD facilities to be stationed on their territory; however, the two countries’ parliaments decided to wait to ratify the accords until after the Obama administration clarified its intentions on missile defense policy. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deliberated long-range missile defense, and has taken actions that many interpreted as an endorsement of the U.S. GMD system. All these are geared toward the accomplishment of the guiding principles of the Bush Doctrine and deterring states that have nuclear intention.

With the above exposition, which has thrown up various problems, we raise the following research questions:

1. What has been the impact of the Bush Doctrine on US military resources?

2. Has the American proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe deterred Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon?

1.3 Objectives of Study

The central objective of this study is to explore the Bush Doctrine and the implications of the proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe as a counter-nuclear attack measure from Iran. The study is guided by the following specific objective:

1. To ascertain the impact of the Bush Doctrine on US military resources.

2. To ascertain whether the American proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe has deterred Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon.
1.4 Significance of the Study

This study finds justification at two important levels. The first is its theoretical significance, while the other is its empirical significance. At the first level, scholars in the field of International Relations have all noted that US foreign policy for over 50 years has been guided by the principles of deterrence and containment irrespective of the party in power. The US has also over the years frowned at unilateral approach to security issues beyond her borders. But all these foreign policy principles which percolated over the years to shape US foreign policy became less appropriate under Bush as the threats US faced became potentially catastrophic-and can arrive with little warning by means that are untraceable-that they cannot be contained.

Thus the study is significant in that it will examine whether it is rational to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy and to know whether preemptive action does come first at the beginning of a long chain of action.

At the second level-empirical, the Bush Doctrine went beyond rhetoric and this has had enormous impact on international politics and the way countries of the world view America. Empirically, this study will be of enormous significant in that it will help the ascertain the Worlds’ perception of the Bush Doctrine and its impact on global politics and the utility or otherwise of political expediency. The reason is that caution and what is politically expedient are the main driving force of external relations and the components of what is commonly called national interest.

Finally, this study will be very useful to scholars interested in American studies, particularly for those who are not yet at home with the Bush Doctrine. Experts in strategic
studies will also find this study very useful. This is because the study will analyse the reasons behind the strategic shift in American defence policy under President Bush (Jnr).

1.5 Literature Review

We shall adopt a thematic approach in our review of relevant literature as follows:

A. Bush Doctrine and US Military Resources.

B. The US Missile Defence system in Eastern Europe and Iran.

Bush Doctrine and US Military Resources

The concept of *Bush Doctrine* and analysis of American Defence system has attracted a great deal of scholarly contributions. Notable scholars who have written profusely on these are (Kaplan and Kristol, 2003; Habermas, 2003; Katahara and Katsuya, 2009; Ivo, James and James, 2002; Cordesman, 2002; Lieber, 2002; Zhiyuan, 2005; Moon and Bae, 2004; Amitav, 2003; Owens, 2008; Vaisse, 2006)

The term *Bush Doctrine* according to (Encarter, 2008) seeks to prevent other nations from obtaining weapons of mass destruction by adopting a policy of *preemptive war* (striking first). It also announced that the United States would maintain unquestioned military supremacy by not allowing any other nation to emerge as a potential military rival. The Bush doctrine removed two key pillars that held U.S. foreign policy in place for more than 50 years: the policy of deterrence, which sought to prevent a nuclear attack by threatening massive retaliation and the policy of containment, which held that U.S. military forces needed only to be strong enough to contain any aggressor. Critics characterized the new stance as an arrogant
statement of power that threatened to alienate world opinion and jeopardize the role of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN).

According to Kaplan and Kristol (2003) the doctrine consists of three basic elements. First, the United States would no longer rely solely on Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence, but would instead pursue a strategy of preemptive intervention in order to take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. Second, the United States would concentrate on exporting democracy, since the requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa, Latin America, and the entire Islamic world. Finally, the United States would maintain its military supremacy beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace. In September 2002, the Bush administration released the National Security Strategy of the United States, which formalized these three elements of the Bush Doctrine: preemptive strike, promotion of democracy, and military supremacy.

They goes further to state that it was widely reported in the Western press that the Bush Doctrine had strong roots in the neoconservative school of thought in the United States. Early drafts of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s report _Defense Planning Guidance_ contained the three basic elements of the Bush Doctrine as early as 1992. In 1997, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, and Robert Kagan founded the Project for the New American Century. In August 18, 1997, Irving Kristol, the father of William Kristol and U.S. neoconservatism, predicted the rise of the neoconservatism in a _Wall Street Journal_ article titled _The Emerging America Imperialism_. He noted that:

One of these days, the American people are going to awaken to the fact that we have become an imperial nation, even though public opinion
and all of our political traditions are hostile to the idea. It is no
overweening ambition on our part that has defined our destiny in this
way, nor is it any kind of conspiracy by a foreign policy elite. It
happened because the world wanted it to happen, needed it to happen,
and signaled this need by a long series of relatively minor crises that
could not be resolved except by some American involvement.

According to Tuck, the preemptive strategy articulated by the Bush administration is
not a recent creation. Rather it has ancient roots reaching as far back as the Roman Empire and
was a key Roman Imperial tactic that Cicero forcefully advocated:

How can you believe that the man who has lived so licentiously up to
the present time will not proceed to every extreme of insolence, if he
shall also secure the authority given by arms? Do not, then, wait until
you have suffered some such treatment and then rue it, but be on your
guard before you suffer; for it is rash to allow dangers to come upon
you and then to repent of it, when you might have anticipated them . . .

The similarity between the sentiments expressed by Cicero in the above passage and the
Bush administration’s recent rhetoric allude to the idea that there are some Classical scholars
among the neoconservatives, opines (Bellow and Ravelstein, 2000).

The German philosopher Habermas (2003) has stressed the radical nature and grave
implications of the Bush Doctrine: “The United States has, with the Iraq war . . . given up the
role of a guarantor of power in international law; with its violation thereof she sets future
superpowers a disastrous example. . . . Let’s not kid ourselves: America’s normative authority
lies shattered.” In other words, Habermas and many other European intellectuals perceive the
Bush Doctrine as breaking off from Clinton’s foreign policy.

Zhiyuan (2005) looked at the Bush Doctrine from the Chinese perspective; the Bush
Doctrine is only one more step along the same trajectory of U.S. grand strategic thinking and
sees no difference between it and Clinton’s foreign policy. In response to the Bush Doctrine,
China has made several efforts to counterbalance the one-sided power of the United States. So far, China has made the following four efforts: (1) using its power in the U.N. Security Council to seek peaceful solutions; (2) supporting the euro by diversifying China’s foreign currency holdings; (3) developing Asian trade and monetary cooperation; and (4) developing trade and security cooperation with Russia and neighboring states in Central Asia (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or Shanghai Six). He goes further to state that, the Chinese counterbalancing effort has been very limited thus far. Generally, China has kept a low profile in international affairs, so as not to be perceived as a threat.

That China has used its veto power only five times since it became a member of the U.N. Security Council (and most of those vetoes related to the Taiwan issue), in contrast to the more liberal exercise of veto power by the Soviet Union/Russia (120 times) and the United States (76 times). However, China’s “low profile” policy does not mean that its perspective on the Bush Doctrine and the U.S. grand strategy has no real policy effects. Indeed, the increasing cooperation between China and the European Union may be the most important response to the Bush Doctrine on the part of either China or the European Union.

He therefore concludes that on its face, the Chinese “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” doctrine (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence contradicts the tenets behind the Bush Doctrine of preemptive intervention, democracy export, and military supremacy. However, this certainly does not mean that China should not democratize. Rather, China must face the challenge of democratic innovations both in economic and political spheres. As Frantz Fanon stated: “If we wish to turn Africa into a new Europe, and then let us leave the destiny of our countries to
Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us.” Thus, the best response to the Bush Doctrine is for the new generation of Chinese intellectuals, policymakers, and common people to develop new institutions of democracy and a market economy, thereby contributing to the progress of human civilization beyond the narrow horizon of development implied by the Bush Doctrine.

Vaisse (2006) in his article titled The Rise and fall of the Bush Doctrine: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations opines that between 2002 and 2005, a relatively coherent and profoundly renewed strategic approach to international relations was developed by the Bush administration. Premised on an optimistic assessment of great power relations (”a balance of power that favors freedom”), it emphasized the importance of promoting democracy as a way to solve many of the long-term political and security problems of the greater Middle East. It rested on the view that American military power and assertive diplomacy should be used to defeat tyrannies, challenge a pernicious status quo and coerce states into abandoning weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism - without worrying too much about legitimacy or formal multilateralism. The Bush doctrine led to tensions with the Europeans, who for the most part shared neither the world view that underpinned it nor its optimism about possible results, especially as far as geopolitical stability, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were concerned. Then, in 2005, two silent developments took place: the Bush administration, while insisting on staying the course rhetorically (through “transformational diplomacy”), reverted to classical realism in its actual diplomacy - largely for reasons of expediency. China and India, on the other hand, imposed themselves on the global agenda, bringing multipolarity back into the picture of the world to come. While generally closer to European views, the new American
realist line remains distinct from the European insistence on strengthening the rules and institutions of global governance.

According to Lieber and Liebier (2002) written on the US defense system under Bush and supporting her policy of preemption argues that the US has often walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. They state that there had been only a handful of clear-cut cases of military preemption by any states in the last two hundred years (Israeli preemption in the Six Day War in 1967 is perhaps the most cited example). They further states that the Attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrate that terrorist organization like al Qaeda pose an immediate threat to the US, are not deterred by the fear of US retaliation, and would probably seize the opportunity to kill millions of Americans if WMD could effectively be used on American soil. Thus a proactive campaign against terrorists is wise, and a proclaimed approach toward states sponsors of terrorism might help deter those states from pursuing WMD or cooperation with terrorists in the first place.

They further opine that the desire to maintain American primacy by seeking to prevent the rise of a peer competitor has guided US foreign policy for the better of the last century. The basic logic explains in large part why the US eventually intervened in both World Wars, and why US forces were brought home after World War 1, but were recommitted to the defence of Europe not long after the end of World War 11. There are compelling reasons they argues for US military primacy, in fact it is good for global peace and stability.

On the unilateralism that the Bush Doctrine advocates, they contend that the explicit willingness to act alone makes good strategic sense and that the global spread of will free and
open societies on every continent. They finally, assert that the doctrine in scope and design is a worthy successor to the most important previous statements.

With regards to the unilateral nature of the doctrine of preemptive use of force, President Chirac of France (2003) has stated, “no one can claim the right to use force unilaterally or preemptively.” He goes on to observe that, “multilateralism is crucial because it ensures the participation by all in managing the affairs of the world.” This rejection of the use of preemptive force combined with the desire to take a multilateral approach to international threats, succinctly sums up the opinion of some in the international community with regards to the Bush Doctrine.

From another perspective, Kelly (2003) cites the shift from moral relativism in the Clinton administration to moral absolutism in the Bush administration as being a key driver in the unilateral nature of the use of preemptive force. To illustrate his point, Kelly quotes the following passage from President Bush’s September 20, 2001 speech before a joint session of Congress, “every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” Kelly contends this monochromatic view of the world, buttressed by a moral absolutist perspective, has driven a unilateral foreign (and use of preemptive force) policy and hence dissention both domestically and internationally with the Bush administration.

Another critique of the unilateral stance of the Bush Doctrine comes from Galson (2002) who contends that, “a global strategy based on the new Bush doctrine of preemption means the end of the system of international institutions, laws and norms that we have worked to build for more than half a century.” He further points out, “what is at stake is nothing less
than a fundamental shift in America’s place in the world. Rather than continuing to serve as
first among equals in the post war international system, the United States would act as a law
unto itself, creating new rules of international engagement without the consent of the other
nations.” Galston concludes his critique by noting that, “we must therefore resist the easy
seduction of unilateral action. In the long run, our interest will best be served by an
international system that is as law like and collaborative as possible, given the reality that we
live in a world of sovereign states. In other words, an approach to international relationships
that appears imperialist or hegemonic will not serve us well in the long term.

Gu Guoliang (2003) observes that the unilateral nature of the Bush Doctrine is just a
continuation of its unilateral path of backing out of, or away from, such things as the Anti
Ballistic Missile Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Biological Weapons
Convention. Guoliang argues that these type of unilateral actions tend to cause and exacerbate
more problems than they solve.39 Jonathan Kirshner takes up this point and notes that policy of
preemption will result in “…the accelerated global proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, greater regional instability and war….” He goes on to observe that, “Paradoxically,
although one of the great concerns motivating the new security strategy is the possibility that
weapons of mass destruction will fall into the wrong hands, the Bush Doctrine actually creates
strong incentives for more states to seek nuclear weapons. Any country that has reason to
believe it is high on the U.S. “hit list” will certainly scramble to get its hands on whatever
weapons it can. While certainly dangerous, this is to some extent little more than the
acceleration of an existing problem, and arguably one that may have emerged in the absence of
a change in U.S. policy. What’s new, however, and somewhat more subtle, is the likelihood
that many governments, even those not currently at odds with the United States, will need to
consider the possibility that they might run afoul of U.S. interests in the future. Some of these states might easily conclude that a small nuclear stockpile would be the only way to deter a preventive U.S. strike.” While the views of Guoliang and Kirshner are perhaps somewhat alarmist, they nevertheless represent a valid school of thought with regards to the dangers associated with such a unilateral approach to national security.

A final point of critique of the Bush Doctrine is its ambiguous nature. Jeffery Record observes that, “the doctrine invites abuse because it offers no criteria by which to judge a threat justifying a preemptive strike.” This lack of objective milestones to determine when force will be used creates confusion and could possibly impact the overall credibility of the policy. For instance, “a rouge state is not automatically a target for preemption; if it were, the Bush administration would be talking about a war with Iran and not talking at all to North Korea.”

According to Owens (2008) the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America’s founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.

A Brookings Institution study on the Bush Doctrine conducted by Ivo, James and James (2002) concludes that the Bush Doctrine’s “silence on the circumstances that justify preemption” raises the danger that other countries “will embrace the preemption argument as a cover for settling their own national security scores. . . . [U]ntil the Administration can define the line separating justifiable preemption from unlawful aggression in ways that will gain widespread adherence abroad, it risks seeing its words used to justify ends it opposes.
As noted by Katakara and Katsuya (2009), in their work titled *The End of Bush Administration and the Challenges that remain*, it is the threat posed by North Korea, Iran and other nations hostile toward the US that gave rise to the Bush Doctrine.

**The US Missile Defence System and Iran**

Missile defense is a system, weapon, or technology involved in the detection, tracking, interception and destruction of attacking missiles. Originally conceived as a defence against nuclear-armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) its application has broadened to include shorter-ranged non-nuclear tactical and theater missiles. The interception technology used has varied over time. In the 1960s, missile defense against ICBMs emphasized nuclear warheads. In recent decades non-nuclear kinetic warheads have been used. Directed-energy weapons such as lasers have been investigated and deployed on a limited basis. For example, India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is developing a laser-based weapon system as part of its ballistic missile defence program to intercept and destroy missiles soon after they are launched towards the country [http://www.thehindu.com/holnus/008200901181531.htm](http://www.thehindu.com/holnus/008200901181531.htm).

Missile defences can be classified by type/range of missile intercepted, trajectory of phase and intercept location relative to the atmosphere.

**Classified by Type/Range of Missile Intercepted**

The types/ranges are strategic, theater and tactical. Each entails unique requirements for intercept, and a defensive system capable of intercepting one missile type frequently cannot intercept others; however there is sometimes overlap in capability.
- Strategic missile defense: Targets long-range **ICBMs**, which travel at about 7 km/s (15,700 mph). Example of currently active systems: Russian **A-135** system which defends Moscow, and the U.S. **Ground-Based Midcourse Defense** system that defends the United States. Geographic range of strategic defense can be regional (Russian system) or national (U.S. system).

- Theater missile defense: Targets medium-range **Theatre ballistic missile**, which travel at about 3 km/s (6,700 mph) or less. In this context the term "theater" means the entire localized region for military operations, typically a radius of several hundred kilometers. Defense range of theater defensive systems is usually on this order. Examples of deployed or soon-to-be deployed theater missile defenses: **Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD)**, **Airborne laser** and Russian **S-400 Triumph**.

- Tactical missile defense: Targets short-range **tactical ballistic missiles**, which usually travel at less than 1.5 km/s (3,400 mph). Tactical ABMs have short ranges, typically 20-80 km (12-50 miles). Example of currently-deployed tactical ABM: **MIM-104 Patriot**, S-300V.

**Classified by trajectory phase**

Ballistic missiles can be intercepted in **three regions of their trajectory**: boost phase, midcourse phase or terminal phase.

- Boost phase: intercepting the missile while its rocket motors are firing, usually over the launch territory. Advantages: bright, hot rocket exhaust makes detection, discrimination and targeting easier. **Decoys** cannot be used during boost phase. Disadvantages:
difficult to geographically position interceptors to intercept missiles in boost phase (not always possible without flying over hostile territory), short time for intercept (typically about 180 seconds). Example: aircraft-mounted laser weapon Boeing YAL-1 (under development).

- Mid-course phase: intercepting the missile in space after the rocket burns out. The coast period through space before reentering the atmosphere can be several minutes, up to 20 minutes for an ICBM. Advantages: extended decision/intercept time, very large geographic defensive coverage, potentially continental. Disadvantages: requires large/heavy anti-ballistic missiles, sophisticated powerful radar often augmented by space-based sensors, must handle potential space-based decoys.

- Terminal phase: intercepting the missile after it reenters the atmosphere. Advantages: smaller/lighter anti-ballistic missile required, balloon decoys won't work, smaller, less sophisticated radar required. Disadvantages: very short reaction time, possibly less than 30 seconds, less defended geographic coverage. Possible blanketing of target area with hazardous materials in the case of nuclear warheads

**Classified by intercept location relative to the atmosphere**

Missile defense can take place either inside (endoatmospheric) or outside (exoatmospheric) the earth's atmosphere. The trajectory of most ballistic missiles takes them inside and outside the earth's atmosphere, and they can be intercepted either place. There are advantages and disadvantages to either intercept technique.
• Endoatmospheric anti-ballistic missiles are usually shorter ranged. Advantages: physically smaller/lighter, easier to move and deploy, endoatmospheric intercept means balloon-type decoys won't work. Disadvantages: limited range and defended area, and limited decision and tracking time for the incoming warhead. Example: MIM-104 Patriot and Advanced Air Defence.

• Exoatmospheric anti-ballistic missiles are usually longer ranged. Advantages: more decision and tracking time, larger defended area with fewer missiles. Disadvantages: larger/heavier missiles required, more difficult to transport and emplace than smaller missiles, must handle decoys. Example: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense and Prithvi Air Defence. Some missiles such as THAAD can intercept both inside and outside the earth's atmosphere, giving two intercept opportunities.


National Missile Defense is a US programme to create a system to defend the USA against a limited strategic ballistic missile attack. NMD is a much reduced version of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). It involves launching interceptor missiles from the ground, using land-based radars and space-based infrared sensors to guide them to destroy incoming long-range missiles. The NMD initiative is overseen by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) set up in 1993. Since the end of the Cold War, the main threat to the USA is felt to come from nations such as Iran and North Korea, which are soon likely to have the potential to hit US targets with nuclear missiles. The system also aims to protect against a small accidental or unauthorised launch of strategic-ballistic missiles from nuclear capable states.

(http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/missile-defense-system)
According to Boyne (2008) Defense Systems, are combination of electronic warning networks and military strategies designed to protect a country from a strategic missile or bomber attack. Air defense systems use radar and satellite detection systems to monitor a nation’s airspace, providing data that would allow defense forces to detect and coordinate against such an attack. Several industrialized nations, including the United States, also maintain an arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons as a deterrent to a nuclear attack. Active defense systems have been proposed that would use interceptor missiles to track and shoot down incoming ICBMs detected and tracked by radar. These are known as antiballistic missile (ABM) or ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems. The most important U.S. antiballistic missile systems were the 1967 “Sentinel,” the 1969 “Safeguard,” and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was proposed by U.S. president Ronald Reagan in 1983. SDI would have used a combination of satellite-based sensors and weapons to destroy ballistic missiles after their launch. The research that began on SDI continued in various ways, but no actual program was started because costs were deemed too high.

Rood (2008) states that the new strategic environment US found itself requires new approaches to deterrence and defense. Our deterrence strategy no longer rests primarily on the grim premise of inflicting devastating consequences on potential foes. Both offenses and defenses are necessary to deter state and non-state actors, through denial of the objectives of their attacks, and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force. Rather than being forced to respond to a ballistic missile attack with massive retaliation, we have responsibly opted to develop defenses, as well. Should Iran, North Korea or some other outlaw state attempt to pursue their objectives through force, coercion, and intimidation by employing ballistic missiles, missile defense will afford the United States yet another option to neutralize the
threat. As we saw in July 2006, when we activated our system for the first time in response to North Korean missile launch preparations, missile defense allowed our national leadership to consider a wider, more flexible range of responses to a potential attack. Missile defense promotes stability as part of a contemporary deterrence strategy. Not only does it increase our options in responding to a ballistic missile attack, it decreases incentives for missile proliferation in the first place by undermining the military utility and attractiveness of these weapons. Missile defense mitigates the deterrence relationship Iran and North Korea are seeking to create with the United States, Europe, and the Russian Federation. We have no intention of being deterred by rogue regimes.

Kartchner (2002), justifies US missile defence system on the grounds that today’s world is fundamentally different and requires new ways of fighting armed groups who seek to acquire growing arsenals of chemical, biological and, in the future, nuclear weapons, as well as increasingly capable ballistic missile as a means of delivery. Thus for the US to be effective, there approach must encompass a broad range of policies and programmes, including proactive nonproliferation and threat-reduction efforts, counter-proliferation measures, and effective response capabilities to mitigate the consequences of the use weapons of mass destruction. And lauded the US Department of Defence for the completion of Nuclear Posture Review which lays the foundation a diversified approach to deterrence that incorporates both conventional offensive strike capabilities and missile defence, thus reducing US reliance on nuclear weapons.

According to Bahgat (2007) the prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons has been a major concern for both regional and international powers. The United States and several European nations have accused Iran of seeking a nuclear-weapons capability. Iran categorically
denies these accusations and says its nuclear program is only for domestic purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been vigorously investigating Iran’s nuclear programme for a number of years. The IAEA Board of Governors has issued several statements underscoring two critical points. First, Iran’s nuclear activities have not been completely in keeping with its commitments to the Non-proliferation Treaty. Second, despite these violations and some serious irregularities, the IAEA has not been able to find evidence that Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons. No “smoking gun” has yet been found.

He further highlighted four characteristics of Iran’s nuclear programme. First, Iran’s desire for some form of nuclear development is rooted in its tumultuous history. Most Iranians perceive their nation as a great civilization that has been deprived of its “rightful” status as a regional superpower by foreign intervention. Accordingly, developing an indigenous nuclear capability would go a long way in restoring a sense of pride, respect, and regional leadership. Second, Dr. Javad Zarif, the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations and other top officials point out that their country is “party to all international agreements on the control of weapons of mass destruction.” These include the Non-proliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Third, a number of military analysts and policymakers are extremely doubtful that Iran fully complies with these treaties. John Chipman, director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, concludes that “an Iranian nuclear capacity is both almost inevitable, and certainly bad.” Finally, there is concern about Iran’s nuclear capability based on perceptions of the Iranian regime, what Dr. Peter Lavoy, Director for Counter Proliferation Policy, calls “political relativists.” Political relativists point to a country’s system of governance, its political
ideology, and its strategic culture as the surest indicators of its likely conduct as a nuclear power.

Freedman (2008), offers a penetrating critique of the policies of the past five US administrations. Freedman frames his narrative around the “incompetent, careless use of power in both the military and political spheres,” the ability of Islam to inspire militancy and the arrogant neo-conservative fantasy underpinning the efforts to promote democracy and “eliminate the evil of terrorism.” In the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he concludes, “the big lesson from past experience is the need to understand the limits to power and the extent to which it is hard for anyone to control events.” Future grand strategy will likely turn on how policymakers understand these limits.

After briefly treating the “first radical wave” of Arab nationalism in the early Cold War, Freedman devotes the bulk of the text to the “second radical wave” following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. US policymakers did not see the Islamist wave coming, he points out, because their grand strategy was defined by Cold War containment, an imperative largely disconnected from the domestic and regional conflicts that dominated the Middle East.

Pollack (2008) in A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East, contends that “reform” should replace containment as the basis for US grand strategy. The former director of Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council is aware that Washington, with its competing core interests in the region, has often pursued self-contradictory policies. The authoritarian regimes Washington has relied upon to maintain stability have impeded reform, resulting in the spread of radical Islam and terrorism. Pollack, however, rejects Freedman’s modesty in favor of an ambitious strategy for transcending the contradictions. Throughout his journey, he posits that neo-liberals are more committed and
better equipped to implement the reform agenda to which the Bush administration paid lip service. Pollack seems to feel he has transcended his own massive blunder, *The Threatening Storm* (2002), a highly influential brief for invading Iraq. But *A Path Out of the Desert* paves the way for a repeat performance.

Pollack begins his preface by announcing, “We’re all frustrated with the Middle East. It is a very frustrating place.” The Middle East frustrates analysts like Pollack because it “seems to defy logic, as well as what Americans consider practical solutions and obvious compromises.” And America gains little from its costly intercession when the region’s problems boil over. As in *The Threatening Storm*, Pollack is forthright about what the main US interests are: the security of Israel and the flow of oil (“the principal strategic rationale for our alignment with Arab states”). The US cares about other Arab states only to the degree that they can threaten US interests or help the US contain such threats.

Rather than exploring how the main interests interact, Pollack plays the shrink, pinpointing the dysfunctions of the region. The Muslims of the Middle East are angry and disaffected, he says, to the point that the despair breeds terrorists. His diagnosis reads like a thorough undergraduate thesis, plowing through economic and social data to advance the one-dimensional claim that these emotions are rooted in runaway population growth, high unemployment, economic mismanagement and low productivity. According to Pollack, these economic problems are compounded by the “cultural method of education,” which is defined by “complete obedience to authority” and the notion that knowledge is revealed, not created. Recycling the most reductionist notions to come out of modernization theory and Orientalism, he paints a picture of traditional societies undergoing the “shock of modernity.” Rather than
embracing modernity, many Arabs and Muslims close themselves off from it out of fear. Cultural globalization only alienates them further.

The initial Bush stance on Iran tended to lean towards isolation, via sanctions and diplomatic activity, rather than engagement noted Dumbrell (2007). Offers of talks with Tehran were declined in 2002 and 2003 following the discovery of Iranian evasion of International Atomic Energy Agency requirements. Tenuous links were also broken off after the May 2003 Riyadh bombing. The short-lived Paris Agreement of 2004 led to some thawing of relations, though the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad represented a defeat for proponents of engagement both in Tehran and Washington. The night before the election, George W. Bush predicted that the ‘tide of freedom’ sweeping the region would ‘come eventually to Iran’. By 2005-6, a host of specialist advisers and academics were promoting the cause of engagement

Cordesman (2002) argues that proliferation is not a new problem in the Middle East. Nation like Egypt and Israel first began to pursue nuclear weapons during the early 1960s. Egypt used chemical weapons when it intervened in the civil war in Yemen in the 1960s, and both Israel and its opponents were heavily equipped for chemical warfare during the October War in 1973. In spite of various denials, U.S. intelligence experts are convinced that the Shah of Iran initiated Iran’s nuclear weapons program during the 1970s, and few doubt that Iraq was actively seeking nuclear weapons at the time Israeli jets struck its Osirak reactor in 1981. The most dramatic use of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East took place during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. Iraq first used mustard gas and then more sophisticated nerve agents. It not only steadily intensified its chemical attacks on Iranian troop concentration, but sometime attacked Kurdish, towns and civilians. The worst of these attacks took place on Kurdish civilians in Halabjah, but there seem to have been a number of other, more limited uses
of such weapons. Iran was much slower than Iraq in its acquisition and use of chemical weapons, but U.S. intelligence experts believe that Iraq has either used its own weapons in limited number or used captured weapons.

Missile proliferation, too, is a long-standing problem in the region. The former Soviet Union began to sell short-range FROG rockets to its allies in the Middle East in the late 1960s, and those sales were soon followed by sales of early types of cruise missiles, like the SAMLET, and medium-range ballistic missile, like the Scud. Israel responded by obtaining missiles, technology from France, and is believed to have had its first Jericho missiles in production by the early 1970s. Syria fired Scud missiles at Israel during the October war of 1973. By the mid-1970s Israel had deployed its first long-range, nuclear armed missiles. He further states that, Iran and Iraq made extensive use of Scud missile against each other’s capitals in the so called “war of the cities” during the Iran-Iraq War. At that time, Iraq developed and used its own longer-range version of the Scud. Iraq later used Scuds against both Israel and Saudi Arabia during the gulf War in 1991, and Deployed warheads for its missiles, as well as chemical and biological bombs for contingency use. While attempting to further advance their missile programme, senior Egyptian officials were caught smuggling missile technology from the US to Canada.

From the above review, however, it is apparently surprising that scholars bothered less to probe into the impact of the Bush Doctrine on US military resources. Second, the strategic implication of proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe for Iran and the Arab world got little attention. The study, therefore seeks to fill these gaps in the literature.
1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study will adopt the theory of political realism as its conceptual framework. According to Onuoha (2008) realism was a product of the disenchantment with academic contributions to the discussion of international politics in the inter-war years, with its concentration on refining legal and organizational forms intended to strengthen international tradition throughout the Cold War. It depicts international politics as a struggle for power among self-interested states, and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for elimination of conflict and war.

The main tenet or thrust of this theoretical framework is “power and rationality”. It suggests that groups or individuals who are acting on behalf of the state should be rational and the rationality must be in consonance with the preservation of the state’s independence and sovereignty. The only way of doing this is to amass power militarily and technologically as this will deter other states in having any conflagration with the home state no matter the size, geographical position, political, social/cultural and economic posture of the state. They also believe that countries could attack any other which could pose a threat to them at any time provided they have the means to back it up.

The major exponents of this school are E.H.Carr and Hans Morganthau, although Thucydides is seen as the father of realist thought. Other notable scholars whose works have elements of realist thought are Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotuis, Niccolo Machiavelli, etc. These Scholars are viewed as classical realist. To them, international politics is driven by endless struggle for power which has its roots in human nature. Justice, law, and society either have no place or are circumscribed. Scholars like Rousseau, Waltz, and Mearsheimer are known as structural realist. Like the classical realist, they believe that a state in the international system
are locked in endless struggle for power but contends that this struggle stems from the anarchical structure of the international system. This anarchical system leads to the logic of self-help which compels states to maximize their relative power position.

The blow that the Second World War dealt to the idealist school coupled with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Italian occupation of Ethiopia made nonsensical of the idealist school. The history of international system had been wars and settlement of disputes. If there are no wars why international order and law? Is it not because of hostility and competition which characterize the relations between states- that brought about international order and law?

The realist realized all these and brought to bear their bank of experience as international relations experts to interrogate why hostility are rampant in the international system. Morganthau was of the view that the imperfections of the world wars were as a result of the forces inherent in the human nature. To him to improve the world, one must work with those forces, not against them. He opined that the key to the understanding of international system or politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power and that this would reveal the true behaviour of politicians and guides us to the proper understanding of what determines a states’ foreign policy. There is no morality international politics.

In international politics, the weak nations quote laws while the strong nations are law themselves. The weak nations are always at the mercy of strong nations and watch aimlessly as strong nations act decisively. In other words, ‘the end justifies the means” according to Nicollo Machiavelli. The actual and putative power of any state determines her position in the frame of international politics and of course her behaviour. For them power is might and the might is always right. Power is a dominant decimal and motivating force in the relation among states.
Going by the view of the realist, the Bush doctrine which advocates preemptive strike, unilateralism and global spread of democracy is a pure demonstration of military strength. America cannot for any reason, explain why they went to war in both Afghanistan and Iraq without the backing of United Nations (UN). America felt seriously threatened by terrorist groups and the ability of most nations in the Arab world to acquire nuclear weapons and realist would want America to act before her security is jeopardized and that was what Bush did by articulating the Bush Doctrine and invading Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent proposed deployment of Missile defence system in Easter Europe. America did all these because she has the means and might to back it up. It is clear that Poland and Czech Republic would not allow a country like Nigeria to station missile defence system on her soil even if Nigeria has the resources to do so.

The forceful transportation of democracy to both Afghanistan and Iran is a clear show of American military might. In fact, today more than eight and five years since the start of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US continues to maintain a strong military presence in both countries despite a universal condemnation of the invasions. It is only a country that has met all the realist credentials that can be in this position.

1.7 Hypotheses

The study will be guided by the following hypotheses:

1. The Bush doctrine as a strategy has stretched US military resources.

2. The proposed US missile defence system in Eastern Europe has not deterred Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
1.8 Method of Data Collection

This section is concerned with attempts to unveil the building blocks of the research edifice. It shows the processes and procedures employed in sifting through mountains of data and choosing a particular set of data; and presenting the data so chosen and the analytical tools utilized to reach conclusions (Agaptus, 2009).

There are two broad methods of generating data for social science research. These are observation method and self-report. While the former entails either observing actions or events as they occur (direct observation) or observing the traces or records of actions or events as well as the reports put down or recorded through direct observation (indirect observation), the latter largely borders on the use of interview and/or questionnaire to elicit information internal in the respondents. For the purpose of generating data to test our hypotheses in this study, we shall use the observation method of documentary sources. By document, we mean any written material (whether hand-written, typed, or printed) that was already in existence, which was produced for some other purpose than the benefit of the investigator (Nwana cited in Obasi, 1999). Hence, documentary method is used in this study to mean a method of gleaning, extracting, examining, analyzing and interpreting information as well as reading meaning into these pieces of information so as to be able to draw inference from the available evidence in order to reach a conclusion (Obasi, 1999).

What the foregoing implies is that documentary method makes the recourse to the secondary sources of data inevitable. By secondary sources of data, we mean data gathered or authored by another person, usually data from the available data, archives, either in form of document or survey results and books (Ikeagwu, 1998). To this end, this study will be based on documentary analysis of secondary sources of data. These sources of data include institutional
and official documents from embassies such as the American Embassy and policy document by strategic institutions. Information on the Bush Doctrine and the proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe by America will be sourced from the libraries of Center for American Studies (CAST) University of Nigeria, Nsukka and Nnamdi Azikiwe Library of the same institution.

Apart from institutional and official documents, this inquiry will extensively source materials in the internet and other secondary sources of data as textbooks, journals, magazines, articles and other written works dealing on the subject matter of this inquiry. To be sure, secondary data sources imply information originally collected for the purpose other than the present one (Asika, 2000). The advantage of secondary data is that it saves time and money through purpose and random selection of recorded materials in order to investigate the problem and test the hypothesis. There is also of the possibility of using the work of others to broaden the base from which scientific generalizations can be made (Ifesinachi, 1999).

The use of documents will be complimented by the technique of non-participant observation as the researcher has been a keen and active observer of the trends and dynamics of American politics.

**Research Design**

In conducting researches, research designs are indispensable. Igwe (2002) shows the link between research and research design thus:

(Research is) a systematic enquiry to discover phenomena, the laws governing them and the diverse means of the application of the knowledge to practical situations. On the other hand (research design is) the methodological and related processes employed in research especially with regard to theoretical framework, and the collection and manipulation of data.
Therefore a research design is a plan which guides a researcher and prevents him/her from veering off course in the process of collecting, presenting, analyzing and interpreting data. It is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation. It also defines the domain of generalizability, that is, whether the obtained interpretations can be generalized to a larger population or to different situations (Bailey, 1978; Nnabugwu, 2006).

This research is basically qualitative and non-experimental; thus we are using the observation method of documentary sources; that is, going through documented evidence to discover the various data and information that have made this work scientific. Non-experiments are based on the same logic as experiments and can be designed to determine associations. While the study couches the hypotheses in relational terms (dependent and independent variables), it does not use experiment or controlled groups.

The relationship amongst variables in our hypotheses is asymmetrical. As Rosenberg (1968) opines, “in this type of relationship, we postulate that one variable (the independent variable) is essentially ‘responsible for’ another (the dependent variable)”. Our variables exhibit the type of asymmetrical relationship which Rosenberg (1968) has described as “essentially a necessary precondition for a given effect”. In our first hypothesis for instance, there is a relationship between the Bush Doctrine as a Defence strategy and the stretching of US military resources. The same pattern is observed in our second hypothesis. There is a relationship between the proposed US missile defence system in Eastern Europe and the incentive for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
To meaningfully undertake the validation or otherwise of our hypotheses, this study utilizes the ex-post facto design. That is, the tests of hypothesis involve observing the independent and dependent variables at the same time because the effects of the former on the latter have already taken place before investigation. Kerlinger (1977) defines the ex post facto design as a form of descriptive research in which an independent variable has already occurred and in which an investigator starts with the observation of a dependent variable; he then studies the independent variable in retrospect for its possible relationship to and effects on the dependent variable.

The choice of ex post facto design is necessitated by the nature of our research questions. The essential variables in our hypotheses are such that control groups cannot be introduced to address the various effects of the Bush Doctrine and the proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe.
CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND BACKGROUND TO THE
PROPOSED US MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN EASTERN EUROPE

2.1 Overview of the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine is a phrase used to describe various related foreign policy principles of former United States president George W. Bush. The phrase initially described the policy that the United States had the right to secure itself from countries that harbor or give aid to terrorist groups, which was used to justify the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan (Weiseman, 2003). Later it came to include additional elements, including the controversial policy of preventive war, which held that the United States should depose foreign regimes that represented a potential or perceived threat to the security of the United States, even if that threat was not immediate; a policy of spreading democracy around the world, especially in the Middle East, as a strategy for combating terrorism; and a willingness to pursue U.S. military interests in a unilateral way (Allen, 2007; Levin, 2006). Some of these policies were codified in a National Security Council text entitled the National Security Strategy of the United States published on September 20, 2002.

This document is often cited as the definitive statement of the doctrine. It was updated in 2006 and is stated as follows:
The security environment confronting the United States today is radically different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense (White House, 2002).

2.2 Components of the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine has been formulated as a collection of strategy principles, practical policy decisions, and a set of rationales and ideas for guiding United States foreign policy. The George W. Bush administration claimed that the United States is locked in a global war; a war of ideology, in which its enemies are bound together by a common ideology and a common hatred of democracy. (Sanger, 2006; Brooks, 2004). Out of the National Security Strategy, four main points are highlighted as the core to the Bush Doctrine: Preemption, Military Primacy, New Multilateralism, and the Spread of Democracy. The document emphasized preemption by stating: "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few." and required "defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders." (Chicago Tribune, September 8, 2008).
2.2.1 Preemptive strikes

President Bush addressed the cadets at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) on June 1, 2002, and made clear the role Preemptive war would play in the future of American foreign policy and national defense (Bush, 2002)

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the world of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long — Our security will require transforming the military you will lead — a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.

Two distinct schools of thought arose in the Bush Administration regarding the question of how to handle countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea ("Axis of Evil" states) Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, as well as U.S. Department of State specialists, argued for what was essentially the continuation of existing U.S. foreign policy. These policies, developed after the Cold War, sought to establish a multilateral consensus for action (which would likely take the form of increasingly harsh sanctions against the problem states, summarized as the policy of containment). The opposing view, argued by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and a number of influential Department of Defense policy makers such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, held that direct and unilateral action was both possible and justified and that America should embrace the opportunities for democracy and security offered by its position as sole remaining superpower. President Bush ultimately sided with the Department of Defense camp, and their recommendations.
2.2.2 Unilateralism

Unilateral elements of the Bush Doctrine were evident in the first months of Bush's presidency. Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer used the term, unilateralism, in February 2001 to refer to the president's increased unilateralism in foreign policy, specifically regarding the president's decision to withdraw from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, ABM (Krauthammer, 2008). There is some evidence that Bush's willingness for the United States to act unilaterally came even earlier. The International Journal of Peace Studies 2003 article *The Bush administration's image of Europe: From ambivalence to rigidity* states:

> When it comes to the future of Europe, Americans and Europeans differ on key issues. The differences seem to point toward three fundamental values which underpin the Bush administration's image of Europe. The first is unilateralism, of which the missile shield is a particularly telling example. The American position flies in the face of the European approach, which is based on ABM talks and multilateralism. An opposition is taking shape here between the leading European capitals, which want to deal with the matter by judicial means, and the Americans, who want to push ahead and create a fait accompli.

2.2.3 Attacking Countries that Harbor Terrorists

The doctrine was developed more fully in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The attacks presented a foreign-policy challenge, since it was not Afghanistan that had initiated the attacks, and there was no evidence that they had any foreknowledge of the attacks. In an address to the nation on the evening of September 11, Bush stated his resolution of the issue by declaring that "we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." This policy was used to justify the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, and has since been applied to American military action against Al Qaeda camps in North-West Pakistan. President Bush made an
even more aggressive restatement of this principle in his September 20, 2001 address to the United States Congress:

We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.

2.2.4 Democratic Regime Change

In a series of speeches in late 2001 and 2002, President Bush expanded on his view of American foreign policy and global intervention, declaring that the United States should actively support democratic governments around the world, especially in the Middle East, as a strategy for combating the threat of terrorism, and that the United States had the right to act unilaterally in its own security interests, without the approval of international bodies such as the United Nations. This represented a departure from the Cold War policies of deterrence and containment under the Truman Doctrine and post-Cold War philosophies such as the Powell Doctrine and the Clinton Doctrine. In his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush declared:

Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity.

After his second inauguration, in a January 2004 speech at National Defense University, Bush said: "The defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom." Neoconservatives and the Bush Doctrine held that the hatred for the West and United States in particular, is not because of actions perpetrated by the United States, but rather because the countries from which terrorists emerge are in
social disarray and do not experience the freedom that is an intrinsic part of democracy. The Bush Doctrine holds that enemies of United States are using terrorism as a war of ideology against the United States. The responsibility of the United States is to protect itself and its friends by promoting democracy where the terrorists are located so as to undermine the basis for terrorist activities (Kaufman, 2007).

2.3 Influences on the Bush Doctrine

Central to the development of the Bush Doctrine was its strong influence by neoconservative ideology (Schmidt, 2007) and it was considered to be a step from the political realism of the Reagan Doctrine. The Reagan Doctrine was considered key to American foreign policy until the end of the Cold War, just before Bill Clinton became president of the United States. The Reagan Doctrine was considered anti-Communist and in opposition to Soviet Union global influence, but later spoke of a peace dividend towards the end of the Cold War with economic benefits of a decrease in defense spending. The Reagan Doctrine was strongly criticized by the neoconservatives, who also became disgruntled with the outcome of the Gulf War and United States foreign policy under Bill Clinton, sparking them to call for change towards global stability through their support for active intervention and the democratic peace theory (Halper, 2004). Several central persons in the counsel to the George W. Bush administration considered themselves to be neoconservatives or strongly support their foreign policy ideas. Neoconservatives are widely known to long have supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and on January 26, 1998, the Project for a New American Century, PNAC, sent a public letter to then-President Bill Clinton stating:

As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be unable to determine with any reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such weapons. Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously
destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard. As you have rightly declared, Mr. President, the security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be determined largely by how we handle this threat.

Among the signatories to Project for the New American Century's original statement of Principals is George W. Bush’s father’s Vice President Dan Quayle, his (Bush Jr.'s) defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, his Vice President Dick Cheney, and his brother Jeb Bush.

PNAC member and the chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (DPBAC), Neoconservative Richard Perle, later expressed regret over the Iraq invasion and ultimately put the blame for the invasion on President George W. Bush; while other renowned neoconservative ideologists like Joshua Muravchik and Norman Podhoretz claim that neoconservatives must take intellectual leadership and that traditional conservatives lack the insight on how to solve terrorism (Borger, 2006). Muravchik called former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (a traditional conservative) a neoconservative hero and champion of military strategy, but that the strength of neoconservatives is their ideology as foundation for policies, and this strength is also recognized by political scientists. Muravchik claims these strengths are present in the case of the Reagan presidency as well as the Bush presidency, and that Bush unlike Reagan has contributed to the "fundamental solution" to the Middle East (Muravchik, 2006).

Other than Bush and Rumsfeld, other traditional conservatives who are thought to have adopted neoconservative foreign policy thinking include Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. The Bush Doctrine, in line with long-standing neoconservative ideas, held that the United States is entangled in a global war of ideas between the western values of freedom on the one hand, and extremism seeking to destroy them on the other; a war of ideology where the United States must take responsibility for security and show leadership in the world by actively seeking out the enemies and also change those countries who are supporting enemies.

The Bush Doctrine, and neoconservative reasoning, held that containment of the enemy as under the Realpolitik of Reagan does not work, and that the enemy of United States must be destroyed before he attacks — using all the United States' available means, resources to do so (Boyer, 2004).

Another part of the intellectual underpinning of the Bush Doctrine was the 2004 book *The Case for Democracy*, written by Israeli politician and author, Natan Sharansky, and Israeli Minister of Economic Affairs in the United States, Ron Dermer, which Bush has cited as influential in his thinking. The book argues that replacing dictatorships with democratic governments is both morally justified, since it leads to greater freedom for the citizens of such countries, and strategically wise, since democratic countries are more peaceful, and breed less terrorism, than dictatorial ones (Dickerson, 2005).

2.4 The Threat for Missile Defence System in Eastern Europe

The Bush Administration argued that North Korea and Iran constituted major strategic threats. North Korea claims to have tested a nuclear device and has a ballistic missile program. The Administration argued that Iran continues to acquire and develop ballistic missiles of various ranges. Until recently, the Bush Administration argued that Iran had an active nuclear weapons development
program. In November 2007, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that “in Fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program,” but that Iran is also keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons at some point. The Iranian nuclear weapons program reportedly also included developing a warhead that could fit atop an Iranian ballistic missile (David, 2007).

The Bush Administration regarded both countries as unpredictable and dangerous, and did not believe they could be constrained by traditional forms of military deterrence, diplomacy, or arms control. On a trip to attend a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in early December 2007, Secretary of State Rice told reporters: “I don’t see that the NIE changes the course that we’re on” to deploy a European missile defense system (CBS News, December 6, 2007). Accompanying her on the trip, Undersecretary of State John Rood, lead U.S. negotiator for the European missile defense talks, added: “the missile threat from Iran continues to progress and to cause us to be very concerned.... Missile defense would be useful regardless of what kind of payload, whether that be conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear.” (Associated Press, December 6, 2007).

According to long-standing unclassified U.S. intelligence assessments, Iran may be able to test an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) or long-range ballistic missile capability by 2015 if it receives foreign assistance, such as from Russia or China. Many in Congress and elsewhere share this specific assessment, or that the potential threat may not emerge by 2015 but is sufficiently worrisome to begin addressing it now. Many therefore believe it prudent to move forward with plans to deploy a long-range missile defense system in Europe to defend Europe, friends and allies, and the United States against long-range ballistic missile threats. Some in the larger international security policy and ballistic missile proliferation community argue that evidence of an Iranian ICBM program is scant and unpersuasive. Additionally, the Iranian government reports (which cannot be verified) that Iran has a
limited missile capability with a range of about 1,200 miles and that it has stopped development of ICBM range missiles. Although some Europeans have expressed concern about Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program, some U.S. friends and allies in Europe question the Administration’s assessment of Iran’s potential ICBM threat. Hence, some question the need for a GMD element of the U.S. BMDS in Europe (Hildreth, 2009).

Before we look at the nature of the proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe, let us first examine the origin of the project.

2.5 The Source of the Defence System

During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan, announced his wish to provide his country with a system based in outer space that could intercept and destroy ballistic missiles aimed at the United States or its allies. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), but, the collapse of the Soviet regime and the departure of Ronald Reagan from the White House marked the end of the SDI project as it was envisaged in the 1980s. Presidents George H. W. Bush (Snr) and Bill Clinton looked at the new strategic context when they modified Mr. Reagan’s ambitious plans. In 1993, the Democratic Administration created a new agency within the Defense Department, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), charged with the task of developing a Theatre Missile Defense (TMD). This new approach, which was intended mainly to protect soldiers engaged in overseas military operations from short and medium range missiles, took into account the nature of post-Cold War conflicts. What comes to mind, in particular, was the Gulf War of 1990-1991, during which theatre missile defence played a rather important role (Raphael, 2007).

However, during the second half of the 1990s, the concept of a National Missile Defense (NMD) returned to the foreground due to technological progress made by a number of states such as
China and India. Whereas Mr. Reagan’s plan was directed at large-scale attacks, the NMD aimed at protecting the nation against smaller attacks. The objective was clearly to confront threats posed by rogue states such as North Korea. The NMD programme was officially launched in April 1997 and comprised both design and implementation of a system capable of protecting the territory of the United States from ballistic missiles by the year 2003. In August 1998, the test of the Taepodong-1 ballistic missile carried out by North Korea prompted the Clinton Administration to accelerate development of the NMD programme. Thus, the American Congress approved the National Missile Defense Act in 1999. According to that law, the United States would deploy, insofar as technology permitted, an effective system […] capable of protecting [American] territory against limited attack by ballistic missiles (American National Defence Act, 1999).

In order to be able to deploy the first phase of the NMD programme consisting of a hundred interceptors located in Alaska, the Clinton Administration was obliged to enter into talks with Russia over possible revisions to the ABM Treaty. According to the 1972 text, the signatories could only protect a single site against ballistic missile attack, not their entire territory. Russia was not very enthusiastic about the idea of entering into negotiations over the ABM Treaty. The heritage of the Cold War had left the Russian authorities very attached to the idea of vulnerability as the foundation of deterrence. Moscow in fact believed that the ABM Treaty constituted the cornerstone of strategic stability between the United States and Russia. According to the Kremlin’s reasoning, deployment of a missile defence system covering American territory would create instability, because, once it felt protected against possible reprisals, the United States could easily be tempted to attack first.
Furthermore, the American plan could endanger international strategic equilibrium by provocating an arms race which would compromise the efforts already agreed to limit and then reduce nuclear stockpiles. From the Russian point of view, a power like China could thus be tempted to develop its offensive capabilities so as to match the increased American defensive efforts (CRS Report for Congress, 2002). Moreover, a number of Russian experts viewed the NMD as a direct threat to their national deterrent power. They believed that American advances in the field of submarines as well as in the precision of their conventional arms offered the United States the means of launching conventional and nuclear attacks on strategic Russian targets. Faced with a nuclear arsenal in decline, both in terms of quantity and in terms of technology, the deployment of an American missile defence would give Washington an immense strategic advantage. It would render any Russian response virtually impossible. Russian observers believed that such supremacy could allow the United States to proceed with radical changes in the military equilibrium (CRS Report for Congress, 2002).

Facing the opposition of President Yeltsin and then of President Putin, the Clinton Administration, which repeated its attachment to strategic stability, found itself with arguments that lacked weight. Russia refused to proceed with any rewriting of the 1972 treaty. As a consequence of this, and given the doubts over the reliability of the technology, in the autumn of 2000 President Clinton abandoned plans to deploy the hundred interceptors in Alaska that had been foreseen in the year 2005 under the NMD programme (Avis, 2000). He preferred to leave it to his successor to decide upon the future of any missile defence system for the United States.

When the Junior Bush came on board as US president, the former Governor of the State of Texas had repeatedly expressed the wish to continue the programme launched by President Clinton. During the electoral campaign, George W. Bush let it be known that his Administration would be ready to act unilaterally if Russia refuses to modify the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty it entered into with
US on limiting defence systems. From the moment he took office, President Bush took up the case of
the missile defence system. In February 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke of the
need to adapt to the threats of the post-Cold War era. After mentioning the benefits of dissuasion, Mr.
Rumsfeld announced that the United States wanted to design and to deploy a missile defence system in
order to protect our people and our forces against a limited ballistic missile attack (Rumsfeld, 2001). But, unlike the position of the Clinton Administration, he added that the United States was ready
to assist ‘its friends and allies’ to ‘deploy such a defence.’ Moscow was clearly the object of this
overture.

At the same time, the White House remained firm on the question of the ABM Treaty. Whereas
the Clinton Administration had sought to engage in dialogue in order to revise the 1972 treaty, the new
team repeatedly let it be known that it was ready to move outside the framework of what Condoleezza
Rice described as a ‘relic of the Cold War’ (Ivo and Daalder, 2002). On May 1, 2001, President Bush,
for his part, mentioned the obsolete nature of the concept of deterrence inherited from the Cold War.
He put the accent on the need to invent a new form of deterrence based on defensive means and no
longer exclusively on offensive means. He added that it was necessary ‘to go beyond the constraints of
the 30-year-old ABM Treaty’ in order to develop ‘a new framework that will allow us to build a missile
defence that is suited to the various threats of today’s world’ (Bush, 2001).

This question was raised by President Bush during his discussions with President Putin in the
summer of 2001. The attacks of September 11, 2001 slowed down these negotiations and for a time
removed the question of missile defence from the presidential agenda. Nonetheless, the vulnerability
which these attacks demonstrated permitted the emergence of a consensus between Democrats and
Republicans on defence issues. Moreover, the support of President Putin in the fight against terrorism
ushered in a rapprochement between Moscow and Washington which could work to the advantage of
the missile defence project. The many meetings arranged in the autumn of 2001 thus enabled Messrs. Bush and Putin to reach an agreement on reducing their respective nuclear arsenals. However, the two men did not come to an understanding on the question of the ABM Treaty. Although it was aware of the new realities of the post-Cold War world, the Kremlin remained attached to the principle of respecting treaties and to the element of predictability that these accords on arms control had brought to the strategic environment.

Consequently, and in accordance with the position developed since his taking office, President Bush announced the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001 (Ivo and Daalder, 2002). This withdrawal took effect six months later. Contrary to what one might have expected, the reaction of Mr. Putin was measured and constructive. After declaring that he considered this withdrawal to have been a mistake, the Russian President added that this decision would not have any negative repercussions on relations between the two states. Moreover, he expressed the wish to build ‘a new framework for strategic relations’ between Moscow and Washington (CRS Report for Congress, 2002).

2.6 The Missile Defence System

Once it was freed from the constraints of the ABM Treaty, the Bush Administration was able to develop its missile defence programme. A Presidential directive dated December 16, 2002 sets out the main features of the project (The White House, 2002). It positions the Bush Administration’s missile defence policy as a continuation of the Missile Defense Act issued in 1999 by President Clinton. This text is noteworthy for ending the distinction between a national missile defence (NMD) and theatre defence (TMD), which was described as a consequence of the ABM Treaty. According to this directive, the United States intended to begin deployment in 2004 of a system that would consist of
interceptors based on land and on sea, as well as radars on land and in outer space. The question of international cooperation was mentioned, in particular cooperation with the United Kingdom and Denmark, which might take in some elements of the set-up. Finally, the directive said that the United States was ready to collaborate with its traditional allies as well as with ‘new friends like Russia.’ (The White House, 2002).

In order to carry out this project, a new agency was created within the Department of Defense: the MDA or Missile Defense Agency. It officially replaced the BMDO, the office created under the Clinton Administration, on January 2, 2002. This change provided the MDA with greater bureaucratic autonomy, since its director would report directly to the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Deployment of the first phase of the missile defence programme began at the end of 2004 to address long-range missile threats primarily from North Korea. Currently, the U.S. Ground base mid-course Defence, GMD, element of the Ballistic Missile Defence System, BMDS, includes about more than two dozen silo-based interceptors in Alaska and several in California. As part of an integrated BMDS capability, the United States also has a number of ground-based radars in operation around the world, space-based assets supporting the BMDS mission, command and control networks throughout the United States and the Pacific, as well as ground-mobile and sea based systems for shorter-range BMD. What remains necessary as part of the global BMDS, according to the Bush Administration, is an ability in the European theater to defend against intermediate-to-long-range ballistic missiles launched from Iran. The Department of Defense (DOD) argues it is important to U.S. national security interests to deploy a GMD capability in Europe to optimize defensive coverage of the United States and Europe against potential threats both into Europe and against the United States (Hildreth, 2009).
There have not been a large number of intercept flight tests of the deployed GMD element. Nonetheless, the Bush Administration and many U.S. military leaders expressed confidence in the deployed system (Cartwright, 2006). Most agree there is the need for further operational testing. Some observers continue to question how much confidence there should be in the system’s potential operational or combat effectiveness based on the types of tests conducted and the test results to date.

The current GMD program began flight tests in 2002. This effort was built on several earlier long-range BMD programs with decidedly mixed results themselves since the early 1980s. Since 2002, some GMD intercept flight tests have taken place with mixed results. In each of these tests, most all other flight test objectives were met. In 2002, the GMD moved to the operational booster and interceptor. The interceptor system flew two developmental tests in 2003 and 2004, and the GMD element of the BMDS was deployed in late 2004 in Alaska and California. Two planned intercept flight tests of the new configuration for December 2004 and February 2005 were not successful. After technical review, the interceptor successfully demonstrated a booster fly-out in 2005. In September 2006, a successful flight test exercise of the GMD element as deployed took place. (Although a missile intercept was not planned as the primary objective of this data collection test, an intercept opportunity occurred and the target warhead was successfully intercepted.) Additional intercept flight tests of the deployed element whose primary objectives were intercepts of long-range ballistic missile targets were originally scheduled for later in 2006, but then subsequently postponed. Then a May 2007 intercept test was scrubbed when the target missile failed to launch as planned. A follow-on attempt scheduled for summer 2007 was completed successfully on September 29, 2007.

The Missile Defense Agency reported a successful intercept in December 2008, but some were critical of this assessment as the test objective was for the intercept to occur amidst a field of decoys,
which decoys failed to deploy from the test target. Supporters and many military officials express confidence in the deployed system, but others continue to question the system’s potential effectiveness based on the mixed intercept flight test record. Most observers agree, however, that additional, successful flight testing is necessary. Supporters add that a significant number of non-flight tests and activities are conducted that demonstrate with high confidence the ability of the GMD element to perform its intended mission.

What would the European element of the BMDS look like? The proposal is to deploy up to 10 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) in silos at a former military base in Poland. It should be noted that the proposed GBI for the European GMD site will not be identical to the GBIs deployed now in Alaska and California. Although there is significant commonality of hardware, there are some differences. For example, the European GBI will consist of two rocket stages in contrast to the three-stage GBI deployed today (Report to Congress, March 1, 2007). This particular 2-stage configuration has not been tested and is a basis for additional questions about the proposed system’s effectiveness. Proponents of the system would argue that the 2-stage version is fundamentally the same as the 3-stage system, however. In Europe, the GBI reportedly will not need the third stage to achieve the range needed to intercept its intended target. This issue has raised the question for some observers as to whether other U.S. systems designed for shorter or medium-range ballistic missile threats, such as Patriot, THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), or Aegis (sea-based BMD) might be more appropriate for addressing the current and prospective Iranian ballistic missile threat to Europe. DOD’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) believes these systems would not be adequate to counter prospective Iranian ballistic missile threats over the mid-term and longer.

Deployment of the silos and interceptors in Poland is scheduled to begin in 2011 with completion in 2013. A final decision on specific locations took into consideration detailed site and
environmental analyses, as well as an overall security and support assessment. The field of the 10 interceptors itself is likely to comprise an area somewhat larger than a football field. The area of supporting infrastructure is likely to be similar to a small military installation. In addition, an American X-Band radar (a narrow-beam, midcourse tracking radar), that was being used in the Pacific missile test range, would be refurbished and transported to a fixed site at a military training base in the Czech Republic. The X-Band radar with its large, ball-shaped radome (radar dome) is several stories in height.

A second, transportable forward acquisition radar would be deployed in a country to be determined, but closer to Iran. Some European press accounts once mentioned the Caucasus region, but the Bush Administration never publicly indicated where this radar might be located. Additionally, the proposed GMD European capability would include a communications network and support infrastructure (e.g., power generation, security and force protection systems, etc.) A few hundred U.S. personnel would be engaged in securing and operating both the interceptor and radar sites. The Administration intends for the United States to have full command authority over the system.
CHAPTER THREE

THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND IMPACT ON US MILITARY RESOURCES

3.1 The Bush Doctrine and Cost on US Soldiers and Equipment

The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy is the attack of any country that poses serious danger to American foreign policy. Public case for the need to confront Afghanistan and Iraq was that both posed a “grave and gathering” threat that should be blunted before the threat became urgent. It was not until the September 11, terrorists attacks that justification to engage in preemptive strikes against perceived enemies of US emerged.

Thus, when US declared war against Afghanistan and later Iraq, the president and his advisers expected a quick, inexpensive conflict. Instead, we have a war that is costing more than anyone could have imagined. According to Tom Regan (2006), the United States may find it hard, if not impossible, to again try in the near future to topple a hostile regime. Its military is stretched, its moral standing diminished. Even democracy itself is tarnished, often equated now with car bombs and chaos, rather than peace and prosperity.

In fact, the news from both wars made the wars to be unpopular in US. Each day brings new attacks on US troops. As many Americans have now died since Saddam's statue fell from its Baghdad pedestal as perished in the war. The weariness of the war even made US soldiers to most times take their own lives. Army active duty suicides were up in 2007, according to Pentagon officials, surpassing the number of suicides in 2006, reaching 108. One truly unfortunate aspect of this news is that a quarter of those that took their own lives did so while in Iraq.
Today, more than five years since the war started in Iraq, the US maintained a strong military strength totaling 146,000 personnel, before the Obama Administration’s troop withdrawal started in June 30, 2009. This military campaign has come at a great human and material prize. It is believed that the US has suffered about 4,185 fatalities since the war began in Iraq (NIDS, 2009).

According to a recent figure, Griffis (2009) noted that US military casualty can be gleaned from the table below:

Table 3.1
The Human Cost of Occupation
American Military Casualties in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>In Combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Deaths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since war began (3/19/03):</td>
<td>4325</td>
<td>3463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since &quot;Mission Accomplished&quot; (5/1/03)</td>
<td>4186</td>
<td>3355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since Capture of Saddam (12/13/03):</td>
<td>3864</td>
<td>3158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since Handover (6/29/04):</td>
<td>3466</td>
<td>2830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since Obama Inauguration (1/20/09):</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Wounded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Wounded</td>
<td>31431</td>
<td>Over 100000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latest Fatality July 13, 2009

Source: http://www.antiwar.com/casualties/
This figure excludes the number of US military causalities in Afghanistan where security situation has seriously worsened. The war in Iraq has badly depleted the National Guard's domestic store of vehicles, weapons and communications gear, officials with the service say, leaving units with one-third of the equipment needed to meet requirements for homeland security, its primary mission. From tanks and radios to Humvees and rifles, equipment taken to Iraq by National Guard units is being worn out, blown up, lent to U.S. forces rotating into Iraq or given away to newly mustered Iraqi units, said Maj. Frank Holder, a special projects officer for logistics with the National Guard. With the 2006 hurricane season just four months away, the Guard is lean on equipment that might be needed in the aftermath of a major storm, analysts say. "Right now the Guard's equipment stocks are depleted," said Christine Wormuth, a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank that specializes in foreign policy. "That's going to have an impact on their ability to do domestic relief missions." (http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,90278,00.html). But Guard officials say the equipment deficit has not hindered domestic operations or training. Guard units have been able to share gear from state to state for deployments to Iraq and domestic emergencies, such as Hurricane Katrina, But analysts have voiced concern that the drawdown in equipment could leave the country vulnerable, especially in the event of multiple disasters calling for response by the National Guard. The National Guard traditionally has performed domestic functions such as disaster relief and responding to civil disturbances. Before the Iraq war, Guard units averaged about 75 percent of the equipment required to fulfill their training and defense missions, said Wormuth, the Washington analyst. National Guard units have played a
major role in Iraq, however, where they made up half of all combat forces at one point last year, said Holder, the National Guard major. Guard units currently make up about 23 percent of the roughly 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq, he said.

Three years of fighting have taken their toll on equipment. "It's war, and you lose equipment," Holder said. "It wears out, it gets blown up." Apart from equipment that has been destroyed, much has been designated "stay-behind equipment," Holder said. When a Guard unit returns home, it often leaves equipment behind to be used by replacement forces rotating in. "Right now the National Guard has $2.9 billion worth of equipment left in theater," Holder said. "It stays in theater and it helps the war effort." Blum said the Guard was hampered by a lack of satellite telephone equipment needed for units to communicate with each other in areas

It is no surprise that American public opinion remains resolutely opposed to the war. A recent poll by USA Today and Gallup found almost 60% believed that it was a mistake to have sent troops to Iraq in the first place. It found that over half of Americans now believe the Bush administration “deliberately misled the American public about whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.”

where cellphone capacity had been knocked out or overwhelmed by emergency demand. "Our best modern radios were in Iraq," he said.

But the war is fading from the media. Stories about the war were about 3% of the news in February 2008, down from 15% in July 2007. Fading coverage has combined with weariness about what to do about the war and a looming economic crisis,
3.2 The Bush Doctrine and Cost on US Financial Resources

On the eve of war, there were discussions of the likely costs. Larry Lindsey, President Bush's economic adviser and head of the National Economic Council, suggested that they might reach $200 billion. But this estimate was dismissed as “baloney” by the Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. His deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, suggested that postwar reconstruction could pay for itself through increased oil revenues. Mitch Daniels, the Office of Management and Budget director, and Secretary Rumsfeld estimated the costs in the range of $50 to $60 billion, a portion of which they believed would be financed by other countries (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). But this turned out to be a mirage.

Due to increasing disenchantment in Iraq and Afghanistan wars and what the American public perceived as unnecessary war spending, the US House of Representative Committee on Budget, requested the Congressional Budget Office, CBO, to present the Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and of Other Activities Related to the War on Terrorism. According to the CBO, from September 2001 through the end of fiscal year 2007, the Congress appropriated $602 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other activities associated with the war on terrorism. In addition, although not explicitly appropriated for that purpose, an estimated $2 billion has been spent by Department of Veteran Affairs, VA, for war-related benefits. Including VA’s spending, funding for the war has amounted to $604 billion. Those sums do not include any funding for fiscal year 2008; activities currently are being funded by a continuing resolution (which is in effect through November 16, 2007), (CBO Testimony, 2007).

According to CBO’s estimates, the majority of the $604 billion appropriated to date—about $533 billion—has been provided to the Department of Defense (DOD) for U.S. military
operations and other defense activities. Such war-related appropriations accounted for more than 20 percent of the department’s budget in 2006 and more than a quarter of its budget in 2007. DOD currently is obligating an average of almost $11 billion a month for expenses associated with its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for other activities related to the war on terrorism. Most of that amount (more than $9 billion per month) is related to operations in Iraq. The remainder of the $604 billion has been provided for three categories of spending: Approximately $30 billion has been provided to establish, train, and equip indigenous security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. About $39 billion has been appropriated for reconstruction and relief efforts, diplomatic and consular operations, embassy construction, economic support, and foreign aid. And a total of almost $3 billion, including both specific appropriations and funds for other costs incurred by VA, has been provided for medical care and other VA programs to assist former service members affected by their participation in operations related to the war on terrorism.

Since September 2001, lawmakers have provided $602 billion in budget authority specifically for military and diplomatic operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other regions in support of the war on terrorism, as well as for attendant costs related to veterans’ benefits and services. Of that amount, about 70 percent has been allocated for the war in Iraq, CBO estimates. Funding to date for military operations and other defense activities totals $533 billion, most of which has gone to the Department of Defense. Lawmakers also provided $30 billion during the 2004–2007 period to train and equip indigenous security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Including the $30 billion allocated for indigenous security forces, a total of $563 billion has been appropriated since September 2001 for defense-related activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the war on terrorism. In addition to funding provided for defense activities
since 2001, lawmakers have appropriated just over $39 billion for diplomatic operations and foreign aid to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries that are assisting the United States in the war on terrorism. Of that amount, $16 billion was appropriated for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Because most appropriations for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for other activities related to the war on terrorism appear in the same budget accounts that record appropriations for other DoD activities, determining how much has actually been spent is difficult (CBO Testimony, 2007).

However, CBO estimates that appropriations for defense-related activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the war on terrorism resulted in outlays of about $430 billion through fiscal year 2007. Of that amount, about $115 billion was spent in fiscal year 2007—an average of between $9 billion and $10 billion a month. Of the funds appropriated for war-related international affairs activities, close to $30 billion was spent through 2007, CBO estimates. In addition to the amounts specifically appropriated for war-related activities, including almost $1 billion in budget authority provided to the Department of Veterans Affairs in 2007, CBO estimates that over the 2001–2007 period, VA has spent almost $2 billion on assistance to and treatment of service members, veterans, and their families as a result of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those costs cover medical care provided to ill or wounded service members at VA facilities, disability compensation paid to veterans with service-connected disabilities, and dependency and indemnity compensation benefits paid to survivors of service members (Goldberg, 2007).

The President’s budget proposal for 2008, which was submitted in February, included a request for $137 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the war on terrorism; $5 billion for establishing, training, and equipping indigenous security forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan; and $3 billion for related diplomatic operations and foreign aid. In an amended request submitted in July, DOD requested an additional $5 billion for mine-resistant and ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. On October 22, the Administration submitted a request for another $46 billion for 2008. If the requested amount is appropriated, the total amount of funding specifically appropriated since 2001 for all operations in the war on terrorism would reach $798 billion. (Including the estimated $2 billion that VA has spent from its regular appropriations and the nearly $1 billion that CBO estimates will be spent in 2008 would bring total funding for the war over the 2001–2008 period to $801 billion.) On September 29, 2007, lawmakers enacted Public Law 110-92, a joint resolution making continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2008. That act provided $5 billion in budget authority for MRAP vehicles. It also extended the $70 billion in war-related appropriations that was included in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-289). However, that $70 billion in funding remains available only until enactment of appropriations for the war for fiscal year 2008, enactment of appropriations for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2008, or November 16, 2007, whichever comes first.

From all sensible indications, this amount ($798 billion) is outrageous. In fact, "The number is so big, it boggles the mind," said Rahm Emmanuel, the current White House Chief of Staff. As of September, 30, the two wars had cost $604 billion, the CBO says. Adjusted for inflation, that is higher than the costs of the Korea and Vietnam conflicts, according to the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2007-10-23-wacosts_N.htm).

Defense spending during those two wars accounted for a far larger share of the American economy. In the months before the March 2003 Iraq invasion, the Bush
administration estimated the Iraq war would cost no more than $50 billion. When we compare the cost of the Iraq/Afghanistan war to other major wars fought by the US, one will notice that there is a wide gulf between this war and others in terms of cost. The table below captures this.

Table 3.2 COMPARING U.S. WARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Cost</th>
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<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>$3,900 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea War</td>
<td>$456 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>$518 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf War</td>
<td>$88 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq/Afghanistan War</td>
<td>$604 billion, excluding the 2008 budgetary request for the war and Obama’s spending.</td>
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The only war in US history which cost more than the Iraq/Afghan war is the Second World War which cost about $5 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). Even though, that $604 billion is mind boggling, the duo of Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) believes that the number does not actually capture war estimate. According to them, the war could cost several trillions of dollars (CBO Testimony, 2007).

Even Lindsey, after noting that the war could cost $200 billion, went on to say: “The successful prosecution of the war would be good for the economy.” In retrospect, Lindsey grossly underestimated both the costs of the war itself and the costs to the economy. Assuming that Congress approves the rest of the $200 billion war supplemental requested for fiscal year 2008, as this book goes to press Congress will have appropriated a total of over $845 billion for
military operations, reconstruction, embassy costs, enhanced security at US bases, and foreign
aid programmes in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the fifth year of the war draws to a close,
operating costs (spending on the war itself, what you might call “running expenses”) for 2008
are projected to exceed $12.5 billion a month for Iraq alone, up from $4.4 billion in 2003, and
with Afghanistan the total is $16 billion a month. Sixteen billion dollars is equal to the annual
budget of the United Nations, or of all but 13 of the US states. Even so, it does not include the
$500 billion US already spend per year on the regular expenses of the Defence Department.
Nor does it include other hidden expenditures, such as intelligence gathering, or funds mixed in
with the budgets of other departments (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008).
CHAPTER FOUR

THE PROPOSED MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IRANIAN DESIRE TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

4.1 Iranian Nuclear History

The foundations for Iran's nuclear program were laid after a 1953, CIA-supported coup deposed democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and brought Shah (King) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power. A civil nuclear co-operation program was established under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. In 1967, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was established, run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was equipped with a U.S.-supplied, 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor, which became operational in 1967 and was fueled by highly enriched uranium. Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, making Iran's nuclear program subject to International Atomic Energy Agency verification.

During the 1970s, the Shah approved plans to construct, with U.S. help, up to 23 nuclear power stations by the year 2000. In March 1974, the Shah envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out, and declared, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23 000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants." (http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/frrsnf.shtml). Iran, a U.S. ally then, had deep pockets and close ties to Washington. U.S. and European companies scrambled to do
business in Iran. **Bushehr** would be the first plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of **Shiraz**. In 1975, the **Bonn** firm **Kraftwerk Union AG**, a joint venture of **Siemens AG** and **AEG Telefunken**, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the **pressurized water reactor** nuclear power plant. Construction of the two 1,196 **MWe** nuclear generating units was subcontracted to **ThyssenKrupp**, and was to have been completed in 1981.

The **joint stock company Eurodif** operating a uranium enrichment plant in France was formed in 1973 by **France**, **Belgium**, **Spain** and **Sweden**. In 1975 Sweden’s 10% share in Eurodif went to Iran as a result of an arrangement between France and Iran. The French government subsidiary company **Cogéma** and the Iranian Government established the **Sofidif** (**Société franco–iranienne pour l’enrichissement de l’uranium par diffusion gazeuse**) enterprise with 60% and 40% shares, respectively. In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25% share in Eurodif, which gave Iran its 10% share of Eurodif. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi lent 1 billion dollars (and another 180 million dollars in 1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory, to have the right of buying 10% of the production of the site. President **Gerald Ford** signed a directive in 1976 offering **Tehran** the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting **plutonium** from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete 'nuclear fuel cycle' (Farhang, 2006). At the time, **Richard Cheney** was the White House Chief of Staff, and **Donald Rumsfeld** was the Secretary of Defense. The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."

Then-United States Secretary of State **Henry Kissinger** recalled in 2005, "I don't think the issue of proliferation came up." (Dafina, 2005). However, a 1974 CIA proliferation
assessment stated "If [the Shah] is alive in the mid-1980s ... and if other countries [particularly India] have proceeded with weapons development we have no doubt Iran will follow suit." (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf).

The Shah also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with South Africa under which Iranian oil money financed the development of South African fuel enrichment technology using a novel "jet nozzle" process, in return for assured supplies of South African (and Namibian) enriched uranium (http://www.since1865.com/archive/detail/11214184).

After the 1979 Revolution, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to restart its nuclear program using indigenously-made nuclear fuel. Iran paid the U.S. to deliver new fuel and upgrade its power in accordance with a contract signed before the revolution. The U.S. delivered neither the fuel nor returned the billions of dollars payment it had received. In January 1978, Kraftwerk Union stopped working at the Bushehr nuclear project with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete, and fully withdrew from the project in July 1979. Iran paid Germany in full, totaling billions of dollars, for the two nuclear facilities in Bushehr (Gordon, 2005). By July 1979, Iran had paid Kraftwerk Union $2.5 billion of the total contract.

When France after 1979 refused to give any enriched uranium to Iran and also Eurodif did not return Iran’s investments, Iran’s government suspended its payments and tried to get refunded the loan by making pressure on France by handling militant groups, including the Hezbollah who took French citizens hostage in the 1980s. Between March 24, 1984 to 1988, the Bushehr reactors were damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes and work on the nuclear program came to a standstill.
In January 1979, Kraftwerk Union (see 1970s) stopped working at the Bushehr nuclear project with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete, and fully withdrew from the project in July 1979. Kraftwerk said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of $450 million in overdue payments. The company had then received $2.5 billion of the total contract. The French company Framatome, a subsidiary of Areva, also withdrew itself. Another result of the 1979 Revolution was France's refusal to give any enriched uranium to Iran after 1979. Iran also did not get back its investment from Eurodif. In 1982, French president François Mitterrand refused to give any uranium to Iran, which also claimed the $1 billion debt. In 1984, Kraftwerk Union did a preliminary assessment to see if it could resume work on the project, but declined to do so while the Iran–Iraq War continued.

In 1983 the IAEA planned to provide assistance to Iran under its Technical Assistance Program to produce enriched uranium. An IAEA report stated that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology”. The United States in or after 1983 persuaded the IAEA to terminate its project to assist Iran in producing enriched uranium (Mark, 2003). In April 1984, the U.S. State Department said, "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr." The spokesperson also said that the light water power reactors at Bushehr "are not particularly well-suited for a weapons program." The spokesman went on to say, "In addition, we have no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran).
According to a report by the Argentine justice in 2006, Iran in 1987–88 signed three agreements with Argentina's National Atomic Energy Commission. The first Iranian-Argentine agreement involved help in converting the U.S. supplied Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) research reactor from highly enriched uranium fuel to 19.75% low-enriched uranium, and to supply the low-enriched uranium to Iran. The uranium was delivered in 1993 (http://cns.miis.edu/wmdme/flow/iran/reactor.htm). The second and third agreements were for technical assistance, including components, for the building of pilot plants for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel fabrication. Under US pressure, assistance under second and third agreements was reduced (Asian Time Online, 2008).

From the beginning of 1990s, Russian Federation formed a joint research organization with Iran called Persepolis which provided Iran with Russian nuclear experts, and technical information stolen from the West by GRU and SVR, according to GRU defector Stanislav Lunev. He said that five Russian institutions, including the Russian Federal Space Agency helped Tehran to improve its missiles. The exchange of technical information with Iran was personally approved by the SVR director Trubnikov (Stanislav, 1998). In 1992, following media allegations about undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, Iran invited IAEA inspectors to the country and permitted those inspectors to visit all the sites and facilities they asked to see. Director General Blix reported that all activities observed were consistent with the peaceful use of atomic energy (Jon, 1992). The IAEA visits included undeclared facilities and Iran's nascent uranium mining project at Saghand. In the same year, Argentine officials disclosed that their country had canceled a sale to Iran of civilian nuclear equipment worth $18 million, under US pressure.
In 1995, Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the partially-complete Bushehr plant, installing into the existing Bushehr I building a 915MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor, with completion expected in 2009. There are no current plans to complete the Bushehr II reactor. In 1996, the U.S. convinced the People's Republic of China to pull out of a contract to construct a uranium conversion plant. However, the Chinese provided blueprints for the facility to the Iranians, who advised the IAEA that they would continue work on the program, and IAEA Director Mohammad El Baradei even visited the construction site (Mark, 1996).

In 1991, an agreement was found for the French-Iranian disagreement since 1979. France refunded more than 1.6 billion dollars. Iran remained shareholder of Eurodif via Sofidif, a Franco-Iranian consortium shareholder to 25% of Eurodif. However, Iran refrained from asking for the produced uranium. In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards new partners for its nuclear program; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed. According to a report by the Argentine justice in 2006, late 1980s and early 1990s the US pressured Argentina to terminate its nuclear cooperation with Iran, and from early 1992 to 1994 negotiations between Argentina and Iran took place with the aim of re-establishing the three agreements made in 1987-88.

4.2 Iranian Nuclear Programme from 2000 to 2009

On August 14, 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesman for an Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran, publicly revealed the existence of two nuclear sites under-construction: a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz (part of which is underground), and a heavy water facility in Arak. It's been strongly suggested that intelligence agencies
already knew about these facilities but the reports had been classified. (http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/517/exiles-and-iran-intel).

The IAEA immediately sought access to these facilities and further information and co-operation from Iran regarding its nuclear programme. According to arrangements in force at the time for implementation of Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Iran was not required to allow IAEA inspections of a new nuclear facility until six months before nuclear material is introduced into that facility. At the time, Iran was not even required to inform the IAEA of the existence of the facility. This ‘six months’ clause was standard for implementation of all IAEA safeguards agreements until 1992, when the IAEA Board of Governors decided that facilities should be reported during the planning phase, even before construction began. Iran was the last country to accept that decision, and only did so February 26, 2003, after the IAEA investigation began. (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf).

France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the EU-3) undertook a diplomatic initiative with Iran to resolve questions about its nuclear program. On October 21, 2003, in Tehran, the Iranian government and EU-3 Foreign Ministers issued a statement known as the Tehran Declaration in which Iran agreed to co-operate with the IAEA, to sign and implement an Additional Protocol as a voluntary, confidence-building measure, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities during the course of the negotiations. The EU-3 in return explicitly agreed to recognize Iran’s nuclear rights and to discuss ways Iran could provide "satisfactory assurances" regarding its nuclear power program, after which Iran would gain easier access to modern technology. Iran signed an Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, and agreed to
act as if the protocol were in force, making the required reports to the IAEA and allowing the required access by IAEA inspectors, pending Iran's ratification of the Additional Protocol.

The IAEA reported November 10, 2003, that "it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored." Iran was obligated to inform the IAEA of its importation of uranium from China and subsequent use of that material in uranium conversion and enrichment activities. It was also obligated to report to the IAEA experiments with the separation of plutonium. A comprehensive list of Iran's specific "breaches" of its IAEA safeguards agreement, which the IAEA described as part of a "pattern of concealment," can be found in the November 15, 2004 report of the IAEA on Iran's nuclear program. Iran attributes its failure to report certain acquisitions and activities on US obstructionism, which reportedly included pressuring the IAEA to cease providing technical assistance to Iran's uranium conversion program in 1983. On the question of whether Iran had a hidden nuclear weapons program, the IAEA's November 2003 report states that it found "no evidence" that the previously undeclared activities were related to a nuclear weapons program, but also that it was unable to conclude that Iran's nuclear program was exclusively peaceful.

In June 2004, construction was commenced on IR-40, a 40MW heavy water reactor. Under the terms of the Paris Agreement, on November 14, 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator announced a voluntary and temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment program (enrichment is not a violation of the NPT) and the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, after pressure from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany acting on behalf of the
European Union (EU) (known in this context as the EU-3). The measure was said at the time to be a voluntary, confidence-building measure, to continue for some reasonable period of time (six months being mentioned as a reference) as negotiations with the EU-3 continued. On November 24, Iran sought to amend the terms of its agreement with the EU to exclude a handful of the equipment from this deal for research work. This request was dropped four days later. According to Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, one of the Iranian representatives to the Paris Agreement negotiations, the Iranians made it clear to their European counterparts that Iran would not consider a permanent end to uranium enrichment:

Before the Paris [Agreement] text was signed, Dr Rohani...stressed that they should be committed neither to speak nor even think of a cessation any more. The ambassadors delivered his message to their foreign ministers prior to the signing of the Paris agreed text... The Iranians made it clear to their European counterparts that if the latter sought a complete termination of Iran's nuclear fuel-cycle activities, there would be no negotiations. The Europeans answered that they were not seeking such a termination, only an assurance on the non-diversion of Iran's nuclear programme to military ends. (http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/06mousavian.pdf).

In February 2005, Iran pressed the EU-3 to speed up talks, which the EU-3 refused to do so. The talks made little progress because of the divergent positions of the two sides. In early August 2005, after the June election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President, Iran removed seals on its uranium enrichment equipment in Isfahan, which UK officials termed a "breach of the Paris Agreement" though a case can be made that the EU violated the terms of the Paris Agreement by demanding that Iran abandon nuclear enrichment. Several days later, the EU-3 offered Iran a package in return for permanent cessation of enrichment. Reportedly, it
included benefits in the political, trade and nuclear fields, as well as long-term supplies of nuclear materials and assurances of non-aggression by the EU (but not the US). Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy head of Iran's atomic energy organization rejected the offer, terming it "very insulting and humiliating" and other independent analysts characterized the EU offer as an "empty box". Iran's announcement that it would resume enrichment preceded the election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad by several months. The delay in restarting the program was to allow the IAEA to re-install monitoring equipment. The actual resumption of the program coincided with the election of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and the appointment of Ali Larijani as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4131706.stm).

In August 2005, with the assistance of Pakistan a group of US government experts and international scientists concluded that traces of bomb-grade uranium found in Iran came from contaminated Pakistani equipment and were not evidence of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iran. In September 2005, IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei reported that “most” highly-enriched uranium traces found in Iran by agency inspectors came from imported centrifuge components, validating Iran's claim that the traces were due to contamination. Sources in Vienna and the State Department reportedly stated that, for all practical purposes, the HEU issue has been resolved.

The IAEA Board of Governors deferred a formal decision on Iran's nuclear case for two years after 2003, while Iran continued cooperation with the EU-3. On September 24, 2005, after Iran abandoned the Paris Agreement, the Board found that Iran had been in non-
compliance with its safeguards agreement, based largely on facts that had been reported as early as November 2003.

On February 4, 2006, the 35 member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted 27–3 (with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa) to report Iran to the UN Security Council. The measure was sponsored by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and it was backed by the United States. Two permanent council members, Russia and China, agreed to referral only on condition that the council take no action before March. The three members who voted against referral were Venezuela, Syria and Cuba. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4680294.stm).

In response, on February 6, 2006, Iran suspended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary and non-legally binding cooperation with the IAEA beyond what is required by its safeguards agreement. In late February 2006, IAEA Director Mohammad El-Baradei raised the suggestion of a deal, whereby Iran would give up industrial-scale enrichment and instead limit its program to a small-scale pilot facility, and agree to import its nuclear fuel from Russia. The Iranians indicated that while they would not be willing to give up their right to enrichment in principle, they were willing to consider the compromise solution. However in March 2006, the Bush Administration made it clear that they would not accept any enrichment at all in Iran.

The IAEA Board of Governors deferred the formal report to the UN Security Council of Iran’s non-compliance (such a report is required by Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute), until February 27, 2006. The Board usually makes decisions by consensus, but in a rare non-consensus
decision it adopted this resolution by vote, with 12 abstentions (http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/09/insights050929.html).

On April 11, 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched uranium. President Ahmadinejad made the announcement in a televised address from the northeastern city of Mashhad, where he said "I am officially announcing that Iran joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology." The uranium was enriched to 3.5% using over a hundred centrifuges. On April 13, 2006, after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said (on April 12, 2006) the Security Council must consider "strong steps" to induce Tehran to change course in its nuclear ambition; President Ahmadinejad vowed that Iran won't back away from uranium enrichment and that the world must treat Iran as a nuclear power, saying "Our answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: Be angry at us and die of this anger," because "We won't hold talks with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium." (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,191588,00.html).

On April 14, 2006, The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a series of analyzed satellite images of Iran's nuclear facilities at Natanz and Esfahan. Featured in these images is a new tunnel entrance near the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan and continued construction at the Natanz uranium enrichment site. In addition, a series of images dating back to 2002 shows the underground enrichment buildings and its subsequent covering by soil, concrete, and other materials. Both facilities were already subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards. Iran responded to the demand to stop enrichment of uranium August 24, 2006, offering to return to the negotiation table but refusing to end enrichment.
Qolam Ali Hadad-adel, speaker of Iran's parliament, said on August 30, 2006, that Iran had the right to "peaceful application of nuclear technology and all other officials agree with this decision," according to the semi-official Iranian Students News Agency. "Iran opened the door to negotiations for Europe and hopes that the answer which was given to the nuclear package would bring them to the table."

In Resolution 1696 of July 31, 2006, the United Nations Security Council demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing related activities. In UN Security Council Resolution 1737 of December 26, 2006, the Council imposed a series of sanctions on Iran for its non-compliance with the earlier Security Council resolution deciding that Iran suspend enrichment-related activities without delay. These sanctions were primarily targeted against the transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies and, in response to concerns of China and Russia, were lighter than that sought by the United States. This resolution followed a report from the IAEA that Iran had permitted inspections under its safeguards agreement but had not suspended its enrichment-related activities. (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-08.pdf).

After Iran still refused to suspend enrichment, as required by the UN Security Council Resolution 1737, the Council decided in March 2007 to widen the scope of the sanctions. In UN Security Council Resolution 1803 of March 3, 2008, the Council decided to extend those sanctions to cover additional financial institutions, restrict travel of additional persons, and bar exports of nuclear- and missile-related dual-use goods to Iran. The implementation of the sanctions is monitored by a Security Council Committee (http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/index.shtml).
On May 10, 2007, Iran and the IAEA vehemently denied reports that Iran had blocked IAEA inspectors when they sought access to the Iran's enrichment facility. On March 11, 2007, Reuters quoted International Atomic Energy Agency spokesman Marc Vidricaire, "We have not been denied access at any time, including in the past few weeks. Normally we do not comment on such reports but this time we felt we had to clarify the matter...If we had a problem like that we would have to report to the [35-nation IAEA governing] board ... That has not happened because this alleged event did not take place." (http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/theworld/2007/).

In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "no evidence" of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaradei as saying "We have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible weaponization. That's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right now, because there is still a lot of question marks... But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No." The IHT report went on to say that "ElBaradei said he was worried about the growing rhetoric from the U.S., which he noted focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said he would welcome seeing It." (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/28/america/NA-GEN-US-Iran.php).

Israel criticised IAEA reports on Iran as well as the former IAEA-director ElBaradei. Israel's Minister of Strategic Affairs Avigdor Lieberman dismissed reports by the UN nuclear
watchdog agency as being "unacceptable" and accused IAEA head ElBaradei of being "pro-Iranian". (Jerusalem Post, Nov 16, 2007)

In a February 2009 press interview, IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei said Iran has low enriched uranium, but "that doesn't mean that they are going tomorrow to have nuclear weapons, because as long as they are under IAEA verification, as long as they are not weaponizing, you know." ElBaradei continued that there is a confidence deficit with Iran, but that the concern should not be hyped and that "many other countries are enriching uranium without the world making any fuss about it"

The IAEA remains unable to draw a conclusion on whether Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program. It normally draws conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities only in countries that have an Additional Protocol in force. Iran ceased its voluntary and non-legally binding implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary cooperation with the IAEA beyond that required under its safeguards agreement after the IAEA Board of Governors decided to report its safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006. The UN Security Council then passed Resolution 1737, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, obligating Iran to implement the Additional Protocol. Iran has maintained that the Security Council's engagement in "the issue of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran" are unlawful and malicious. (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc724.pdf).

In its Safeguards Statement for 2007, the IAEA found no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in 47 of 82 states that had both NPT safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols in force, while it was unable to draw similar conclusions in 25 other
states. In August 2007, Iran and the IAEA entered into an agreement on the modalities for resolving remaining outstanding issues, and made progress in outstanding issues except for the question of "alleged studies" of weaponization by Iran. Iran says it did not address the alleged studies in the IAEA work plan because they were not included in the plan. The IAEA has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies and says it regrets it is unable to provide Iran with copies of the documentation concerning the alleged studies, but says the documentation is comprehensive and detailed so that it needs to be taken seriously. Iran says the allegations are based on “forged” documents and “fabricated” data, and that it has not received copies of the documentation to enable it to prove that they were forged and fabricated. (http://www.iranconsulate.org.hk/HTML/English/An%20Assessment%20of.pdf).

In February 2009 IAEA Director General reportedly said that he believed the possibility of a military attack on Iran’s nuclear installations had been ruled out. “Force can only be used as a last option... when all other political possibilities have been exhausted,” he told Radio France International. Former Director General Hans Blix criticized Western governments for the years lost by their "ineffective approaches" to Iran's nuclear program. Blix suggested the West offer "guarantees against attacks from the outside and subversive activities inside" and also suggested U.S. involvement in regional diplomacy "would offer Iran a greater incentive to reach a nuclear agreement than the Bush team's statements that 'Iran must behave itself.'" (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/25/iran-nuclear-weapons).

In February 2009, anonymous sources reportedly complained that most U.S. intelligence shared with the IAEA has proved inaccurate, and none had led to significant
discoveries inside Iran. In July 2009, Yukiya Amano, the in-coming head of the IAEA said that he did not see any evidence Iran was trying to gain the ability to develop nuclear arms. "I don't see any evidence in IAEA official documents about this," Yukiya Amano told Reuters. (Reuters, Friday July 3, 2009).

Interviews and surveys show that the majority of Iranians in all groups favor their country's nuclear program, including a full fuel cycle program, but most also believe that nuclear weapons are contrary to Islam. (http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafircara/527.php?id=&id=&ptnt=527&lb=brmc). Polls in 2008 showed that the vast majority of Iranians want their country to develop nuclear energy, and 90 percent of Iranians believe it is important (including 81% very important) for Iran "to have a full fuel cycle nuclear program."

In explaining why it had left its enrichment program undeclared to the IAEA, Iran said that for the past twenty four years it has "been subject to the most severe series of sanctions and export restrictions on material and technology for peaceful nuclear technology," so that some elements of its program had to be done discreetly. Iran said the U.S. intention "is nothing but to make this deprivation" of Iran's inalienable right to enrichment technology "final and eternal," and that the United States is completely silent on Israel's nuclear enrichment and weapons program.

The Iranians believe that concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation are pretextual, and any suspension of enrichment is simply intended to ultimately deprive Iran of the right to have an independent nuclear technology: According to the Iranian authority, “[W]e had a suspension for two years and on and off negotiations for three... Accusing Iran of having “the
intention” of acquiring nuclear weapons has, since the early 1980s, been a tool used to deprive Iran of any nuclear technology, even a light water reactor or fuel for the American-built research reactor....the United States and EU3 never even took the trouble of studying various Iranian proposals: they were – from the very beginning – bent on abusing this Council and the threat of referral and sanctions as an instrument of pressure to compel Iran to abandon the exercise of its NPT guaranteed right to peaceful nuclear technology...”[http://www.un.int/iran/statements/securitycouncil/articles/Dr.%20Zarif%20Statement%20before%20the%20Security%20Council.%20Dec.%2023.%202006.pdf](http://www.un.int/iran/statements/securitycouncil/articles/Dr.%20Zarif%20Statement%20before%20the%20Security%20Council.%20Dec.%2023.%202006.pdf).

Iran says that its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology has been the subject of "the most extensive and intensive campaign of denial, obstruction, intervention and misinformation" and that the international community has been subject to "bias, politicized and exaggerated information" on the Iranian nuclear program and activities.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary and Conclusion

This study was designed to ascertain the impact of the Bush Doctrine on US military resources and whether the American proposed missile defence system in Eastern Europe has deterred Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon. After a critical analysis of available data and literature, the study reveals as follows:

1. That the US has suffered about 4,185 fatalities since the war began in Iraq. This figure excludes the number of US military causalities in Afghanistan where security situation has seriously worsened. The study further revealed that the war has badly depleted the America’s National Guard’s domestic store of vehicles, weapons and communications gear, officials with the service say, leaving units with one-third of the equipment needed to meet requirements for homeland security, its primary mission.

2. The study also revealed that the two wars have cost America $604billion, excluding Obama’s budgetary request for the war. Defense spending during those two wars accounted for a far larger share of the American economy. Adjusted for inflation, it is higher than the costs of the Korea and Vietnam conflicts.

3. It was further revealed that the American intention of using its missile defence system in Eastern Europe to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon leveraged Iran from pursuing nuclear capability.

In the final analysis, the Bush defence policy for America is both a mixed blessing in that he ruled at a time that America needed a personality that can confront headlong the growing
anti-American sentiments in the world and particularly in the Middle East. But this he achieved with enormous cost and grief to the American people.
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