NIGER DELTA CRIZES AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA: APPRAISAL OF THE AMNESITY PROGRAMME

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This thesis is dedicated to God Almighty for his infinite mercy and protection for seeing me through this programme. God I thank you.
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Abstract
The Niger Delta – the geographical heart of oil production in Nigeria has been a breeding ground for militants for some years now. This is because the discovery of oil and its exploitation has ushered in a miserable, undisciplined, decrepit, and corrupt form of ‘petro-capitalism’ which produces conflict accelerating factors. Devastated by the ecological costs of oil spillage and underdevelopment, the Niger Delta has become a centre of violence. In an attempt to solve the Niger Delta crises, the Federal Government recently introduced the policy of amnesty to militants as the solution to the Niger Delta Crises. The study assessed the Amnesty Programme which is basically a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) to the Niger Delta militants and effect on national security. Utilizing the theory of the post-colonial state, the study argued that the amnesty programme to the Niger Delta militants was basically oriented towards enhancing the security situation in the Niger Delta region for the purpose of increasing crude oil production. Employing qualitative method and relying on secondary sources, relevant data were generated and analyzed using qualitative descriptive method. The study therefore contended that there was nexus between the Amnesty Programme to the Niger Delta militants and increased in crude oil production in Nigeria. Arising from these therefore, it is our recommendation that the federal government should urgently and comprehensively tackle the underlying economic and social problems of the Niger Delta region so as to prevent a relapse into crises.
CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Prior to the advent of commercial oil production in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in 1958, the region was essentially a pristine environment which supported substantial subsistence resources for the mostly sedentary population. The region accounted for a large percentage of Nigeria’s commercial fisheries industry (Afinotan, 2009). For centuries therefore, the people of the Niger Delta were content to engage in farming, fishing and such other endeavours like pottery, mat-making and hunting, unaware that underneath their soil was one of nature’s most prized mineral resources.

Crude oil was discovered in the Niger Delta over fifty years ago, with the discovery of oil in Oloibiri in 1956 by Shell Petroleum Development Company (Aaron and George, 2010). Since, oil has become the mainstay of the Nigerian Economy, contributing over 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings of the government, it is surprising that the trajectory of constitutional development, socio-economic development and class formation have been massively influenced and dictated by the politics of oil (Owugah, 1999). While the Nigerian State may see the availability of the crude resources as a ‘Blessing’ and a source of pre-eminence in the global market place, the communities where this crude resource is endowed with, see it as a ‘Curse’.

This is because the massive exploitation of crude oil creates serious developmental, social and environmental problems which the Nigerian state and the collaborative oil giants have neglected for a long time (Omotola, 2006). Lamenting about this state of affairs, Owugah (1999:106) observes that “The oil which brought so much wealth to the nation and those in
power, brought much poverty, disease, death, loss of livelihood, to the people of the oil bearing areas”.

With the emergence of a pan-Niger Delta militia group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in 2006, the struggle for local control of Nigeria’s oil assumed a more violent dimension. Apart from MEND that appears to have clearly articulated grievances namely Environmental Insecurity and Socio-Economic Marginalization of the Niger Delta people, sundry groups emerged in the Niger Delta as well. Some of these groups, it would appear, were driven not by liberation ideology but crime and criminality. Independently the activities of these groups created a difficult security challenge in Nigeria’s oil belt (Aaron, 2010).

Oil installations were attacked and oil workers particularly expatriate staffs, at any rate, initially, were taken hostage for ransom. All these were happening, in spite of the heavy presence of the Joint Task Force (JTF), comprising of the Navy, Army and Air Force, who were sometimes overrun by the superior fire power of the militants (Aaron, 2010). The implications of this parlous security were grave. Oil production figures plummeted to all time low, as many TNCs announced production shut-ins. Specifically, average production figure for 2009 was around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd), down from 2.7 million bpd (NNPC, 2009). The country lost an estimated $92 billion in oil export earnings to production shut-in and crude oil theft associated with the activities of militants (Davis, 2009). The cumulative effect of this was a drastic fall in the country’s oil exports. Consequently, public finance was subjected to one of the worst crises since independence.

In what appears an admission of the futility of violent response, late President Umaru Yar’Adua, on 25th June, 2009, announced an amnesty for militants who were willing to surrender their arms. The amnesty programme was in phases: Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Aaron (2010). Disarmament of militants entailed the physical removal of the means of combat from ex belligerents (weapons, ammunition). Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed groups, followed by processing of individual combatants in temporary centres with provision of support packages. Reintegration entails the process of reintegrating former combatants/militants into civil society ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict (Nwachukwu and Pepple, 2011).

The first phase lasted between 6th August and 4th October 2009 (Newswatch, November 9, 2009). The amnesty programme has been hailed by many as successful given the quantity of arms surrendered by the militants. Five years after the proclamation of the amnesty and implementation of the major components of the programme by Goodluck Jonathan’s administration following the demise of President Musa Yar’Adua. This study sets out to explore the nexus between the Amnesty programme granted the Niger Delta militants and National Security. However, the study will investigate the effect of disarmament of the militants on crude oil production in Nigeria on one hand, and the effect of demobilization and reintegration of militants on kidnapping and oil pipeline vandalization on the other hand.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The deployment of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) to restore order and create a conducive atmosphere to do business could not tame the militants. However, no State relies exclusively on the use of violence or force to ensure social order. It resorts to non-violent strategies as well, especially, when it comes under intense pressure from the people which threaten the interest of its survival. At such times, the state makes what Parenti (1974:274) terms “symbolic concession” to pacify the people. Thus, confronted with persistently intense agitation
from the communities, the Nigerian State, in response, adopted the strategy of symbolic concessions. The State, thus, raised the percentage on derivation of the oil producing states from 1.5% to 3% and later 13% (Owugah, 2010). It is also within this context that the setting up of series of development commissions for the Niger Delta should be understood. The commissions started with the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) in 1960 followed by the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDRBA) in 1976, then the Oil Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992. Ibeanu (2002:31) argues that “OMPADEC became, in the popular consciousness of people of Niger Delta, another ruse designed to enrich the families and friends of the military government while pretending to be investing in the Niger Delta”. The failure of OMPADEC to achieve its desired expectations coupled with the intensity of Ijaw ethnic struggles led to the establishment of Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. The NDDC, like its predecessors, failed to record significant improvement in the welfare of the Niger Delta people because it gave room to financial misappropriation and profligacy (Omotola, 2007). Owugah (2010:194) argues “Therefore, by establishing these agencies, it pacifies some members of the communities and also gains the support of others in the non-oil producing areas. Secondly, it provides an avenue for patronage to members of its hegemonic class with the awards of contracts, consultancies and supplies of materials for the projects. These projects became another money-making source for members of the ruling class. For one thing, they were fully paid for contracts, even though the projects were not undertaken, abandoned or uncompleted. The Niger Delta landscape is littered with such projects. Yet, no one has ever been asked to refund any amount or prosecuted in the law courts”. When Late Musa YarAdua assumed office as the nation’s president, he came up with his own idea of developing the Niger Delta, which he tagged “Niger Delta Development Plan”. Nothing has been done in
this regard. He also set up the Ministry of Niger delta Affairs. Again, on 25 June 2009 he granted amnesty to the “militants” via Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) to turn in their weapons within sixty (60) days (Aaron, 2010). In addition, they militants were to renounce violence through the execution of renunciation of militancy form. The repentant militants were to be paid the sum of N65, 000 (about $430) per month for 42 months that the rehabilitation programme would cover. This is addition to daily feeding allowance of N1500 (about $10). Beyond disarmament, repentant militants are to undergo some form of skills acquisition to enable them live economically productive lives (Aaron, 2010).

The leaders of the militants, including Ekpemupolo (Tompolo), Henry Okah, Asari Dokubo, Fara Dagogo, Ebi Ben, Ateke Tom, Saboma Jackrich (alias Egberipapa), gave up their weapons. Tompolo and his group gave “117 assorted rifles, 5,467 rounds of live ammunitions, 20 camouflage bullet jacket, 26 camouflage uniform and two helmets. By official account, about 26,356 militants surrendered their arms at various disarmament centres. On the whole the total of 26,760 guns of different types 287,445 rounds of ammunition, 18 gun boats and 1090 dynamites were surrendered” (Omadjohwoefe, 2011:254).

The Amnesty programme granted to the militants of Niger Delta has drawn the attention of writers. Omadjohwoefe (2011), Ibara (2011), and Egwemi (2010) argued that, the amnesty initiative, though a unique approach, does not have what it takes to answer the Niger Delta question. Olatoke and Olokooba (2012) argued that the amnesty programme is yet to be passed into law and as such unconstitutional. Smoke (2009 ) opined that managers of the Nigerian system should develop strategies to deal with the post amnesty challenges and that all stakeholders need to be involved in actualizing the implementation of the post amnesty programme. Aluede (2012) argued that the way the programme has been implemented to cost
several billion naira to benefit a few people who have committed crimes against the state is wrong.

The efforts of scholars thus, appear to neglect the effect of the disarmament of the militants on crude oil production in Nigeria. It is, therefore, this gap among others in the literature that this study is aimed at filling based on the following research questions:

1. Did the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increase crude oil production in Nigeria?
2. Did the Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduce kidnapping in the Niger Delta region?
3. Did the Reintegration of Niger Delta militants fail to reduce oil pipeline vandalization?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The central objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of the amnesty programme granted to the Niger Delta militants and effects on national security in Nigeria. This research tends to explore the nexus between the amnesty programme via Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration granted to the Niger Delta militants and national security.

However, the study is set to achieve the understated specific objectives:

1. To determine whether the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increased crude oil production in Nigeria.
2. To determine whether the Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduced kidnapping in the Niger Delta region.
3. To ascertain whether the Reintegration of Niger Delta militants failed to reduce oil pipeline vandalization.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The research has both Theoretical and Practical significance.

Theoretically, this study will contribute to the scholarly debate on the amnesty programme granted to the Niger Delta militants and effects on national security in Nigeria. This study explores the amnesty programme whose dynamics either impacts or transforms the lives of the people of the Niger delta region in Nigeria. It will also investigate the amnesty programme as panaceas for peace in the Niger delta region.

 Practically, the outcome of this study will be instrumental to socio-economic and political development of the Niger Delta in particular and the Nigerian state in general, it will help the policy makers to reposition, complement or change the strategies and methods of intervention in the Niger Delta so as to achieve maximum results. Finally, if the study succeeds in clarifying issues and facilitating understanding, it will enrich the pool of literature on the Niger Delta to the benefit of researchers and students.
CHAPTER TWO

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviewed relevant literature related to the key research question of this paper, with a view to clarifying the gap in knowledge that this study seeks to fill.

Did the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increase crude oil production in Nigeria?

Timiebi Koripamo-Agary (cited in Business Day, 2009) media coordinator of the amnesty committee described the exercise as successful. She said the number of militants that accepted the amnesty offer were so many that the committee’s capacity was pushed to the limits. Accordingly, with the cooperation of all, including the military, security agencies, the militants, media, the commitment of amnesty officials and Nigerians, the country was able to successfully implement the programme. The huge quantity, quality and sophistication of the arms recovered under the amnesty programme shows that the Niger Delta and Nigeria is a safer place now. It is a huge relief that these weapons have been moved out of the region. With peace returning to the Niger Delta, the youths, the people and security forces will no longer lose their lives in needless conflicts, communities will be peaceful, children can return to school without disruption and the process of rebuilding and development can begin. It is a win-win situation for all (Business Day, 2009).

Swartz (2009) wrote that a high-profile government amnesty program aimed at stopping militants in Nigeria’s oil-rich delta region from bombing pipelines are coming under fire for not seeking permanent solutions to the area's underlying problems. The amnesty program, scheduled to begin Thursday and run two months, is the biggest public effort yet by President Umaru Yar'Adua to ease the unrest in the Niger Delta that has cost the country billions of dollars in lost oil revenue. But Nigerian state governors, analysts, and the militants themselves
have criticized the plan because it does little to address the core causes of the militancy and criminality that have plagued the Niger Delta for decades, such as the lack of education, jobs and basic services. State governors from the Niger Delta region, a powerful group but rarely in agreement, last week threatened to withdraw from the amnesty program because it lacked a definite post amnesty plan arrangement for the region.

Alaibe (2011) argued that the Amnesty programme has been a resounding success. I make bold to assert that the programme will go down in history as the sincerest effort by the Federal Government to address the Niger Delta question. You would recall that the late President Umaru Yar’Adua had on June 25, 2009, proclaimed a 60-day unconditional amnesty period for militants in the Niger Delta, as a step towards resolving the protracted insecurity in the region. The terms of the amnesty included the willingness and readiness of militants to surrender their arms, and unconditionally renounce militancy and sign an undertaking to this effect. In return, the government pledged its commitment to institute programmes to assist their disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and provision of re-integration assistance to the ex-militants. In other words, the programme was structured to have three broad components. One, a security component dealing with the disarmament and demobilization of the various militant groups in the Niger Delta; two, an economic component with commitment to provide access to re-integration opportunities for the ex-militants; and three, to promote the economic development of the Niger Delta. Flowing from this, we proceeded to execute what has become, perhaps, the most successful disarmament exercise in the history of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration) in Africa. By October 2009, (some) 20,192 ex-militants had willingly disarmed, turned in huge cache of arms and ammunition to security agencies and got enrolled in the programme. Going back to your question, I insist that the Amnesty programme has been a
resounding success. Where we are currently would be better appreciated when viewed from the pedestal of where we were prior to the amnesty proclamation. Furthermore, let me clarify that while it is true that the late Yar’Adua initiated the Amnesty programme, it is important to place on record that when it seemed that the programme was floundering, it was President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan that revved it up, gave it fresh impetus and provided all that was needed to attain the success that we are talking about today.

Oladoyinbo (2012) argued that, to the people of the Niger Delta region in Ondo State, one of the best things that ever happened to them under this democratic dispensation was the granting of amnesty to the militants that participated in the struggle for their emancipation. For him, Prior to the granting of amnesty by the administration of the late President Umaru Yar’Adua, the region was very volatile with thousands of youths up in arm against the government, arguing that their region was so backward despite being the goose that lay the golden eggs. The youths from various camps and under the control of their leaders threatened oil companies, corporate organizations, wealthy individuals and expatriates among others. Kidnapping, killing, violence attack, vandalisation of oil installations and other vices were the order of the day with all these activities seen as those needed to ensure that government listen to them and address the imbalance in the polity. However, when the agitation got to a stage, government in its wisdom offered amnesty to everybody that took part in the struggle and following consultation and deliberation, the militants agreed to the idea and they surrender their arms and ammunition, signaling the end of the struggle.

Olatoke and Olokooba (2012) examined the amnesty granted to militants of Niger Delta from the legal perspective, questioning the legality of the amnesty programme. He argued that the amnesty programme is yet to be passed into law and as such unconstitutional. Furthermore,
he queries if the amnesty programme is a lasting solution to the problem in the region considering the unabated activities of the militants. Finally, he urged the presidency to approach the National Assembly to make law permitting the president to grant amnesty to the militants and other related groups and other related groups who are willing to voluntarily make peace.

Nwachukwu and Pepple (2011) wrote that with the successful disarmament of the militants in the Delta, the federal government, the Niger Delta region and, indeed, the entire Nigerian state has been reaping the gains of the disarmament programme. The first gain of the disarmament programme is that there is a visible reduction in the quantity and volume of arms and ammunition in the region and this has, no doubt, gone a long way in enhancing national security in the country. The booming of guns in the creeks of the Niger Delta with their harrowing human and economic calamities has been replaced by peaceful environment conducive for normal living and doing business.

Dakolo (2011) argued that Late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua went all out to confront the problem with all sincerity through the Amnesty initiative in June 2009. When the Federal Government announced the Amnesty programme for the militants not a few persons took it with a pinch of salt. With the Amnesty programme now in full swing and ex militants receiving rehabilitation, reintegration, training and certification at Obubura, Cross River State since June 28th, 2009, it is important that the issues which led them to take up arms, in the first place are frontally addressed. At the last count, over 20,000 militants were said to have thrown in the towel. No doubt, the success of the Amnesty programme is underscored by the large turnout of militants at the various arms collation centres across the Niger Delta and the staggering trench of ammunitions recovered so far. Equally commendable is the fact that since the commencement of the programme sporadic outburst of violence in the region has been drastically reduced. But the
Stakeholders must never rest on their oars as there is still a lot of work to be done. Government and those entrusted with the arduous task of prosecuting the Amnesty programme must be seen to be transparent and credible in discharging their mandate. There is a whole world of difference between actual militants and miscreants who cash in on the volatility to perpetrate heinous crimes. This group of people should not be included as militants. What is important now is for the ex militants to be properly and effectively demobilized and adequate training given to them to make them beneficial to the society. But beyond that, there should be a mechanism to ensure that new militants are not created in the future.

Olubayo and Olubisi (2012) noted that without doubt the amnesty programme is expected to improve the human capital development of the country which is presently low. Nigeria’s Human Development Index (HDI) value comprising three basic dimension of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living) for 2011 stands at 0.459, positioning the country at 156 out of 187 countries and territories if well implemented, the amnesty programme in Nigeria could serve to negate the ‘resource curse’ theory that resource-rich economies such as Nigeria, Congo, Angola, etc. are more prone to mismanagement, underdevelopment and violence. According to him, one of the major challenges of the amnesty package is in the area of poor implementation. The amnesty programme was not implemented as recommended in the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee.

Oscar (2012) opined that the amnesty programme did not make provision for the role of multinational oil corporations who have been accused by environmental activists of fueling human rights violations and resource depletion in the region. This feeds into the issues of compensation and victim’s protection and livelihoods that need to be addressed. According to him, the lavish expenditures on the amnesty programme have been described in the popular
media as a ‘political liability’ to the Nigerian government. Furthermore, the year 2012 budget proposed allots a whooping $450 million to the amnesty programme, which is more than what the government spends to deliver basic education to children.

Oluwaniyi (2011) examined the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme within the context of building peace in a volatile and crisis-ridden Niger Delta region and the implication of the programme for peace in the region. It is generally agreed that the central task of peace building is to create a long term goal of positive peace, a ‘stable social equilibrium in which the structural and cultural forces of violence are addressed’. One of the critical means, in fact, the basic tenet for achieving long term goal of peace building in a post-conflict situation is through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. These are not distinct phases but they constitute part of a seamless web of transition from military to civilian life. The DDR of ex-combatants has become a standard package of measures implemented within the ‘peace building’ slogan and it incorporates issues bothering on security concerns, management of spoilers, and social and economic recovery of the country concerned.

Akpan and Ering (2010) argued that following the “Success” of the amnesty programme, the federal government quickly released the sum of 50 billion naira to the Presidential Committee on Amnesty (PAC) to begin to implementing the post- amnesty programmes for the repentant militants. However, it is important to note that apart from the 65,000 naira monthly allowance to be paid to each militant and the proposed skill acquisition training programmes for the militants, there is no government whitepaper on how the 50 billion should be spent.

Etekpe (2012) wrote on issue of mismanagement of the programme as the implementation is handled by people who lacked the experience and capacity for negotiation and mediation. Aside, the stakeholders have not been given the opportunity to come together to
discuss the best way to achieve DDR. Thus, they too feel alienated. More so, he argued that the amnesty experience is pleasant; it requires the support of all Nigerians. This is important because if the programme fails, the region and country shall not be able to control another round of insurgency and counter-insurgency; he also urged that the pace of implementation of the programme be increased to achieve the desired sustainable development.

It has been argued by the highly influential security and intelligence group that the whole idea of granting amnesty to militants in the Niger Delta is part of a broader plan by the ruling people Democratic Party to consolidate its hold on power. Seen from this perspective Amnesty for militants who through acts of political thuggery, were instrumental to the electoral victories of some powerful current political office holders (Stratfor, 2009).

Sayne (2012) argued that the Niger Delta has now enjoyed four years of relative calm. However, there is a significant chance the region could see renewed violent conflict in the next one to two years. Dividends from a 2009 amnesty for local militants are real and substantial. Critics of the amnesty claim the program fails to treat the root causes of conflict, is corrupt and unsustainable, and promotes warlordism and the spread of organized crime, among other things. These criticisms are not without basis, but they often lack context and balance. Major conflict drivers in the delta are still in place, and no long-term peace plan exists. The coming period likely will bring strong flash points and triggers, particularly around the 2015 presidential and gubernatorial elections. Wavering leadership on security, the closedown of the amnesty program in 2015, decreased support for President Goodluck Jonathan’s candidacy, and close electoral results could all lead to violence in the delta.

At this point, there is no doubt that from the foregoing review, attempts have been variously made by scholars to examine the gains of the amnesty programme via disarmament of
Niger Delta militants. However, these efforts, as reviewed above, do not really help determine whether the disarmament of Niger Delta militants has increased crude oil production in Nigeria.

**Did the Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduce kidnapping in the region?**

Aluede (2012) wrote that since the introduction of the Amnesty Programme, I have been privileged to meet people who have been the benefactors both as government contractors and as individuals. I have always been of the opinion that the huge investment approach of the amnesty programme was not in the best interest of Nigerians. Don’t misunderstand me on this matter; I am not saying that the Amnesty Programme is wrong. What I am saying is that the way the programme has been implemented to cost several billion naira to benefit a few people who have committed crimes against the state is wrong. You can argue for and against the actions of the Niger Delta militant. In my view, our constitution lacks checks and balances which prevent people from taking appropriate actions where and when their elected representatives have failed them. The issue of militancy will remain at our door step, as recently highlighted by the emergence of the Boko Haram sect, until our constitution is reviewed or preferably a new acceptable one is put in place. I have looked at the illegality of the programme, now I will analyze the programme approach. In the first instance, how did the PAO establish that those who claim to be militants are who they say they are? We all recall too well the problem of putting a face to the actors. According to him, since the introduction of the programme we have several tens of thousands of people claiming the right as militants of Niger Delta origin. There should be a due process to fish out who were real militants as well as establish each militant’s role in the uprising against the republic. We can check their alleged claims as militants base on the information they provide against records from government agencies on the activities of the
militant group. For him, it is important to highlight that intelligence was gathered to help the nation avoid a repeat of Niger Delta militants holding the country to ransom.

Ajaji (2012) observed that when the programme debut in 2009, encomiums were showered on the late President, at home and abroad for initiating the amnesty, which appeared a respite for the restiveness in the creeks. The amnesty then appeared a major feat at repositioning the economy of the country, which revolves around oil exploration despite the rich untapped potentials in other sectors. However, there were a few ‘skeptics’ who believed the programme was ill-conceived as it left many questions unanswered. Those skeptics seem to be justified by hindsight. It was not clear, for instance, the enabling law guiding the programme. Apart from the Presidential pronouncement, there is no legislative instrument underlying the amnesty programme to date. In view of the fact that it was more of a political antidote, not many people thought that lack of specific legal basis would pose a challenge. In a constitutional democracy wherein all measures and institutional settings are subject to the dictates of the constitution, the amnesty programme is one step subsumed in discretionary exercise of power. The danger of such exercise of discretion by an Executive Arm of Government already super empowered by the constitution, is manifestly obvious. Instead of the step being duly checkmated and subjected to a strict constitutional order, the National Assembly (NASS) relapsed into the euphoria of a short cut to a national challenge.

Smoke (2009) contended that youth restiveness and community impoverishment in the Niger Delta region was grown out of the mindset of sharing the available national cake rather than attempting to bake any new cake. For him, the sharing strategy has over time strategically maximized the share made available for individuals outside the economic zones. Consequently, the zones where the revenue has accrued from have been left impoverished resulting in the
situation that now exists in the Niger Delta region. According to him, the actions that gave birth to the pain in the Niger Delta must be reversed in order to remove the pain. He averred that all stakeholders need to be involved in actualizing the implementation of the post amnesty programme and pro activity was recommended as the best strategy for managing the challenges in the Niger Delta.

Eremie and Thom-Otuya (2011) revealed that the Niger Delta militants’ disposition against the Federal Government of Nigeria and the oil firms coupled with the international pressures compelled the government to grant the amnesty to the Niger Delta militants. The amnesty deal is a desperate effort by the Nigerian state to end the Niger Delta crisis, and thereby restore some dignity and pride to itself. Furthermore, he therefore examined the nature and character of the amnesty deal, the rationale behind it with the objective to find out reasons why the amnesty deal may not work. He proffered solutions that could help sustain and strengthen the programme for peace to reign in the Niger Delta and Nigeria.

Ibaba (2011) argued that the conditions for violence in the Niger Delta are pervasive, and that the amnesty programme which removed militias from the creeks could be likened to an inchoate operation for removing a cancerous part of a body without containing its further spread or re-emergence. According to the scholar, violence could recur in the region if the frustrations which support insurgency are not resolve. Resolving these frustrations is therefore a requirement for peace-building in the region. Accordingly, the scholar averred that escaping the frustration-aggression trap is predicated on addressing the lack of development, the most fundamental cause of the violence and dealing with oil induced environmental degradation and corruption in governance are the two key issues. For him, therefore, ending oil based degradation is a sure way to improve the living standards, and empower local people through their fishing and farming
based occupation, to have adequate access to health and educational services and facilities. To achieve this, environmental laws which are presently weak and suffer poor enforcement will need to be strengthened and enforced adequately. For him, the enforcement of environmental laws and placement of adequate sanctions on MNCs is a sure way to elicit compliance and thus protect the environment. Sabotage spills could be contained by responding to the development challenges of the people, in addition to enforcing the relevant laws dealing with sabotage as an economic crime. The amnesty programme is defective in this regards, as it has isolated the ex-combatants for attention, while neglecting other segments of the population.

Fineman (2010) argued that as part of his determination and desire to put an end to the agitations and violence in the region, the late President also initiated an Amnesty Programme with the aim of disarming, rehabilitating and re-integrating militants into their communities with a promise to tackle head on, the challenges facing the region. The Amnesty Programme was a huge success as the militants accepted the offer and began coming out of hiding to hand over their arms and ammunition to the government through the peace committee set up to coordinate the programme. At present, the rehabilitation centers have been established and the born-again militants have started the process of rehabilitation. With the amnesty declared a success and the period over, the post-amnesty period is before us and this period is also significant in bringing about lasting peace and development to the region. The effort and determination of the government to achieve these objectives can be seen in the budgetary provisions for the Niger Delta Affairs Ministry in the 2010 budget can benefit from the businesses in the sector. While it is necessary to ensure a conducive business environment in the area, the development of the educational Post-Amnesty collaborative effort Programmes captured between the militancy in the 2010.
Oluwaniyi (2011) argued that deeper analysis indicates that there are challenges ingrained in the programme itself. Firstly, there was no proper planning for the DDR programme. More so, the tenets of the technical committee were not adhered to by the federal government for a bottom-up approach to the programme. Rather, the government collaborated with ex-militants commanders, who were only interested in their personal aggrandizement and did not consult with the militants on the ground. Secondly, the indirect money for weapon approach implemented undermined the quality and success of the programme. Thirdly, much money goes towards paying ex-militants commanders, managers of the programme and the surging number of consultants and contractors to extent that the programme itself is now perceived as being a very lucrative business, rather than a transformational strategy. According to him, many people now form organizations to benefit from the largesse. According to the panel set in January 2010 to review the rehabilitation aspect of DDR, about 80% of the budget had gone on payments to consultants and contractors, leaving just 20% for the rehabilitation of ex-militants.

Egwemi (2010) revealed that the almost wholesale embrace of the amnesty by the repentant militants has been a great relief for Nigerians. For him, the relative peace which the amnesty programme brought to the Niger Delta region needs to be consolidated and all that is required to do this is the necessary political will on the part of the Nigeria’s class especially the executive. Such political will according to him, should ordinarily manifest in the form of equitable distribution of revenue derived from the region, a determined effort towards massive infrastructural development, job creation and confidence building measures. Accordingly, such political will should be demonstrated especially in the post amnesty period in form of enabling law to backup the post amnesty programmes.
Ogege (2011) argued that whatever benefits that accrue to the people (if at all) only go to the few youths who accepted the amnesty offer, abnegated militancy and surrendered their arms. However, it should be noted that those who renounced militancy constitute a very infinitesimal percentage of the Niger Delta population, so taking them to camp and re-integrating them does not in any way address the problem of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. The amnesty is silent about the plight of the Niger Delta people that caused and reinforced violent agitations in the region. According to him, the amnesty initiative, though a different and viable approach to the Niger Delta crisis, is not different from other measures in the sense that it has not been able to provide satisfactory solution to the problem of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. The amnesty initiative addressed only the symptom and not the cause of the Niger Delta problem.

At this point, it is obvious that the extant literature is not bereft of attempts by scholars to examine the implementation of the amnesty programme via demobilization of Niger Delta militants. However, these efforts, as reviewed above, do not help us to determine whether the demobilization of Niger Delta militants has reduced the threats to national security in the region.

**Did the Reintegration of Niger Delta militants fail to reduce oil pipeline vandalism?**

Effiong (2011) wrote that President Goodluck Jonathan, represented by Minister of State for Niger Delta Affairs, Hajiya Zainab Ibrahim-Kuchi, declared that the amnesty programme had succeeded well beyond initial expectations. “I make bold to say that after today’s event, our great country, Nigeria, will be entering the annals of history as one of few countries in the world that achieved a successful closure to the disarmament and demobilisation phases of its Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) programme. Accordingly, the programme indeed saw some challenges right from inception. Observers recall that though the
presidential amnesty programme had been viewed with some skepticism at the onset, the situation is quite different today, considering the impact it has made on the circumstances of youths in the region. As attested to by Jonathan, the core essence of the amnesty proclamation was to stabilise, consolidate and sustain security conditions in the Niger Delta, as a prerequisite for promoting economic development in the area in particular and the nation as a whole. Though Yar’ Adua died in office after a protracted illness, the programme remained on course, being vigorously prosecuted by Jonathan, his successor. Accordingly, not many believed that the goals of the programme would be met at some point, recalled Jonathan, who expressed satisfaction that two years after, the programme had aided speedy return of safety, security and sustainable development in the region. We have achieved 80 per cent in this amnesty programme. This is the only DDR programme that is solely funded by the country itself. This is Nigerian-made amnesty.

Pepple (2012) accessed the reintegration of the militants and state that no fewer than 300 ex-militants from the Niger Delta region were yesterday empowered with business set up materials and finance to start their small and medium scale businesses as part of efforts to reintegrate them into society. The delegates are beneficiaries of empowerment programmes initiated by the Presidential Amnesty Office for ex-militants of the region, which include sales of building materials, electronics, fisheries, super markets. The ex-militants were also urged to learn how to plough back profits into their businesses. According to him, the empowerment scheme was aimed at assisting the trained delegates and equips them to be the new generation of entrepreneur. He recapped the successes of the years past, according to him, over 13,000 delegates, had been deployed to local and foreign training, skill acquisition and other formal education.
Ogundele (2012) examined the amnesty programme, since its introduction, has proved to be the panacea for peace in the hitherto restive oil-rich Niger Delta region of the country. The programme, introduced by the late President Umaru Yar’Adua, may not have stopped agitations in the region but has ended the appalling bloodbath and militancy. To that extent, it will be safe to term the programme a success. But three years down the line, what was introduced as an ad hoc measure to tackle a dire security and economic situation has since raised concern by those who feel it is fast becoming a programme in clear danger of being abused. The concern has been spurred by a recent announcement by the Chairman of the Presidential Amnesty Programme, Kingsley Kuku, of an approval for a third batch of 3,642 amnesty beneficiaries. Kuku said that 26,328 ex-militants had been fully disarmed and were undergoing various forms of entrepreneurial training. The latest figure would, therefore, bring the total to close to 30,000 persons. The question however arises as to the direction that the programme is headed and when it is likely to be brought to an end. Or, has it become a permanent instrument for assuaging the rage of jobless Niger Delta youths? In fact, questions are also being raised about the huge cost of running what is becoming an amorphous programme by the Federal Government. These concerns are largely sensible. Last year’s budget for the amnesty programme was put in the region of N74 billion and well over N160 billion has been spent since the programme started. Even if some may say that it is not too much a price to pay for peace, it is nevertheless substantial. Only the annual budgets of the super rich oil producing states are higher than that.

Kuku (2012) argued that the terms of the amnesty included the willingness and readiness of the agitators to surrender their arms on or before October 4, 2009, unconditionally renouncing militancy and signing of an undertaking to that effect. In return, the government pledged its commitment to institute programmes to assist the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation
and reintegration of the former agitators. At the expiration of the 60-day grace period on October 4, 2009, a total of 20,192 Niger Delta ex-agitators had surrendered large number of arms and ammunition to the Federal Government and accepted the offer of amnesty. And pursuant to the letter and spirit of the Amnesty Proclamation, the Federal Government instituted a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, DDR, package for those who accepted the offer of amnesty on or before the expiration date, Mr. Kuku said another 6,166 persons were added in November, constituting a second phase of the programme and bringing the number of the persons enlisted in the Presidential Amnesty Programme to 26,358. The presidential aide said the Federal Government approved inclusion of another 3,642 former militants, totaling 30,000 in October, 2012. He said that out of the 30,000 former agitators, more than 11,525 had been placed in skills acquisition/training centres, as well as in formal education within the country and offshore. Of this number, 4,929 are being trained offshore, while the balance of 6,382 have either been returned to formal education or have been placed in skill acquisition centres within the country. “Similarly, 6,067 transformed ex-agitators are currently being processed for deployment to reintegration centres (both within the country and offshore) in the fiscal year 2012. The presidential aide said that 113 former militants had been assisted in securing employment in maritime, welding and fabrication companies at home and abroad.

Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Niger Delta, Senator Nurudeen Abatemi- Usman, expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the programme. Hear him:

We came here to assess how deep the amnesty programme is. We all know what brought about this programme because Nigeria decided to address a fundamental injustice to a section of the country. From what we have seen and experienced during our interaction with the trainees, I can tell Nigerians that the amnesty programme gives us hope and we are very proud of these youths. The funds allocated
to the programme are being judiciously used and we will continue to support and expand its scope (National Mirror, 2012: 3).

Confirming the position of Abatemi-Usman, his House opposite number, Hon. Warman Ogoriba had this to say:

When amnesty was granted, most Nigerians thought nothing good will comes out of it. But now the story is different. Our youths are being trained all over the world in critical sectors. We are very impressed and my advice to these young Nigerians is to continue to be good ambassadors of our country (National Mirror, 2012: 4).

Jegede (2012) argued that the amnesty programme under the direct supervision of Kingsley Kuku, Adviser to the President on Niger Delta Affairs, remains the most successful intervention programme ever run by the federal government in the Niger Delta region since independence. It should be seen as the most profound effort to tackling the agitation for fairness, equity and development in the oil-rich region. Of recent, I have read several articles on unsubstantiated allegations of embezzlement against the leadership of the Niger Delta Amnesty Office. Some have even suggested that the programme should be stopped on the grounds that Kuku and his team are only enriching themselves from the fund meant for the programme while other wrote that there was nothing to show for the allocations they have received since inception. Such an argument is obviously illogical and cannot be supported by facts on ground. The truth is that today, the amnesty programme has made significant impact in the restoration of peace in the Niger Delta region. President Goodluck Jonathan has received commendation and applause for deeming it fit to ensure the sustenance of the programme started by his predecessor, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua.
Senate Leader, Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba (SAN), had in an interview noted that it was completely out of place for some Nigerians to be calling for the cancellation of the programme for now. On the argument that too much money is being spent on the programme, the three-term Senator said: “Let us look at the other side of it. What was the country losing when we have militancy? It is easy to do a cost benefit analysis. If what we were losing is far in excess of what it cost us to get peace then, I think the amnesty programme is justifiable” (National Mirror, 2012). The National chairman of the Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN), Allen Onyema, while speaking to newsmen on the programme, noted that the programme is celebrated the world over, as the international community seems to be bemused as to how Nigeria was able to get it right from the stage of disarmament, through demobilization to re-integration (National Mirror, 2012).

At this point, is apparent that efforts have been made to access the benefits of the amnesty programme via reintegration of Niger Delta militants. However, impressive these attempts do not help us ascertain if the reintegration of Niger Delta militants has failed to reduce oil pipeline vandalization.

The Gap

What seem to emerge for the literature are attempts variously made by scholars to examine the implementation of the amnesty programme via disarmament of Niger Delta militants. Scholars such as Swartz (2009) argued that the amnesty programme lacked a definite post amnesty plan arrangement for the region. Olatoke and Olokooba (2012) questioned the legality of the programme arguing that it is yet to be passed into law and as such unconstitutional. Etekpe (2012) argued that the amnesty is mismanaged by people who lacked the experience and capacity for negotiation and mediation. However, these efforts, as reviewed
above, do not really help determine whether the disarmament of Niger Delta militants has increased crude oil production in Nigeria.

With reference to the second research question, the review of the extant literature demonstrated that scholars like Ibaba (2011), and Egwemi (2010) argued that, the amnesty initiative via demobilization of Niger Delta militants, though a unique approach, does not have what it takes to answer the Niger Delta question. Aluede (2012) argued that the huge investment approach of the amnesty programme was not in the best interest of Nigerians because it has been implemented to cost several billion naira to benefit a few people who have committed crimes against the state is wrong. However, these efforts, as reviewed above, do not help us to determine whether the demobilization of Niger Delta militants has reduced kidnapping in the region.

Finally, despite the efforts of scholars, it is evident that a systematic update of persistent threats to national security in spite of the amnesty programme is timely. This present study, therefore, is an attempt to generate and analyze relevant data and by so doing fill this gap in the literature.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is principally anchored on the theory of the Post-Colonial State. This theory is imperative to the research because of its effectiveness and merits among other means for the study and understanding of the social system and related phenomena. The theory of post-colonial state was developed by Alavi (1972), and popularized by third world scholars like Ake (1985), Ekekwe (1985) and Ibeanu (1998). The theory suggests that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism. As such, it has followed the developmental strategy dictated by the interest of imperialist and its local allies, not by those of the majority of the indigenous population. This post-colonial state has created for itself a deep crisis from which it can hardly extricate itself without fundamentally changing its present nature. According to Ekekwe (1985), the post colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state, this, in turn, had incorporated some important elements of the pre-colonial rudimentary state structures. The main goal of the colonial state was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie in alliance with the ruling elite would take place through the exploitation of local human and other natural resources. It was on this basis that the post-colonial state emerged.

As Ibeanu (1998) has also noted, despite anti-colonial struggles, the post-colonial state altered very little in the arbitrariness of its predecessor. This is especially the case in a country like Nigeria where independence was negotiated with the colonialists. Negotiated independence, according to him, implied that the structures of the colonial state were not changed in any fundamental sense; it was just a change of personnel. Therefore, the state that now emerged, though ostensibly independent and sovereign, was not only a creature of imperialism, but also
sought to dovetail its interest with the foreign bourgeoisie. This is why the Nigerian state consistently protects the interest of the multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta as against the interest of the host community.

One basic character of the post-colonial state is that it has very limited autonomy (Ake, 1985). This means that the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and so, is immersed in the class struggle that goes on in the society. This lack of relative autonomy is one reason why the post-colonial state in Nigeria is incapable of mediating political conflicts (Ake, 1985). In other words, to the extent that there is highly limited autonomization of the state, the possibility of resolving contradictions and crises is severely limited. This explains why government efforts (through repression, persuasion, negotiation, pacification) have always failed to resolve the Niger Delta crises.

The post-colonial state is also constituted in such a way that it reflects and carters for a narrow range of interest (Ake, 1985). The post-colonial state as regards the Nigeria state, carters mainly for the interest of the Nigerian bourgeoisie and metropolitan capitalist. Ekekwe (1985) has noted that in any discussion of the post-colonial state, there is need to consider capital and the state as being closely related. This is because foreign capital plays dominant role in post-colonial states.

THE APPLICATION OF THE THEORY

The theory of post-colonial state as a tool of analyses is very suitable for explaining and understanding the Amnesty offer granted to the militants in the Niger Delta. When Nigeria is put in its proper neo-colonial state that is not only characterized by low autonomy, but also solely depends on the exploration, export and sale of oil, we begin to understand why the reliance on oil
royalties is inevitable and why government resorted to conciliatory approaches such as the Amnesty programme since the use of force to quell the crises has not yielded any positive dividend.

This theory enables us understand that, in as much as there is a symbiotic alliance between the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies, the interest of the latter, irrespective of the approaches adopted, will always take precedence over the indigenous population. In the light of this, we can see that the granting of the amnesty was borne out, in first instance, for the interest of the foreign capital that wants an increase in the daily production of crude oil, secondly, ensure the security and safety of foreign oil workers. In furtherance of this theory, it is quite obvious that the Nigerian state with regard to the post amnesty programme considers the interest of the indigenous population secondary to enhancing security in the Niger Delta and maximizing oil production. It is within this context that we conclude that the amnesty programme via Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) granted to Niger Delta militants is not intended to address the political, economic, and socio-environmental problems that are the main drivers of crises in the Niger Delta region in the first place. Rather, the policy was designed to allow the Nigerian state unhindered access to more oil and gas resources in the region. Secondly, ensure the security and safety of foreign oil workers not minding environment and human security. It is important to note that at any point in time that the rulers of Nigeria are denied easy access to oil and gas resources from both the fake and genuine agitators from the region. They simply introduce palliative measures that would immediately remove the obstacle on their way. This is exactly the philosophy behind the Amnesty and Post-Amnesty programme.
3.2 HYPOTHESES

The study was guided by the following hypotheses:

1. The Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increased crude oil production in Nigeria.
2. The Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduced kidnapping in the region.
3. The Reintegration of Niger Delta failed to reduce oil pipeline vandalization.

3.3 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The method of data collection for this study is the qualitative method. According to McNabb (2005), qualitative method is a set of non-statistical inquiry techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomena. Thus, qualitative data refers to some collection of words, symbols, pictures, or other non-numerical records, materials or artifacts that are collected by a researcher and is data that has relevance to the social group under study. The use of these data go beyond simple description of events and phenomena; rather they are used to creating understanding, for subjective interpretation and for critical analysis as well.

First, in qualitative research, cases can be selected purposefully, according to whether or not they typify certain characteristics or contextual locations. Second, the researcher’s role receives greater critical attention. This is because in qualitative research the possibility of the researcher taking a ‘neutral’ or transcendental position is seen as more problematic in practical and/or philosophical terms. Hence, qualitative research reflects on the role of the researcher in the research process and makes this clear in the analysis. Third, qualitative data analysis can take a wide variety of forms, and approaches analysis holistically and contextually, rather than being reductionist and isolationist. Nevertheless, systematic and transparent approaches to analysis are almost always rewarded as essential for rigour.
Burnham *et al* (2005) sees the qualitative method as very attractive in that it involves collecting information in depth but form a relatively small number of cases. He goes on to state that analytic induction is often used by qualitative researchers in their efforts to generalize about social behavior. Concepts are developed intuitively from the data, and are then defined, refined and their implications deduced from the data.

Therefore, the study relied on institutional and official documents from organizations such as the PENGASSAN publication, NNPC quarterly reports and reports of Technical Committee on Niger Delta among others. The institutional and official document were complemented by other secondary data sources as textbooks, journals and magazines, articles and other written works bordering on the subject matter. Finally, this study extensively utilized materials sourced from the internet.

**3.4 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS**

In the study, we adopted the qualitative descriptive method in analyzing our data. Qualitative descriptive analysis according to Asika (2006) essentially has to do with summarizing the information generated in a research, so that appropriate analytical methods could be used to further discover relationship among the variables. The adoption of the foregoing analytical method is necessary because the study principally relied on secondary sources of data.

**3.5 RESEARCH DESIGN**

In this study, we adopted one Group Pre-test Design. In this type of design, a single group is compared with itself. This requires a measurement to be taken before an independent variable or causal event occurs and then after the causal event has occurred. The difference between the first and second observations is attributed to the independent variable; while a test of
significance is commonly used to see whether the observed difference is beyond what might be obtained by chance.

One group pre-test-post-test design is represented in this form: $O_1 \times O_2$

Where:

$O_1$ - First Observation

$X$ - Independent Variable

$O_2$ - Second Observation

In applying one group pre-test-post-test design to our study, the test of the hypothesis involves observing $X$ that is the independent variable (Disarmament of the Niger Delta militants), and $Y$, that is, dependent variable (increased crude oil production in Nigeria) simultaneously and in retrospect because the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable had already taken place before the study. Hence, a randomized judgmental selection and observation of crude oil production in Nigeria between 2006 and 2012 “before and “after” the Disarmament of the Niger Delta militants was used to test our hypothesis.

In conducting our investigation, therefore, we first observed oil production between 2006 and 2008, before the Disarmament of the Niger Delta militants in 2009. Our second observation deals with crude oil production in Nigeria between 2010 and 2012, after the Disarmament of the Niger Delta militants.

For the second hypothesis, we first observed cases of kidnapping in the region between 2006 and 2012 “before” and “after” the demobilization of the Niger Delta militants in 2009. Our second observation deals within the period between 2010 and 2012, after the demobilization of the Niger Delta militants.
For the third hypothesis, we first observed cases of oil theft and oil pipeline cases between 2006 and 2012 “before” and “after” the reintegration of the Niger Delta militants in 2009. Our second observation deals within the period between 2010 and 2012 after the reintegration of Niger Delta militants. As we have already stated the difference, if any, in $O_1$ and $O_2$ is attributed to the experimental variable.

The adoption of this type of research design enabled us to identify the most severe threats (both internal and external) to validity and reliability of the topic under study. However, we addressed this under validity and reliability of data.

3.6 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DATA

The issue of validity and reliability of data is so crucial that no worthwhile scientific investigation should ignore. Hence, to enhance scientific utility of this study, the problems associated with its validity and reliability needs to be adequately addressed. We shall also rely on one-pre-test-post-test design common in ex-post-facto experiment. This essentially enables us to structure our observation since it is applied in ex-post-facto experiment. Again, a theoretical framework of analysis based on the theory of post-colonial state will help to link the theoretical base of this study. (For summary see logical data framework below).
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### Did the Reintegration of the Niger Delta militants fail to reduce oil pipeline vandalism?

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<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Local and Foreign Training, Small and medium scale business.</td>
<td>Qualitative descriptive analysis of documents.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After- Reintegration- Oil theft/oil pipeline incidence.</td>
<td>Qualitative method: Gathering of data from secondary sources such as Journals, conference papers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Oil theft:</strong> 2010-2,316,281, 2011-6,391,310, 2012-3,045,624</td>
<td>Qualitative method: Gathering of data from secondary sources such as Journals, conference papers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Oil pipeline incidence:</strong> 2009-1,453, 2010-836, 2011-2,768, 2012-2,230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER FOUR

DISARMAMENT OF MILITANTS AND CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA

4.1. THE NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA

The Niger Delta has been variously defined by scholars, individuals, organizations and authorities. The World Bank Report describes it as one of the world’s largest wetlands, and African’s largest delta covering some 70,000km, formed by the accumulation of sedimentary deposits transported by the Niger and Benue Rivers (World Bank, 1993). The Federal Government of Nigeria sees the Niger Delta region as the Part of the Nigerian State:

… Situated in the southern part of Nigeria and bordered to the south by the Atlantic Ocean and to the east by Cameroon. It occupies a surface area of about 112,100 square kilometers and represents about 12% of Nigeria’s total surface area of Nigeria having a population of 28 million inhabitants by the beginning of 2006. The region has nine of Nigeria’s constituent states. Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers (FGN, 2006).

Isoun (2001) identified three definitions of the area. These are the Scientific, Historical and Political definitions. Scientifically, the Niger Delta, according to him, is that location associated with the lower Niger especially where the River splits into its major tributaries: River Nun and the Escravos. It starts from the Benin Basin in the West, goes up to Agbor in the north and then to the Imo River. Historically, the Niger Delta refers to the conglomeration of people who in 1958 canvassed for special attention that led to the inauguration of the Henry Willinks Commission. It includes the Ogoni province, Degema province and so on. According to Isoun, the definition at the time even excluded the present Port Harcourt and Warri. The political Niger Delta is a recent phenomenon associated with the proposed Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC). Politically, the Niger Delta has been made to be synonymous with oil production. It is assumed that all oil producing communities are part of the Niger Delta.

A publication of the defunct Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) has this to say about the Niger Delta:

…. The River Niger disgorges its waters into the Atlantic Ocean through a large number of tributaries which form the Niger Delta. The area of the Delta is further enlarged by rivers other than tributaries of the Niger… Calabar River, Cross River and Imo River to the East, and Siluko River, Benin River, Escravos River and River Forcados, to the West (OMPADEC, 1993).

In the view of the OMPADEC, the River Niger, its tributaries and other rivers which have enlarged the area of the Niger Delta, defined the scope of the area. Accordingly, it posits that the Niger Delta is made up of, at least, 7 states Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Cross Rivers, Ondo and Edo states.

Some of the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta include the Igbo, Ibibio, Annang, Efik, Itsekiri, Isoko, Ogoni, Urhobo, Ukwuani, Abua, Ijaw, Yoruba, etc. In all; there could be as many as 60 languages in the Niger Delta. The primary occupations and means of sustenance of the people consist of fishing, farming, trading, and forest product gathering. Despite the emergence and subsequent dominance of the hydrocarbon industry, over 80 per cent are still dependent on the traditional agrarian trade (Alamieyeseigha, 2005). The Niger Delta region is characterized by wetlands and water bodies with creeks and rivers crisis-crossing the entire southern part. Indeed, it has been widely stated that the Niger Delta is one of the very few Deltas in the world. The region is endowed with enormous and rich natural resources. In addition to oil and gas, the Niger Delta is blessed with both renewable resources, including construction materials, wild-life, water resources, and abundance of non-timber resources as a source of food, spices, condiments and medical herbs, alongside great potentials for agricultural development. Despite this tremendous
natural resources base, the region represents one of the extreme situations of poverty and underdevelopment (Nwachukwu and Pepple, 2011).

The Niger Delta is most significant and known for its large hydrocarbon deposits in oil and gas. The Niger Delta is indeed the epicenter of the West African belt and Nigeria’s economic heartbeat. This has been so since the 1970s when oil became the mainstay of the country’s economy. The country has over 20,000 million barrels of crude oil reserves, in addition to an estimated associated gas reserve of about 300 trillion cubic feet. All these are concentrated in the Niger Delta region (Nwachukwu and Pepple, 2011).

4.2 NIGER DELTA PEOPLE AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT

The Niger River Delta, simply called Niger Delta, is in the south-south geopolitical zone of Nigeria. It is richly endowed with crude oil deposits, on and offshore. Oil exploration began in 1956. Before 1958, the mainstay of the local economy was fishing and farming. Environmental pollution, due mainly to the obsolete exploration technologies, coupled with the non provision of the basic needs of the host communities created the fault lines for perennial crises over oil in Niger Delta. The crisis has also engendered polarization within and between communities, dilating the conflict and occasioning cyclical violence. State-backed oil activities in the Niger Delta have impacted negatively on the psychological and physical environment, causing stress, violence and insecurity (Osita, 2007).

Predominantly riverine areas, communities of Niger Delta have experienced consistent oil exploration for over four decades. Oil spillage, gas flaring, and other forms of ecological disasters have been recorded at different times. Oil spills destroyed aquatic life and rendered fishermen at times unemployed. Acres of arable land have been destroyed along with the livelihoods of farmers and their families. Rooftops are corroded owing to acid rain. The
cumulative effects of these are poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, and severely fractured cognition for generations.

The conflict in Niger Delta could thus be linked to be a denial of the ontological needs of the people, and complicated by the communal content, governance of the state, and the international linkages. It transcends the conception of conflict simply as the fear of the past lived in the present; it is an engrained and habitual consciousness of deprivation (Lowenthal 1986, cited in Osita, 2007). Having lived unresponsive authoritarian (military) regimes for many years, the people need no re-enactment to reactivate their history of unashamed injuries and injustices. Where dialogue and constitutional means of seeking redress were anathema, violent confrontation became inevitable as a form of expression.

The asymmetry of development between Niger Delta and non-oil producing areas recently provoked the agitation for resource control, by which oil producing areas would directly exploit oil and make remittances to the Federation account. The state is opposed to this, for its implications for an economy, serviced mainly from oil revenue. The primary interest of both the oil companies and the state is the accumulation of capital. To this end, everything, including the lives and livelihood of the people of the oil bearing areas as well as their environment is subordinated (Owugah, 1999).

4.3. STATE’S RESPONSE

The response of the state to any crises is usually determined by the perception of those who exercise state power. Hence, in the Niger Delta crises the state’s response is shaped by the perception of those who exercise state power.

Owugah (2010) argued that the state’s introduction of violence into the Niger Delta conflict marked a turning point in the conflict. For one thing repression did not achieve its
intended objective of intimidating the people into silence; instead, it boomeranged into a spiral violence, which in its current phase has assumed a revolutionary dimension. For another, the state’s violent action did not only lead to the people’s loss of confidence in the state but also to a different perception of the conflict, namely, a struggle to reclaim their lost rights to exclusively exploit the resources of their environment for their socio-economic well being and the right to own and use arms for their personal and property security which they had earlier surrendered on becoming part of the wider Nigerian polity in the state making process.

It is worth noting that the state inability to fulfill its obligations of ensuring the people’s socio-economic well-being in spite of the enormous earnings from the oil resource. Nigeria earned over $600 billion in its forty-five years (1960-2005) of oil export (The Guardian, 2008). In 2007 alone, Nigeria reportedly earned $55 billion making it the fourth highest earner among the member of states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). But Nigeria’s huge earnings have not been translated into improving the living conditions of a majority of the people (Owugah, 2010). Instead, it turned the very forces and weapons meant for ensuring their security against them. The very forces, whose salaries are paid from the earnings from oil located in their area and the weapons purchased with the earnings from the same source, to ensure their personal security, were turned against them. The violent response of the state is not particularly surprising, especially, for a weak fragile and insecure state which relies on violence to maintain social order.

However, the Nigerian government has over the years created several bureaucratic and institutional frameworks through establishment of commissions to address the numerous development problems of the Niger Delta even before independence, the situation of the Niger Delta, rather than improve, would appear to have worsened. The developmental strategies of the
agencies have been essentially cosmetic, distorting the genuine development aspiration of the people (Omotola and Patrick, 2010).

On assumption of office in 2007, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua identified the Niger Delta question as one of the critical items on his seven-point agenda and remained undaunted in his determination to resolve the problem. In order to find a lasting solution to the problem, he set up the Technical committee on the Niger Delta headed by Ledum Mitee in September, 2008 (Nwachukwu and Pepple, 2011). The committee believed that the antidote to the problem was not military might but persuasion and dialogue with the heavily armed militants groups who claimed they took to militancy because they felt the people of the oil-rich region were marginalized by successive government in Nigeria. On June 25, 2009, President Yar’Adua granted amnesty via Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) to the militants with effect from August 6, 2009 and gave them 60 days within which to surrender their arms and renounce militancy (Aaron, 2010).

**TABLE 1: THE PHASES AND PROCESSES OF DDR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament (Removing the weapons)</td>
<td>Collection and documentation of arms and ammunitions from combatants and development of arms management program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization (Discharging combatants from their units)</td>
<td>Discharge of active combatants from armed groups and the provision of reinsertion (transitional assistance) in the form of allowances to cover basic needs, short-term education, training and employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration (The socio-economic process of becoming a civilian)</td>
<td>Status change process from combatant to civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibaba, 2011
The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia groups in the Niger Delta was a policy recommended by the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC), a committee established in 2008 by the Nigerian government to determine appropriate peace-building strategies in the region. The 40 member committee, made of scholars and opinion leaders from the region made wide consultations with stakeholders, including the combatants before making its recommendations. The policy recommendations on DDR states in part that:

- Federal government should establish a credible and authoritative DDR institution and process including international negotiators to plan, implement, and oversee the DDR programs at regional, state, and local government levels
- Grant amnesty to all Niger Delta militants willing and ready to participate in the DDR program
- Work out long-term strategies of human capacity development and reintegration for ex-militants
- Exclude from amnesty and criminalize the activities of those militants not committed to the DDR process and unwilling to surrender to arms (NDTC, 2008:66 cited in Ibaba, 2011).

4.4. DISARMAMENT OF NIGER DELTA MILITANTS

Disarmament entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition, etc). Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. The United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) defines disarmament as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population (http:www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php).
According to UNDPKO, DDR activities are crucial components of both the initial stabilization of war-torn societies as well as their long-term development. As such, need for disarmament. The UNDPKO notes that the objective of the DDR process is to contribute to stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of the military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process.

Fusato (2003) argues that the three phases of DDR are interconnected, and the successful completion of each phase is essential to the success of the others. According to him, the goals of DDR are both short term and long term. The immediate short-term goal is the restoration of security and stability, through the disarmament of warring parties. Progressive disarmament reduces the mistrust that fuels a security dilemma between the fighting factions, allows aid workers to intervene more effectively, and allows peaceful social and economic activities to resume.

Table 2: Militant Camps in Niger Delta as at 30 June, 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Name of Camp</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status of camp</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Olugbobiri</td>
<td>Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Joshua Mckiver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Korokorosei</td>
<td>Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Africa Owei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Okiegbene/Ebrigbene(Ikebiri I and II)</td>
<td>Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Gidson Kala (Prince Igodo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Robert Creek</td>
<td>Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cowthorne Channel</td>
<td>Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Camp 5</td>
<td>Delta State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo) and Henry Okah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Okerenkoko</td>
<td>Delta State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Opuraza</td>
<td>Delta State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Azuzuama</td>
<td>Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jackson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By the expiration of the October 4, 2009, deadline which the Federal Government gave the militants to disarm, virtually all the militants and their key leaders had embraced the Amnesty deal as highlighted in Table 1 above. Among the militants leaders who came out of the creeks and surrendered their arms are Victor Ben Ebikabowei, alias Boyloaf, former leader of MEND, in the Bayelsa axis; Government Ekpemupolo, alias Tompolo, Leader of Camp 5; Ateke Tom among others.

Table 3: Arms handed over to Government by Militants in Bayelsa and Rivers States 20 August 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Gun</th>
<th>Rifles</th>
<th>Mort. Bombs</th>
<th>Gun Boats</th>
<th>General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG)</th>
<th>Grenades</th>
<th>Rockets Launchers</th>
<th>Others (Bullets, etc)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa State</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>95,970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 highlight the number of arms handed over to government by militants in Bayelsa and Rivers on August 2009.

Table 4: Disarmed Militants in the Niger Delta, December 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>9,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>4,396</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>2,198</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>8,963</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,089</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>26,361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amnesty Office, Abuja, 2010

Table 4 highlight the total number of militants in the Niger Delta disarmed in 2010.

4.5. DISARMAMENT OF MILITANTS AND CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA

Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh largest in the world, averaging 2.5 million barrels per day in 2004 (Okonta and Douglas, 2004). The rise of Nigeria as a strategic player in the world of oil geopolitics has been dramatic and has occurred largely in the wake of the civil war that ended in 1970. Since then, Nigeria’s oil sector has remained a vast domestic industrial infrastructure with more than three hundred oil fields, 5,284 wells 7,000 kilometers of pipelines, ten export terminals, and 275 flow-stations. This accounts for over 80 percent of government revenues, 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, 96 percent of export revenues (Ikelegbe, 2006).

In August 2004, the then Nigerian Finance Minister announced government plans to produce 2.6 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2005 and to increase it to 3 million barrel per day
(bpd) in 2006 and finally to 4 million bpd in 2010. Such aspiration led to disputes with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as the country frequently exceeded its production quota at 2,265,000 bpd compared 2,220,000 bpd, the quota set in September 2004 (NNPC, 2009). However, the simultaneous growth of militancy and oil disruption which commenced in the late 1990s compromised oil production such that instead of increasing, oil production dropped by no fewer than 750,000 barrels per day (Watts, 2007).

**PRE-DISARMAMENT CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA**

In late 2005, militancy in the Niger Delta worsened with frequent attacks on oil installations and the taking of hostages. In December 2005 and early 2006, a hitherto unknown group of insurgents from Warri, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) began calling for international community to evacuate their nationals from Niger Delta by February or “face violent attack” (Watts, 2007). In the last nine month of 2006, the attacks degenerated to the use of electronically detonated car bombings, attack on government building and massive disruption of oil installations, deploying of sophisticated military equipment and the kidnapping of workers sometimes from platforms 40-60km offshore.

**Table 5: Incidence of Pipeline Vandalism 2001-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>Amount lost (N) billion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>10121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>3.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>7.971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>12.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>19.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2237</td>
<td>42.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3674</td>
<td>36.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3224</td>
<td>17.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: culled from *Punch* 15th May, 2008
Following the incidence of pipeline vandalism (as shown in Table 5) and deterioration of insecurity in the Niger Delta region many oil companies withdrew their personnel and oil production drop as low as 900,000 barrel per day (NNPC, 2009). Commenting on the beginning of the drop in oil production in Nigeria, Tanimu (2009) noted that immediately after election, violence in the Niger Delta region drop Nigeria’s crude oil output by nearly 1 million barrel per day, plunging production to its lowest level since early 2003. The Managing Director of NNPC Funsho Kupolokun disclosed that the country was losing 600,000 barrels of oil daily because of conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta (Punch, May, 2008). The Technical committee on Niger Delta reported that the average of 700,000 barrel of oil was lost per day (TCND Report, 2008). The committee highlighted that these losses were recorded each time the militants attacked oil installations.

Oil losses on account of militancy amounted to over $1 billion annually. The department of petroleum resources claims this figure represent 32% of the revenue the country generated that year (NNPC, 2009). In 2006, MEND claimed to have achieved a goal of cutting Nigerian output by 30% and has apparently succeeded (Watts, 2007). These destructions have reduced both export revenue amount going to the Federation Account. Furthermore, due to the Niger Delta crises, merchandise trade for the second quarter of 2007 stood at 2.74 trillion ($19.8 billion), that is a decrease of N208.4 billion ($1.7 billion, 7.8 percent) from the year’s first quarter (Watts, 2007). In spite of the soaring price of oil in the international market, the value of oil exports for the second quarter of 2007 was N1.61 trillion ($12.9 billion) a decrease of 5.8 percent over the first quarter (PENGASSAN, 2009).
The Technical Committee on Niger Delta (TCND), as shown in table 2 below, reported that country lost about N8.84 trillion ($66,746,526,000 billion) to oil vandalism and sabotage in the volatile region between 2006 and 2008.

Table 6: Loss of Revenue due to Militants Activities from 2006-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount lost in US Dollars ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$27,220,320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$18,805,362,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$20,270,842,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>$66,746,526,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TCND Quarterly Report (1) 2009: 10

At the height of the volatility in the Niger Delta as shown in Table 6, the total cost of crude oil production drop due to the activities of the militant in 2006 was estimated at N2.454 trillion or $27.2 billion. In 2007, drop in crude oil production was estimated at N2.69 trillion or $18.8 billion. In 2008, drop in crude oil production was estimated at N2.97 trillion or $20.2 billion (TCND Report, 2009).

The table below presents a summary of oil production in Nigeria between 2003 and 2008:

Table 7: Crude Oil Production in Nigeria, from 2003-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,275.00</td>
<td>7.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,328.96</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,627.44</td>
<td>12.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,439.86</td>
<td>-7.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,349.64</td>
<td>-3.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,165.44</td>
<td>-7.84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Energy Information Administration, (EIA), www.eia.doe.gov, retrieved on 30/05/2013.
Table 7 indicates drop in crude oil production due to the heightened insecurity in the Niger Delta region before the disarmament programme for the militants.

**POST-DISARMAMENT CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA**

Given the number of militants that turned in their weapons, it is no accident that the government considers the amnesty programme via disarmament a huge success. The Amnesty has been hailed by many as successful, given the quality of arms surrendered by the militants. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) even proposed a public rally and celebration to mark the success of the programme (leadership, October, 2009). In the same vein, the upper chamber of the parliament also passed a resolution commending the success of the amnesty deal. Ojo Madukwe observed that “the disarmament of the militants has yield positive result for the government of Nigeria, the participation of the militants in the amnesty offer is producing some benefits for Nigerian government, he observed the increase in oil and gas production as against the sharp decrease witnessed in the first quarter of 2009” (Guardian, December, 2009).

Ekwuruke (2009) emphasizing on the outcome of the benefits of the Amnesty programme via disarmament of the militants states as follows:

1. With the cessation of hostilities in the Niger Delta region, Nigeria can once again fill its OPEC quota and be trusted by major nations to meet its contracted obligation.
2. Contractors handling projects in the region are now fast tracking the repairs of oil and gas infrastructure. This will in turn boost the production level of oil companies.

Report from the Government indicate that following the relative peace ushered in by the cease-fire as a result of the amnesty declaration, the country’s oil output had risen to 2.3million barrels a day from 800,000 barrels a day in (2006-2008) as a result of the improvement in
security in the oil region. An increment of 1.5 million barrels per day indicates 120.45 million dollars of revenue to national coffers every (Igwe, 2010).

From a cursory look, “the post amnesty programme via disarmament of the Niger Delta militants has yielded considerable outcomes. In terms of favorable outcomes, the spate of violence-including kidnappings and killings has been reduced, while the production of Oil has increased from 700,000 barrels to 2.4 million barrels per day”.

To buttress this point, table 8 below presents oil production in Nigeria between 2008 and 2012, that is, before and after the disarmament programme for the militants.

**Table 8: Crude Oil Production in Nigeria, 2008-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,165.44</td>
<td>-7.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,208.31</td>
<td>1.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,455.26</td>
<td>11.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,520.00</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,525.29</td>
<td>3.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Energy Information Administration, (EIA), [www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov), retrieved on 30/05/2013.

Table 7 indicates that oil production in Nigeria significantly increased after the disarmament programme granted to the militants in Niger Delta.

Tanimu (2009:13) observed “gains from the disarmament programme to include:

1. Rise in the nations crude oil export,
2. Rise in oil and gas infrastructure to the three tier of government as well as the return of oil companies to the Niger Delta region,
3. Repair of oil and gas infrastructure destroyed during the pre-amnesty periods.”

The success of the disarmament programme of the militants spawned immediate results as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) announced that the countries crude
production per day has increased to 2.4 million barrels (NNPC Report, 2009). From the foregoing evidence, we accepted our first hypothesis; hence the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increased crude oil production in Nigeria.
CHAPTER FIVE

DEMOBILIZATION OF THE MILITANTS AND KIDNAPPING IN NIGER DELTA

5.1. GENESIS OF ARMED MILITANTS IN NIGER DELTA

The Niger Delta historically has been a protest prone zone; the protests not unconnected with the innate will of the people to resist oppression, exploitation, violence, servitude and establishment of brigandage. The likes of Jaja of Opobo, and Nana of Itesekiri, are established cases of resistance to imperialism, domination and exploitation (Chime, 2008). Cajetan (2008) opined that when the social welfare of the people deteriorated to an intolerable level, they formed stronger pressure groups to take their destiny into their hands. So the people pushed by what could be described as the instinct for self preservation, formed violent groups to match force with force.

Resistant movements have existed in the Niger Delta since the 1960s. The rise of these movements has to do with the people’s discontent over limited economic opportunities and poor environmental practice since prospectors first struck oil in the 1950s in the region (Nwachukwu and Pepple, 2011). It is important to point out here that oil is not the only contributor to violence and rise of armed militants in the region. Hazen and Horner (2007) cited in Badmus, 2010 argued that there have long been and continue to be clashes between communities over land and security concerns, as well as a number of criminal gangs and cult groups who contribute to the atmosphere of insecurity and violence. Yet, oil has become both a cause to rally around and a source of necessary funding for the fight.

Militant activities in the region, like those of the government and the oil companies, have equally endangered many lives and have resulted in many deaths and loss of properties worth of billions of naira. Their notable actions include kidnapping of oil workers especially expatriates,
as well as their use of might, money and maneuvering to convince, persuade, coerce and recruit youths (even adolescent and children) to join them. The immediate reaction of the federal government was to deploy military troops to go and silence the people. They actually killed some people, and detained others indefinitely (Cajetan, 2008).

One of the first armed activities that emerged from the oil-rich region of Nigeria, ranging from the Boro-led Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) in 1966, the Ken-Saro-Wiwa-led Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1992, the Aleibiri Demonstration (AD) in 1997, the Kaiama Declaration (KD) in 1998, the Odi Massacre (OM) in 1999, the Asari-Dokubo-led Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) in 2004, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in 2005, Tom Ateke-led Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and several other militant groups (Eseduwo, 2007). See Table 8 below for the profiles and activities of selected militant groups in the Niger Delta since 2003; have proved deadly with kidnappings and taking over oil facilities in the volatile Niger Delta. The movements claim that their activities are to seek a redistribution of oil wealth and increased local control of their God given resources. These groups are notorious for kidnappings of oil workers (especially expatriates) for ransom with negative consequences on the Nigerian state since the deteriorating security has forced some oil services firms to leave the country (Badmus, 2010).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Egbesu Boys of Africa                      | • Militant arm of the Ijaw Youth Council  
• Seeks justice and equity for the oil bearing Ijaw communities in the Niger Delta  
• Not a cohesive militant movement; members are active in other groups | Egbesu involvement in Ijaw-Itsekiri conflicts (Delta); various kidnappings and attacks on oil Installations.                                |
| Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Forces (NDPVF) | • Led by Mujahedeed Asari Dokubo  
• Founded in 2003  
• Members mainly Ijaw  
• Demands more control over resources for the Niger Delta states  
• Modeled on Isaac Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Force (1966) | Declared all-out wars vs. Nigerian government in 2004 and was subsequently outlawed; violent confrontation with NDV mid-2003 to late 2004; kidnappings and attacks |
| Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV)                 | • Led by Ateke Tom  
• Members mainly Ijaw | Violent confrontation with NDPVF mid-2003 to late 2004; kidnappings and attacks                                                           |
| Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) | • Emerged December 2005  
• Close links to NDPVF  
• Demands: 100% control of oil wealth; release of Dokubo; release of Alamieyeseigha  
• Elusive leadership; Jomo Gbomo communicates with media via email | Many of the recent hostage tasking and attacks on oil facilities; armed clashes with security forces between 2005 and January 2006. |

Source: Badmus, 2010
5.2. STRUCTURES OF INJUSTICE AND MILITANCY IN THE NIGER DELTA

There are several instruments, processes and policies the Nigerian states have devised over the years to justify and legalize its mode of engaging the people and communities of the Niger Delta. These are what we refer to as structures of injustice. Reason, they have been used to suppress, disempowered, alienate and underdeveloped the people of the region. And for us to thoroughly understand and appreciate the pain, anger and volatile nature of the agitations of the Niger Deltans for justice, it is imperative that we examine these structures.

One major instrument for the disempowerment of communities in the Niger Delta is the several unjust and obnoxious laws enacted by the Nigerian government to govern the oil industry in the country (Nna 2003 cited in Inokaba and Imbua, 2010) these laws constrain Niger Delta development in two ways. One, it strips the people of the ownership of their oil and gas resources, thereby jeopardizing their destiny. Second, the law fails to adequately protect the Niger Delta environment; giving rise to environmental degradation, which impedes sustainable development. Some of the oppressive laws include the following:

❖ The Petroleum Act of 1969 (CAP 350) by which the Federal Government appropriated all minerals in the continental shelf of the coastal or littoral states. In other words, this piece of legislation vests the ownership of all onshore and offshore revenue from resources derivable there on the Federal Government.

❖ Lands (Title, Vesting, etc) Decree recognizes the Federal Government as the sole proprietor of any land within 100 meters of the coast or water-course or river throughout the country. What this implies is that most of the riverine communities of the Niger Delta have all become tenants to the Federal Government.
The National Inland Waters Authority Decree 13 of 1977 makes all navigable waters the property of the Federal Government. The implication of this law is that the Federal Government has not only usurped the ownership of all oil minerals but it has also taken over the region’s water resources. The implication for the Niger Delta is huge when one considers the central role water plays in the lives of inhabitants of the region (Inokaba and Imbua, 2010).

Land Use Act of 1978 expropriated the ownership and control of all lands in Nigeria and vested it in the Federal Government (Ibaba 2005). Essentially, by the provisions of the Land Use Act, Niger Deltans are the only Nigerians who cannot make decisions over the use of their own lands. Nigerians from the non-oil producing regions dictate the management of land in the Niger Delta.

Again, the devastating impact of the Land Use Act on the very existence of the Niger Delta people becomes more obvious when one considers the sociological relevance of land to any society. The relationship of a people with their land determines what they are socially, economically and politically. And this act of injustice, deprivation and decolonization by few elites of the majority ethnic groups is what the Niger Deltans have vehemently opposed and challenged over the years. As earlier stated, violent militancy in the Niger Delta is a product of long years of government (both at the centre and state levels) insincerity, insensitivity, stubbornness and trivialization of the genuine demands of the people of the region for fairness, equity and justice. In the process of engaging the Nigerian system, moderate voices were imprisoned, harassed, or extra judicially killed by the Nigerian authority. Ken Saro-Wiwa was not an advocate of violence yet he was mindlessly murdered by the Nigerian state for preaching peaceful solution to the Niger Deltan crisis (Inokaba and Imbua, 2010).
It is also important to note that, as much as violent militancy has brought the issues of the Niger Delta to the front burner at both local and international arena, the frequency of kidnapping have created for the Niger Delta, a new unflattering global image. Rampant kidnapping which knows no age or gender and demand for ransom is doing incalculable harm and damage and violence to the reputation of all in the Niger Delta region.

5.2.1. KIDNAPPING

Defining what is kidnapping poses a number of definitional problems in relations to a country’s legal and moral viewpoints as well as the availability of other variances such as hostage taking and hijacking. In this study, Turner’s (1998 cited in Akpan, 2010) broad working definition of kidnapping has been adopted in which kidnapping applies to all situations where persons are forcibly seized and transported to a destination where they are held against their will in unlawful confinement. It also describes incidents when persons are lured away and then held illegally. This may involve force. Kidnapping has grown over the years as an industry involving every level of the society and motivated by many reasons.

Ekeibe and Eze (2012: 28) argued from the criminal law perspective that “kidnapping is the wholesale taking away or transportation of a person against the person’s will usually to confine the person in false imprisonment without legal authority. This act may be done principally to extract ransom or in furthermore of another crime, or in connection with a child custody as a fall out of marital dispute.

One country where kidnapping has become a daily event of recent is Nigeria and particularly the Niger Delta. Niger Delta is rich in petroleum oil and has been explored by multinational corporations and the Federal Government of Nigeria amid high incidence of
poverty, absence of infrastructures and deprivations of the locals and oil communities. Various forms of crime, including kidnapping have emerged as a consequence (Akpan, 2010).

5.2.2. KIDNAPPING IN THE NIGER DELTA

The root and rise in kidnapping in the Niger Delta can be traced to what Townsend (2008) referred to as “natural resource nationalism”-the tendency to seek bigger shares of the returns from natural resources. It is also compounded by what Omeje (No Date cited in Akpan, 2010) termed “accumulation politics”-the tendency for the ruling class to be involved in endless accumulation of natural resource rents accruing from the region through deliberate act of marginalization and deprivation.

Concerns for the development of the Niger Delta region are age-old phenomenon. The communities in the region have been protesting the injustices peacefully for decades, until recently when such protests took on a violent form. The parties in the conflict do not involve only the Federal Government and the Niger Delta people but also the oil multinationals. In summary, the grievances of the people have involved three closely interrelated but analytically distinct issues. Firstly, that all laws relating to oil exploration and land ownership are abrogated; secondly, the issue of natural resource control and self -determination; and thirdly, that appropriate institutional and financial arrangements should be put in place by the oil producing communities for the developmental and environmental problems associated with oil exploration and exploitation (Akpan, 2010).

The government seems not to be taking this matter seriously given its attitudes of using military option to suppress the people’s demands and protests. The locals have now opted for hostage taking, hijacking and kidnapping of expatriate oil company workers and the demand of
ransom, and the repeated invasion and blockading of oil installations. It is so far estimated that over 200 foreign oil workers have been kidnapped in the region (AKBC-FM 10am News: 12th Nov, 2008 cited in Akpan, 2010). The Niger Delta people have now become more organised in their demands for the development of the region, which has been denied them for a long time. These conflicting positions of the Federal government and the locals have set the stage for violent conflicts. Of late, kidnapping of foreign workers have become one of the key elements of such conflicts as a deliberate attempt to challenge government’s hegemonic powers over their resources. See Table 10 below for some selected cases of hostage-taking/kidnapping between 2003 and 2005.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Troops are sent to the oilfields amid clashes between rival Ijaw and Itsekiri groups. Around 30 people die. In April, militants seize four Niger Delta oil rigs, taking some 270 people hostage, 97 of them foreigners. After negotiations, the hostages are released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Five Nigerians and two Americans working for Chevron Texaco are killed by pirates in the Niger Delta. Fighting between groups seeking to control the oilfields leaves some 500 people dead in Port Harcourt and surrounding regions, according to Amnesty International. In October, the groups reach a ceasefire agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Six oil workers including two Germans are kidnapped, and then freed three days later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Akpan, 2010

Kidnapping has, of recent, assume alarming dimension in the States in the Niger Delta region opening up opportunities and avenues for dangerous degeneration. Its occurrence and impacts started to be felt this early 21st century, a phenomenon induced by oil resource exploration. There are many factors that have contributed to the emergence of kidnapping in the region. Apart from the wider liberation consciousness of the people over the years, social,
economic and political reasons have come to play prominent roles for the rise in the industry of recent.

Early versions of kidnapping were believed to be part of a wider liberation call by the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) for the development of the State. It was then an activity with no monetary attachment as the key motivation factor and in most cases part of the outcome of a confrontation between MEND and oil interests or the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). Kidnapping has come to play important role in such fights over the years. Initially, it could go without ransom (if the source of finance is guaranteed by their sponsors) but these days, some financial demands are made before release could be made. Such ransom seems to be useful in funding the organized groups involved. From the cases cited above, target kidnappees are foreign oil company workers, although key government officials have been targeted these days as a direct confrontation with the FGN.

The beginning 2006 and 2007 saw the emergence of various other deviant groups by various names who hide under liberation struggle to commit economic crimes. It takes few persons to organize somebody’s kidnap. In this case the victim would be snatched and taken to a safe location. Such operation is always well-planned and well-executed. The family of the victim is then contacted and a ransom demanded, which is subject to negotiation. In this category, there is heavy financial motivation and the victims are always from the “well-to-do” class-political class, foreign workers, men and women and people of very rich background (Akpabio and Akpan, 2009). See table 11 below for overview of kidnappings and selected incidents in the Niger Delta 2006-2009 before the demobilization of the militants.
Table 11: Overview of Kidnappings and Selected Incidents in the Niger Delta 2006-2009 before the Demobilization of the Militants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Expats taken</th>
<th>Nationals taken</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>First MEND kidnapping. MEND boarded a boat in the EA oil field and seized a Bulgarian, Briton, American and Honduran. They were soon released, and President Obasanjo declared that hostage taking would not be repeated. A barge was attacked by several speed boats. Exchange of fire and nine foreigners were kidnapped: three Americans, one Briton, two Egyptians, a Filipino and 2 Thais. Nelson, an SPDC Community relations officer, was held by the community he was negotiating with. On 20 August, he was freed from his confinement and was on his way back via the creeks in a flotilla of boats carrying himself, local government personnel who facilitated the release, and a number of militant guards who were acting as an escort. They happened upon a unit of armed forces. In the ensuing confused fire fight 10 of the “militants were killed along with the “freed” hostage and a number of the facilitating government officers. The military personnel thought they had intercepted a militant task force.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Three senior management staff of the chemical company Indorama and 4 family members (2 women and two children) were kidnapped with Nigerian staff, 10 in all. Three-year-old Margaret Hill (British father, Nigerian mother) was kidnapped on her way to school; MEND condemned the attack. The girl was released, but the father died shortly after from poor health complicated by stress.</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Robin Hughes and Matthew John Maguire were seized with 25 other oil workers when their boat was hijacked by an armed gang associated with MEND. The 25, mainly from the Ukraine and South Africa, were quickly released, but the two Britons were kept as “leverage” by the militants to negotiate release of their leader, Henry Okah, who was on trial for treason and gun-running. Hughes was released after seven months because of illness; Maguire was kept for about nine months.</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>MEND announced it had “declared war” on kidnappers claiming to operate under its umbrella. On the same day, gunmen hijacked a French vessel with 9</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
crew members aboard, four expatriates and five Nigerians. The vessel and crew were released three days later. Gunmen loyal to militant Tom Polo seized the MV Spirit and abducted 19 hostages (15 Filipinos and four Nigerians) plus the vessel. The same day, they seized the MT Chikana. The JTF later launched a huge offensive and razed TomPolo’s camp, freeing some of the hostages. MEND claimed 2 Filipinos were killed in crossfire. On 16 May, JTF said they had freed 9 expats and 4 Nigerians. JTF announced on 23 May that they had rescued 3 more of the group. Foreign ministers on 24th confirmed 2 fatalities. The 2 last incidents prompted MEND to declare a full scale war and no fly zone for helicopters of oil companies across the Niger Delta. JTF full force response induced all fighters in the Niger Delta to accept Presidential Amnesty by October 4th, 2009.


5.3. DEMOBILIZATION OF THE MILITANTS

5.3.1. Demobilization

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion (Nwachukwu and pepple, 2011). According to them, Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short term education, training, employment and tools. Demobilization
of armed groups is another fundamental short step in the improvement of security conditions at the end of an armed conflict.

The role of demobilization in any post-conflict scenario is always to bring back ex-militants to purely civilian life. After disarmament, ex-militants received a stipend of N65000 monthly allowance (at 1500 per day) and the payment would last till the end of their reintegration, depending on the careers opted for (Amnesty office, 2010). The allowance serves as reinsertion package to divert their minds away from militant attitudes. In addition to the payment of allowances, accommodation arrangements were made for registration and training purposes in six designated areas in the region (collection of personal information), namely; two in Aluu, Rivers State, two in Agbarho, Delta State and two in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State. Beyond their role as rehabilitation/training centres, the sites also served as a refuge to most ex-militants ostracized in their communities. In all, no separate arrangement was made for the under-aged (less than 18) ex-militants among them (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

Due to the incapability of the camps to take in the whole of 20,192 ex-militants simultaneously, decisions were made at the initial stage to divide them into batches, with each batch spending four weeks on reorientation, counseling and spiritual regeneration of the ex-militants. Registration for ex-militants included data capturing, certification of the eligibility for benefits, allocation of cards, receipt of reinsertion allowances, and preparation for full demobilization. The registration was extremely important to know the number of ex-militants to be rehabilitated, their career aspirations, the costs and other logistic issues necessary for successful rehabilitation and reintegration (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

5.3.2. THE DEMOBILISATION PROGRAMME AT THE OBUBRA CAMP

It was planned to last for three months with centres proposed in Plateau, Adamawa, Taraba, Kwara, Lagos, Enugu and Cross River State but the government decided, later to use the
Obubra camp in Cross River State because it was safer, tidier and cost-effective. The essence of the rehabilitation programme was to reorientate and transform their minds towards productive civilian life. The rehabilitation programme of ex-militants took-off on Monday 28 June, 2010. The training was aimed at changing the mindset of ex-militants and makes them responsible and productive citizens in life. It was also meant to instill in them the knowledge of peace process and conflict resolution through dialogue as well as educate them in non-violent communication, civil education and family responsibility (The Punch, 2010). An analysis of the training cum rehabilitation programme can be broken into various categories namely:

- Arrival and Documentation Process
- Daily Routine
- Training Sessions

5.3.3. POST DEMOBILIZATION OF MILITANTS IN NIGER DELTA

Addressing newsmen in a press conference in Abuja on Feb 9th 2012, the Chairman of the Presidential Amnesty Programme Hon. Kingsley Kuku outlined the benefits of the Amnesty Programme to include:

- Entrenching peace in the Creeks,
- Drastically reducing the menace of kidnapping

He attributed the success achieved in the Presidential Amnesty Programme to the determination of President Jonathan to sustain peace and security of lives and property in the Country, while at the same time creating a conducive environment for oil production and foreign direct investment (Ajaji, 2012).

According to Effiong (2011) the relative peace in the entire niger delta region, has undoubtedly been the result of the sustained and diligent implementation of the Federal
Government's Amnesty Programme for former militant youths in the region. Peace in the Niger Delta is also creating an environment for revival of economic activities, return of foreign investment and improvement of economic security. By 2009, the conflict in the region had greatly eroded the confidence of both foreign and even local investors. But with the effective end of armed conflict and the progress in peace building, that confidence has been greatly restored, and is now attracting new investment, particularly to the upstream sector of the nation's oil industry. Perhaps the most critical indicator of its impact beyond that mandate is the improvement in public safety and security which it has brought to the Niger Delta. Prior to the programme, kidnapping and hostage taking targeting both expatriate and local workers, as well as sabotage and outright damage of oil and gas infrastructure, were rampant across the region. The sustained implementation of the Amnesty programme and the non-violence transformation of many former members of cults and gangs have had a calming effect on the region. The improved climate of public safety and security contributed significantly to curbing electoral violence in the region, in the run-up to the April 2011 polls.

Table 12 below shows the selected cases of kidnapping in Niger Delta after demobilization of militants between 2010 and 2012.

**TABLE 12: CASES OF KIDNAPPING IN THE NIGER DELTA AFTER DEMOBILIZATION OF THE MILITANTS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2012.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Expats taken</th>
<th>Nationals taken</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Britons and a Colombian working for Netco were kidnapped when their convoy was attacked near Port Harcourt. A Nigerian employee of Total was kidnapped by unknown men in southern Nigeria.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>Five Indian sailors aboard the <em>SP Brussels</em> were kidnapped by M.E.N.D. militants. 4 South Korean oil workers were kidnapped by MEND gunmen from an oil plant in the Niger Delta</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four years down the line, I do not think it will be wrong to say that the introduction of the amnesty programme by the late President, fully supported by his then Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan and now President, has really paid off. The amnesty proclamation is seen to have made momentous impact in the return of peace to the Niger Delta, an area that was previously known to be the imprint of violence and massive destruction with the conducts of the agitators.

Another important gain of the demobilization programme has to do with the fact that contractors handling developmental projects in the region now have a lee-way to fast track their efforts so as to assure the ex-militants of government determination to bring about sustainable development in the Niger Delta. The kidnapping of local and international workers which was rampant and which was used by the militants as one of their bargaining strategies has almost ebbed away in the region. Overall, one can observe that the demobilization programme reduced kidnapping in the Niger Delta region as showed above (Table 12). Hence we accepted our second hypothesis of the study which state that; The Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduced kidnapping in the region.
CHAPTER SIX
REINTEGRATION OF THE MILITANTS AND OIL PIPELINE VANDALISM

6.1. OIL AND THE NIGERIAN STATE

Oil is important to the Nigerian economy and its survival. Oil accounts for about 40% of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and between 70-80% of Federal Government revenues. In 2003, about 80.6% of total Federal Government revenues came from oil and gas (Lawal, 2004 cited in Badmus, 2010). The Nigerian state has enacted various laws that empower it to control the oil sector while the government petroleum corporation holds majority of the shares in both onshore and offshore ventures. The operation of the oil sector of the economy is being run by the various MNOCs of which Shell is the primary player under the state military umbrella. MNOCs operate in joint ventures with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

Furthermore, oil revenue distribution to the federating states through a derivation-based allocation (known in Nigeria as the ‘derivation formula’) has been continuously declining. The Federal Government has, to the detriment of the ethnic minority nationalities, distorted the derivation formula. This is because during the 1950s when agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy; the constitution recognized 100% derivation as the basis for revenue allocation. The situation became different in the 1960s when derivation was reduced to 50%. It declined further to 45% in 1970; 20% in 1975; 1.5% in 1982, and 3% in 1992 respectively (see Table 13 below cited in Badmus, 2010). Under the 1999 constitution, there appears to be an appreciable development when derivation was increased to 13% consequent on the agitations of the oil-bearing ethnic nationalities. Sadly, the derivation formula is, apparently, disenfranchising the people of the oil-delta since the region is home to Nigeria’s oil resources.
**TABLE 13: STATE AND FEDERAL SHARES OF PETROLEUM PROCEEDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Producing State (percent)</th>
<th>Federal Account including DPA (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-1960</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1971</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>45 minus offshore proceeds</td>
<td>55 plus offshore proceeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>20 minus offshore proceeds</td>
<td>80 plus offshore proceeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1981</td>
<td>.....</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1992</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999--</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This perceived marginalization and lopsided state policy in the distribution of oil revenues have increased the anger and fanned the fire of hatred of the people of the region towards the Nigerian state and its ruling elite. Ironically, people outside the region are the ones benefiting from lucrative employment in the oil sector (Badmus, 2010).

**6.1.1 OIL INDUSTRY OPERATIONS IN NIGER DELTA**

Since the discovery of crude oil and natural gas (ONG) in the Niger Delta Region in 1956, the socio-economic and political well being of the people of the region has deteriorated. This is due mainly to environmental degradation caused by unregulated and abusive ONG exploration and production activities coupled with persistent political corruption which have contributed to endemic poverty and unmet development objectives (Okolo and Etekpe, 2010).
Oil production has maintained a steady increase although fluctuations occur sometimes in response to the existing state of the world economy. In 1997, for instance, oil production rose to a peak level of 2.3 million barrels per day (Phil-Eze, 2004). The oil producing states are Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers State. The contribution of the states to total oil production in Nigeria ranges from 38.6% for Delta state, 36.4% for Rivers state to 2.0% and 1.0% for Abia and Edo states respectively (NNPC, 1992 cited in Phil-Eze, 2004).

By 1998, about ten foreign oil companies were operating in Nigeria with other fourteen ancillary or servicing companies, of all of them; Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) has the largest concession in oil prospecting and production in Nigeria. The Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) is a Nigerian government agency that has a joint operating partnership with all oil companies in Nigeria. It has an Inspectorate Division that monitors the activities of the oil companies; a marketing company called Pipeline and Products Marketing Company (PPMC) that is in charge of local and oversea marketing of petroleum products; and refineries across the country (Phil-Eze, 2004).

In order to facilitate easy distribution of petroleum products in Nigeria, pipelines are laid across the Niger Delta to other parts of Nigeria through which the products are pumped to the various depots and pump stations for local consumption. Ibaba (2001: 30) however agreed that “the operation and activities of the oil MNCs have destroyed the region’s object of labour-fishing waters and farmlands, hence, peripherized the local people and caused massive exodus of people from the host communities to the urban areas in search of food and employment”.

Pipelines are used to convey the crude oil to the terminals for export, thus, facilitating the evacuation of the region’s resources. This constitutes the major destroyer of the farmlands
and fishing waters. Oil pipelines carrying about 4315 multi-products, connecting about 23 depots and 4 refineries covers an area of 666 kilometers (Ezeibe, 2011). Nigeria has a total of 7000km of pipelines, out of which Phil-Eze (2004) reported that SPDC alone has a network of 4,786km of field pipelines and 1,543km of trunk pipelines to the flow stations.

After many decades of oil exploration in the Niger Delta, the region has remained one of the most under developed parts of Nigeria. Both the federal government and oil MNCs have made little or lip service effort to salvage the deplorable state of the region. The Niger Delta youths however refused to act the spectator (to watch the federal government and the oil multinational action and inaction to continually destroy the environment), hence, they turned warlords and became militants to disrupt the flow of oil out of the region (Ezeibe, 2011). In the absence of jobs and sustainable development, criminal and political violent activities in the Niger Delta have steadily increased.

The pipelines for premium motor spirit, otherwise called petrol or fuel in our local parlance have in recent times been constantly vandalized. Given the proximity and accessibility of the region’s energy infrastructure to inhabitants, oil pipeline vandalism and illegal bunkering has become a key issue that has played a role in fuelling criminality and conflict, caused population displacement, and encouraged the social disintegration of communities. The process of oil and natural gas (ONG) exploration, extraction, and transportation often impinge on the lives of the people and their environment, the negative effects are usually taken for granted by the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) and the federal government until there is protests. The protests are then suppressed through obnoxious laws. This frustrates the people and makes them intensify the level of their protests, and eventually vandalize the pipelines conveying the crude oil (Okolo and Etekpe, 2010).
It is, therefore, no longer news that the crisis in the Niger Delta has become perennial, especially from 1998. This has manifested in several ways, including oil pipelines vandalization that are discussed in the next section.

6.1.2 OIL PIPELINE VANDALIZATION

The Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act of 1990, for example, defined oil pipeline vandalization or saboteur as any “person who does; aids another person; or incites, counsels or procures any other person to do anything with intent to obstruct or prevent the production or distribution of petroleum products in any part of Nigeria; or willfully does anything with intent to obstruct or prevent the procurement of petroleum products for distribution in any part of Nigeria; or willfully does anything in respect of any vehicle or any public highway with intent to obstruct or prevent the use of that vehicle or that public highway for the distribution of petroleum products” (Okolo and Etekpe, 2010).

For Ezebi(2011:77) oil pipeline vandalization refers to “the destruction of oil pipelines. The vandals puncture the pipelines especially the ones conveying petrol, they in turn siphon the petrol into tanks, plastics containers and drums for sale in the black market. It is an act of sabotage and a capital offence under the Petroleum Act and also covered by the Criminal Justice Decree of 1975”. Vandalization of oil pipelines is prevalent in the Niger Delta. It is mainly conducted by the “ethnic militants” (Phil-Eze, 2004:278). NNPC reported that “as at the year 2000, over 400 cases of oil pipeline vandalization were recorded as against 50 cases recorded in 1999” (Phil-Eze, 2004:278). This implies that the act of oil pipeline vandalization has geometrically increased especially with the inception of Nigeria’s modern democracy (Ezebi, 2011).
6.1.3 HISTORICAL FACTORS LEADING TO VANDALIZATION

The history of vandalization is traced to the general perception of being frustrated as the people are deprived from benefiting the huge revenue sourced from the region since 1956. “The Niger Delta people are conscious of the value of oil extracted from their farmlands and that the difference between the value extracted and what they get as monthly allocation goes into the hands of corrupt politicians. This disease of exploitation engendered by capitalism, Marx argued should be cured by enthroning socialism and destroying of all exploitative relations. The two million man match in Abuja in 1998 exposed the Niger Delta people to how the oil wealth has transformed Nigeria, leaving the goose that laid the golden egg to die in hunger and decayed infrastructure” (Ezebi, 2011:79).

Furthermore, Okolo and Etekpe (2010) and Ezebi (2011) outlined other factors that account for pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta or Nigeria namely:

- Oil production operations
- Sabotage
- Corrosion
- Corruption on the part of political office holders in both federal and state levels especially in the Niger Delta
- Perceived deception of the federal government in February 2001 on resource control
- Perceived uselessness of various ploys by the oil MNCs to cat away oil illegally through bunkering
- Continual decaying of infrastructure in the region, illiteracy and consequent unemployment of vast majority of the youth in the region.
The analysis points to corrosion as the major factors responsible for pipeline vandalization. This is followed by vandalism (sabotage) which is induced by poverty and unemployment. This shows how the economic motive has made the exercise of breaking pipelines difficult to wane, and the number of actors continues to increase.

### 6.1.4 ACTORS

Okolo and Etekpe (2010) identified three categories of actors responsible for oil pipelines vandalization in the Niger Delta region. They are:

- **Sabotage for Economic Gains.** Here, the local actors (militants) collaborate with some of the staff of the multinational oil companies (MNOCs), especially in the Production Department and Liaison Offices in their flow stations to break pipelines, and later recommend the same “criminals” to the company’s Management for “clean-up” at exorbitant cost. This is very rampant in SPDC and NAOC.

- **Corrosion Due to Aging Pipes.** This occurs due to corrosion of aging facilities mostly from flow line. The Management of SPDC, however, stated, that it has designed programmes to replace and upgrade aging facilities and pipelines, improved the way it operates, maintains facilities and responds much quicker to oil spills, as well as, work more closely with host communities.

- **Militants (for Negotiation for Development).** The third group of actors is the militants. The group is new phenomenon, but has over-shadowed the other two groups. Their argument is that after the Niger Delta has been the economic life wire of the country from the tune of oil boom in 1973, the oil producing/bearing communities in are increasingly worst-off. This shows that nothing has significantly changed since Henry Willink’s Commission report over 50 years ago that the people of the Region are “poor, backward
and neglected”. This angered the people and the form groups and revolted against the federal government. The revolt was to draw the national and the international attention to the plight of the people in the Region. The goal of these organizations is to increase the spate of oil pipelines vandalization and other forms of disrupting the activities of MNOCs in the region. The essence is to encourage the Federal Government to negotiate with them for purpose of developing of the region. From the humble beginning of Isaac Boro in 1966, the seed for armed struggle, including oil pipelines vandalization to press for socio-economic development, gainful employment, improvements in social infrastructure, and resource control and management have attracted national and international sympathy. The arms struggle has eventually grown in the minds of the people of the Niger Delta, and the MNOCs and the Federal Government are now harvesting the product in form of an unprecedented spate of oil pipelines vandalization. Table 14 below shows the diary of pipeline incidences between 2005 and 2008 before the amnesty programme via reintegration of the militants.

**TABLE 14: PIPELINE INCIDENCES NIGERIA, 2005 - 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidences</th>
<th>Value loss N (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2237</td>
<td>41,615.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3674</td>
<td>36,645.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3224</td>
<td>17,240.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2285</td>
<td>14,594.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The consequences or effects of oil pipelines vandalization cannot be exhausted; the immediate effect of oil pipeline vandalization is oil spillage. This has become has become a
source of worry to both Niger Delta people and federal government/oil MNCs as it cause considerable ecological and physical damage to the environment. It thus destroys the farmlands, water, vegetation and wild life (Phil-Eze, 2004).

Oil spillage causes a number of other harms to both the host communities and government ranging from environmental pollution, destruction of farmlands, fire outbreak, inter-communal wars, loss of jobs, youth vs. police(JTF) clash and hundreds of thousands of death(Ezebi,2011). Hence the special programme to pardon the militants dubbed “The Amnesty Programme” via reintegration of the militants.

6.2 REINTEGRATION OF THE MILITANTS

Reintegration: It is the process by which ex-combatants acquire full civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates longer-term external assistance (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

Furthermore, reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at local level. It is part of the general development of a country and national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance (http://www.unsdrr.org/whatisddr.php, accessed on 3rd March, 2013).

Reintegration of ex militants started with their absorption into the society, training and community empowerment. At this juncture, it is important to point out that leaders of ex-militant groups were reintegrated into the society immediately after the disarmament phase. They were given reinsertion allowances and awarded sumptuous contracts in the Niger Delta region and
Abuja in order to keep them financially buoyant till the end of the reintegration process, which is about 5-6 years.

But for their members, they had to pass through all the phases of the DDR process. Immediately after the two weeks’ demobilization at the Obubra camp, names were submitted to the Amnesty Office in Abuja where preparations were made to start off with their reintegration into the society. Based on the skills selected by the rehabilitated ex-militants, interested training centres pick trainees for real reintegration (Oluwaniyi, 2011). As part of government’s efforts in facilitating ex-militants’ reintegration in terms of training and empowerment, it had discussions with other partners to participate meaningfully in a programme that would have a life span of three years. Different organizations work under these groups to train ex-militants in fish production, poultry farming, wielding, marine, baking and hairdressing to mention but a few. According to Oluwaniyi (2011:44) “Three major groups handle the individual reintegration of ex-militants and they include the federal government (carried out by the Amnesty office), Post-Amnesty Oil and Gas Foundation and the NDDC”.

AMNESTY OFFICE

This is the government arm responsible for demobilizing and reintegrating ex-militants. It absorbs majority of the rehabilitated ex-militants. Based on the vocations chosen at the Presidential Amnesty camp, vocation centres are sourced both in Nigeria and abroad through the partner organizations working under their authority, and ex-militants are deployed to these centres as part of their reintegration into the pre-militancy society. Their programme is not limited to vocational skills training but includes formal education up to tertiary level (Oluwaniyi, 2011).
The amnesty office has successfully placed a total of 17,500 out of the 26,358 ex-militants who accepted amnesty and have been enrolled for degree and vocational skills acquisition training programmes in Nigeria and abroad (Mbalisi, et al, 2012). The vocational and technical training programmes include: seaman training, welding, aviation, computer technology, leadership training, marine technology, entrepreneurial skills, information technology, employment/placement opportunities development activities and so on.

Kuku (2012) the amnesty chief, states that 2299 delegates are currently undergoing various forms of skills acquisition in Nigeria and other parts of the world. For vocational training, beneficiaries of the amnesty programme are in France, United States of America, Italy, Greece, Poland, South Korea, Israel, Belarus, Romania, United Kingdom, Croatia, Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, Ghana, Jordan, India, Vietnam and the Philippines. Table 15 below shows the overview of ex-militants benefitting from the reintegration programme.

**TABLE 15: OVERVIEW OF EX MILITANTS BENEFITTING FROM REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Maritime, Welding and Fabrication at Home and Abroad.</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agriculture, Automobile, Entrepreneurship, Carpentry, plumbing, Oil drilling, Marine, Electrical Installation and ICT</td>
<td>9192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Delegates in Higher Institutions of learning (Formal Education)</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pilots</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Women placed in specialized skill centres</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Delegates offered direct employment in government and private institutions</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amnesty Office, 2012
REPATRIATION

In spite of the government’s efforts in rehabilitating and reintegrating ex-militants, some of them were repatriated from their countries of training for misdemeanors while some were punish in the countries of training. For instance, 27 out of 212 ex-militants were apprehended by the Ghana authorities for unruly behaviour at the National Vocation Training Institute, Ghana. The apprehended 27 trainees did not like the kinds of food being served and therefore, requested for food-for-money, which was disapproved by the hotel management. There was an argument, which later culminated in fighting and heckling of hotel staff. On their release by the authorities, they were repatriated back to Nigeria (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

On 15 August 2011, eight out of fifty ex-militants who were sponsored for vocational training in undersea wielding and boat building at the Topher Zhang Maritime Vocational Centre in Sri Lanka on 22 July 2011, were ordered repatriation following their expulsion from the training centre for offence ranging from fighting to willful destruction of training equipments. These are just a few of the repatriation exercises conducted by the Amnesty office (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

6.2.1 POST REINTEGRATION NIGER DELTA

The post-amnesty deal has been beneficial in revamping lives of most youth in the Niger Delta region. Beyond exposing a lot of the ex-militants, who had been confined to the creeks, to towns and cities, the process has resulted in sending some of them abroad to learn different vocations and for formal education, thereby exposing them to more opportunities in life. Nevertheless, the programme is bedeviled by serious challenges that if they are not promptly addressed, may derail the whole essence of the process.
Without doubt, the Niger Delta region is touted to be the driver of the Nigerian economy as it contributes about 80 per cent of the nation’s foreign exchange earnings with the millions of barrels of oil derived from its rich soil. However, for a region that comprises of about 90 per cent of Nigeria’s maritime environment, the area has been bedeviled with criminalities including crude oil theft, illegal bunkering, and pipeline vandalism (Ezeobi, 2012). With the huge revenue derived from the region’s rich crude oil, these criminalities no doubt portend grave dangers for the nation’s economy.

**OIL THEFT**

Oil theft is an illicit trade that involves the theft of crude oil and its derivative products through a variety of different mechanisms with significant economic, social, environmental, governance and security implications. This criminal act has contributed significantly to the poverty and degradation that exists in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria today. Nearly all of the country’s primary reserves are concentrated in and around the delta of the Niger River, but offshore rigs are also prominent in the well-endowed coastal region. To steal oil, thieves tap into pipelines and other infrastructure in the Niger Delta. They then pump the oil onto waiting barges and boats. Some of it is refined locally while larger vessels carry the rest abroad. There are also allegations that oil vanishes from at least some of the country’s roughly two dozen export terminals.

Douglas (2012) argued that even though kidnapping of oil workers and obstruction of oil production have reduced significantly, oil theft seems to be the innovation that has replaced the problems in the Niger Delta creeks. There have been increasing and worrisome reports of incidences of illegal oil bunkering and unauthorized local refineries in the Niger Delta. An estimated 100,000 to 250,000 barrels of crude oil are believed to be stolen, and about $1billion in
revenue lost to the oil thieves daily despite reintegration of the militants. This is a disturbing trend, considering that the Nigerian economy relies mainly on oil which contributes 80 per cent of the country’s revenue.

According to the Director General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Ziakede Patrick Akpobolokemi, powerful interests and high profile people are behind illegal oil bunkering. He also asserted that “Equipment used by the oil thieves, such as boats with massive tanks, vessels, imported arms and ammunition, are beyond the reach of the poor. They are obviously supplied by the rich who stay in their mansions and expect returns from the boys on the field” (www.nigerianoilgas.com, retrieved, January, 2013). The bunkering business is a well coordinated illegal industry, which involves people that wield a lot of influence in the society. Oil bunkering has become a serious issue in the Niger Delta and this growing trend has been a source of serious concern as it appears that there is no effective structure in place to put a stop to it (www.nigerianoilgas.com, retrieved, January, 2013).

Furthermore, the Akwa Ibom State Chairman of TUC, Comrade Ifreke Akpan, has condemned increase in oil theft despite the award of N5.6 billionn Pipeline Surveillance contracts to former militant leaders by the Federal Government. He said Nigeria had been enveloped in “heinous web of poverty, unemployment and insecurity” which were the outcome of many years of misrule and corruption. Akpan challenged the Federal Government to demonstrate high level of commitment and capacity to fight corruption which he said was responsible for insecurity in the country (Anichebe, 2013). The best available data suggest that Nigeria lost about 11.75 million barrels of oil from 2010 to 2012, due to crude oil theft, despite the amnesty programme. See Table 16 below for breakdown.
TABLE 16: LOSS OF OIL DUE TO OIL THEFT 2010-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>BARRELS N(MILLION)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,316,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6,391,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3,045,624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is particularly worrisome that the relative peace witnessed in the Niger Delta following the amnesty programme for oil militants seems to have waned, going by available statistics. The Nembe Creek axis seems to have been the worst hit by the criminal act, despite being the operating base of a key former militant who has cornered a lucrative Federal Government contract to protect Nigeria’s coastline from the same bunkering activities that are now getting out of control. If this rise in oil theft is allowed to escalate further, we predict it will undoubtedly affect Nigeria’s oil price predictions for 2013 budget and subsequent national fiscal budget.

Furthermore, according to available statistics, despite the amnesty programme via reintegration of the ex-militants and other checks put in place, the trend seems to be on the increase as backed by further reports and statistics. In 2011, Nigerian recorded about $7 billion loss to oil pipeline vandalization and crude oil theft, a clear but whooping difference from the value of crude oil lost between 2005 and 2008. Table 17 and figure 1 below shows the overview of oil pipeline vandalization after reintegration of the militants 2009-2012.

TABLE 17: PIPELINE INCIDENCES IN NIGERIA, 2009-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidences</th>
<th>Value loss N (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1453</td>
<td>8,195.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>6,848.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2768</td>
<td>12,526.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>21,484.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following Table 17 and Figure 1, in reviewing US Energy Information Administration (EIA)’s data on pipeline vandalism in Nigeria between 2002 and 2011, it is fair to state the number of reported incidences fell sharply in 2010 during the introduction of the Niger Delta amnesty programme via disarmament and demobilization, however the number of cases reported in 2011 rose sharply during the reintegration phase to almost the same levels as 2006; Today, we say the situation is actually worse than we had thought, exacerbated by pipeline vandalism and crude oil theft which have reached an unsustainable level. Hence we accept and validate our third hypothesis that the reintegration of Niger Delta militants failed to reduce oil pipeline vandalization.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 SUMMARY

The study focused on the nexus between the Amnesty programme granted the Niger Delta militants and National Security. It specifically investigated the effect of disarmament of the militants on crude oil production in Nigeria on one hand, and the effect of demobilization and reintegration of militants on kidnapping and oil pipeline vandalization on the other hand. On the basis of this, therefore, the research work was motivated by the desire to provide satisfactorily answers to the following research questions:

4. Did the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increase crude oil production in Nigeria?
5. Did the Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduce kidnapping in the Niger Delta region?
6. Did the Reintegration of Niger Delta militants fail to reduce oil pipeline vandalization?

In order to adequately address the foregoing research questions, we adopted the theory of the post-colonial state as our theoretical framework. Our choice was informed by its analytical utility to explicate that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism and its local allies rather than that of the majority of the indigenous population. We equally chose the theory because of its ability to expose that the post-colonial state has created a deep crisis from which it can hardly extricate itself without fundamentally changing its present nature. The choice of this theory was also informed by its ability to unveil that the post-colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state, which in turn, had incorporated some important elements of the pre-colonial rudimentary state structures which implies then that the main goal of the colonial state was to
create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the dominant economic class (top government functionaries, oil MNCs and some local chiefs in the Niger Delta). This dominant class amasses wealth through various corrupt practices at the expense of the environment and people that inhabit the region.

In an endeavour to arrive at a satisfactory answer to the research questions we adduced the following hypotheses:

4. The Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increased crude oil production in Nigeria.
5. The Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduced kidnapping in the region.
6. The Reintegration of Niger Delta militants failed to reduce oil pipeline vandalization.

The study relying on secondary sources of data generated both qualitative and quantitative data. These were presented and analyzed accordingly. This study was, therefore, partitioned into seven chapters.

7.2 CONCLUSIONS

The character and attitude of the Federal Government to the agitation in the region is well known and documented. The use of force to keep the people down and exploit their oil and gas resources could not resolve the crises. This motivated the Nigerian government to separate the genuine intentions from the criminal motives in region, particularly with the failure of the militarist approach to the conflict resolution. The real threat to the nation’s economic survival and national security was one of the most important catalysts for the proclamation of amnesty in the Niger-Delta. To this end, the study uncovers that the success of the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increased crude oil production in Nigeria.

Similarly, the study reveals also that a semblance of peace exists in the Niger Delta in the aftermath of the programme. The relative peace experienced in the Niger Delta area as a result of
the amnesty programme via demobilization and reintegration of the militants has major impacts on the Nigerian economy and the potentials for the generation of adequate revenue for development. It said that without prejudice to whatever solutions that key stakeholders may proffer to the criminal act of pipeline vandalism and oil theft, it is important for the security agencies operating in the Niger Delta to ginger up their efforts to safeguard lives and property in the Niger Delta.

Finally, there is an urgent need for decisive action to be taken to solve the developmental problems in the Niger Delta area since it is the root cause or justification of militant activities and violent conflicts in the area. Eradication of corruption and social peace building are the keys to ensuring sustainable development in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria and the government must recommit itself to enhancing security of investment in the region, while at the same time tackling headlong the grinding poverty in the oil region.

In the light of the foregoing findings, we, therefore, put forward the following recommendations for policy implementation.

7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Niger delta oil constitutes a major source of threat to national security in Nigeria. Hence, the control of the violent activities of the Niger Delta usually expressed through oil pipeline vandalism and oil theft is core to the national interest of Nigeria since oil forms the cornerstone of Nigerian economic survival. Now, what is germane is to address the fundamental grievances of the oil-bearing communities. The proclamation of amnesty is regarded as a palliative measure that will have no significant effects on the conflict trajectory. As long as the Federal Government fails to tackle the root causes of the conflict, the people of the region will
continue to be restive with negative consequences of arms proliferation while insecurity will continue unabated. Hence we recommend that:

Firstly, there should be rapid development of the Niger Delta region through the provision of infrastructural facilities. It is time to adopt the simple method used for the rapid development of Abuja in developing the Niger Delta.

Secondly, the way to go remains the dismantling of the huge social infrastructure on which militancy in the Niger Delta rests, that is, a reform of the extant petroleum laws and related policies of the Nigerian State that constitute a violation of resource control rights of Niger Delta people.

Thirdly, the government should establish a credible institution to check the corrupt practice of governors, local government chairmen, chiefs, community leaders and youths in the Niger Delta region. The Nigerian economy should be diversified in order to reduce dependence on the petroleum sector. The success of this diversification will reduce the rising incidence of oil theft and oil pipeline vandalization and guarantee national security.

Finally, the destruction of the Niger Delta environment by the MNOCs should be addressed by the Nigerian state. The region’s ecosystem can be protected by enacting laws that will regulate the activities of MNOCs and also agencies to monitor such activities and enforce compliance. Market based instruments like pollution taxes and effluent charges should be utilized. Revenue obtained from pollution taxes should be plough back into developmental projects or used to compensate inhabitants of the Niger Delta who have suffered as a result of environmental damage. An attempt should be made to mainstream environmental concerns in national economic policies. This will promote visibility and sustainability of environmental policies.
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NNPC ASB 2012-IST EDITION


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