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CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA AND GHANA, 2003 – 2013

BY

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A PROJECT REPORT PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (COMPARATIVE POLITICS)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

SUPERVISOR: DR. I.M. ABADA

SEPTEMBER, 2014
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA AND GHANA, 2003-2013
This is to certify that this project report titled “Civil Society organizations and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana, 2003-2013” has been examined and approved by the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka for the award of Master of Science (M.Sc.) in Political Science (Comparative politics).

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Date: ............................                             Date: ............................
DEDICATION

This study is dedicated, first and foremost to the Almighty God, who provided and took care of me throughout my M.Sc. program in the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. There is no greater love than his because he showered tender mercies and kindness on me despite my flaws. Glory and honour be ascribed unto his name forever and ever, amen.

Also, to friends and loved ones that are no more, the likes of Eke Lazarus, my beloved uncle whose time on earth was spent bettering the lot of his community and humanity but whose fond memories cannot be forgotten, my beloved grand ma, Mrs. Eke Mercy, whose time on earth was well spent and Okezie Ekeoma who died without making his mark. I miss you guys.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Finally, I must not forget my esteemed lecturers who put me through the furnace of academics in order to refine and mold me into a political scientist with strong bias in Comparative politics. I cannot forget your academic mentorship. I doff my cap for Prof. Jonah Onuoha, ride on with your good works, Prof. Ken Ifesinachi, thanks for your academic drilling in research methodology, to my erudite scholar, Prof. Obasi Igwe, thanks for broadening my knowledge. I must remain eternally grateful to scholars like Dr. Peter Mbah, Dr. Ukwuaba, Dr. H. Agbo, among others. These were scholars who showed me the academic light and opened my eyes. I also, appreciate my friends and course mates who made my time in University of Nigeria, Nsukka to be worthwhile and eventful.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMMG</td>
<td>Ahmadiya Muslim Mission of Ghana</td>
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<td>CAN</td>
<td>Christian Association of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Catholic Bishop Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCG</td>
<td>Catholic Council of Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Centre for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Centre for Democratic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDHR</td>
<td>Committee for Defense of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDHR</td>
<td>Committee for the Defense of Human Right</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDRA</td>
<td>Center for Development, Research and Advocacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAR</td>
<td>Centre for Enterprise, Development and Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLEEN</td>
<td>Centre for Law Enforcement Education</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CICOL</td>
<td>Civil Society Coalition on Land</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLO</td>
<td>Civil Liberties Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODEO</td>
<td>Coalition for Domestic Observers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention Peoples Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Center for Research and Documentation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI-RA</td>
<td>Civil Society Index-Rapid Assessment</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFCC</td>
<td>Economic Financial Crime Commission</td>
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<td>ERN</td>
<td>Electoral Reform Network</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GBA</td>
<td>Ghana Bar Association</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GJA</td>
<td>Ghana Journalist Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNAT</td>
<td>Ghana National Association of Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEG</td>
<td>Institute of Democratic Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>Institute of Economic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>ISODEC</td>
<td>Integrated Social Development</td>
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<td>JFM</td>
<td>June Fourth Movement</td>
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<td>JNI</td>
<td>Jama’ atu Naril Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFJ</td>
<td>Movement for Freedom and Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBA</td>
<td>Nigerian Bar Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDM</td>
<td>New Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>Nigeria Labour Congress</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>New Patriotic Party</td>
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<td>NUGS</td>
<td>National Union of Ghana Students</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUJ</td>
<td>Nigerian Union of Journalist</td>
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<td>NUT</td>
<td>Nigeria Union of Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAMSCAD</td>
<td>Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Peoples Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLWHAP</td>
<td>People Living With HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNDC</td>
<td>Provisional National Defense Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWD</td>
<td>People With Disability</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEND</td>
<td>Social Enterprise Development Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERAC</td>
<td>Social and Economic Rights Action Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAR-Ghana</td>
<td>Strengthening, Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>Transition Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trans -National Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Assistance for Development</td>
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<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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ABSTRACT

Civil Society Organizations played an instrumental role in the restoration of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana and in recognition of their important role in democratic transition in both countries they were considered by both scholars and international organizations as a veritable tool for democratic consolidation. The argument that CSOs aid democratic consolidation in both countries and account for the dissimilarities in democratic consolidation necessitated this study. Therefore, the study examined the nexus between civil society organizations and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana and noted like in other studies that CSOs in both countries suffer from lack of unity, communication gap, inadequate personnel, among others. Hence, this study deduced that civil society organizations in both states perform similar functions and share the same problems. In this context, the study argues that it is not CSOs that account for the differences in democratic consolidation as regards free and fair election and the alternation of power between the two major political parties in Ghana. The study posited that the differences in the nature and character of both states are the underlying factor that account for the marked differences in democratic consolidation in both states. The study made use of ex-post facto research design, qualitative method of data collection, qualitative/descriptive method of data analysis and adopted the theory of post-colonial states. The study noted that CSOs do contribute to democratic consolidation in both states but are facing problems associated with post-colonial states and that the nature and character of both states influence the roles of CSOs in the process of democratic consolidation and this is what account for the differences in democratic consolidation in both countries. It recommended among others, the strengthening of CSOs by government of both states, adequate funding by donor agencies and adoption of effective method by CSOs stakeholders to engage the state.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) among several forces played an instrumental role in the restoration of democracy in developing countries, and such pivotal roles ushered in the third wave of democratization in Africa especially in Nigeria and Ghana (Huntington, 1993; Diamond, 1999; Gyimah-Boadi, 1996; Aidoo, 2006; Imade, 2007; Ojo, 2011; Majeed, 2011; Odeh, 2012). Before the return to democracy in Nigeria and Ghana, the governments in both states especially during the military regimes, hitherto were unaccountable and despotic, and became even more authoritarian as they embarked on unpopular and belt-tightening policies like Austerity Measures, Structural Adjustment Programmes, among others. Also, during this period, the governments were marred by executive lawlessness, human rights abuse and reckless political decisions making. This activated the civil society, determined to check-mate the erosion of rights, freedom and civic values. The conjecture was characterized by intense restlessness among citizens and civic groups, which demanded for democracy, participation and justice (Odeh, 2012).

As a result of their above roles, CSOs are considered very central to the current wave of democratization in Africa, in terms of its restoration; were democracy has been absent or was scuttled and consolidation; were their exist democratic institutions but requires to be strengthened. Little wonder, scholars like Diamond (1999); Young (2000); Kew (2005); Imade (2007); Ojo (2011); Majeed (2011); among others have in their various studies posited strongly that civil society organizations were crucial in the restoration of democracy in Africa and according to these scholars, CSOs have greater roles to play in the consolidation and deepening of democracy in Africa. They argued separately and strongly that, if democracy is to be sustained
and consolidated in Africa, then vibrant CSOs are not only important but necessary. In line with the above, Hadenius and Uggla (1996) cited in Majeed (2011:12) contends that:

An active civil society is a necessary condition for the development of a democratic system of governance…….only the free practice of democracy found in civil sphere can promote the development of the democratic popular culture that makes the rule by the people a feasible option.

According to Encarnacion (2003), a consolidated democracy appears to depend on the existence of a vibrant civil society. They do this by performing the following functions thus:

In recent times……, CSOs do execute diverse programs such as voter’s education, election observation, campaign finance monitoring, election tribunal monitoring, electoral reforms advocacy, conflict mitigation, access to justice, public interest litigation, budget tracking, constituency outreaches as well as research and documentation in thematic areas of democracy and governance (Odeh, 2012:61).

Furthermore, CSOs are considered catalyst for change, healthy for enhancing good governance and democracy because they are placed in the limelight to fight for, maintain as well as deepen democratic values in Nigeria and Ghana. According to Monga (2009) CSOs have been identified as one of the key actors that are capable of facilitating the processes of democratic consolidation, particularly in emerging democracies (Nigeria and Ghana). In this context, Hearn (1999) posited that a thriving civil society can widen democracy by promoting pluralism, and can deepen democracy by embedding the values and institutions of liberal democracy within society at large, not simply at the state level but also nationally, and indeed, globally. Hence, international organization and governments tend to invest significant amount of resources in strengthening civil society, particularly in developing countries (Nigeria and Ghana) with the goal of consolidating their democracies.
However, despite the existence of CSOs in both countries and the strong premium placed on them as institutions possessing the capacity to deepen and consolidate democracy in both states, democracy in Ghana have fared better than in Nigeria (Skanning, 2008; AfroBarometer, 2006; Freedom House, 2011). This assertion is based on how peaceful, free, fair and creditable the electoral process in Ghana has been when compared with that of Nigeria since 2003. These contradictory trajectories of democratic consolidation in terms of free, fair and creditable election in both countries have been traced to the activities of CSOs. Comparative scholars like Majeed (2011) and Oladipupo (2011), argued that the differences in democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana is tied to the very existence of CSOs in these countries. Yet, non-comparative scholars like Gyimah-Boadi, (2004), Dwauni, (2010), Ojo, (2011), and Ikubaje, (2011), among others, posited separately and strongly that CSOs in both countries do suffer from ethnicity, lack of internal democracy, corruption, communication gap, unaccountability, and government patronage. Therefore, from the above, this study argues that it is not CSOs that account for those glaring disparities (free and fair election and alternation of power among the two major political parties) in democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana rather it is the difference in the character of both states with regards to CSOs. In this light, this study investigates the nexus between civil society organizations and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. In particular, it seeks to unravel the underlying factors that aid or account for the difference between CSOs in Ghana and Nigeria in the drive to consolidate democracy, with a view to pin-pointing useful lessons to boost democratic growth in both countries and the overall development of Africa.
1.2 Statement of the Problem

The third wave of democratization in Africa which commenced in the late 1990s in Africa was largely a transition from authoritarian rule/military dictatorship to democratic regimes (Young, 2005). As democracy became fashionable all over the world, authoritarian regimes in most countries, especially Africa transmuted or transformed into democracy. In other words, they became more democratic or simply wore the toga of democracy in order to gain national and international acceptance. Moreover, Nigeria and Ghana were not spared from the contagious and snowballing effects of the democratic wave. Although Ghana was at the forefront to restore democracy as a form of government in 1992, however Nigeria followed suit and restored democracy as a form of government in 1999.

In fact, since the return of Africa to the paths of democratization under the ‘third wave’, the challenges of consolidating democracy have, and still occupy a central position, not only in academic discourse, but also in the domains of civil society, public policy and democracy aid industry. This is because sustaining and consolidating democracy is often a task as difficult as establishing it, if not much more daunting (Schedler, 1998, 2001). Moreover, the experience of history demonstrates convincingly the fluctuating fortunes of democratization in Africa, given the abysmal failure of all previous attempts at democratization in the continent (Omotola, 2009).

However, the emphasis on the roles of CSOs in the consolidation of democracy has been a mixed bag of the good, bad and ugly (Gyima-Boadi, 1997). The skewed trajectory of democracy in the Sub-Saharan of Africa led to the creation of terms like ‘delegative’ (O’Donell, 1996); ‘illiberal’ (Zakaria, 1997); ‘hybrid’ (Diamond, 2002) and ‘incipient’ (Raker, 2007) democracies. Despite the premium placed on CSOs as institutions of strengthening democracy in
Africa, democracy has not fared well in the continent. Put it differently, democracy in Africa has refused to take root downwards and bear fruit upwards. Leys (1997), have criticized the democratization process that Africa has experienced, describing it as essentially an exercise in re-estabilization of democratic cartels through improved circulation of elites, to lend legitimacy to economic deregulation. In the same vein, Shin (2009:34) posited that:

Democratic transition in African countries (Ghana and Nigeria) has not automatically produced democratic institutions in place of the replaced authoritarian ones. Nor have the newly created democratic institutions performed any more efficiently than the ones they replaced.

Also, scholars like Awe (1991), Young (1993), Ake (1996), O’Donell, (1996), Nnoli (1999), and more recently, Rakner and Svåsand (2004), Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) and Manning (2005) have in their separate works posited that the consolidation of democracy in Africa (Nigeria and Ghana) is not yet eureka because issues like unaccountable strong–man leadership, corruption, ethnicity, religious crisis, lack of rule of law, or its uneven application and other patrimonial factors are giving democracy a fight for its life. Therefore, the current state of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana leaves much to be desired.

Although, it has been argued that despite the lamentable state of democracy in Ghana and Nigeria, there exist contradictory trajectories in democratic consolidation in both countries (AfroBarometer, 2006; Skanning, 2008). While Ghana is considered to have recorded impressive progress in the democratization process in terms of free and fair elections that alternated power between the two prominent parties (New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC), Nigeria, is said to have recorded limited success with the Ruling party (Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) still in power since 1999. Though, that of Ghana is not totally flawless, especially given protracted controversy that surrounded the 1992 founding elections
(Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; Qquaye, 1995; 2000), however, there is now a broad consensus domestically and internationally that Ghana is on the right track in consolidating democracy (Nugent, 2005; AfroBarometer, 2006; AfriMAP, 2007). Nigeria, on the other hand, has received fewer encomiums from domestic and foreign writers on democratic consolidation (Omotola, 2009, Obi 2008, Onu and Momoh, 2005, Oladipupo, 2007, 2011, Bratton, 2008). To be specific, Oladipupo (2009) lamented that:

> More than three years after the conduct of the Last General Elections in Nigeria, the last has not been heard as far as its worldwide condemnation and internal problems, that is, litigations arising from its outcome are concerned. Problems such as incompetence and deliberate bungling by the INEC, widespread use of thugs and security agents against voters, and the flagrant abuse of the powers of incumbency combined together to give the condemnable outcome. The loss of opportunity to transfer power from one civilian to another civilian regime, for the first time in the history of Nigeria without such overwhelming attendant electoral shenanigans, makes the INEC woeful performance more painful (Oladipupo, 2011:106-113).

This failure, perhaps, motivated Adibe (2014) to aver that the democratic success recorded by Ghana in recent times, especially the 2012 general elections were applauded by the international community as well as local and foreign observers as the best model for West African sub-region. To this end, it attracted the visit of the United States President, Barrack Obama to Ghana. However, elections in Nigeria in recent times is dubbed a do or die affair that even 2011 elections that was recorded to be among the fairest was also among the bloodiest, claiming the lives of over 800 persons, displaced 65,000 others and not less than 350 churches were either burnt or destroyed (Human Rights Watch, 2011). As far back as 2006, AfroBarometer (2006) in a quantitative or empirical study ranked Ghana as first among other West African countries with
an excellent grade (71%) whose citizens believed in her democratic process. This assertion was corroborated by a survey conducted by Skanning in 2008 which is seen in the figure 1:1 below.

**Figure 1.1: Levels of Satisfaction with Democracy in Sub-Saharan African Countries**

From the above chart, there exist a clear cut difference in terms of democratic satisfaction between Nigeria and Ghana. While Ghana has the highest level of democratic satisfaction, Nigeria on the other hand, occupies the seventeen position among the eighteen countries sampled in sub-Saharan African by Skanning (2008), in his study on ‘democratic satisfaction’. Although democratic satisfaction is not democratic consolidation but it is an indicator of the level of trust citizens have on the democratic processes. It is this observed difference in democratic consolidation between 2003 and 2013 in both countries as regards free, fair and creditable
elections and the alternation of powers between political parties that justify the period of the study.

However, the observed differences in democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana in terms of free and fair elections and the alternation of powers between major political parties have been attributed among other factors, to the vibrant nature of CSOs in Ghana. Previous comparative studies on civil society organization and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana (Omeiza, 2009; Majeed, 2011; Oladipupuo, 2011) posited that both countries do differ considerably in democratic consolidation as a result of strong and vibrant civil society organizations in Ghana. Their views about the weakness of CSOs in Nigeria was also collaborated by other scholars like Imada (2007); Ojo (2011); Ikubaje (2011), and Odeh (2012), Who in their separate work asserted that CSOs in Nigeria are unable to effectively influence the democratic process because of the strong presence of ethnicity, lack of internal democracy, corruption, communication gap, unaccountability, government patronage, lack of state support and partnership and lack of unity. However, other scholars like Mohan (2002); Gyima-Boadi (2004); Kew (2005); CIVICUS (2006) focusing on Ghana have maintained different stand point from the comparativists such as Omeiza (2009); Majeed (2011); and Oladipupuo (2011) among others, because in their various works they posited that ethnicity, lack of internal democracy, corruption, communication gap, unaccountability, government patronage, lack of state support and partnership, and lack of unity are also problems bedeviling CSOs in Ghana in their bid to deepen the democratic process and this are problems afflicting Nigerian CSOs too.

From the above, the vexing issue in this study becomes evident, that, CSOs exist in both countries, they perform the same functions and suffer the same problems yet democracy is more consolidated in Ghana than in Nigeria which has been attributed to the activities of CSOs in
Ghana (Majeed, 2011). However, the extant literatures surveyed so far have tended not to pay adequate systematic attention to what aided CSOs to consolidate democracy more in Ghana than in Nigeria. They tended not to have paid adequate attention to the character of both states as the underlying factors that accounts for the differences in the influence of CSOs in the process of democratic consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria. This study therefore is geared towards examining, unraveling, ascertaining and resolving the above controversy and ambiguities concerning civil society organizations and consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana. On the basis of this gap in the literature, this study seeks to address the following research questions:

- Does the existence of civil society organizations contribute to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana?
- Does the character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states account for the differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to investigate the nexus between civil society organizations and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. However, the specific objectives of the study are to:

- Ascertain if the existence of CSOs contributes to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.
- Determine if the character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounts for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states.
1.4 Significance of the Study

This study has both theoretical and practical significance. At the theoretical level, it seeks to contribute to existing body of knowledge on the study of civil society organization and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana generally, specifically; it offers a new insight in interrogating both variables by focusing on the nature and character of both states as the underlying factor influencing CSOs in the process to consolidate democracy. This study will, therefore, academically serve as a reference material to researchers seeking to understand what account for the marked difference between CSOs not only in Nigeria and Ghana in the process to consolidate democracy, but also in other countries in Africa and beyond. Above all, it seeks to spur research interest in that direction where possible.

Additionally, this study has practical significance, which includes political, social and economic significance. Politically, this study touches on the interest of policy makers, government, donor agencies, not only in both countries but worldwide. The political value of this research is to bring to fore the dynamics and manifestations of CSOs in the process of democratic sustainability and consolidation. The political essence is to trigger national and international discourse on the issues surrounding CSOs and the consolidation of democracy. This is because a large number of democratic governments in Africa are relatively unconsolidated and CSOs are one of such measures explored to facilitate their consolidation.

Socially, the significance of the study touches on the societal and public interests of both countries given the crucial role of CSOs to the society. In this context, the study will serve as an eye-opener on the roles, functions, types, structures, strengths and weaknesses of civil society organizations not only in both states but in Africa and beyond. The key purpose is to demystify
CSOs and democratization as well as to discern patterns that are unique or different among CSOs in both states and to extract valuable lessons that can enhance social development.

Economically, the value of this research cannot be underscored because the importance of a consolidated democracy to stable economic development cannot be overstated. In this context, the study will bring to bear the nature and manner of how CSOs influences democratic consolidation which can usher socio-economic and political development in both countries. From the foregoing, the central concern of the study is to factor out democratic lessons which can be exchanged not only in both countries but also in Africa and the world at large.
CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

The aim of this study is to examine whether the existence and activities of CSOs have contributed to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. Also, it is geared toward ascertaining what account for the differences in the effectiveness of CSOs in the process of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. In this light, it is pertinent to review, principally and thematically, the divergent views of scholars, using the research questions as guide to locate the gap in the literature.

Does the existence of civil society organization contribute to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana?

The meaning, nature, existence and activities of CSOs and their contributions to democratic consolidation in both countries have been examined in various ways which has led to proliferation of different postulations, contestations and even bitter accusations among scholars, who attacked these concepts from diverse theoretical and ideological stand points. The diversities of views on CSOs led Young (1994) to assert that the concept is vague and is shrouded with a lot of ambiguities. He noted that:

Civil society (organizations) is indeed an elusive concept and a more fugitive reality. But the remarkable energies devoted to its definition and pursuit strike me as the most powerful force on the scene. The quest for a civil society (organizations) that can reinvent the state in its own admittedly idealized image is a drama of redemption whose potential nobility commands our admiration (Young 1994: 48).

This definitional crisis is in tandem with most social science concepts, and also accounts for the exciting and interesting nature of most of its concepts, including CSOs and democratic consolidation. According to Drah (1993) civil society organizations are the existence of a cluster of intermediary organizations/associations that operate between the primary units of society (like
individuals, nuclear and extended families, clans, ethnic groups, and village units) and the state. This view is in tandem with Ninsin (1998) who saw CSOs as organizations that are formed by certain social groups to pursue a set of goals and objectives that are determined by the general interests of its members. For Whitfield (2002) civil society organizations are specific kinds of non-state organizations in public life engaged in organizational activity according to particular criteria. He added that they are instrumentally positioned to make states more democratic, more transparent and more accountable. These organizations tend to be independent from the state, sufficiently financed and expertly led, in order to overcome opposition to democracy and participate in its consolidation.

Moreover, scholars like Hutchful (1995, 2002), Allen (1997), Markovitz (1998), Migdal (2000), and Kaviraj (2001), among others, have criticized and even doubted the existence and usefulness of civil society organizations in the political process of Africa. They argued that the idea and application of civil society organizations in Africa is necessarily problematic because it forms part of a universal language, emanating from the West that is inherently particular. The central thrust of their argument is that the very idea of CSOs is un-African; rather it is Eurocentric and capitalist oriented (Kaviraj 2001). Specifically, Allen (1997) questions the use of the term as a valid concept for studying Africa, because it is too ideologically laden and does not shed light on critical political processes. He went further to note that the significant theses associated with the concept of civil society (organizations) appear not to be derived from a body of empirical evidence and well-constructed theory but from a set of neo-liberal nostrums, incorporated into the argument as assumptions and then proudly presented as valid conclusions. As such, civil society forms part of the ‘liberal project’ (Allen, 1997: 336). Hutchful (1995) posited that:
The so-called civil society perspective is not merely a way of understanding state-society relationships; by implication, civil society ought to exist because it is a superior way of organizing state-society relationships, given that it is the only viable or conceivable foundation for democracy.... Apparently, like democracy, one has to have civil society to belong to the modern world order (Hutchful 1995: 75-6).

Markovistz (1998) coming from the Marxist flank, attacked the idea of CSOs, which he described as basically, institutions used to perpetually exploit and dominate Africans. For him:

A compulsive concentration on civil society, improperly understood, will distract from those elements of coercion in capitalism that invariably affect most Africans. ‘Exploitation’ and ‘domination’ are old words, out of fashion. They are, however, still relevant (Markovitz 1998: 47).

Civil society organizations which according to Gold (1990) are a whole range of social groups that seeks to operate independently of the state such as private business enterprises, labour unions, trade unions, professional associations, religious bodies, student organizations, among others, have also been criticized in Africa for being conflictual and a manifestation and representation of the dynamics of ethnicity plaguing the continent. Scholars like Ekeh (1994); Fatton (1995); Osaghae (2001) and a host of others have attacked CSOs for being ethnically oriented. According to Ekeh (1994) such orientation make the space occupied by CSOs not to be the consensual or cohesive arena that is assumed by some western versions, but an arena of vigorous and virulent contestations. The conflicting character of CSOs was succinctly captured by Fatton (1995) who warned that:

If civil society (organization) is to be a useful heuristic tool in deciphering contemporary African history, it has to be conceptualized as the realm of collective solidarities generated by processes of class formation, ethnic ‘inventions’ and religious ‘revelations’. As such it does not always embody the peaceful harmony of associational pluralism...In fact, civil society in Africa
is conflict-ridden...It is the prime repository of...ethnic hierarchies, conflicting class visions, patriarchal domination and irredentist identities fuelling deadly conflicts in many areas of the continent (Fatton, 1995:73).

In the same vein, Osaghae (2001) while adopting a mild approach by noting the roles most CSOs played in the restoration of democracy in Africa, attacked the concept by stating that at the very heart of CSOs lies the hydra headed monster of ethnicity which accounts for their ineffectiveness. On the other hand, scholars like Mamdani (1996), Diamond (1999), Mohan (2002), Whitfield (2002), and Ikubaje (2011), among others, have come to terms with the idea, existence and roles of civil society organizations in Africa (Nigeria and Ghana). They argue that civil society organizations are independent from the state, sufficiently financed and expertly led, in order to overcome opposition to democracy and participate in its consolidation. Their views are in tandem with Ibityoe (2012), who saw CSOs as formal organizations of people with common interest for the purpose of influencing government to the advantage of the general public. The idea of CSOs functioning for the good of the general public was corroborated by Ekeh (1994). He defined CSOs as free associations whose operations have the consequences, whether intended or unintended, of promoting individual liberty and whose existence is related to the functioning of the state and public domain.

Etymologically, the historical trajectory of the concept of the civil society under which civil society organization is subsumed can be traced to antiquity. According to Whitfield (2002) the genealogy of civil society is a very long one. Its origin is as old as man. He noted that:

A diverse body of literature tells a very similar story about the genesis and genealogy of the civil society concept, despite disagreements among authors over its interpretation and analytical value (see Cohen and Arato 1992; Keane 1988; Seligman 1992). This literature sketches the metamorphosis of civil society as idea that can start as far back as Cicero and Aristotle, travel through the
writings of Kant, Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, then on to Ferguson and Smith, Hegel and Marx, lingering longer on de Tocqueville and Gramsci, and ending with Habermas. Interestingly, the actual term ‘civil society’ does not even appear until the 18th century, but authors such as Seligman (1992) find its essence within the writings of the early political philosophers nonetheless (Whitifield, 2002:8).

However, in its latter development, the concept of civil society assumed different paradigmatic frameworks. The Hegelian, Tocquevillian, Marxian and Gramscian School of thoughts occupied the centre stage in the discourse of civil society. These diverse views about CSOs led to virulent contestations and sometimes bitter accusations on the meaning, role, relationship and purpose of civil society. This debate is centered on the empirical, conceptual and analytical usefulness of CSOs and is never ending.


To be exact, the role of CSOs in the consolidation of democracy cannot be over flogged because today civil society faces greater challenges and more onerous responsibility in helping to consolidate democracy and make it sustainable as well as irreversible than it did in the struggle to enthrone it. According to Konneth (2006), the stability of democratic regimes is enhanced by strong CSOs and trade unions, whose components struggled for democracy.
Democratic consolidation, in its original context is the avoidance of authoritarian regression; particularly, through the institutionalization of a credible electoral administration process. The sum total of democratic consolidation was captured by schedler (1998) with his presentation of a graphical representation of the normative and empirical horizons of democratic consolidation.

Figure 2.1: A Graphical Representation of the Normative and Empirical Horizons of Democratic Consolidation


From the graph, Schedler opined that originally, the term democratic consolidation was meant to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual reverse waves, however apart from making democracy sustainable, democratic consolidation progressed to include other countless functions such as completing, deepening and organizing democracy which can be seen from the graph. He went
further to note that democratic consolidation have come to include such divergent issues as popular legitimation, the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of anti-system actors, civilian supremacy over the military, among others. Indeed, while democratic consolidation may have been a nebulous concept since its very inception, the conceptual fog that veils the term has only become thicker and thicker the more it has spread through the academic and political world (Omezia, 2009). This scenario led Encarnacion (2000) to posit that democratic consolidation among other processes of democratization is the least studied and the least understood which makes current works on democratic consolidation an abstract, complex and without clearly identifiable benchmarks.

The idea of democratic consolidation for Gasiorowski & Power (1998) connotes an acceptable qualitative improvement in democratic practices and it is the process by which a new democracy matures, in a way that makes it unlikely to revert to authoritarianism without an external shock. Democracy is consolidated when power is alternates between rivals, support for the system is continued during times of economic hardship, rebels are defeated and punished, the regime remains stable in the face of restructuring of the party system, and there exists no significant political anti-system (O’Donnell, 1996).

However, despite the lack of consensus on a universal meaning of democratic consolidation, a key thread run across the gamut of definitions of the concepts as posited by scholars. For instance, Przeworski (1991) states that democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town; when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost. In similar vein, Linz & Stepan (1996) tie the loose screw of the concept by arguing that
democracies can be considered as consolidated when it becomes internalised behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally. Behaviourally, a democracy is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a democracy is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or isolated from pro-democratic forces. Constitutionally, a democracy is consolidated when governmental and non-governmental forces alike become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (Mottiar, 2002). The major thrust of the argument of these scholars is that democratic consolidation entails the betterment, sustainability and deepening of democracy in a state.

To be exact, Nigeria and Ghana do share a lot of similarities, which include but not restricted to the following, first of all both Nigeria and Ghana share similar colonial experience because they are both ex-British colonies which entail they got their independence from Britain roughly during the same period. Nigeria in 1st October, 1960 and Ghana in 6th March, 1957 (Omezia, 2009). These shared historical experiences of colonialism not only influence both countries but also shape their socio-economic as well as political development.

these dictatorial, brutal and despotic military regimes left a bitter tale in the history of both countries and like a bad spot have refused to fade making such odious experience to lurk behind the memory of the citizens of both countries especially those that witnessed the authoritarian nature of such regimes. Human right abuse was flagrant and widespread during military rule in both countries (Babatope, 2008; Boafo-Arthur, 2008).

Additionally, both Nigeria and Ghana operate multi-party system and have also held elections consecutively. Since 1992, Ghana has held six consecutive elections in December 1993 and 1996 which Lt Colonel Jerry Rawlings won, in December 2000 and 2004 which John A. Kufour won, in December, 2008, John A. Mills won the election and the December, 2012, which John Mahatma won while since 1999 Nigeria have also witnessed four consecutive elections in February 1999, April 2003 both won by Olusegun Obasanjo, also, the April 2007 election was won by Musa Yar Adua and the April 2011 election which Goodluck Jonathan won (Oladipupuo, 2011, Majeed, 2011).

Also, Nigeria and Ghana share same socio-cultural, political and religious similarities in terms of political dichotomy, ethnic and religious composition of it population. Also both countries are located in West Africa (see Appendix A-B). Ghana is politically divided into Northern and Southern region, with over 100 different recorded ethnic groups with Akan, Mole-Dagbon and Ewe constituting the three major ethnic groups. Ghana is also divided on religious affiliation with Christianity, Muslims and traditional religion being the three major religions while in Nigeria, there are over 300 recorded ethnic groups with the largest ethnic groups being the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. Politically, Nigeria is also divided into two broad regions which are the Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, also the Nigerian state is skewed along...

Finally, but more importantly, Nigeria and Ghana witnessed the resurfacing of a strong civil society who fought for the restoration of democracy in the two countries. The role played by civil society organizations in the restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria and Ghana is widely known and documented by scholars, government and international organizations. They according to Majeed (2011) played a crucial role in their various states transition from authoritarianism to electoral democracies. In short, from available literature: Mutfang, 2003; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Kew, 2005; Imade, 2007; and Ikubaje, 2011. It is strongly argued that civil society is largely instrumental in the return to democratic rule in Nigeria and Ghana.

Moreover, one of the conditions given by Linz & Stepan (1996) for the consolidation of democracy is the presence of strong civil society organizations which they defined as self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and to advance their interests in a society. And this because of the role they play in the democratic processes which according to Mano, Robinson & White (1999) include public policy and decision making, enhancing state performance, transparency and information; and social justice and the rule of law.

For Odeh (2012) CSOs aid democratic consolidation in Nigeria because they ensure credible elections, guard against democratic threats, influence public policy and respond to social interest. The situation is not different in Ghana because Majeed (2011) stated that the influence of CSOs on democratic consolidation in Ghana include but not restricted to election monitoring,
citizens education and participation, restraining state powers and promoting transparency and accountability; public policy influence and strengthening state institutions.

From the foregoing, CSOs aid democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana which according to Gunther, Diamandourous & Puhle (1995) is possible when there has been an adoption of democratic institutions, processes and values by the political class and the masses and they aid this processes because they monitor elections to ensure and enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the emerging government (Diamond, 1997). They do their functions by ensuring credible election which involves monitoring the electoral process and educating both the voters and candidates. Below is a diamond diagram depicting the impact, environment, structure and values of CSOs in Ghana.

**Figure 2.2: Civil Society Diamond for Ghana**

![Civil Society Diamond for Ghana](image)


Inferring from the above, the score for STRUCTURE IS 1.3, for ENVIRONMENT 1.5 while VALUES is 2.0 and IMPACT is 2.0. As indicated by the diamond, civil society has weak structures and operates within a somewhat disabling environment, but has a rather strong impact on policy and especially on the lives of Ghanaians. There impact on the electoral process is well
known for according to Gyimah-Boadi (2004) many CSOs in Ghana monitor elections to deter frauds and this enhances public confidence in the electoral process and improves its credibility and legitimacy. For Igbuzor (2011) CSOs in Nigeria do engage in voter’s education by teaching the electorate tools, methods and strategies to employ in order to prevent electoral manipulation. Below is a diamond formation on the structure, values, environment and impact of CSOs in Nigeria.

**Figure 2.3: Civil Society Diamond for Nigeria.**

![Civil Society Diamond for Nigeria](image)


The above figure reveals that CSOs is weak in its environment, moderately weak in structure, values and impact. The structure and environment dimension of civil society in Nigeria is less developed than the values and impact dimensions. Their impact was buttressed by Odeh (2012) who argued that during elections, CSOs do deployed thousands of observers to follow through and report on the electoral process.

Not only did ‘civil society’ (organizations) in its various Western theoretical guises enter African political studies through academics, but it also entered the common parlance of social organizations and African citizens.

However, on the other hand, are writers who believed that CSOs were in existence before the scrambling and partitioning of Africa, scholars such as Gyima-Boadi (1999, 2004, 2012), Ikelegbe (2001, 2005, 2013), Uadiale (2012), among others, posited that CSOs existed in pre-colonial African societies the likes of age grade organizations, titled men, among others. The above scholars argued, that they were examples of pre-colonial CSOs but somehow different from present day CSOs in structure, environment, values, however, both of them do impact on their various settings.

Moreover, CSOs enhance democratic consolidation in both states as a result of their influence in public policies making and implementation. This view was also asserted by Encarnation (2003) who stated that CSOs influence public policies and provide important data for policy reforms. According to Mbah (2014), civil society organizations in Nigeria promote democratic consolidation as regards public policy because they involve in the discovery, publication and dissemination of information as regards the implementation of government policies and programmes. He went further to note, that they sometimes mobilize the citizens to pressure government to change or implement existing policies. On the other, CSOs in Ghana also
play similar role because as observed by Afrimap (2007), CSOs in Ghana do influence government policy formulation process through their collective power which is based on their ability to mobilize and organize the masses.

Furthermore, CSOs strengthen state institutions in terms of their performance and service delivery. This view is also corroborated by Encarnation (2003) who posited that CSO consolidate democracy by strengthening democratic foundations and institutions. According to Robinson & White (1999) as cited in Mbah (2014) CSOs in Nigeria contribute to good governance through a public-private partnership in which CSOs work closely with state institutions in designing and providing health and educational services, by mobilizing funds from among client groups and donor agencies by providing services directly, and by monitoring quality and coverage. The reverse is not the case in Ghana because CSOs too perform similar function and this was buttressed by Duwani (2010), who observed that CSOs in Ghana contribute to democratic consolidation through building the capacity of state institutions to meet their obligation and they do this by designing training programs and seminars targeting key state institutions and providing them with technical capacity and information.

Finally, CSOs fight against democratic threats like human rights abuse, abuse of the rule of law, suppression of freedom of speech, among others and as a result consolidate democracy. According to Robinson & White as cited in Mbah the advocacy role of CSOs help in the implementation of existing laws concerning oppressive state apparatus like the police while the protective role of CSOs involves sheltering individuals threatened by repressive state, defending their rights through the provision of paralegal services. According to CSI-Ghana (2006) civil society organizations in Ghana promote, practice, respect and internalize democratic values and procedures. For CSI-Nigeria (2007) it is the advocacy and activities of CSOs that the legal and
constitutional environment has improved tremendously since the return to civilian rule in 1999. From the literature reviewed, (CSI-Nigeria, 2007; CSI-Ghana, 2006; Majeed, 2011; Odeh, 2012; Igbuzor, 2011; Gayima-Boadi, 2004; Mbah, 2014) it is a well known fact that CSOs have contributed in the consolidation of democracy in both countries and they tend to agree with the position of this study. However, this study will go extra mile in adding to existing knowledge on the types of CSOs and show how they have aided democratic consolidation in both states.

Does the nature and character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states account for the differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states?

The issue of the nature and impact of civil society organization towards democratic consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria and factors that account for their differences has been examined in various ways. Ikelegbe (2003) posited that CSOs in Nigeria though abundant in existence have not succeeded in deepening democracy in the country. He cited corruption in CSOs as one of the factors that have become a clog in the wheel towards democratization. This view run amok to the very idea of CSOs as described by Diamond (1997:6) that:

Civil society organizations occupy the realm of organized social life that is open, self generating, at least partially self-supporting and autonomous from the state. It involves citizens acting collectively in public sphere to express their interest, passion, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state and to hold state officials accountable.

In the same vein, Uadiale (2008) posited that though the CSOs are very vibrant in Nigeria, and strategically speaking, they are very weak and has done little or nothing to consolidate democracy in Nigeria because of lack of accountability. This is not in tandem with the very idea of CSOs as envision by Mutfang (2003) who posited that they are wide range of associations and
other organized collectives in a state, capable of articulating the interest of their members, molding and constraining powers of officials especially in a democratic state.

Odeh (2012) also shared the same view that Nigerian CSOs suffer from the general hydra headed monster called ‘corruption’, which is bedeviling not only Nigerian democracy but has permeated the entire fabrics of Nigerian society. He singled out corruption as a militating factor against CSOs in their quest to consolidate democracy in Nigeria. He also, asserted that there have been accusations on corruption, ranging from lack of transparency in the utilization of donor funds to outright embezzlement/conversion of foreign donations to CSOs for personal use. This tends to weaken the CSOs moral right to engage the state. It also hinders people of integrity and value from associating with them. The impact of their advocacy for a change is also limited, because it is stated that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. And democratic consolidation, according to Diamond (1997) represents a state where by institutional rules and constraints of democracy becomes the sole legitimate means for acquisition and exercise of political power. Odeh (2012) went further to note that the CSOs have not done much to curb the unprecedented corruption among the ruling class, because the CSOs themselves are corrupt and have also become means of enhancing corruption which is a great threat to the survival of democracy in Nigeria. This situation is not in tandem with Newton (2001) idea of CSOs, because he saw them as:

A dense network of voluntary associations and citizens organizations that help to sustain community relations in a way that generates trust and cooperation between citizens and a high level of civic engagement and participation. Therefore, they create the conditions for social integration, public awareness and action, and democratic stability (Newton, 2001:201).
On the other hand, despite the contrary views of Majeed (2011) who averred that accountable CSOs have enhanced democratic consolidation in Ghana. CSOs in Ghana are also plagued by the widespread systemic and endemic corruption. No wonder, Giles (2002) posited that the real beneficiaries of strengthening civil society have been the local elite because CSOs managers who use foreign aid and locally generated income as a means of achieving or consolidating their middle-class status. In the same vein, CSI-RA (2013) noted that CSOs are vulnerable to the counter-criticism of lack of accountability which they accused the Ghanaian government of. Whether they are accountable, it is only to their donor agencies and not to their respective communities. Giles (2002), went further to assert that CSOs in Ghana are used as vehicles for personal and party political gain by local officers through various mechanisms like petty corruption, largesse, interlocking political affiliations, and status have rendered them useless and turned them into fiefdoms for local élites to further their material and political status. The lack of accountability of CSOs defeat the views of Veneklasen (1994) who saw civil society organization as a group that occupy the sphere of social interaction between the household (family) and the state which is manifested in the norms values (trust, cooperation, reciprocity, tolerance and inclusion) of their respective communities with certain structures of voluntary association and networks of public communication. For him norms are critical to cooperation and community problem solving while structure of association refers to the full range of informal and formal organizations through which citizens pursue common interests. From the above, it can be deduced that corruption and lack of accountability are factors rocking CSOs in Nigeria and Ghana and have hindered their attempt to consolidate democracy in both countries.

Going further, Ikubaje (2011) noted that despite the existence of vibrant CSOs in Nigeria it has not succeeded in consolidating democracy because most of their activities are mostly
restricted to the federal government level. They lack national spread and most if not all of these organizations are concentrated in Lagos and a few other state capitals in the country. According to Ikubaje (2011) this anomaly makes it difficult for majority of the Nigerian population that lives in rural areas to appreciate the role they play, imbibe their doctrines and through the process, develop political consciousness and confidence to resist inducement from politicians. Nevertheless, CIVICUS (2009) argued that the ineffectiveness of CSOs in Nigeria to ensure the consolidation of democracy is as a result of disconnect between them and the rural populace in Nigeria, and that the exclusion of poor and indigenous people from leadership and membership of CSOs remains a challenge in the quest for democratic consolidation. Moreover, democratic consolidation for Schedler (2001) is a situation whereby democratization is nearing completion, effectively insulated from threats of erosion and collapse.

CSOs in Ghana are not exempted from the problem of communication gap, despite the views of Majeed (2011) who posited that comparatively speaking, (without comparatively checking) CSOs in Ghana are more involved in strengthening grassroots development and community development on diverse issues to enhance their participation in national development than CSOs in Nigeria. To Giles (2002), the rural areas and local communities in Ghana especially in the northern part of Ghana are used by the CSOs to attract foreign aids but without giving ear to their voices or even change their condition. Botchway (2001) affirmed this assertion thus:

Communities were hardly involved in programme design or critical decision-making process of rural based CSO’s especially in Northern part of Ghana. And that the fetishisation of participation among civil society organizations involved in rural areas development blinks them and diverts attention away from the structural causes of poverty. In their rush to promote inclusion and equality
they covertly endorse processes which deepen poverty at
the individual, regional and international scales (Botchway,
2001:13).

In Ghana, as argued further by Giles (2002), CSOs claim to represent the local communities, but
have rather patronizing attitudes towards them, because they are beyond reproach and in this way
civil society organizations actually impede democratization and good governance. From the
views above, one can deduced that lack of effective and efficient communication between CSOs
and rural areas constituted the clog in the wheel of democratic consolidation.

The existences of CSOs in Nigeria have not led to democratic consolidation because
according to Odeh (2012) the divisions among the Nigerian civil society along ethnic and
regional lines have not helped its democracy advocacy. This has led to disunity and disagreement
among the Nigerian CSO practitioners in term of decision making and unity of purpose. The
internal contradictions within the membership make it difficult to agree on common positions
during the period of engagement with the state. According to CSI (2009) CSOs have been
competing for financial resources because of limited government funding, and as a consequence,
conflicts between CSOs have arisen. This has resulted in a low level of collaboration among
Nigerian CSOs. Ikubaje (2011) corroborates that such inherent divisiveness weakens efficiency
and makes the associations vulnerable to penetration by government agents. Democracy,
according to its procedural and minimalist conceptualization as propounded by Joseph
Schumpeter in his Magnus opus titled *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* published in 1942,
is as an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. And at such, needs
to be jealously protected by CSOs. Similarly, according to CSI-RA (2013), argue that most
CSOs in Ghana compete with each other especially in the quest to get foreign aid or government
patronage. For them cooperation among CSOs is however fraught with challenges. The main barrier to harmonious cooperation is lack of funding as well as competition for funding bedeviling the operations of CSOs among these countries. Other impediments include but not restricted to cooperation between CSOs include groups that have different organizational structures, and a lack of effective means of communication. CSI-RA (2013) also posited that lack of a common voice from CSOs, and CSOs seeing each other as competitors rather than partners are major weakness of CSOs in their bid to ensure the entrenchment of democratic values and principles. According to Darkwa (2006) communication among CSOs is poor and this arose not from lack of willingness to communicate, but from a lack of effective means of communication, particularly between urban CSOs, pre-urban and rural CSOs. According to Addae-Boahene (2007):

> There is still much mistrust between the state and CSOs in Ghana. Many CSOs see state agencies as overly politicized, opaque, unable to help poor people, and unable to implement policies consistently. The state and its agencies similarly tend to be suspicious of CSOs, partly because, CSOs are a large diverse body of stakeholders contributing to development, but who do not speak with one voice (Addae-Boahene 2007: 26).

Sadly, the above scenario about the disunity of CSOs in Nigeria and Ghana captures the views of Ashman (2005) who posited that CSOs are autonomous organizations, each with its own mission, governance body and set of stakeholders to which it must respond and their autonomy can hinder cooperation both within networks and with actors outside them. The ineffectiveness of CSO’s to consolidate democracy according to these writers is as a result of disunity between and among them.
Ojo (2011) also noted that civil society organizations in Nigeria are also faced with lack of capacity in terms of knowledge, skills and methods of advocacy. It is expected that any organizations that wish to engage the state must be well equipped with superior knowledge and articulation of stronger points. Connor (1999) saw CSOs as composed of autonomous associations which develop a dense, diverse and pluralistic network. And as it develops, civil society organizations will consist of a range of local groups, specialized organizations and linkages between them to amplify the corrective voices of civil society organization as a partner in governance and the market. This one corrective voice is still absent in many of the civil society organizations in Nigeria. According to Ibeanu (2006) prodemocracy CSOs lack the necessary structure and formula to engage the state. This he pointed out constitutes a major challenge in their quest to consolidate the gains of democracy. Adopting similar position, CSI (2009) avers that despite the available skilled human resources in Nigeria, a capacity gap is still evident, particularly in relation to advocacy and engagement of CSOs, and also in information technology and the different forms of internal communication.

CSOs in Ghana on the other hand, also suffer from lack of skilled personnel in its quest to advocate the consolidation of democracy. Although Majeed (2011) posited otherwise stating that CSO’s in Nigeria that lack skilled and dedicated manpower unlike their counterparts in Ghana, however, Friedman & Robinson (2005) in a study on CSOs in Ghana, concluded by stating that CSOs in Ghana have generally proved ineffective in their efforts to influence government polices and legislations because of poor advocacy skills. In the same, Darkwa (2006) in a related study found out that the overall impact of Ghanaian civil society is limited as a result of lack of skilled personnel. This is corroborated by CSI-RA (2013) who posited that inadequate knowledge of
government policies, inadequate qualified personnel, high attrition and poor orientation for new staff are hindrances on the part of CSOs to consolidate democracy in Ghana.

Furthermore, the inability of CSOs to consolidate democracy in Nigeria despite their recognized existence is because according to CSI (2007) the relationship between CSOs and the state is largely characterized by suspicion and tension. Essia and Afzal (2009) said the relationship between the state and civil society organization is constantly in a state of flux and is yet to establish in many developing countries; the pattern of relationship that may be cooperative, conflictual, integrative or even nonexistent. They also argued further that governments in developing countries are yet to come to terms with the role CSOs should play. This view was buttressed by Odeh (2012) who noted that state officials have viewed CSOs as competitors of power, influence, and legitimacy in the public sphere rather than as partners enhancing development in society.

While one of the areas singled out by Majeed (2011) in his analysis of CSOs in Nigeria and Ghana is that state supports for CSOs in Ghana is strong. He strongly posited that whereas Government-CSOs relation in Ghana seems to be characterized by cordiality, cooperation and reciprocity, there seems to be suspicion and antagonism characterizing CSO-state relations in Nigeria (Majeed, 2011:31). Although a different view exist among scholars like Alidu & Ame (2012) who posited that in Ghana the state has often seen CSO’s as competitor rather than collaborators. Mohan (2002) affirmed this assertion and argued that:

The Ghanaian state has established its own 'non-governmental' organizations, confined registration to 'non-political' organizations, ……the civil society organizations do not channel opinion into government or scrutinize its operations, but treat it with profound mistrust and often duplicate its efforts. No synergy, in a formal sense, exists here between state and civil society organization……the
central state in Ghana has used civil society organizations to drive local politics and actively promoted decentralization as a means of consolidating rural support (Mohan, 2002:20-21).

In this context, Enarnacion (2000) warned that the state should be vigilant of civil society groups because the proliferation of CSOs may in fact be inimical to democratic deepening. In some instances CSOs have become alternatives to strong political institutions, for examples political parties in atomizing society, dispersing political power, thereby complicating democratic consolidation. The push and pull factors between of the state and CSOs led Chabel & Daloz (1999) to argue that to talk of the existence of civil society in Africa is a misnomer because the state in Africa is poorly institutionalized, and weakly autonomous from society. In both states there exist vertical integration, poorly organized and civil society is integrated in vertical, infra-institutional and patrimonial networks which undermines the performance of CSO in these countries.

Lastly, ethnicity is also one of the reasons militating against CSOs in their quest to consolidated democracy. For Osaghae (2006) the ethnicisation of civil society marks the “uniqueness” of Africa’s civil society. Ekeh (1992) as paraphrased by Ayiede (2014):

Went on to advance a classification of the vast number of associations in Nigeria are based on the basis of the context from which they operate; the ends they seek to advance and the sources and means they apply in their operations. Emphasizing the primacy of the primordial public sphere, he argues that most associations operating in this domain are unable to foster democratic reform because they are not oriented towards common notions of liberty. Based on kinship, they are unable to transcend ethnic boundaries and crystallize generalized conceptions of the human person and individual liberty. The associations in the civil public domain, such as labour unions, professional associations and human rights groups who may have contributed to
In this connection, Kasfir (1998) noted that some of the organizations that have been very crucial to the democratization process in Nigeria do not seem to possess the “civic/civil” character that supposedly differentiates civil society organizations from other organizations in society. Accordingly, the importance of civil society organizations to the democratization project has been exaggerated because most of them have tribal inclination (Kasfir, 1998).

Despite the attempt by Majeed (2011) to exempt CSOs in Ghana from ethnic influence, other scholars, like Gyimah-Boadi & Asante (2006) noted that CSOs have long identified themselves along with political parties, who hid under ideological canopies but are distinguishable by their ethnic affiliations. This view was also corroborated by Langer (2007) that the ethnic character of the NDC and NPP is reflected in the ethno-regional pattern of voting and its attendant problem of political patronage. Furthermore, that ethnicity is a strong factor in contemporary democracy in Ghana because during their tenures of office, both the NDC and NPP have been accused of discriminating against Akans and Ewes respectively. Hibou (1999) cited by Mohan (2010) noted that in Ghana:

The promotion of CSO’s leads to an erosion of official administrative and institutional capacity, a reinforcement of the power of elites, particularly at the local level, or of certain factions, and sometimes stronger ethnic character in the destination of flows of finance from abroad. In many cases, these CSOs are established by politicians, at the national and local level, with a view to capturing external resources which henceforth pass through these channels on a massive scale (Hibou, 1999: 99)

The above shows clearly, that ethnicity is a strong factor in preventing the CSOs in both countries from achieving democratic consolidation. Making critics like Hutchful (1995) to doubt
their effectiveness in consolidating democracy. He bluntly asked that the use of the concept of
civil society is thus an attempt to capture the fact that something significant has happened in
African politics. What is it that has happened in Africa? Are the presence of civil society
organizations and democracy accurate depictions of what has transpired? These questions remain
fundamental in the discourse of CSOs in Africa (Hutchful, 1995: 58).

Much as the above literatures tried to give a bird’s eye view to the factors which
influence CSOs that are responsible for the observable differences in democratic consolidation
between Nigeria and Ghana, none has tended to pay adequate systematic attention to the nature
and character of both states as the underlying factor influencing CSOs, in the process of
democratic consolidation which account for the difference in the process of democratic
consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.

**Gap in the Literature**

This review above shows the positions of pertinent extant literature that address the
existences and activities of CSOs as regards democratic consolidation and factors which
influence CSOs that is responsible for the observable differences in democratic consolidation
between Nigeria and Ghana. It looked at the various views (comparatively and in single cases) of
scholars such as Young, (1994), Duwani, (2010), Igbuzor, (2011), Majeed, (2011), Mbah,
(2014), among others, concerning the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both
countries, and observed that CSOs have contributed to the consolidation of democracy in both
states as a result of their presence and activities. However, their respective assertions and
discourses constitute a starting point for this study, although, the study will also contribute to the
body of knowledge on the roles of CSO in consolidating democracy citing data driven and
empirical evidence.
Moreover, the study also examined literatures on the challenges faced by CSOs which may account for the varied result in their bid to strengthen democracy in both countries. Scholars such as Ekeh, (1992), Chabel & Daloz, (1999), Giles, (2002), Ikelegbe, (2003), Gyimah-Boadi & Asante, (2006), Darkwa, (2006), Osaghae, (2006), Addae-Boahene, (2007), Uadiale (2008), CSI-RA (2006, 2013), Alidu & Ame, (2012), Ayiede, (2014), among others, have studied and identified ethnicity, cultural and regional sentiments, accountability, poor organization and management, corruption, lack of internal democracy, state patronage, unhealthy competition of CSOs for space and fund as factors that influences CSO’s in the process of consolidating democracy, and that they may account for the observable differences in democratic consolidation in both countries. Although, scholars such as Ekeh (1992), Chabel and Daloz (1999), Mamdani (1996), among others, have examined the influence of the nature and character of state on CSOs, specifically, how the nature and character of the post-colonial states in Africa relate with civil society organizations. However, the difference in the nature and character of both states as a factor that influences CSOs which account for the differences in democratic consolidation in both states have not been treated adequately and therefore, this forms the gap in the literature which the study is set to investigate.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODODOLOGY

The study like any academic research is guided by a methodology which according to Manion (1980) is the specific technique and objective procedure employed in carrying out scientific investigation. According to Kaplan (1964) cited in Ogban-Iyam (1998) methodology is regarded as techniques and the scientific procedures used in a given science or in particular context of inquiry in that science. It deals with the problem, prospects, assets and liabilities of the techniques. However, the methodology for this study contains: the theoretical framework, hypotheses, research design, method of data collection, method of data analysis, and logical data framework.

3.1. Theoretical Framework

There is hardly any valid research that has no theoretical construct. Meanwhile, the essence of theorizing is to explain in order to reach generalization, predict and control. It is on this note that the study adopted the neo-Marxist theory of the post-colonial state which is an offshoot of the classical Marxist political economy approach. The major tenets of the theory of post-colonial state are generated from the works of Ekeh (1972) Alavi, (1973); Ake, (1985); Ekekwe, (1986); who among others are the Marxist epigenists that have contributed to the explanation and understanding of the character of states in the periphery.

The central focus of the theory is on understanding the nature, structure, history, composition and character of the (Nigerian and Ghanaian) state in order to ascertain the dynamics of political development and processes within the state and this dynamics include CSOs and democratic consolidation with their various manifestations. They argued that it is the state that occupies the centre stage of politics and therefore is the major determinant of the most societal processes including civil society and democratic consolidation. The theory suggests that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism. As such, it has followed the developmental strategies which include civil society organizations and democratic consolidation, dictated by the interest of imperialist and its local allies, not by those of the majority of the indigenous
population. The post-colonial states has created for itself a deep crisis from which it can hardly extricate itself without fundamentally changing its present nature and this affirms the reason why Engels (1919) cited in Omoyibo (2014:23) saw the state as nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. Little wonder, Ake noted that:

The state is a specific modality of class domination, one in which domination is mediated by commodity exchange so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is differentiated and disassociated from the ruling class and even the society appears as an objective force standing alongside society (Ake, 1985:5).

Similarly, Alavi (1973:146) had opined that “post-colonial states and its apparatus are instruments of primitive accumulation by the dominant class and their collaborators”. According to Ekekwe (1986), the post colonial states rest on the foundation of the colonial state, this, in turn, had incorporated some important elements of the pre-colonial rudimentary state structures. The main goal of the colonial state was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie in alliance with the ruling elite would take place through the exploitation of local human and other natural resources. It was on this basis that the post-colonial state emerged.

Given this context, the stakes and struggles for state power are very high and often assume 'a zero-sum game approach. The limited autonomy of the post-colonial state in Africa leads to an exclusive politics articulated in the struggle for power based on efficiency norms rather than legitimacy norms; the triumph of the vicious over the virtuous circle; centralization of power; imposition of domination and political control; alienation of leaders from their masses; and the deployment of extremism in the exercise of power are all hallmarks of the postcolonial state which in effect, the ‘people tendentially retreat into primary groups which become the beneficiary of their residual loyalty and explore other ‘extra-juridical’ and ‘non-state means,’ which often have very high conflict potential. In the process, society becomes deeply divided and
alienation is endemic, while distrust and anxiety among the contending groups are so pronounced that the state stumbles and totters on the brink of disaster, almost headed for disintegration in a cycle of political violence, recrimination and war (Ake 1982). The intensities or the frequencies of the above forces in African states affect the operationalization of CSOs and the consolidation of democracy in such states.

Under these circumstances, state-building is subverted and becomes the political equivalent of primitive accumulation ‘in a rather violent form’. It entails conquest and subjugation, since it is projected as arbitrary power. It revokes the autonomy of communities and subjects them to ‘alien rule’ within an otherwise independent political system (i) by laying claim to the resources of subordinated territories and (ii) through its exertion of ‘legitimate force’ in counteracting resource wars and pro-democratic resistance. State-building in Africa thus assumes a rather violent character as groups or social classes jostle for power and resources (Ake, 1997).

He further argues that an understanding of the history, nature and character of the state is very important for capturing the dynamics of socio-economic formations, their configuration and transformation (including CSOs and democratic consolidation). Perhaps this led Ogbunwezeh (2005) to aver that:

The African continent is littered with failed states. Most of these states are economic backwaters, social apologies and political ruins… the states, naturally implode upon the inglorious weight of their inherent contradictions. Colonialism designed and inspired the problems… these set of political actors were rogues personalities, weaned on selfishness… They did an inglorious job of mismanaging Africa, so much so that she is today the laughing stock of the world (Ogbunwezeh, 2005:2).

And that the basic character of the state in Africa is that it has very limited autonomy. This means that the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and so, is
immersed in the class struggle that goes on in the society which does have an overbearing influence on the roles of CSOs in the process of democratic consolidation. According to Ake (2000:115-16):

For the most part, at independence, the colonial state was inherited by the indigenous elite rather than being liquidated or transformed. As was the case with the colonial state, the distinguishing characteristic of the post-colonial state in Africa is its lack of autonomy; power was highly fused and used by those in control of the state simply as the instrument for serving their own interests.

In similar vein, Uaidiale (2010) as cited by Oladipupo (2011) noted that states in Africa cannot escape from the post colonial quagmire because they are:

Plagued by a host of intra-state instabilities, lawlessness, criminality, civil wars, ethnic clashes, recurrent coups d’etat, armed insurgencies, factional fighting, military disloyalty, and ideational conflicts; the African continent exemplifies manifold form of non-state violence and declared absence of the state (Oladipupo, 2011:7).

Ekekwe, (1986:12) notes that “the distinction between states in advanced capitalist societies and those in post-colonial formations is that whereas the state in the former functions to maintain the economic and social relations under which bourgeois accumulation takes place (democracy) in the later, factors which have to do with the level of development of productive forces make the state direct instrument of capital accumulation for the dominant class or its elements.

Moreover, despite its analytical power, the neo-Marxian theory of the post-colonial state has been attacked for been ambiguous and vague. Scholars such as Ashcroft, (1989), Slemon, (1995), Young, (1996, 2001), Moore, (2001), among others have attacked this theory from different flanks. In fact, according to Slemon (1995) the neo-Marxian theory of post-colonial state not only lacks clarity and consensus but also keeps changing through “new forms of social
collectivity as they emerge in time and space in the postcolonial world. However, according to Rukundwa & Aarde (2007) its fluidity and ambivalence, is what is genuinely enabling about the theory. The theory is also accused of suffering from colonial reductionism and at such cannot stand empirical scrutiny because it lacks adequate and valid explanation as to why countries like USA, Australia, Singapore, among others, all former colonies are exempted from the postcolonial quagmire (Okolie, 2010).

However, leaving aside this theoretical confusion, it can be convincingly demonstrated that the neo-Marxian theory of post colonial state raised succinctly some major questions as regards the question of democracy and development in Africa (Ake, 1996). And these issues according to Gutkind & Wallerstein (1976:21):

Must be approached historically, for it is the past, rather than some evolutionary dynamics that have shaped the present and it is these past events and experiences which so many contemporary analysts have elected to ignore. By implication, this theory sees the historical analysis as way of explaining and simplifying social realities- the realities of the introduction and spread of colonialism and capitalism, or more precisely, colonial imperialism, all the major and complex processes as revealed in the specific political, economic and social matrix of colonial and post-colonial African.

From the above submissions, it can be stated that the neo-Marxian theory of post colonial state is relevant in interrogating CSOs and democratic consolidation as both variables are implants of neo colonialism. To be exact, in recent time, this theoretical framework has been used by scholars like Arowosegbe, (2001) Oladipupo, (2011) Ugwu & Chukwuma, (2013), among others to investigate political phenomenon like democracy, ethnicity, poverty, underdevelopment, good governance conflict, among others. Therefore, this theory is not only in vogue but also relevant in the examination of germane issues like CSOs and democratic consolidation.
Application of the Theory

The relationship between civil society organization and democratic consolidation is better explained in the light of neo-Marxian theory of post-colonial state. This framework unravels the hidden relations that influences CSOs differently in the process of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. The importance of this approach in interrogating CSOs and democratic consolidation in both countries lies in the following

First, this theory enables us to go beyond analyses whose account are limited to the features, origin, types and potentials of CSOs and their role in the process of democratic consolidation. The theory mirrors vividly the actual state of democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana because it is the nature and character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states that ultimately control and influence CSO’s also account for the difference in democratic consolidation. This view was corroborated by Aiyede (2005) who noted that in this context civil society organization can hardly solidify as it becomes vulnerable to the overarching character of the state as the dominant employer, bearer of opportunities for upward social mobility, and manipulator. Although both states are post-colonial states, however, there exist a difference in the nature and character of both states.

Unfortunately, the nature and character of the Nigerian state typifies this ugly picture yet finds it difficult to cross the hurdle. Alluding to this, Onyeoziri (2005) reiterated how the character of the Nigerian state, especially its authoritarian and unitarian tendencies discourage the practice of good governance. For instance, according to Oladipupo (2011) statement credited to former President Olusegun Obasanjo, that the 2007 General Elections were going to be a do-or-die affair for the ruling party, is unimaginable and detrimental to transparent leadership succession. Little wonder, Onyeoziri opined that when the institutions of the state are too weak
to enforce fairness, justice and the rule of law, thus allowing crude power politics to reign, then, there is no end in sight yet as far as electoral misfortune is concerned. This weakness disallows the state from thriving, democratically. The major headache is located in crude electoral processes which is a reflection of the character of the Nigerian state. Unlike Ghana, the Nigerian situation is aptly captured by Isa & Arowosegbe (2002) as cited in Ugwu & Chukwuma (2013:235) when they note that:

Since independence era, the Nigerian state has been undergoing several forms of crisis and conflict situations-both political and socio-economic. Others equally abound which are ethno-religious dimensions. At different points under postcolonial arrangement and under various regimes (and / or administrations), these situations have severally tempted the total paralysis of Nigeria federal structure and the weakening of its democratic spirits. In particular, contemporary Nigeria is replete with division of her people along various ethnic and religious constituencies

The above scenario is different in Ghana; though sharing similar historical and socio-cultural experiences of colonialism, ethnicity and religious division with Nigeria yet is free from ethno-religious and even threatening political crisis (Buchberger, 2011). According to Buchberger, Ghana is way ahead of its West African neighbors in terms of democratic consolidation. He noted that:

Since the introduction of the 1992 constitution, Ghana has made constant progress towards the consolidation of its democracy. After the re-introduction of multi-party democracy, the ratings for Ghana’s political system constantly rose and have remained high on an almost perfect level for the last decade (Freedom House 2011). Also political scientists see Ghana on a good path towards democratic consolidation, although some challenges remain (Abdulai, Crawford 2010). Especially in contrast to the last elections in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, Ghana stands out with its set of five consecutive peaceful and successful parliamentary and presidential elections. While the first two still had some flaws, their quality constantly improved over time and still continues to be improved. Although the last elections came
very close and highly contested, they still remained peaceful and led to broadly accepted results (Buchberger, 2011:2)

The reason for this two contrasting scenario between both countries in terms of democratic consolidation is tied to the differences in the Nature and character of both states. The Nigeria states suffers from predatory, parasitic and non-productive ruling class who see politics as a zero sum game and at such strongly possess a winner takes all mentality (Oladipupo, 2011) The concept of Godfatherism, weak opposition, rigging of election, cross-carpeting and defection are well pronounced and documented in Nigeria more than in Ghana and these are attributed to the high premium placed on capturing state power in Nigeria (Omeiza, 2009).

Secondly, according to Bebbington & Bebbington (2000) the emphasis on society diverts attention from the webs of relationships that link civil society organizations and the state and that may offer the prospect of changing forms of state action, therefore, this theory will refocus, realign and engineer a paradigm shift from the CSO’s in both countries to the nature and character of the state in the quest to consolidate democracy because the state to a large extent determines what to be consolidated or not. As corollary, Encarnacion (2000) posited that in the name of democracy the concept of CSO’s is lifted and applied without contemplating its compatibility with the socio-economic of context of most of these transiting countries to which the term is applied. Therefore, this theory examines the missing link between civil society organization and the state in both countries and brings to fore what accounts for the differences in democratic consolidation between the two countries.

Lastly, this theory studies the state-civil society organization dialectical relationship, in which strategies of the state and changes in those strategies shape civil society, especially as regards democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana and vice versa. As a result, who
comprises civil society and the types of alliances formed among social groups change over time. The term ‘dialectical’ emphasizes that one shapes the other in a simultaneous and continuous process of constant action and reaction, even within the unequal power relations between the post-colonial state and society in Africa. The most important implication of this dialectical relationship is that the process of state and civil society formation and transformation which cannot be grasped by isolating, observing and analyzing one component or the other, but requires the study of both. Such an analysis is needed for as Ake (1992) noted that the democratization struggles (of CSO’s) is an expression of the will to survive rather than a conscious effort to open up the political space for liberal democracy. This is because neoliberal reforms hit at the very livelihood of citizens even as the state becomes more rampageous in its oppressive character.

3.2. Hypotheses

Based on the forgoing, the working hypotheses that will guide this research are

1. The existence civil society organization contributed to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.
2. The character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounted for the differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states.

3.3. Research Design

The research design is a plan and structure that guide the investigator in the process of data collection, analysis and interpretation. It is a logical model or proof that permits the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relationship among variables being investigated (Asika, 1991:27). This study is based on a single-case ex-post facto design which is also known as ‘after-the-fact’ design. And is based on the examination of independent and dependent variables after the events have occurred and the data are already in existence.
The \textit{ex-post facto} design according to Kerlinger (1977) is a form of descriptive research in which an independent variable has already occurred and in which an investigator starts with the observation of a dependent variable, and then studies the independent variable in retrospect for its possible relationship to and effects on the dependent variable. In addition Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2011) noted that \textit{ex-post facto} means ‘after-the-fact’ or ‘retrospective studies’ which are investigations geared towards knowing the cause-and-effect relationships by observing an existing condition and searching back in time for the plausible causal factors. In other words, the \textit{ex-post facto}, or ‘after the fact’ design attempts to identify a natural impetus for specific outcomes without actually manipulating the independent variable and is represented as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccc}
R & B_1 & B_2 & B_3 & X & A_1 & A_2 & A_3 \\
\end{array}
\]

Where:

\[
\begin{align*}
R &= \text{Random assignment of subjects} \\
B &= \text{Before observation} \\
A &= \text{After observation} \\
X &= \text{Independent variable} \\
Y &= \text{Dependent variable}
\end{align*}
\]
The analytical routine involved in testing the independent variable (X) and the dependent variable (Y) is based on concomitant variation. This is to demonstrate that (X) is the factor that determines (Y). This implies that whenever (X) occurs, there is the likelihood that (Y) will follow later. The criteria for entering causality have been summarized by Seltiz et al (1997:32) as follows:

(a) Co-variation between the presumed cause and presumed effect.

(b) Proper time order with cause preceding effect.

(c) Elimination of plausible alternative explanation for the observed relationship.

The design is found appropriate for this study because it is a method of testing possible antecedent of the events that have occurred, therefore, it cannot be engineered or manipulated by the investigator (Cooper & Schindler, 2006). In this method of research design, the researcher can only report what has occurred or what is occurring by trying to hold factors constant by giving careful attention to the independent and dependent variables. The analytical routines involves testing structural causality on ex-post facto analysis of the independent variable (X) and the dependent variable (Y) which is based on concomitant variations. This is to demonstrate that (X) is the factor that determines or causes (Y). In other words, when (X) occurs then there is the tendency of (Y) to occur.

This design, therefore, will guide the research process and the testing of hypothesis which involve observing the independent variable (civil society organization) and the dependent variable (democratic consolidation) at the same time as they manifest in Nigeria and Ghana within 2003-2013, because the effect of the former on the later have already occurred before investigation. However, in testing the two hypotheses which are ‘the existence and activities of CSOs contributed to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and
Ghana’ and ‘the nature and character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounts for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states’, the study sees ‘existence and activities of CSOs’ and ‘the nature and character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states’ as (X) variables while ‘contributed to democratic consolidation’ and the ‘differences in the roles of CSOs and democratic consolidation’ as (Y) variables.

The empirical referents of (X) variable are: existence of pro-democratic CSOs that monitors election and educate voters, presence of labour CSOs that protects the right of its members and the society against anti-peoples policies, the existence of economic CSOs that influence the budgeting process, presence of human rights CSOs that engage in right advocacy and protection, predatory/parasitic and patriotic/nationalistic ruling class, high/low emphasis on prebendel, patrimonial and cliental politics high/low premium placed on ethnicity and religion as means to capture political power whereas that of (Y) variables are: increased in the levels of political education and participation, influencing public policies, contribution to budgetary process and protection and promotion of fundamental human rights, electoral violence/peaceful election, high/low level of transparency and accountability and existence or non-existence of ethno-religious-political conflicts.

3.4. Method of Data Collection

Method of data collection, according to Legge and Francis (1974:188) is the ‘the science and art of acquiring information about the selected properties of units’. The method of data collection according to Ifesinachi (2010:12) ‘deals with how to generate the necessary evidence or proof to test the assumptions and answer the questions posed in the statement of problem’. The complexity of CSOs and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana makes it necessary to state some specific procedures of data collection to generate relevant date/information for
analysis (Egwu, 2004). It is in this context, that the method of data collection for this study is qualitative method which according to McNabb (2005:341), is:

A set of non-statistical inquiry techniques and processes used to gather data about a social phenomenon. Thus, qualitative data refers to some collection of words, symbols, pictures, or other non-numerical records, material or artifacts that are collected by a researcher and is data that has relevance to the social group under study.

Similarly, Obasi (1999) argues that it is a method of data collection that does not involve measurement or statistics. It is largely used to gather in dept understanding of human behavior and the reasons for human behavior. However, this method of data collection is not only suitable but effective for this study because it will go beyond simple examination and description of events and phenomena to create better understanding of such phenomena that can aid interpretation and enhance critical analysis. This method is usually applied to obtain in-depth information about concepts and variables and it also enables us to access into inner recesses of group life, organizational structure and character, bureaucratic processes as well as motivations for the individual behavior (Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006).

Therefore, based on this method used in this study, the data gathered are from documentary sources such as official documents from different institutions and organizations. Besides institutional official documents, the study was based on secondary sources of data such as books, journals, conference papers, among others. And this was done to unravel the hidden relations between the state, civil society organization and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.
3.5. Method of Data Analysis

The method of data analysis to be used for this study is qualitative/descriptive analysis. The qualitative method of data analysis is concerned with identifying and understanding the attributes, characteristics and traits of the object of inquiry. This method of data analysis according to Asika (1991) has to do with the verbal summary of the information generated in research, so that appropriate analytical method can be used to further discover relationships among variables and is very relevant to our study given the very nature of the phenomenon under investigation. In this case, it studies cause and effect relationships by observing an existing condition and searching back in time for plausible causal factors (Obasi, 1999).

This method is mainly associated with textual and contextual analysis of already existing information on the phenomenon being investigated it involves the presentation, reading, prognosis, analysis, critique and discussion of relevant information gathered from the different categories of sources, from which conclusion can be drawn (Fraser, 2004). Therefore, the use of this method of analysis is informed by the simplicity with which it can summarizes expose and interprets relationship implicit in a given data by giving a qualitative description of the variables under study. This method is used in this study to examine, criticize, prognosis, analyze and make inferences concerning civil society organization and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.
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| Does the existence of CSOs contribute to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana? | The existence of CSOs contributed to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. | The existence of CSOs | **X** |  - The existence of pro-democratic centred CSOs like TMG and CD in Nigeria and CDD and IDEG in Ghana who engaged in the activities of monitoring election, voters and candidate’s education, etc.  
  - The presence and activities of labour centred CSOs like the NLC, NUT, NBA in Nigeria and the GLC, TUC, GUT in Ghana who promote and protect the interest of its members and the society and sometimes organize mass protest against anti-people’s policies.  
  - The existence and actions of economic based CSOs like centre for research study in Nigeria and institute for economic affairs in Ghana who influence public policy formulation and implementation.  
  - The presence of human right based institutions like PWD, PLWHA in Nigeria and PWD, PLWHA in Ghana who engaged in right advocacy and protection. | Secondary source of data collection. E.g. textbooks, journals, Newspaper, seminar and conference paper and other publications | Qualitative method of data collection | Qualitative/descriptive method. Ex-post-facto research design. Neo-Marxian theory of post-colonial states. |
| Contributed to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Ghana by a coalition of CSOs (CDD) among others.

- Involve in good governance through holding the government accountable by influencing the reversal of some anti-people policies like the removal of fuel subsidy in Nigeria in 2012, the reversal of the privatization of water policy in Ghana 2004.
- Impact in the formulation and implementation of public policies in the likes of freedom of information act in 2013 in Nigeria and the ISODEC input in the budgetary process in Ghana.
- Reduction and exposure of human right abuse, protection and promotion of fundamental human rights in both states. Like the enactment and adoption of the Child Right Law in 2007 by Nigeria and enactment and implementation of People With Disabilities Act in 2006 in Ghana.
<table>
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<th>Research Questions</th>
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| Does the character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounts for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states? | The character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounted for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states | X | • Predatory/Parasitic Ruling Class and Patriotic and Nationalistic Ruling Class. The likes of President Olusegun Obasanjo who wanted to amend the Nigeria Constitution in 2006 for a third term but failed, however, influenced the outcome of the 2007 elections to favour his party and preferred candidates. High level of rigging in 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections (Freedom House, 2013). And the likes of John Kufour who did not attempt to extend his tenure nor influenced the outcome of the 2008 elections to favour his party and preferred candidates. Little or no rigging in 2004, 2008 and 2012 elections in Ghana (Amankwaah, 2012).  
• High/low level of Prebendel, Patrimonial and Cliental politics. Over 40 prominent Nigerian politicians have been tried by EFCC since 2002 with just four convictions (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Pockets of corruption exist however, the resignation, prosecution and convictions of top politicians like George Sipa-Yankey and Seidu Amadu shows Ghana is improving its fight against corruption (Gayima-Boadi, 2013).  
• High/low premium place on ethno-religious factors in politics. In Nigeria the likes of Arewa Consultative Forum, Egbe Afenifere, Ohaneze Ndigbo etc making inflammatory statements which have resulted into ethno-religious conflicts(Human Rights watch, 2013). While low premium is placed on ethnicity in Ghanaian politics though parties have their strongholds in the domain of different ethnic groups (NPP and Akan group, NDC and non-Akan groups) yet Ghana has not witnessed widespread ethno-religious conflict (Commonwealth election. | Secondary source of data collection. E.g. textbooks, journals, Newspaper, seminar and conference paper and other publications | Qualitative method of data collection | Qualitative/descriptive method. Ex-post-facto research design. Neo-Marxian theory of post-colonial states. |
accounted for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states

- Frequent occurrences of pre/post electoral violence in Nigeria. Especially that of 2011 where over 800 persons were killed, 65,000 were displaced and over 300 houses were burnt. (Human Right watch, 2011). Low level of pre/post electoral violence in Ghana. Elections in Ghana has steadily improved with the opposition party winning the presidential election in 2008 (Freedom House, 2013) Nigeria also topped Ghana in an Afrobarometer(2008) survey of countries with perceived illicit electoral tactics and violence.

- Good governance issues that account for the difference in corruption, accountability and transparency ratings in both states. According to International Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria from 2003-2012 has topped Ghana with high score on countries perceived to be corrupt. Again, Ghana is ranked as the easiest place to do business in West Africa from 2003-2012 (World Bank, 2013).

- High rate of ethno-religious and political violence in Nigeria. The Boko Haram crisis which is one of the many ethno-religious/political that started in 2009 has claimed over 1,600 lives in Nigeria. (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Since 2003-2012, no widespread ethno-religious violence has occurred in Ghana but there are pocket of ethnic strife like the Fantes and Ewes clash in 2012 but was put to a stop by the government. and manipulation of ethnic cleavages by politicians to get votes. (Mahama, 2013).
CHAPTER FOUR
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA AND GHANA

In order to verify our first hypothesis which is that ‘The existence of CSOs Contributed to Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana’, a number of empirical indicators were identified and examined and these indicators were derived from the hypothesis.


To be exact, the existence and activities of civil society organizations in Nigeria and Ghana and their contributions towards the democratic process especially the pro-democratic based CSOs cannot be disputed. According to Diamond (1994) civil society organizations have a greater responsibility of protecting and sustaining democracy than initiating it. In similar vein, Uadiale (2011) noted that:

Civil society organizations in all democracies have been known to play very important role in the electoral process. This is because elections are considered very important aspects of the democratic process, the outcomes of which should be seen as strengthening democracy. To guarantee this, the transparency of the electoral process should be ensured by electoral governance institutions allowing non-partisan oversight and civil society involvement. And more importantly, the civil society with a traditional role of restricting the state can by its oversight activities prevent the incumbent government from manipulating the elections through the divesting of the electoral umpire’s power to work independently. By so doing, civil society organizations can help to ensure the acceptability and credibility of outcomes of elections which depends greatly on the measure of independence of purpose, neutrality and impartiality (Uadiale, 2015:156)

On this note, civil society organizations since the third wave of democratization have sustained and fought against democratic threats in both states. In Nigeria, the presence and activities of CSOs like TMG, CD, CLEEN, NADECO, NACOREV, ERN, CDD, ACE, among others before,
during and after elections have helped to protect and strengthen democracy in Nigeria. According to Majeed (2011) over 1000 election observers were deployed during the 2004 general election in Nigeria. This was also corroborated by Igbuzor (2011), who observed that CSOs trained some Nigerian citizens and communities on the protection of mandate in preparation for the 2007 general election, and this according to him, involved series of tools and strategies that citizens could use to engage political parties, and security agents to prevent electoral disenfranchisement. Another recorded achievement of CSOs towards the consolidation of democracy was the fury that followed the 2003 election which led to the publication of Nigerian Civil Society Input to the Electoral Bill in 2004 which was a proposal by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). This proposal was incorporated into the 1999 Nigerian constitution (Mbah, 2014).

Again, CSOs in Nigeria over the years, particularly from 2003-2013 have fought against democratic threat such as pressurizing the National House of Assembly not to allow former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to tinker with the Nigerian constitution in 2005/2006 to extend his tenure (Odeh, 2012). The activities of CSOs during the third term saga of President Olusegun Obasanjo is worthy of mention because they influenced Senators and House of representative members to kick against the third time desire of ex-President Obasanjo. Not only that, Igbuzor (2011) observed that CSOs like ‘Save Nigeria Group’ and ‘Enough is a Enough Group’ actually sized the initiatives and demanded for the recognition of Vice President Goodluck Jonathan as President after the death of President Musa Yar’ Adua. This led to the adoption of the famous “Doctrine of Necessity” by the National Assembly in March 2010 (Agbo & Lanshie, 2010).
On the other hand, the presence and activities of CSOs such as CDD, IDEG, NED, CODEO, among others have also strengthened and protected democracy in Ghana. According to Majeed (2011), CODEO which is a network of about 28 CSOs trained and deployed 7800 volunteers to polling stations and collation centers in the 230 constituencies across 10 regions of Ghana in the 2004 general elections. These groups of people monitored the electoral process by checking media coverage’s for opposition and incumbent. They also observed the conduct of party primaries and how their campaigns are conducted as well as scrutinize voters registers and report cases of electoral violence.

Again, CSOs in Ghana also protected the state from democratic threats because Majeed also noted that:

CSOs such as CDD, SEND Ghana, IEA, CICOL and a multitude of others continue to monitor government actions by instituting platforms, issuing press statements, memos and communiqués addressing specific concern for example the CDD launched a quarterly bulletin called *Democracy Watch* where it gives an overview of the state of Ghana’s democracy and undemocratic tendencies of the state observed during the quarter (CDD website). Similarly, the IEA also launched a *Legislative Alert* series which monitors and reports on legislative and policy issues undertaken by the government (IEA website) (Majeed, 2011:27).

The above roles of CSOs in both states have contributed in no small measure to the consolidation of democracy and this is in tandem with the views of Diamond (1994) that CSOs check abuses and violations, institute public scrutiny and foster the development of democratic culture and political participation in a democracy. This view was corroborated by Chasen (1999) who posited that CSOs control state abuses by holding rulers accountable to citizens thereby maintaining and consolidating democracy.

However, the nature and character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states have somewhat hindered the effectiveness of CSOs in checkmating democratic threat in but state. Odeh (2012)
observed that, despite the activities of CSOS before, during and after, the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections, it was still marred with electoral violence and mal-practice. Ghana also is still battling with the post colonial state syndrome where state power is central for according to Frempong (2007), during the 2004 general elections in Ghana, there were episodes of violence in Tamale, the Northern Regional capital. The arrest and subsequent death in military custody of Alhaji Mobila, the Regional Chairman of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) was perhaps the darkest spot in the 2004 election, also there were incidents of attacks on electoral officers and the burning of ballot materials as well. Again, The contestation of the result of 2012 presidential election in court by the opposition candidates despite the claim of domestic and international observers of its being free and fair is still an indication that Ghana has not escaped the high premium placed on the acquisition of state power which an attribute of the post-colonial state (Freedom House, 2014). Ikelegbe (2013) instructed that:

What should be noted is that it is the nature of the state, its operations, weaknesses and failings that necessarily conduces and may continue to generate oppositional relations (to CSOs). Thus it may seem that even if the relations is broadly positive and functional, certain circumstances rooted in the character and operations of the state may provoke and warrant challenges, contestations and counteractions (Ikelegbe, 2013:15).

However, in the final analysis, Pro-democratic CSOs in Nigeria and Ghana through monitoring of the electoral process and fighting against democratic threats have impacted positively in consolidating democracy in both states but are forever battling with the dynamics and manifestations of the nature and character of post-colonial states.
4.2. The Presence and Activities of CSOs and Their Contribution to Good Governance.

The presence of labour based civil society organizations in Nigeria and Ghana cannot be disputed, the likes of NBA, NUT, NLC, NUJ, among others are examples of labour based CSOs in Nigeria. While the like of TUC, GNAT, GJA, GBA, among others are also examples of labour based CSOs in Ghana. These sets of CSOs partake mostly in protecting and enforcing the rights of their members and engaged the state in issues concerning the wider society. These can be seen in the mission statement of the NLC which read thus:

Nigeria Labour Congress is to organise, unionise and mobilize all categories of Nigerian workers; defend and advance the political, economic, social and cultural rights of Nigerian workers; emancipate and unite Nigerian workers and people from all forms of exploitation and discrimination; achieve gender justice in the work place and in NLC; strengthen and deepen the ties and connections between Nigerian workers and the mutual/natural allies in and outside Nigeria and; lead the struggle for the transformation of Nigeria into a just, humane and democratic society (NLC, 2007:8).

This above mission statement of the NLC, according to Ahule (2013) is typical of trade unions not just in Nigeria alone but all over the world. The major concern of labour based CSOs therefore are to protect the right of their members in particular and that of the society at large. However as indicated above, trade unions have the capacity to impact on the nature, structure and implementation of government programmes (Oyelere, 2007). They are not only capable of articulating the interests of their members; they also mould and constrain state power. Some of their demands provide input for the democratic political process which at times is aggregated by political parties. Their approval or disapproval of what goes on in government contributes to accountability. A country that is well endowed in this aspect is well positioned to democratize and ensure good governance (Nchuchuwe & Ajulor, 2008).
Good governance ensures that political, social and economic choices and decisions are made on the basis of broad consensus in the society through elected representatives (Akindele, 2003). Good governance should among other things, be participatory, transparent, equitable and accountable. It should enhance high-level institutional effectiveness and economic growth. The rule of law must prevail and be complemented by a politically stable environment for the formulation and implementation of government policies (Ibitoye, 2012). One of the interesting findings of a survey conducted by CSI (2007) when they sought to know the perception of CSOs stakeholders on the ability of CSO to hold the Nigerian state accountable was that:

CSOs are more successful in holding the state accountable at the national than at the local level. This indicator asks the following questions: Does civil society demand state transparency? Does it seek to increase the availability of information about government performance? Does it denounce violations of citizens’ rights? Does it monitor public expenditure and the implementation of government policy objectives? Does it denounced state corruption? Does it demand rectification of government misdeeds? Finally, has it developed clear benchmarks for monitoring government performance? According to the RSCs, 54% of the stakeholders admitted that CSOs are somewhat active in holding the state accountable, while 15% felt that CSOs have been inactive. Furthermore, 63% of the respondents rate the performance of CSOs in this regard as somewhat successful (CSI Nigeria, 2007:68)

True to the above, the Nigerian Labour Congress is in the forefront of actively influencing public policy that is perceived to be anti-people. The reversal in 2007 of the pump price of fuel and kerosene from 80 naira to 70 naira and 70 naira to 55 naira respectively is one of the recorded achievements of the NLC (Mbah, 2014). However, the most notable of NLC influence on public policy is its role in the fuel subsidy protest of 2012. As observed by Kunle (2012) when the federal government unilaterally removed subsidy on petrol or Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), with its attendant increase in fuel prices and hardship on the citizens in January 2012, CSOs, led by the
NLC, mobilized Nigerians from all walks of life for what they described as the “mother of all protests”. According to Odeh (2012) the government reversed the policy to N97.00 per litre, in favour of the citizens.

The situation is no different in Ghana because an interesting finding in a similar survey conducted by CSI (2006) in Ghana, when they sought to know the perception of CSOs stakeholders on the ability of CSO to hold the Ghanaian state accountable was that:

The respondents were generally of the opinion that civil society played an important role in this regard. Half of the respondents thought that civil society was active to a limited extent; a quarter of the respondents thought that civil society was quite active in holding the state accountable to its citizenry; and 5% thought that civil society was very active in holding the state accountable to the population. Only 20% thought that the state was not active at all. In spite of the generally high levels of activity in this regard, respondents were generally of the opinion that the impact of all of these activities was quite limited. Twenty-two percent did not think that civil society made any impact at all on the state; 63% thought that they made limited impact, 14% thought they made moderate impact while only 1% thought that civil society made a significant impact on the state (CSI Ghana, 2006:77).

To buttress the above findings, it should be recalled that according to the Voice of America News (2014), the Trade Union Congress of Ghana mobilized thousands of workers into the streets of major regional capitals protesting against the depreciation of the Ghanaian Cedi which is the official currency of Ghana and the rising cost in the price of goods (retrieved from www.VOA News.com on 24/07/14). The secretary while speaking with Joy News (2014) was reported to have said that “we are extremely satisfied; we really give thanks to God that the expectations of this protest were duly met (retrieved from www.Joynews.com on 24/07/14). Although, the most notable influence of labour based CSO’s was the reversal of the privatization water policy in Ghana in 2004. According to CSI-Ghana (2006), in 2002, the NPP government revisited the
privatization of water plan. This became a cause of disagreement between civil society and the state. Public mobilisation against the policy provoked intolerant pronouncements by a government that proclaimed itself the guardian of Ghanaian traditions of liberal democracy. However, after relentless advocacy, lobbying and public sensitization efforts by CSOs, the anti-privatisation drive paid off. In February 2004, the Government of Ghana and the World Bank held a meeting to suspend the water privatization process in favour of a management contract where two foreign firms will manage the state owned Water Company for a period of five years. This case study highlights the ability of local CSOs to liaise with other like-minded organisations, both nationally and internationally, to push for changes in anti-people policies.

Despite the above recorded achievements of CSOs, the nature and character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states which are post-colonial states have stifled the attempts of CSOs to hold the state accountable though with different magnitude. There is a constant contestation between CSOs and the state. In short, the Nigerian and Ghanaian states have pauperized CSOs with its powers. The can be seen in the Harassment of “BringBackOurGirls” campaigners in Abuja by the Nigerian Government and the hostile reaction of the Ghanaian government meted to TUC protesters in Accra (Leadership Newspaper, 03/092014, Joy News, 24/07/2014, both retrieved on 21/09/2014). The state constrains and weakens CSOs, perhaps, this led Ikelegbe (2005) to warn that “while the relations between CSOs and the State could be complementary, supportive ad collaborative in specific instances, civil society must possess the potential of contending with and opposing the state when the need arises” (Ikelegbe 2005: 244).

In all, the above examples show vividly that the presence and activities of labour based CSOs have influenced democratic consolidation by holding the state accountable which is a key component of good governance. These scenarios show how they can contribute to good
governance which is central to the consolidation of democracy in a state. Their ability to mobilize and galvanize their members and the wider society to action despite the overbearing influence of the state with all the forces and apparatus at its disposal is a constant reminder to the government of both states to be accountable and transparent.

4.3 The Existence and Actions of CSO’ and Their Impact in the Formulation and Implementation of Public Policies in Nigeria and Ghana.

The contribution of CSOs in the formulation and implementation of public policies is a well known fact among scholars and institutions. Scholars such as Diamond (1994), Enacarnation (2003), Majeed (2011), Ikubaje (2011), among others and institutions like World Bank (1997), World Movement For Democracy (2014) and Freedom House (2014), have recognized the role of CSOs in the making and execution of public policies. for instance, according to the World Bank (1997) civil society organization is a means of channeling opinion into policy making in a coordinated fashion and simultaneously increasing people’s confidence in involving themselves in public affairs as well as building their institutional capacity to do so.

In Nigeria, civil society organizations such as CRD, CDRA, CEDAR, among others have been involved in policy formulation and implementation of public policies. Their actions led Ikelegbe (2013) to posit that:

CSOs engage governments in the design of programmes, programme strategies, implementation methods and outcome. CSOs have also protested against proposed or existing policies by highlighting and educating citizens on potential policy externalities……. CSOs may also pressure governments to release and implement the findings of commissions and inquiries. Public policies that depredate or undermine citizen interests and welfare, or that favour privileged groups at the expense of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, whose costs are too high or those not seen to be in the national interests, have come under the criticisms of CSOs (Ikelegbe, 2013:28).
Their contribution to public policy in Nigeria was also supported by a survey conducted by CSI-Nigeria (2014), on CSOs stakeholders’ perception of the impact of CSOs on Public policy in Nigeria.

Figure 4.1: Nigerian CSOs Stakeholders Perception on the Impact of CSOs on Public Policy

![Bar chart showing CSO stakeholders' perception on the impact of CSOs on public policy in Nigeria.](chart.png)


The above chart shows the perception among stakeholders of CSOs on the impact level of CSOs in Nigeria. 30% of CSO’s stakeholders posited that CSO’s have limited on public policy, 49% of the who is who in CSO averred that CSOs do have limited impact on public policy, 12% agreed that CSOs made no impact on state policy while 9% of them concurred that CSOs do have high impact on the public policy. This can be confirmed by the contribution of the above mentioned CSO’s in the budgetary process in Nigeria which according to CSI (2007) involved the Budget Law and the Fiscal Responsibility Initiative to help monitor the budgetary process. The passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 2012 which was sponsored on a private member bill can be attributed to the hard work of CSOs involved in public policy formulation and implementation.
(Ojo, 2011). The 2014 National Conference which was basically to discuss pressing national issues concerning the sanctity of Nigeria is also a fall out of the agitations of CSO’s for a Sovereign National Conference.

In similar vein, CSOs in Ghana such as ISODEC, CICOL, IEA, among others have influenced the policy formulation and implementation process. CSOs contribution to the policy making was corroborated by a survey conducted by CSI- Ghana (2014) on the CSO stakeholder’s perception on the impact of CSOs in public policy in Ghana.

**Figure 4.2: Ghanaian CSO Stakeholders Perception on the Impact of CSOs on Public Policy**

![Bar Chart](chart.png)


From the chart above, it can be deduced that CSOs 3.8% of CSO stakeholders posited that it has very high impact on public policy process, 28.8% confirmed that it is high, while 38.5 agreed on the average CSOs do impact on public policy and 28.8% averred that CSOs have low impact on public policy. Therefore, it is safe to say that all things being equal the perception of CSOs in Ghana is that to some reasonable extent they do influence public policy.
Moreover, in a separate study, CSI-Ghana (2006) posited that CSOs influence the budget process through lobbying their elected representatives in Parliament and educating and shedding more light on issues at stake. Majeed (2011) citing relevant examples, buttressed the above facts which include how ISODEC instituted a routine public forum for CSOs to debate and track the national budget and government expenditure. Also, ISODEC has a Center for Budget advocacy with the goal of watching over the budgeting process (retrieved on 22/09/2140 from www.ISODEC.org). Not only that, CSI-Ghana (2006) noted that the Ghanaian government invited IMANI Centre for Policy and Education to take part in discussing and formulating a policy on salaries, also, the Ghana National Union of Polytechnic Students was also involved in the fashioning of the current Polytechnic Act 245, which helped to redefine and solidify the mandate of polytechnics.

However, despite the plausible contributions of CSOs in public policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria and Ghana, it is yet eureka and this is as a result of the hostile environment in which they operate. From the two charts presentable above on Nigeria and Ghana, there are perception that the influence of CSOs in public policy is nonexistent or at best limited. This view tallied with the assertion of CSI-Ghana (2006) that:

The general picture is that neither government nor the donor community has defined and adopted a specific standard of civil society participation in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes which may be considered as adequate or satisfactory. This leaves government free to undertake any kind of consultation or involvement to suit the time available to it and secure its own political convenience. Worse still, civil society in Ghana has not yet been very involved in using its networks to independently monitor the impact on the poor of Government policies and expenditure (CSI-Ghana, 2006:76)
In Nigeria, the situation is not different but even gloomier, because the Nigeria state has several times emasculated and engaged in a rapacious relationship with CSOs and this is because as Ikelegbe (2013) noted:

There are suspicions about the ulterior motives, leanings, interests and grievances of founders and trustees of CSOs. CSOs are seen to be arrogant and lay claim to superior knowledge, ideas, policy and methods of conducting public affairs and governance. There are also suspicions about the ulterior motives, leanings, interests and grievances of founders and trustees of CSOs. CSOs are seen to be arrogant and lay claim to superior knowledge, ideas, policy and methods of conducting public affairs and governance (Ikelegbe, 2013:43).

The above scenario in both states typifies the nature and character of post colonial state where by much emphases is placed on the compulsive urge to acquire, consolidate and demonstrate state power over people and development. Given the authoritarian, absolutist, intensely hegemonic and comprehensively intrusive and totalizing character of the post colonial state (Young 1992:39), it seeks total domination and control of the socio-economic and political space (Harbeson 1992:287), and public realm and is unwilling to share the space with any competing social force as CSOs. Thus, the state even if democratic still potentially constitutes a threat to civil society’s autonomy, vibrancy and roles and therefore sees it as nuisance to be accommodated, than as a partner (Ikelegbe, 2013). The bureaucratic bottle neck involved in accessing the recently signed freedom of information act in Nigerian and the banning of SEND-Ghana in Volta Region because of challenging the government on the use of HIPC funds meant for buildings which have not been constructed (Freedom House, 2014, CIVICUS, 2006) among others are vivid examples of how the post-colonial nature and character of both states stifle CSOs in their attempts to influence public policy in both states. To sum it up, CSOs have recorded mild achievement in influencing public policy giving the context in which they operate.
4.4 The Presence of Human Right Based Institutions and Fundamental Human Rights

To be sure, the existence of CSOs that engages in right protection and advocacy is a well known fact among writers with biased in CSOs. Scholars such as Mano, Robinson & White (1999), Gyimah-Boadi (2012), Kwame (2008), Ikelegbe (2005, 2013), among others have posited separately and strongly on the protective and advocacy roles of CSOs. Ikelegbe (2013) in particular, noted that CSOs have made much progress in the aspects of advocacy, assistance and support in the areas of social welfare, poverty alleviation, human capital development, diseases control, and humanitarian assistance. In similar vein, STAR-Ghana which is a coalition of over 20 CSOs Ghana, posited that CSOs engage in:

Majority of the projects that involved advocacy focused programming (the organization of events or training workshops to sensitize political stakeholders or the general public on a particular concern – such as the environment, education, or conflict prevention, creating processes to support the registration and voting of some marginalized groups (STAR-Ghana, 2013:21).

Organizations such as PLWHA, PWDs, CLEEN, CLO, CRC, SERAC among others are examples of rights advocacy and protection CSOs in Nigeria while PWDs, PLWHA, CODAC, STAR-Ghana, CHRAJ, among others are also examples of rights based advocacy and protection CSOs in Ghana that have strategically influenced the government of both states to reexamine issues bothering on the rights of the citizenry especially the less privileged and minorities.

In Nigeria, these set of CSOs have drawn government attention to human rights issues because according to Odeh (2011), CSOs through its advocacy campaign against Human Trafficking led to the establishment of National Agency for the Prohibition in Trafficking of Persons. Odeh citing CSI Reports of 2007 posited that CSOs in Nigeria have succeeded in partnering with 11 states in Nigeria in the enactment and passage of the Child Right Law. Again
the activities of CSOs like People living With HIV/AIDS have helped in the reduction in the stigmatization of people that are living with HIV/AIDS (CSOs, 2007).

In the same vein, the presence and activities of these sets of CSOs have also led to noticeable achievement in rights protection and advocacy. For instance, it led to the passage of the People with Disability Acts by the Ghanaian parliaments (STAR-Ghana, 2013). Also the Human Rights Watch Report of Ghana (2012) noted that the national chapter of the International Federation of Women Lawyers, the Legal Aid Board, and several other human rights CSOs worked closely with the Ghanaian police to combat domestic violence and such help, aided the police to received 375 reports of rape and reported 177 arrests and 93 prosecutions, resulting in 13 convictions; 130 cases remained uninvestigated at year’s end.

However, irrespective of the achievement of the CSOs in rights advocacy and protection, human right situation still leaves much than desired in both states. The belligerent nature and character of the post-colonial states is pressing down the neck of CSOs and snuffing life out of it and this is in tandem with Arowosegbe (2011) postulations while paraphrasing Ake (1985) that:

The rudimentary development of the state form in Africa’ underlines the Hobbesian character of political struggles – usually based on relations of raw power among contending groups and social classes – in which right is co-extensive with power and security depends solely on the control of state power. This, he says, inhibits equality, formal freedom and competitive politics. It also undermines the legitimation of power – a problem underlying the crises of authority and nation-building on the continent – given the personalised use of the state’s coercive resources (Arowosegbe, 2011:23).

Inferring from the above statement, it is safe to say that injustice, domination and inequality in all ramification is central to the post-colonial states. And their various manifestations in Nigeria and Ghana have impinged the advocacy and protective role of CSOs in both states. Take for
instance, measures adopted by CSOs in Ghana to address disability issues have lagged. Implementation of the Persons with Disabilities Act (Act 715) passed by the previous administration in 2006 has scarcely moved beyond the Mills administration’s inauguration of the National Disability Council. The act prohibits employment and education-based discrimination against the disabled, and mandates improved access to buildings and transportation services. However, disabled Ghanaians continue to suffer exclusion from education and unemployment, and access has not improved significantly (Freedom House, 2012). In Nigeria too, out of 36 states, only 11 as at 2011 has domesticated the Child Rights Law (Odeh, 2011). Below is a table detailing the types of CSOs in Nigeria and Ghana and their areas of interests or influences.

**Table 4.1: Some Selected CSOs in Nigeria and Ghana.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Types of CSOs</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Areas of interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faith Based CSOs</td>
<td>Christian Fellowship of Nigeria (CAN), Jama’atu Naril Islam (JNI).</td>
<td>Catholic Council of Ghana (CCG), Ahmadiya Muslim Mission of Ghana (AMMG).</td>
<td>FBOs engaged in charitable work and many of them are making a significant contribution in the health and education fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Profession Based CSOs</td>
<td>Nigeria Bar Association (NBA), Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT), Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC).</td>
<td>Ghana Bar Association (GBA), Trade Union Congress (TUC) Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT).</td>
<td>These are mainly voluntary associations of members of a particular trade or profession, with the aim of furthering a profession and the interests of its members, and sometimes of acting as an oversight body for that profession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-democracy Based CSOs</td>
<td>Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), Campaign for Democracy (CD),</td>
<td>Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG).</td>
<td>These are organizations that involve majorly in monitoring of electoral processes, educating voters and candidates and training of electoral observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocacy and Protective Based CSO’s</td>
<td>Civil Liberty Organizations (CLO), People Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).</td>
<td>Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), SEND-Ghana.</td>
<td>These are groups that are involved in checkmating human right abuse, exposing possible offenders, rehabilitee victims and educating the citizens about their rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Based CSOs</td>
<td>Arewa Consultative Forum, Ohaneze Ndibgo, Egbe Afenifere.</td>
<td>Fantes Progressive Union, Akan Federation Assembly, Ewe Progressive Youth Forum.</td>
<td>These set of organization are keenly interested in Protecting the interest of their members and also mobilizing them to protect either group or personal interest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows some selected CSOs in Nigeria and Ghana and their possible areas of interest of influence. Inferring from the table, also from our preceding argument and findings on the existence of CSOs and the roles they perform under the over bearing nature and character of both states as a prototype of the post-colonial state, it is safe to say that to some reasonable extent that have while performing their roles in Nigerian and Ghana, enhanced and strengthened the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana and therefore we accept and validate our first hypothesis that “Roles of CSOs Contributed to Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.”
In order to verify our second hypothesis which is that ‘The character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounted for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states’, a number of empirical indicators were identified and examined. And the indicators were selected from the X and Y variables of the hypothesis.

5.1. Predatory/Parasitic Ruling Class and Patriotic and Nationalistic Ruling Class and Electoral Process

To be exact, peaceful, competitive and periodic elections is one of the tenets of democratic consolidation and evidence abound of the roles of CSOs in the electoral process which involves voters and candidates education, electoral monitoring, among others (Igbuzor, 2011; Majeed, 2011) CSOs like CLEEN, TMG, CD in Nigeria and CDD, CODEO, CICOL in Ghana are few examples of civil society organizations that are part of the electoral process. Although the criterion of peaceful, periodic and competitive elections as a yardstick for democratic consolidation has being attacked from many flanks by scholars like Diamond, (1996) Bratton & Van der Walle, (1997), Rose & Shin, (2001), among others. For Diamond (1996:3) ‘in many of the world’s new democracies (Nigeria and Ghana), competitive elections have not ensured liberty, responsiveness and the rule of law’ while Rose & Shin (2001:23) opines that ‘institutionalizing electoral competition is not sufficient for the consolidation of democracy’. Despite the correctness of their assertions, dismissing peaceful, competitive and periodic elections as a characteristics of democratic consolidation with the wave of hand, amount to
throwing away the baby with the bath water because election though not the only criterion is very central to the concept of democratic consolidation. Little wonder Huntington (1993) argues that:

Democracy becomes consolidated when an electoral regime is fully entrenched and capable of delivering free and competitive elections. He argues that there is consolidation if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election (Huntington, 1993:267).

According to Orji & Uzodi (2012) elections involve a set of activities leading to the selection of one or more persons out of many to serve in positions of authority in a society. They outlined the importance of elections to democratic consolidation by arguing that:

Political scientists and development theorists link free, fair and credible elections to democratic governance, peace and development. In brief, they argue that free, fair and credible elections provide the basis for the emergence of democratic, accountable and legitimate governments with the capacity to initiate and implement clearly articulated development programmes. Again, they claim that free, fair and credible elections empower the electorate to hold the government accountable and to demand strong credentials and feasible development agenda from prospective government officials. In other words, free, fair and credible elections bestow on governments the legitimate authority to, on one hand, initiate and implement policies; while on the other hand, they empower the citizens to hold governments accountable for their actions and/or inactions. Credible elections are, therefore, *sine qua non* for democratic governance, political stability and national development (Orji & Uzodi, 2012:6).

However, the ruling class in Nigeria has made the role of CSOs in aiding democratic consolidation as regards the electoral process not only difficult but almost impossible unlike their counterparts in Ghana. We posit that high premium placed on the acquisition of power by the
unproductive, parasitic and predatory Nigerian ruling class, therefore, account for the differences in democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana as regards electoral violence.

Moreover, Since 2003-2013, Nigeria have witnessed three consecutive elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011 and all were marred by pre/post electoral violence with the ruling party (PDP) still in power. This view was supported by Human Rights Watch Reports (2012) which asserted that elections in Nigeria are characterized by constant and violent struggle that is marked by wanton killings and destructions. The 2003 general election that got President Olusegun Obasanjo reelected was marred by fraud and violence which prompted the runner-up, retired General Muhammadu Buhari, the presidential candidate of the now defunct All Nigeria People’s Party to challenge Obasanjo victory in court. After President Obasanjo failed attempt at amending the constitution to get a third term in 2006, he influenced the outcome of 2007 elections through electoral fraud and violence (Freedom House, 2008). This is because, according to Oladipupo (2011), the then Former President as both the leader of the Peoples Democratic Party and the Nigerian state posited that the 2007 General Elections were going to be a “Do or Die Affair” and true to his statement, the elections was marked with violence leading to numerous contestations in the court. The 2003 and 2007 elections were particularly marked by dissatisfaction of candidates, voters and observers (Ibrahim and Ibeanu 2009).

Dissatisfaction with the 2003 and 2007 general elections reflected in the barrage of litigations brought before the election tribunals and courts as well as the number of election results that were nullified. Over 1250 petitions were brought before the electoral tribunal (INEC, 2007, Ugochukwu, 2009, Fabiyi, 2011). The 2011 general elections was no different but even bloodier because according to the Human Rights Watch Reports (2011), not less than 800 persons were killed, more than 65,000 others misplaced and over 350 churches either burnt or
destroyed in the violence that proceeded the announcement of the 2011 general elections in Nigeria.

Ghana on the other hand, from 2003-2012, has conducted three elections that have consistently improved on their fraud and violent free record. According to Amankwaah (2012) violence in Ghana’s electoral process has improved with each election. The adherence to the constitution by President Kufour not to cling to power after the expiration of his tenure in 2003 and the alternation of power between NPP and NDC, the two main political parties in Ghana speak volume about the nationalist and patriotic nature and character of politicians in Ghana (Freedom House, 2013). This view about Ghana and Nigeria is in tandem with the findings of a survey carried out by Afrobarometer in 2008 involving four (4) countries on illicit strategies employed to win elections.

Figure 5.1: A Perception about Electoral Malpractice in Selected African States.
From the above chart, Nigeria scored more than Ghana on countries where dubious techniques are employed to win elections. Nigeria surpassed Ghana on all variables used in the study with a relatively high score and this confirms the assertion that electoral manipulation and violence are widespread in Nigeria than in Ghana which is a result of the high premium Nigeria ruling class placed on capturing state powers through elections.

To be exact, Ghana too has witnessed pockets of electoral violence because according to Frempong (2008), in 2004 election in Ghana, there were episodes of violence in Tamale, the Northern Regional capital. The arrest and subsequent death in military custody of Alhaji Mobila, the Regional Chairman of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) was perhaps the darkest spot in the 2004 elections. There were also incidents of attacks on electoral officers and the burning of ballot materials as well. However, other than that, the election was peaceful, the 2008 general election received world commendations and praise because it was not marred by much violence and witnessed the transition of power to the opposition party. Likewise the 2012 general elections that was far peaceful than any previously conducted elections in Ghana (Amankwaah, 2013). The above assertion is not that the elections in Ghana did not witness electoral violence but that it was not widespread because there were bits and pieces of electoral violence unlike Nigerian elections that witnessed widespread electoral violence.

However, the electoral successes recorded in Ghana have been attributed to the presence of CSOs, according to Frempong (2008) the most innovative contributions to Ghana’s electoral politics have come from civil society organizations (CSOs) in terms of voter education, election observation/monitoring and other strategies for peaceful elections. Yet these are similar roles which CSOs in Nigeria do play (Odeh, 2012). The difference in electoral success as regards peaceful, competitive and periodic elections in both countries is not the absence or
ineffectiveness of CSOs in Nigeria; rather, it is traced to the high premium Nigerian ruling class placed on acquiring power, which they do by employing all the tactics against the rules of the game in winning elections (Oladipupo, 2011).

In the final analysis, the Hobbesian nature and character of the Nigerian politics as amplified by the prevailing ruling class and their leadership style which is predatory and parasitic is observed as being a condition making the glaring difference between Nigeria and Ghana as regards democratic consolidation and not the absence/presence or effectiveness/ineffectiveness of CSOs. In other words, the leadership problem has always been a stumbling block in the way of Nigeria’s attempts at overcoming the perennial problems bedeviling her electoral processes. The major headache is located in crude electoral processes which is a reflection of the nature and character of the Nigerian state.

5.2. High/low level of Prebendel, Patrimonial and Cliental Politics and Good Governance in Nigeria and Ghana

In fact, one of the roles of CSOs in the consolidation of democracy is that they promote good governance in a state and the concept of good governance involves the following characteristics; accountability, fighting corruption and improving transparency in government, influencing public policy and decision making process, information gathering and dissemination, enhancing state performance, among others (Mbah, 2014). The contribution of CSOs to good governance which is a key component of democratic consolidations in both states is that they influence and engage state institutions to perform better and mobilize the masses to protect their rights and fight against anti-peoples policies (Kukah, 1999).

However, one of the observable differences in democratic consolidation between Nigerian and Ghana is the difference in corruption, accountability and transparency ratings
which scholars like Majeed (2011) traced to the effectiveness of CSOs in Ghana. This presupposes that CSOs in Nigeria are not into good governance advocacy which is not in tandem with the views of Ojo (2011) and Igbuzor (2011) who both agreed that CSOs in Nigeria have fought for good governance by guarding against democratic threats like the tenure elongation plan of President Obasanjo in 2006 and mounting of pressure on the National House of Assembly which led to the adoption of the doctrine of necessity in 2010. Although, Organizations like Freedom House and Transparency international have constantly over the years, rated Ghana above Nigeria in terms of the afore mentioned indices. This is because according to Human Rights Watch Report (2011) over 40 prominent Nigerian politician have been tried by the Economic Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) since its inception in 2002 have only won four convictions with little or no jail time because most of them were gotten through plea-bargaining. No wonder, Transparency international from 2003-2013 rated Ghana better than Nigeria as regards corruption and governance issues and below is a chart showing corruption perception rating of Nigerian and Ghana.

**Figure 5:2: A Chart showing Corruption Perception index of Nigeria and Ghana.**

![COMPARATIVE CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX BETWEEN NIGERIA AND GHANA 2003-2013](chart.png)

Source: adapted from Transparency International (2014) and compiled by the author.
From the above chart, Nigeria has not fared well in Transparency international rating as regards corruption, accountability and transparency issues. Although this does not presume that Ghana is corrupt free, rather, its show that it has fared better than Nigeria. Nigeria is always ranked on the high side and above 120% while Ghana has not exceed 70% in the rating. The Corruption perception index graph of Nigeria and Ghana from 2003-2013 compiled above is better explained with a Scatter diagram presented below

Figure 5.3: A Scatter Chart Showing the Trend Pattern of Corruption perception index Between Nigeria and Ghana.

From the Chart above, the perception of corruption in Ghana has not gone above 80% while that of Nigeria is almost 160%. The perception of corruption in Nigeria is two times that of Ghana.

Although writers like Thompson & Shah (2005) have criticized Transparency International corruption ratings, questioning its criteria, views and methodology, however, it is a strong yardstick for measuring the accountability and transparency level of states like Nigeria and Ghana. According to Kawsau (2013) Corruption in its popular conception is defined as the exploitation of public position, resources and power for private or selfish gain. For instance, Dobel (1978) defined corruption as the betrayal of public trust for individual or group gain. In a
similar vein, Obayelu (2007) identifies it as efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means for private gain at public expense, or a misuse of public power for private benefits. As noted by Kwasau (2013):

Corruption scandal in the oil sector totaling N1.7 trillion from 1999-2011, Police Pension Fund of N18 billion as well as the James Ibori N450 billion corruption case of money laundering in London is just the tip of an iceberg as far as corruption is concern in Nigeria (2013:184).

In similar vein, Ogundiya (2010) asserted that corruption has greatly eroded the fundamental values of democracy and the essential principle that government should be representative and accountable to the citizens and he argues that it is not only responsible for the prebendel, patrimonial and cliental politics but also accounts for the fragility and volatility of democracy in Nigeria.

However, despite the giant strides achieved by Ghana on the corruption perception index from 2003-2012, it is not free from corruption for according to Ghana Integrity Initiative Survey of 2005, 92.5 percent of urban households in southern Ghana believed corruption to be prevalent in the country. the resignation, prosecution and convictions of top politicians like George Sipa-Yankey and Seidu Amadu shows Ghana is improving its fight against corruption (Gayimab-Boadi, 2013). Although pockets of corruption exist in Ghana, it is not as perverse like the case of Nigeria where since 2003 to 2013, cases of corruption abound for according to Human Rights Watch Reports (2007) it is estimated that Nigeria lost a minimum average of $4 billion to $8 billion per year to corruption over the eight years of the Obasanjo administration and that figure would equal between 4.25% and 9.5% of Nigeria’s total GDP in 2006. To put those numbers in perspective, a loss of 9.5% of the United States’ GDP to corruption in 2006 would have
translated into $1.25 trillion in stolen funds or $222 billion (GBP 108.6 billion) in the case of the United Kingdom’s economy according to the reports.

The claim by Majeed (2011) that CSOs in Ghana have done better than their Nigerian counterparts in terms of good governance is misleading. The argument here is that, there is need to note that the effectiveness of civil society organizations is determined by the nature and character of the state, therefore, the high level of prebendel, patrimonial and cliental politics that is inherent in the nature and character of Nigerian ruling class who engaged in primitive accumulation of the highest order tend to make transparency and accountability which are the roles of CSOs in Nigeria as regards good governance highly impossible. In similar vein, Anthony & Chukwuma (2013) saw it as the characteristics of state in the post-colonial era because the dominant class usually control and translate political power into the means of accumulating for themselves the wealth and resources of the state. While we have National bourgeoisie in Ghana who tended to make capital circulate, the reverse is the case in Nigeria, a state populated by comprador bourgeoisie who prey on the fortunes of the Nigerian state by engaging in Capital flight. The subsidy probe and the discovery of over 18 oil Companies that defrauded the Nigerian Government over 1.7 trillion from 1999-2011 coupled with the alleged bribing of the chairman of the probe committee, Hon. Faruok Lawal with $620, 000 being a part payment of 1.3 million for clearance by Femi Otedola, the Chairman of Zenon Oil and Gas Limited which led to the end of the case lay credence to the above assertion (Nigerian Tribune, Friday 22\textsuperscript{nd}, June, 2012: 1-2).

In all, the difference between Nigeria and Ghana as regards transparency, accountability and corruption is not a function of CSOs; rather it is hinged on the tapestry of the Nigerian State. In other words, the exploitative and primitive accumulative tendencies inherent in the nature and
character of the Nigerian state are accountable for such observed differences. And that CSOs like their counterparts in Ghana are doing their best to hold government accountable and make them transparent. The Fuel Subsidy protest of 2011 in Nigeria and commercialization of water protest of 2004 in Ghana are one too many of their roles in making government accountable and responsible in both states.

**High/low Premium Place on Ethno-Religious Factors in Politics and High/Low rate of Conflict in Nigeria and Ghana.**

To be exact, Nigeria and Ghana do share similar tapestry in terms of regional, ethnic and religious dichotomies that have manifested virulent in both states. For Ghana is politically divided into Southern and Northern region, with over 100 recorded ethnic groups with Akan, Mole-Dagbon and Ewe constituting the three major ethnic groups, also, the population is divided along religious lines and it is between Christianity, Islam and African traditional religion. Nigeria is no different because it is politically divided into southern and northern region, populated by over 300 diverse ethnic groups that are also divided on religious affiliations with Christianity, Islam and African traditional religion being the three main religions (USAID-Ghana, 2013; USAID-Nigeria, 2013).

However, Nigeria have witnessed plethora of ethno-religious conflicts that is rooted in the politics of who get what, when and how than Ghana despite the similarities in socio-cultural affinities in both states. According to Ikejiani-Clark (2005) over the years, many events in Nigeria have led to the politicization of mistrust, intolerance, violence and acrimonious relations between the mainly Moslem north and the Christian south of Nigeria. This is in tandem with the view of Salawu (2010) who posted that the major cause of what we now see as ethnic-religious conflicts in Nigeria has to do with the accusation and allegations of neglect, oppression,
domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry which are rooted in the nature and character. Ethnic and religious affiliations determine who gets what in Nigeria; it is so central and seems to perpetuate the virulent conflict witnessed in the Nigerian state. The Boko Haram crisis which is one of the many ethno–religious/political crisis that started in 2009 has claimed over 1,600 lives in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Since 2003-2012, no widespread ethno-religious violence has occurred in Ghana but there are pocket of ethnic strife like the Fantes and Ewes clash in 2012 but was put to a stop by the government (Mahama, 2013).

The differences in the level of conflicts in both states have also been attributed to the effectiveness of CSOs in resolving conflicts in Ghana than their counterparts in Nigeria. Majeed (2011) in particular posited that the ethnic compositions of most CSOs in Nigeria have contributed greatly to their inability to consolidate democracy. He cited the existence of powerful groups like Arewa Consultative Forum, Ijaw Youth Council, Egbe Afenifere, Ohaneze Ndigbo, among others who tend to protect the interest of their members even at the detriment of democracy to buttress his point. To some extent, this view is not correct because the absence of ethnic based CSOs is not the reason for the low level of ethno-religious conflicts recorded in Ghana rather it is the inability of the ruling class to violently and forcefully manipulate and reinforce ethno-religious dichotomies in the acquisition, consolidation and demonstration of power or in other words, it is their ability to manage such differences within a cordial and peaceful framework that account for the low level of ethno-religious violence in Ghana.

This does not presuppose that the dynamics of ethno religious cleavages does not manifest in Ghana because according to Abdulahi (2009) the 2004 general elections in Ghana showed that NPP won majority of the seats in all five Akan regions of Ashanti, Borong Ahafo
Central, Eastern and Western (90 as against NDC’s 39) while the NDC won four of the non-
Akan regions of Northern, Upper East, Upper West and Volta (56 compared to NPP’s 12). This
corroborated the views of Commonwealth election reports of 2012 election in Ghana that
political parties have their strongholds in the domain of different ethnic groups (NPP and Akan
group, NDC and non-Akan groups) yet Ghana has not witnessed widespread ethno-religious
conflict.

Nigeria on the other hand is a hot bed or cease pool of ethno religious violence that have
political undertones. And according to the Norwegian Refugee council (2013) over one million,
six hundred thousand Nigerians are displaced as a result of ethno religious violence. And the
genesis of such violent conflicts according to scholars such as Eliagwu, (2005), Best (2007),
Alubo (2008), among others is traced to the struggle for socio-economic well being among
various groups manipulated by the ruling class. And this violent struggle is rooted in the nature
and character of the Nigerian state. The table below is a comparative analysis of Nigeria and
Ghana.

Table 5.1: A Tabular Presentation of Nigeria and Ghana in Comparative Perspective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Areas of Similarities and Differences</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Located in west Africa bordering Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Togo, current population is over 170 million, with over 300 ethnic groups but the major ones are Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. Muslims contains 50% of the population, Christians are 48% while the rest is shared between other religions. National capital is Abuja.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Practice a parliamentary system after independence in 1960. Followed by alternating military and civilian regimes. Returned to presidential system of Government in 1999. Nigeria is politically divided into southern and northern but administratively divided into 36 states, with 774 local governments. Has a independent Judiciary with National house of Assembly and runs a multi-party democray with PDP and APC being the major political parties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Nigeria is blessed with abundant Natural resources like Gold, Bauxite, Natural Gas and Oil. Oil is it major source of revenue. It also export agricultural product like Cassava, Cocoa and Groundnut. Its Current GPD per capital is 2,800.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Located in West Africa bordering Cote d’Ivoire and Togo, current population of Ghana is over 22 million with over 100 ethnic groups but the major ones are Akan, Ewe, Mole-Dagbon. Muslims contains 14% of the population, Christians are 75% while the rest is shared between other religions. its National capital is Accra. Operated a parliamentary system of government in 1975, followed by alternating military and civilian regimes. After 1992 it now runs a presidential and parliamentary system of government. Ghana is politically divided into southern and northern regions but administratively divided into 10 regions with 110 District Assembly. Has independent Judiciary. Runs a multi-party democracy with the NPP and NDC being the Major political parties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana is blessed with abundant Natural resources like Gold, Oil, Natural gas, Diamond, Bauxite. Gold was it major source of income before oil was discovered in commercial quantity in 2007. It is also a major export of Agricultural products like Cocoa, Timber, Shea nuts Bananas. Its current GDP per capital is $ 1,400.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted From CIA World Fact Book (2014) and Compiled by the Author.

From the table above, it is evident and crystal clear that Nigeria and Ghana do share certain similarities and differences. However, the nature and character of the Nigeria state have made it difficult to consolidate democracy particularly, the Nigerian ruling class with their predatory and parasitic approach to acquire, consolidate and demonstrate state powers in order to manifest their
prebendel, patrimonial and cliental politics have manipulated ethno-religious identities. This is in contrast with their counterpart in Ghana. This has frustrated the effort of CSOs in Nigeria while giving room for CSOs to function in Ghana. In the Light of the above, we accept and validate our second hypothesis which states that the character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounted for the differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary

The study examined some empirical indices and indicators of the roles of CSOs in the process of democratic consolidation with particular reference to Nigeria and Ghana. Also, it investigated factors that account for the difference in democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana from 2003-2013. To adequately interrogate the problem under study, the study was divided into six chapters. Chapter one historicized and problematized the study while looking at it empirical and theoretical significances. However, inferring from our broad objective above, we outlined some specific objectives which were:

1. To ascertain if the existence of CSOs contribute to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.

2. Determine if the character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounts for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states.

Therefore, using our specific objective as a guide and frame work, the following research questions were posed:

1. Does the existence of CSOs contribute to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana?

2. Does the character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounts for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states?

The above research questions thematically, guided the review of pertinent extant literatures on the study in chapter two. The empirical, classical and conceptual views of scholars on themes associated with civil society organizations and democratic consolidation were examined and

However, chapter three looked at the methodological approach employed in the study. The study adopted the analytic framework of Neo-Marxian theory of post-colonial states as expounded by scholars such as (1972) Alavi, (1973); Ake, (1985); Ekekwe, (1986), among others. The central focus of the theory is on understanding the nature, structure, history, composition and character of the post-colonial states (Nigerian and Ghanaian) in order to ascertain the dynamics of political development and processes within the state and this dynamics include CSOs and democratic consolidation with their various manifestations. The researcher choice of this theory as a tool for analysis is informed by its ability to interrogate properly political phenomenon and their dynamics and various manifestations in African states. Furthermore, through the use of this analytic framework, we go beyond the present to historicize in broad perspectives current challenges bedeviling the African states which are left over’s and hang over’s of colonialism.
In addition, the Neo-Marxian theory of post-colonial state as a tool for analysis helped us to understand and explain the reality of CSOs and democratic consolidation. It portrays the never-ending struggle among CSOs and democratic consolidation on one hand and the vicious nature and character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states on the other, while both of them are creatures of colonialism they are characterized by triumph of the vicious over the virtuous circle; centralization of power; imposition of domination and political control; alienation of leaders from their masses; and the deployment of extremism in the exercise of power which are threat to democracy.

The hypotheses adduced from our research questions in order to arrive at a satisfactory answer to our research questions include:

1. The existence of CSOs contributed to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.
2. The character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states accounted for differences in the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in both states.

This study adopted the single-case _ex-post facto_ design which is also known as ‘after-the-fact’ design. And is based on the examination of independent and dependent variables after the events have occurred and the data are already in existence The qualitative method of data collection was employed in the study, relying on secondary sources of data such as text books, journals, official publications, seminars, conference and workshop papers, magazines, newspapers, among others. The descriptive qualitative method of data analysis was adopted to give descriptive explanations or interpretations to tables and figures in our study and to demonstrate the validity and reliability of the findings of this study.
Moreover, in chapter four, we tested our first hypothesis which showed that CSOs have has constantly battled the dynamics and manifestations inherent in the nature and character of the Nigeria and Ghanaian states in the process of consolidating democracy, that from 2003-2013 CSOs have performed roles like monitoring of elections, participated in educating voters and candidates on the electoral process, contended against democratic threats, kicked against anti-peoples policy, held government accountable, among others which are very central to the consolidation of democracy against the backdrop of a rampant and vicious nature and character of both states. The relationship between CSOs in the process of democratic consolidation and the Nigerian and Ghanaian states is characterized by virulent contestations.

Again, in Chapter five, we x-rayed our second hypothesis which showed that the differences in democratic consolidation in both states as regards peaceful elections in Ghana which has led to alternation of powers between the two major political parties, that has been attributed to the vibrancy of Ghanaian CSOs is not only false but misleading because they too suffer from the plethora of problems facing CSOs in post-colonial states which are communication gap, lack of personnel, lack of state support, corruption, lack of unity, among others. That the laudable achievements in democratic consolidation recorded by Ghana as regards peaceful periodic, free and fair election is tied to the nature and character of the ruling elites in Ghana because of how nationalistic and patriotic they are.

Lastly, in chapter six we dealt with the summary of the study, which is an overview or a sum total of the study. The study also contains conclusion which discussed the findings of the study. Some recommendations were given at the end of this chapter which includes actions programmes and policies which if taken will ultimately enhance CSOs and democratic consolidation in both states.
Conclusion

In this study, we have evaluated CSOs and their contributions to democratic process in Nigeria and Ghana from 2003-2013 and examined factor responsible for the observable differences in the roles of CSOs in the process of democratic consolidation in both states. The study found out that CSOs have played significant roles in the strengthening of democracy despite the vicious nature and character of both states. The roles include election monitoring, rights protection and advocacy, influencing public policy, holding government accountable, among others.

In addition, the study tried to posit that factors like Communication gap, ethnicity, lack of unity, corruption, lack of fund, suspicion between and among CSOs, lack of state support, lack of access to information, control from foreign donor agency, leadership tussle in CSOs, among others, are all problems bedeviling CSOs not only in Nigeria and Ghana but in all post colonial states. Meaning that the nature and character of the states determine how effective and efficient CSOs can contribute towards democratic consolidation.

Finally, the study attempted to uncover and unravel the underlying factor responsible for the observable difference in democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana as regards free and fair elections, ethno-religious and political conflicts. These conflicts in most cases, if not all, are rooted in the dynamics and manifestations associated with the acquisition, consolidation and demonstration of state powers in Nigeria. Therefore, the study uncovers a glaring reality that despite similar socio cultural tapestry and historical trajectory between Nigeria and Ghana, democracy has evolved and consolidated more in Ghana as a result of the patriotic and nationalistic nature and character of its ruling class. On the basis of the analysis above we state the following findings
i. Civil society organizations exist and have immensely contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana despite the vicious nature and character of both states which are legacies of colonialism.

ii. Civil society in Nigeria and Ghana are battling with problems of lack of fund, corruption, communication gap, suspicion among and between CSOs and the state, lack of state support, ethnicity, accountability, internal rancor, among others.

iii. The difference in the character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states to a very large extent influences the contribution of CSOs to democratic consolidation. That while the ruling class to an extent in Ghana are nationalistic and patriotic, the Nigeria ruling class are parasitic and predatory. To this end negates CSOs effort at consolidating democracy in Nigeria.

Recommendations

In the light of the above findings of the study, the following recommendations are put forward to the policy makers in Nigeria and Ghana for implementation by states (judiciary legislative and executive) government, donor agencies, researchers, stakeholders and civil society organizations:

- CSOs are very central to the strengthening of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana and at such should be encouraged by the government of both states and such encouragement should be in the form of funding them, making laws to protect them, taking their inputs in policy formulation and implementation process, not harassing CSOs in the course of their legitimate duty like election monitoring, registering their displeasure against government policies through protest, among others.
• That the difference in democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana is not just a function of CSOs but the willingness of ruling class to imbibe the tenets of democracy in Ghana and therefore the Nigerian ruling class should turn a new leaf by imbibing such tenets of democracy like free and fair elections, presence of vibrant opposition, independent electoral body, among others.

• The Ghanaian government despite recorded democratic achievements should be careful and watchful against democratic rollback as regards the proclivity of politicians to manipulate ethnic and religious cleavages in order to acquire, consolidate and demonstrate power. The first and the second wave of democratization in Ghana coupled with the heated ethno religious conflicts in neighboring countries should always serve as a constant reminder to the Ghanaian ruling class.

• The Nigerian and Ghanaian government should put in more effort in fighting corruption, being accountable, transparent and open to checks from CSOs. Especially in Nigeria were corruptions have permeated the entire fabric of the Nigerian society, the bulk lies in the responsibility of the government to open up to the scrutiny of CSOs and not see them as opponents.

• The Nigerian government should endeavor not to place high premium on the acquisition of power by all means and that the manipulation of ethno-religious cleavages to acquire power should be discouraged. Sanitizations and orientations programs can be created to disabuse the minds of such politicians and this can be done through the help of CSOs that are created and placed to educate politicians against such practices.

• Give the roles of CSOs in deepening democracy in both states, Donor agencies should do more by training, funding and providing the necessary logistic in order to enhance the
performance of CSOs towards democratic consolidation. Although donor agencies have contributed to the successes recorded by CSOs in Nigeria and Ghana but giving CSOs strategic importance towards democratic consolidation, more should be done.

- As a result of the roles of CSOs in consolidating democracy in Nigeria and Ghana, CSOs stakeholders in both states should also endeavor to acquire more skills and techniques on how to engage the state. They should also put in more time in being accountable, avoid internal rancor, have local presence, shun partisan politics and frown at ethno-religious divisions.

- More studies should be undertaken by scholars and researchers on CSOs and democratic consolidation. Areas like how the nascency/longevity of democracy affect it consolidation can be interrogated using Nigeria, South Africa or even Ghana as case studies. Issues like mass media and CSOs in the process of democratic consolidation should also be examined. Also the use of protest by CSOs as an effective means to engage the state should be analyzed. These are areas for further study which any researcher with strong bias in CSOs and democratic consolidation should critically consider.

The above recommendations if taken into cognizance and implemented will not only go a long way in improving the performance of CSOs but will also fast track the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana.
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OTHER ARTICLES


Appendix A

Political Map of Nigeria

Appendix B

Political Map of Ghana